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The main objective of this study is to search, using both 
theoretical analysis and empirical evidence for the European 
case, for the strategy to be followed for the creation of a 
monetary union among a group of countries, and to derive the 
conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to make such a 
strategy viable. 
The theoretical foundations for the creation of a monetary 
union are set out. The European realities suggest gradualistic 
approaches. Theoretical analysis of the strategy of economic 
policy coordination takes place in terms of all of the above 
considerations. Analysis then follows on the extent to which 
this strategy, implemented in Europe since the early seventies, 
has been successful. Finally, in the light of this analysis 
and analysis of other proposals, a conclusion is reached on 
which should be the preferred strategy, and how it should be 
established successfully. 
The move towards exchange rate fixity has implications for 
members' objectives and policies. The European arrangements 
were inadequate and did not pay sufficient attention to import-
ant issues which remained unsolved. Economic discipline was 
not forced and members' objectives diverged considerably. Poli-
cies did not depict any coordination pattern. As a result the 
1972 intra-European exchange rate arrangements failed. Other 
undesirable implications also followed. 
Policy coordination still seems to be the preferable approach 
provided that important changes take place, and measures to even-
tually develop centralisation are taken. 
The decision to create a European monetary system is judged 
in view of these conclusions. Major weaknesses remain and the 
system's ability to guarantee long-run stability is questioned. 
Important changes are necessary for the Community to em~ark on 
·l 
the path to a monetary union. Indications are not encouraging, 
uhile important obstacles to the changes remain. 
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PREFACE 
The main objective of this study is to look for the way to 
move towards the creation of a monetary union in Europe. That 
is to search, on the basis of both theoretical analysis and 
empirical evidence for the case of Europe, for the strategy to 
be followed for the creation of a monetary union among a group 
of countries, and to derive the conditions which have to be 
fulfilled in order to make such a strategy viable. Theoretical 
analysis of the strategy of economic policy coordination takes 
place in terms of these considerations. Analysis then follows 
on the extent to which this strategy, implemented in the 
European Community since the early seventies, has been success-
ful. Finally, in the light of both theoretical and empirical 
analysis and analysis on other proposals a conclusion is reached 
on which should be the way, and what might have to be done to 
establish it successfully in order to move towards a European 
Monetary Union. 
The study is divided into three parts: 
The first part, chapters one to three, attempts to set out 
the theoretical underpinnings for the creation of.a monetary 
union. It answers questions like what is a monetary union, 
why it may be desirable among a group of countries and how to 
move towards its creation. The political realities in Europe 
lead to the necessity of choosing strategies based on gradual-
ism. The policy coordination strategy is one such strategy, 
and the one chosen for the case of Europe. One has therefore 
to analyse both what such a strategy implies in terms of mem-
bers' objectives, and policies that have to be followed for 
that purpose. 
The second part, chapters four to six, presents the empirical 
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analysis of the case of the 1972 European exchange rate arrange-
ments, whose ultimate goal was the creation of a monetary union 
by 1980. 
Firstly the extent to which the decisions taken were approp-
riate and sufficient, and the prospects of success are analysed. 
Secondly, it is examined whether the implementation of the 
exchange rate scheme was successful, i.e. to what extent mem-
bers followed consistent policies and achieved the level of 
objectives that would guarantee that level of nominal exchange 
rate fixity among them which would bring forth the expected 
benefits. 
The third part, chapters seven and eight, refers mainly to 
the future prospects of a monetary union in Europe. Given the 
earlier theoretical and empirical analysis, it attempts to 
answer the question of whether the coordination strategy is 
the most preferable way to move towards nominal exchange rate 
fixity among a group of countries or whether other gradualistic 
approaches should be chosen. Specifically it deals with the 
Manifesto approach based on the introduction of an inflation 
proofed common parallel currency, to eventually replace all 
national member currencies under the market forces process. 
Then in the light of this and all previous analyses, the new 
European exchange rate arrangements of December 5, 1978, are 
analysed. The extent to which they were appropriate and suf-
ficient and avoided possible mistakes of the past is discussed. 
Analysis of the as yet short period of the implementation of 
the European monetary system follows, and conclusions are drawn. 
finally general concluding remarks from all above analyses fol-
low with respect to the future of a monetary union in Europe. 
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The content of individual chapters is as follo~s: 
Chapter one deals with the derivation of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a monetary union. The necessary 
conditions refer to the main components of a monetary union. 
The establishment of the sufficient conditions goes beyond 
this usual interpretation of a monetary union. They are derived 
out of theoretical analyses which try to establish the approp-
riate policy mix in open .economies under fixed exchange rates, 
combined with what is happening in the real world. Many of 
these points will be analysed in more depth and consolidated 
in the following chapters. 
Chapter two analyses the various approaches to the deter~ 
mination of the appropriate domain of a monetary union, based 
both on the traditional single criterion approach and the costs 
versus benefits approach. Then it applies them for the case of 
the European Community. Conclusions are drawn on the extent to 
which the latter could constitute a desirable monetary union. 
The degree of economic interdependence among the European 
Community members and also between them and the United States 
of America is analysed here because of its relevance to the 
above question, and since it emphasises - given its implications -
policy cooperation among a group of interdependent countries. 
Economic interdependence here does not rely exclusively on 
import and export shares. Capital transactions among members 
are also analysed. The analysis attempts also to examine the 
extent to which economic fluctuations are transmitted among 
member countries through interdependence and the extent to 
which they underline common policies to be followed among the 
interdependent members. 
Chapter three has a threefold purpose. Firstly, it analyses 
the concepts' of internal and external balance for a single 
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country and for a monetary union. Then it shows that when 
moving to form a monetary union, through the policy coordination 
strategy, the main objective refers to the external balance of 
each member. Secondly, given the necessity of compatible 
external balance situations among members, it analyses the 
determinants of the external balance, and hence the exchange 
rate, both in the long-run and in the short-run. Thirdly, 
based on these determinants, it outlines the policies that 
members have to follow in order to achieve external balance 
compatibility. The importance of inflation as the major long-
run determinant leads to the analysis of inflation, and the 
potential implications stemming from achieving inflation simil-
arity among members. 
Chapter four begins by analysing the implications that the 
policy coordination approach entails in terms of the members' 
monetary and fiscal policies. Then it analyses the 1972 
arrangements for economic and monetary union in Europe and 
examines whether they were sufficiently sound to bring forth 
a successful monetary union in the European Community at that 
time. The difficulties encountered in the coordination approach 
for the case of the European Community, and the modifications 
in the strategy required for the transitory stages to the mon-
etary union are analysed. It also deals with other important 
implications stemming directly from these arrangements beyond 
the general ones analysed in earlier chapters. 
Chapter five deals uith part of the empirical analysis of 
the Snake period, in the light of what uas stressed in the 
previous four chapters. Three major factors would contribute 
to the success of the venture: firstly, policy coordination, 
including the process by which it ~ould be achieved, would 
harmonise members' objectives and render exchange rates fixed 
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among them. Secondly, abolition of exchange controls would 
bring forth a necessary ingredient of the monetary union, 
namely currency convertibility. Progress on this matter would 
also facilitate the coordination and unification process, keep-
ing in mind the automatic adjustment that could take place 
between regions through factor mobility and the fact that fin-
ancial market integration within the European Community would 
make supply and demand pressures in any individual country 
spread to other national markets. Interdependence would rise, 
as would the inevitability of members following more dependent 
and hence more coordinated policies among themselves. Thirdly, 
an effective regional policy would, in certain cases, be neces-
sary within the coordination strategy for monetary unification. 
By analysing the progress made in these factors one could come 
to conclusions regarding the degree of success of the European 
exchange rate arrangements implemented on April 24, 1972. The 
evolution of members' exchange rates and the degree of jOint 
fluctuation are analysed both in the long-run and in the short-
run. Then analysis concentrates on the coordination achieved 
both on the long-run and short-run determinants of exchange 
rates among the members. Attention is paid to national inter-
nal and external balance objectives as well as to the instru-
ments and targets which bring forth the desired evolution in 
these objectives. Analysis of the short-run determinants is 
based on the asset market equilibrium approach and its implica-
tions for policy variables. Interest rate differentials both 
covered and uncovered are analysed. further, given the import-
ance of expectations and the necessity of predictability and 
stability of policy variables, the performance of the latter 
is analysed. Attention is also paid to uncertainty and risk, 
the effects of destabilising speculation as well as those of 
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non-monetary shocks, both internal and external. It uas 
stressed in the previous chapters that, given the incomplete 
effectiveness of policy coordination during the transitional 
stages to a complete monetary union, intervention would also 
be needed to contribute to maintaining the exchange rate 
arrangements. What is more, it should be of a non-sterilizing 
nature. Econometric analysis is undertaken in order to detect 
the extent to which national monetary authorities implemented 
this rule. Regression analysis under ordinary and two-stage 
least squares, based on a reduced form of a macroeconomic 
model, is used to analyse international capital movements for 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany. Turn-
ing to convertibility and financial market integration, the 
progress of capital control dismantling is assessed, as is 
uhat has to be done for free capital mobility to be established 
uithin the European Community. Financial market integration is 
analysed in terms of the concept that focuses on interest rates 
in various countries. The analysis takes the form of examining 
levels of interest rates as uell as econometric testing of the 
interest parity theory. Finally the effectiveness of the 
implemented regional policy is analysed. The reasons for its 
inadequacy are stressed as uell as the changes that are required, 
if it is to play the expected role in facilitating progress on 
monetary integration. The chapter ends with an assessment of 
the willingness of members to follow "European" policies. 
Chapter six analyses firstly the main disadvantages for 
which the fixed exchange rate system has been criticised, spec-
ifically those of the burden of policy adjustment and delayed 
parity realignments. Analysis concentrates on the extent to 
which Snake participants shared equally the burden of establish-
ing compatible external balance situations, or whether it was 
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a certain group of them that bore most of the adjustment burden. 
Also it analyses the extent to which members adjusted acequately 
and whether Snake stability was kept by other means. Further, 
given the economic realities in Europe, parity realignments 
could not be excluded during the transitory stage. we examine 
whether the parity realignments implemented were timely and 
what might have to be done towards this end. Both of the above 
questions are also considered for the case where all major 
members participate in the Snake; whether they would make 
thinks easier or more difficult during the transitory stages 
to the monetary union. Then the implicatio~s of the absence 
of a joint external exchange rate policy are analysed,i.e. 
what members should do to establish such a policy as well as 
what would have to be done on a world basis given that European 
stability cannot be achieved or guaranteed in the absence of 
world stability. Final conclusions stemming from the Snake 
period follow. 
Chapter seven proceeds to deal with the various strategies 
which exist for the creation of a monetary union in the EEC. 
The Coordination strategy and the Centralisation strategy are 
compared with the Coordination-cum-Centralisation strategy. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each strategy are analysed 
and conclusions are drawn regarcing the strategy to be adopted 
for the gradual creation of a monetary union in the EEC. 
Chapter eight refers to the European monetary system. The 
factors that led to its creation, and the soudness and adequacy 
of the arrangements are analysed. To what extent they took into 
account crucial issues which had remained unsolved in the past 
and which contributed to the failure of the 1972 exchange rate 
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arrangements are dealt with. Such issues would greatly deter-
mine the degree of suocess of this new venture. New i~plica­
tions are also an~lysed stemming from the decision to create in 
the future a European Monetary Fund, and to develop the European 
Currency Unit. These implications mainly refer to the relation 
between the European monetary system and the international mon-
etary system. Analysis of the early stages of the functioning 
of the European monetary system follows, concentrating on the 
extent to which coordination and other crucial issues developed 
to bring forth exchange rate stability among the members of the 
European monetary system, indicating the degree of success of 
the system 
Chapter nine aims first~, to state the thesis and secondly, 
to relate the analysis contained in the preceeding chapters to 
the conclusions reached. 
The various strategies,which were derived for the creation of 
a. monetary unionin the EEC,are considered and the strategy which 
the EEC members should follow is proposed, as well as the 
conditions which have to be fullfilled during the monetary 
integration process. 
Then,it refers to the analysis on which the thesis is based. 
Firstly, it deals with the theory which isrelevant for the 
monetary integration process,and analyses the policies which 
members have to follow under the various strategies. Secondly, 
it analyses the implementation of the EEC exchange rate 
arrangements, which were based on the coordination strategy, and 
examines the ability of this strategy to leadto a monetary union 
in the EEC. Thirdly,it deals with the ability of the centralisation 
strategy to lead to a monetary union.Finally, it analyses why the 
coordination-cum-centralisation strategy should be preferred to the 
other strategies available. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER ONE ON THE DEfINITION Of THE MONETARY UNION 
1.!!.. .!h~ !!e!n.!noS ~f_M~n~tar.l .!nte,.2r,!!tio,!! 
Corden (1972) in his comprehensive essay, asserts that 
monetary integration has two components. (a) The exchange rate 
union, an area within which exchange rates bear a permanently 
fixed relationship to each other, even though in ~nison, ~hey may 
vary relative to non-union countries(1), and (b) currency 
convertibility, that is the permanent absence of exchange 
controls for both current and capital transactions within the 
area. While (a) is required to promote free trade among the 
union members, (b) is related to free factor mobility and is 
the principal element of capital market integration - a unified 
capital market free of capital movement restrictions - within 
the union. The latter is necessary in a monetary union, not 
in customs unions or free trade areas. 
MI takes place when the exchange rate union is combined 
with capital market integration. 
Although this seems to be the usual interpretation of MI, 
it does not establish sufficient conditions of an MU. 
1.8. Requirements for Monetary Integration 
-------------------
1.8.a. Implications for National Monetary Independence 
------------------------
In order to derive further requirements that an MU 
necessitates, one should firstly go to earlier contributions 
which tried to establish the appropriate policy mix in open 
economies with fixed exchange rates. The initial efforts are 
attributed to Mundell (1968) who produced two main results, one 
in comparative statics and one in dynamics. The former was the 
relative superiority of monetary policy in achieving external 
policy aims; while both fiscal and monetary policy _ represented 
by the budget surplus or deficit and the level of interest rates 
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respectively - may help to match demand and supply in domestic 
markets and to balance the current account, monetary policy 
has, through its impact on capital flows, an additional effect 
on the overall external balance. The dynamic corollary of this 
was the principle of effective market classification: in a 
system without centralised simultaneous decision making with 
respect to both instruments, an optimum would nevertheless be 
approximated by assigning each to the target on which it has a 
comparative advantage i.e. monetary policy to the XB target. 
However, subsequent work by Mundell (1971) and Swoboda (1972) 
(1973), while retaining this basic conclusion, underlines its 
very short-run nature(2). This work has also moved to clarify 
the conditions under which monetary policy in the longer run 
has external effects only. This analysis is summarised by the 
proposition that) in an open economyJa once and for all change 
in the domestic assets of the central bank - through open market 
operations or changes to lending in private banks - alters the 
equilibrium value of the domestic national money stock in 
proportion to the size of the country in the world economy. The 
process equalises the relative changes in money stocks and price 
levels between countries. This conclusion relies on three basic 
assumptions: (a) that the economic system is stable, (b) that a 
domestic credit expansion tends to generate an external deficit, 
and (c) that such deficit reduces the domestic money supply. 
The third assumption does not hold in reserve currency countries, 
or in economies where automatic sterilization operations are 
undertaken. But this leaves a wide area of applicability for 
the model. The proposition in its extreme simplicity does not 
rely on the existence of capital movements sensitive to changes 
in relative monetary conditions between countries. IndeedJthe 
process will take place in their absence. But the speed of 
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adjustment to the new equilibrium will be faster the greater 
the sensitivity of capital movements and the share of traded 
goods in total demand. While the above proposition is one of 
comparative statics) similar results have been derived in 
comparative dynamics, see Mundell (1971), Thygesen (1973). An 
acceleration in DeE does not sustain a parallel acceleration in 
money stock; a convergence of growth rates of the latter and of 
inflation rates is assured through the redistribution of inter-
national reserves. 
It can be seen that exchange rate fixity coupled with 
capital market integration in a group of countries) could deprive 
each of them of using monetary policy for domestic stabilisation 
purposes. Monetary independence is lost. The influence of 
high capital mobility necessitates the level of domestic 
money supply that satisfies XE. Authorities, by losing the 
ability to achieve quasi-equilibrium external targets, have lost 
the instrument of using monetary policy for pursuing the level 
of internal objectives they want, unless at the level of XE 
internal objectives are achieved too. Attempts by the 
authorities to change their national money supply under 
conditions of perfect capital mobility - common interest rate 
within the union - would affect capital inflows and outflows) 
while money supply would remain unchanged. 
An MU is defined as the area where exchange rates are fixed 
among members, with no fluctuation margins, and capital market 
integration has taken place. This then implies loss of national 
monetary policy independence. Monetary policy is carried out 
at the union level. 
It has been suggested that if either flexible exchange 
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rates or controls are introduced)the constraint on national 
monetary policy no longer applies. The strength of monetary 
policy will be enhanced and that of fiscal policy will be 
completely emasculated, see Mundell (1963), Tower-Willet (1976). 
However the validity of such a proposition may be questioned 
if one is to adapt the Mundell model in the economic realities 
of the seventies and especially to the case of SOEs. Mundell's 
proposition about the impotence of monetary policy under fixed 
exchange rates, does not seem open to question. Unless capital 
mobility can be prevented in some waYJ it will be impossible to 
get control over nominal money supply. His results)howeve~ 
have been recently questioned by Niehans (1975), Turnovsky and 
Kingston (1977) and Casas (1978), among others. An argument 
against the Mundell model taken from Kelleher and McCarthy (1978) 
runs as follows: 
The original Mundell model may be ~ritten; 
E (V,r) + G + 8 (V,TI) = V 
-M = L (V, F) 
(1) and (2) determine V and IT 
where E = domestic expenditure, V = output, G = government 
spending, B = trade surplus, r = interest rate, II = exchange 
rate, M = money stock. 
But V can be determined by (2) above, since it is the only 
endogenous variable. The model is recursive, ~ith the value 
of V determined by the money market feeding into the goods 
market to determine II. The money and fiscal multipliers are: 
dV/dM = 1/Ly and dV/dG = 0 (3) 
Ly is the income slope of the demand for money function. 
Results in (3) are the standard Mundell results and are used to 
demonstrate the potency of monetary policy under flexible 
exchange rates. However an objection to Mundell's model is 
\1 
! 
.1 , 
- 5 -
that for an SOE it is hardly reasonable to assume both a 
flexible exchange rate and a rigid price level, except in the ~ 
very short run. If we let prices vary with the product of the 
world price level and the exchange rate, an SOE assumption more 
in line with the other assumptions on which the model relies, 
we get an augmented model of the form: 
- (4) P = !T.PIJ 
(V,r) - + B (V) (5) E = + G = V 
M/P = L (V,F) (6) 
where P = domestic price level and PIJ = world prices 
(4) is the 50E price-taker assumption. (5) is identical to (1) 
except that IT has been deleted from the trade function - with 
prices also flexible this would no longer make sense. (6) is 
the demand for real balances. 
These alterations, which seem more consistent with an 50E, 
reverse policy conclusions. Output is completely determined in 
the goods market and the exchange rate is determined in the 
money market so: 
dV/dG = 1/(1-Ey-By) and dV/dM = 0 (7) 
which are the same standard results as under fixed exchange 
rates. Monetary policy therefore is ineffective under either 
regime for domestic stabilisation purposes. 
The writers above deal also with such additional questions 
as the role of expectations, the wealth constraint, the 
government's budget constraint, the role of interest rates, 
capital accumulation, among others. They conclude that Mundell's 
flexible exchange rate conclusions are questionable. When an 
SOE moves from flexible to fixed exchange rates, it may well be 
sacrificing nothing in the area of monetary policy effectiveness. 
MI for an SOE may involve giving up a policy instrument which 
one would not choose to use in any event. 
ii 
~, 
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Arguments of fixed exchange rates could similarly apply 
under the adjustable peg with narrow fluctuation margins. 
looking at the post-war period, however, theory as stated above 
seems to be a poor approximation of reality. DeE growth rates 
and inflation rates have differed significantly between countries. 
If one looks at the experiences of major industrialised countries, 
swings in the XB do not appear to have been closely associated 
with differential .rates of credit expansion , see Thygesen 
(1973). Modifications to the theory seem to be necessary. 
Parkin (1972) develops a model of the inflationary p~ocess 
in an open economy which integrates the MABP theory with the 
expectations theory of inflation so as to make clear the adjust-
ment process involved in the MABP. He distinguishes between 
traded goods determined by world supply given to the country, 
and non-traded goods. Assuming that the world is in full 
equilibrium and the economy expands its domestic credit, an 
attempt is made to run down the increased money balances. The 
demand for traded goods rises. The country is facing an elastic 
supply curve from the rest of the world, satisfying its demands 
at the prevailing price levels, and it incurs an external 
deficit. further, part of the money goes to domestic goods. 
Their prices rise and wages rise, since the economy is in full 
equilibrium. Exports are affected and the external deficit 
rises. Inflation in this economy is higher than the world 
level. As the process continues, however, the country eventually 
incurs an external deficit such that it loses reserves at a rate 
proportional to the DeE rate. Its inflation then equals that of 
the rest of the world(3). However the country still loses 
reserves and such a process cannot go on for ever. It will 
- 7 -
either reverse its DCE growth rate or change its exchange rate. 
What is important in Parkin's model is that the inclusion of 
the non-traded sector, whose prices rise, dampens the adjust-
ment process. Also a differential DCE process could continue 
until such time as domestic policies or exchange rates are 
adjusted to stop reserve loss or accumulation. The self adjust-
ing mechanism of the MABP cannot be relied upon to bring about 
XE. 
Kouri (1975) suggests that the theoretical models appearing 
in the literature, like that of Parkin as well as those of 
Dornbusch (1973) and Krueger (1974), although giving an 
explanation of the fact that under fixed exchange rates different 
inflation rates may prevail, all assume fully employed economies 
with flexible prices. Thus the theory of inflation that they 
imply is at best a long-run one. It would seem clear that 
changes in unemployment could generate, at least temporarily, 
changes in wage and price inflation quite independently of what 
is happening in other countries. If all of this is granted the 
process by which inflation rates are equalised becomes of great 
importance. Parkin did not assume capital flows. This main 
modification of the monetary theory of XB - by including 
capitru flows - was developed in the late sixties. Theoretical 
and empirical work in this area has consisted mainly of the 
extension and application of the portfolio selection model 
developed by Tobin (1969) and others, notably Branson (1968) 
and Branson and Hill (1971). Later, Porter (1972), Kouri and 
Porter (1974), and Kouri (1979), derived a capital flow equation 
from a general equilibrium mOdelJand found evidence supporting 
the thesis that capital flows may be viewed as a mechanism 
whereby excess demand for,or supply of,money is eliminated. 
One can see under the new developments,the effects of the 
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monetary policy in an open economy. Assuming absence of capital 
flows, as Parkin did, there is a direct link between domestic 
inflation, the current account and the money supply, and a 
specie-flow mechanism of a kind is in operation, assuming no 
sterilization. Under perfect capital mobilit~ howeve~ there is 
no direct link between the current account and the money supply 
since, as evidence shows, capital flows completely offset 
liquidity effects of the current account(4). The central 
proposition that}with fixed exchange rates inflation rates must 
be the same in the long-run still holds - allowing for index 
number problems arising from changes in relative prices - but 
the adjustment process is no longer the 'same. The current account 
no longer has a liquidity effect, but it does have a wealth 
effect. Changes in the current account)of course)have the 
Keynesian multiplier effects on aggregate demand, and thereby 
on the domestic inflation rate. In addition to these two 
channels of imported inflation there is the direct effect of 
costs of imported raw materials. Also to the extent that 
internationally traded goods are close sUbstitutes one would 
expect their prices to be equalised quite swiftly - ignoring 
transport costs. On the other hand capital flows accommodate 
inflation, whether it is imported or domestic in origin. An 
increase in domestic inflation will increase money demand. If 
this is not met by domestic credit expansion, it will be met 
by capital flows. Thus domestic monetary policy is frustrated 
in its attempts to control inflation. Secondly, inflation may 
be imported through the international capital market. An 
expansionary monetary policy in the reserve currency country 
will lower interest rates throughout the world. This increases 
aggregate demand, which is again accommodated by an increase in 
money supply(S). 
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Evidence suggesting that capital flows offset domestic 
monetary policy has been challenged in view of simultaneity 
problems as well as specification errors in the reaction 
functions, by Herring and Marston (1977). Their structural 
model for Germany suggests that the Bundesbank successfully 
resisted external pressures for domestic monetary adjustment, 
which enabl~Germany to pursue domestic policies markedly 
different from those of Germany's main trade partners, contribut-
ing to instability particularly within the Snake. 
The econometric analysis - set out in Chapter Five - for 
the seventies based on the macroeconomic approach, adjusted for 
specification errorn, indicates that for the five EEC members 
analysed, authorities seemed to have the ability to sterilize 
and indeed there is reason to believe that they pursued such 
policies for long periods, although to a lesser extent since 
1977. This evidence, like the case above, although tentative 
nevertheless seems to suggest that the authorities have used 
monetary policy independently. 
The analysis of what is happening in the real world was 
necessary in order to check the assumptions leading to the 
conclusion that monetary policy under an MU will have to be 
carried at the union level. Under fixed exchange rates it will 
be assigned to the XB. Tha latter, except in the very short-
run, will be at the level that brings XE, and attempts to change 
it and pursue domestic objectives at levels different to those 
resulting from the XE level and/or quasi XE situations are 
unsuccessful. High capital mobility speeds up the whole process. 
Houever the analysis above demonstrated that the self-adjustment 
mechanism to the XE level might not be as effective as it was 
thought, if authorities) through various measures, are able to 
adopt policies that would not bring about tha assumed monetary 
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adjustment. For the latter to come about} countries must be 
willing to stop undertaking measures in pursuit of independent 
monetary policies. The genuine maintenance of fixed exchange 
rates implies the abandonment of autonomous control over 
domestic monetary policies. Otherwise) the more inflationary 
country, within a fixed exchange rate system, would not only 
obtain command over additional goods and services, but would 
also pass on unwanted inflation to its partners, see Goodhart (1975 
p 299). Countries which follow sterilization policies, as will 
be seen later, could create reserve flow instability and hence 
exchange rate instability. No such system can persist without 
some discipline over the monetary policies of the countries 
involved. Experience indicates that independent nations do not 
want to submit themselves to external constraints. The 
discipline and decisions necessary to run a fixed exchange 
rate system will nowadays very much depend on political harmony. 
1.B.c. 
Up to now it has been said that an MU needs fixed exchange 
rates, capital market integratio~and it implies monetary policy 
carried at the union level. However this group of countries 
depends also on the rest of the world. Its growth prospects are 
affected by the latter. The MU implies therefore the creation 
of a common monetary policy with respect to third countries. 
There could be the possibility of irrevocable exchange rate 
fixity among the partners of the group at a moment where they 
are not (roughly) equally dependent on each other - and hence 
on the rest of the world - with respect to external transactions. 
Irrevocable exchange rate fixity among members could affect, 
undesirably, the effective exchange rate of each one of them. 
The latter rate is more relevant as far as current account 
transactions are concerned. One should also keep in mind that 
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the role of across the border credit and other financial trans-
actions is important and should acquire greater significance 
for the MU, and what counts here are nominal exchange rates. 
Market exchange rate fixity reduces uncertainty maintaining 
orderly conditions and encourages growth of a credit market 
straddling national boundaries. The union, therefore, in order 
to avoid regional imbalances should have to adopt a proper 
policy combining intra-union exchange rate fixity with a desired 
degree of effective exchange rate evolution on the part of each 
member. A successful union exchange rate floating in relation 
to third currencies would be needed. Further, even in the case 
where the competitiveness and economic structure of each member 
is the same, such a policy is required in view of the eff~cts 
on eoonomic growth that the evolution of the union exchange rate 
would have on the MU and the rest of the world. Within the IMS 
concept, therefore, there should be an international policy of 
the union in negotiating with third countries and/or MUs. 
The carrying of monetary policy at the union level implies 
either centralisation of monetary policy or an agreement on 
strict adherence to a well defined rule of conduct in monetary 
expansion. In the second case the power of discretion remains 
in the hands of national monetary authorities, which could 
conduct their monetary policy contrary to the union assumptions. 
To avoid exchange rate instability, surplus members could 
finance the deficit ones without the latter undertaking 
corrective measures. The question is how long the former cQUld 
accept such a process. Exchange rate instability might finally 
occur. One could also envisage reserve pooling at the union 
level in .the sense of establishing an institution responsible 
for managing the members' foreign reserves. It could operate 
in the market to maintain permanently fixed exchange rate 
- 12 -
relationships and decide on the common floating. However such 
a measure may not be enough. Pooling could make exchange rate 
fixity possible technically, but it might not make it possible 
from a long-run practical viewpoint, assuming that certain 
members continue to adopt non-union policies. 
In any case there will be a credibility gap as long as each 
member retains such power. Speculative movements may also take 
place enhancing exchange rate instability. Under these circum-
stances this union institution should not only manage members' 
reserves but should also be endowed with its own reserves and 
apply union-wide effective monetary control in order to assure 
the success of fixed exchange rates and make the MU permanent, 
implying also a movement towards policy centralisation. One 
could possibly envisage the functions with which this body 
would be entrusted. It should decide on domestic (union) 
monetary policy such as bank liquidity, credit and interest 
rate policies, administer foreign reserves and decide on union 
liquidity. It will,in a sensei decide on the money creation 
within the union. Monetary policy in individual states would 
be determined by the policy being pursued by this supranational 
institution. 
Thereare even nowadays debat~ on how free national fiscal 
policies are in an MU(6). The latter implies monetary policy 
coordination among members. There is a close link between the 
PSD and its financing on one hand and XB on the other. Because 
of its monetary repercussionsJ harmonisation of budgetary policies. 
in particular the PSD - between members has an important role to 
play in assuming consistent intra-union XB situations. Arguments 
also exist for the centralisation of fiscal stabilisation policy. 
All these points are analysed in chapters three and four. As it 
will be seenJnational governments retain the instruments and 
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are still able to influence the geographical distribution of 
employment and economic activity, and ch~e the size of the 
PSD. The only restriction is that a deficit is financed by 
loans at the going market rate and provided the long-run 
equilibrium conditions, which derive from the government budget 
constraint and the XB constraint, are not violated. 
Redistributive transfers have been proposed to temper the 
effects of income redistribution arising from MI. Such a view 
could be challenged on the following grounds: (a) Evidence, 
especially during the seventies seems to indicate that the 
existence of the Phillips curve has been questioned in the long-
run. (b) Transfers will not be a sUbstitute for exchange rate 
adjustment whenever price and cost developments between members 
are out of line. 
If there is a case for transfers, it may arise when along with 
the MI process, there is a trend for price and cost equalisation 
between regions and countries. In this case divergent economic 
tendencies could be identified as structural problems or 
differences in productivity. The conveyance of such transfers 
for productive investment rather than subsidizing of living 
standards should be emphasised. 
1.B.d. Distinction between a Monetary Union and a Pseudo 
--- -------------------------
fx£h~nge_R~t~ Un!o~ 
An analysis by stages was attempted above in order to detect 
some of the important characteristics that an MU should have. 
The above concept of the MU should therefore be distinguished 
from that of a "Pseudo exchange rate union" as it is termed by 
Carden (1972), where each member may retain its foreign exchange 
reserves, its own monetary and fiscal policy, and operate these 
policies in order to ensure that it does not exhaust or over-
accumulate its reserves. Further, in such a cas~ representatives 
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meet periodically to decide whether they should in unison 
realign, appreciate or depreciate their currencies. The 
difference between such a system and the one described above 
is the absence of commitment to keep irrevocable exchange rate 
fixity and hence follow the policies that it implies. A member 
country may, for various reasons, not follow such policies and 
instead prefer to realign its currency with the rest of the 
members or opt out of the agreement. There are no explicit 
rules that would assume the effective consistency of members' 
monetary policies. In the absence of a firm agreement-
manifested by reserve pooling, absence of controls and abandonment 
of monetary independence- an adjustable peg system is created, 
of which it is questionable whether the benefits of an MU could 
be brought forth, especially when realignments take place 
frequently, or under crisis situations and/or by large amounts. 
Members should therefore be in a fixed exchange rate agree-
ment not because they have chosen similar monetary growth rates 
for domestic reasons but because they have chosen these rates 
because they are in the fixed exchange rate arrangement. 
The conditions for a complete monetary union are, therefore, 
the irrevocable exchange rate fixity among the member currencies, 
total currency convertibility, dependent national monetary 
policies, a common external monetary policy, harmonisation of 
national fiscal policies and a regional policy on certain 
occasions. 
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CHAPTER TWO ON THE DOMAIN OF A MONETARY UNION 
Doubt on the suitability of flexible exchange rates 
for all existing currencies leads to the question of what is 
the sui tabl e domain of the MU. Earlier approaches tried to 
single out a crucial characteristic that would indicate the 
domain. Others started with national economies taking each 
nation state and national currency as an indivisible unit to 
constitute an MU. But a nation with many economically hetero-
geneous subregions can be viewed as a homogeneous entity in 
terms of policy attitude and national preferences so that this 
approach falls into line with earlier approaches. The alter-
native approach attempts to provide a unifying framework and 
recognises the shortcomings of theories based on a single facet 
of the economy and evaluates costs and benefits in participating 
in an MU for a region or country. 
Meade (1957) and Scitovsky (195B) pioneered work on MUs 
and fixed exchange rates. The first contribution to MU theory 
as such was by Mundell (1961) which in turn gave rise to important 
contributions by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). The term 
"optimum" under this group refers to the ideal position, the 
objective being the maximisation of achievement of price 
stability, full employment and XE. A region is defined as an 
OCA, when it exhibits the characteristics which lead to automatic 
removal of unemployment and external imbalances. Automatic in 
the sense that no interference is required through monetary or 
fiscal policies to restore equilibria. An MU should then be 
formed so that the maximum benefit will be accomplished out of 
it. Each theory is distinguished from the other in relation to 
differences in suggested characteristics. This form of approach 
is different from later work on MUs, see Fleming (1971), 
Ingram (1969), Magnifico (1973). Firstly) in the sense that 
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Mundell attempts to redefine frontiers, while the latter take 
a more realistic approach seeking to determine whether a group 
of countries should create an MU. Secondl~ they are more 
policy oriented and attempt to establish the necessary economic 
policies to create IB and XB, in the absence of exchange rate 
adjustment. They recognise the needfor government interference(1) 
although the form and size differs from one proposal to the 
other - see also Williamson (1973), Wood (1973), and the All 
Saints Day Manifesto Approach (1975). However the traditional 
approach provides a basis for an empirical study on the 
feasibility of an MU. 
1.~. Th~ ~i~g!e_CLi!e£i2n_AEP£0~c~ 
l.~.~. ~uto~ati£ ~diu~t~e~t 
According to Mundell (1961») high factor mobility is the 
basis for a unified area. Howeve~ differential changes in unit 
costs may not be the only possible causes of external imbalances. 
Or even on Mundell's assumptions, factors may not flow, see 
Presley and Dennis (1976, pp 12-7). further, countries do not 
encourage labour mobility. They formulate instead regional 
policies. It is suggested - Lanyi (1969), Scitovsky (1967), 
Dunn (1971), Carden (1973), Kenen (1969), Goodhart (1975, 
p 294) - that in practice, due to various factors, it is unlikely 
that sufficient inter-regional labour mobility can be counted as 
an adjustment mechanism. The question is . whether labour 
is the crucial factor or if capital alone could suffice to 
bring the necessary changes. fleming's analysis (1971) points 
out that it may not be of a sufficient degree of effectiveness. 
According to McKinnon (1963) highly open economies should 
comprise an MU. He places emphasis on internal price stability 
for each member uhile Mundell favours XE. Carden (1973) and Presle) 
and Dennis (1976) explain uhy it is only uhen IB exists that 
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McKinnon's suggestions could work and bring XE. Further, 
McKinnon did not consider external macroeconomic disturbances. 
This criterion would require cautious appraisal in the practical 
context, depending on the stability of the external environment 
compared to that of the country concerned, and also on if the 
SOE tends to be financially undisciplined. Also to what extent 
the SOE has diversified its trade with several large countries. 
For Kenen (1969) optimality comes by introducing an MU 
based on product diversification. However Kenen's special 
assumptions have been questioned, see Presley and Dennis (1976, 
pp 23-5), Flanders (1969), Ishiyama (1975) and Ingram (1969). 
Applied to the real world it means that small areas - less 
diversified states - are OCAs profitably maintaining flexible 
exchange rates. The low diversification criterion comes to 
conclusions opposite to those arrived at by the openness 
criterion. The two approacheS are incompatible. Contradictory 
conclusions arise from different assumptions concerning the 
principal source of external disequilibria. 
£.~.2. !h~ £P!i~u~ ~i~e_of ~ ~o~e!a£y_U~i£n 
In the above criteria there seems to be a difficulty that 
could be confusing: early papers had two ideas running through 
them. One concerned the features that a country must possess 
in order to gain by joining an MU and the other concerned the 
features that must be possessed by an OCA to be of benefit to 
its members. Authors above are concerned with the size, looking 
at where to draw the lin~ knowing that a large MU maximises IB 
and XB objectives. 
Goodhart (1975, pp 291-301) analyses the reasons for doubt-
ing whether the size is the most crucial variable determining 
the boundaries of an MU - in achieving the best resolution of 
objectives - or even if it is important once the minimum size 
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has been reached. Social unity for Goodhart is a far more 
important factor. If it exists, irrespective of size, 
authorities could and should introduce fiscal measures to 
ease the adjustment process as effectivel~ or perhaps more so) 
as exchange rate changes. It would in such conditions make 
labour migration easier and wage-price adjustment harder to 
bring about under any exchange rate regime. "Optimum" should 
be defined not so much as a function of geography but as a 
function of social psychology. One could then reap the benefits 
of a larger MU, the most obvious being the elimination of 
currency exchanges and uncertainty about likely exchange 
rate changes. It was explained in chapter one - page 13 - that 
strict economic reasons may not justify such transfers in the 
MU concept. Indeed some members may provide this argument 
insisting on real adjustment to be undertaken. The main 
question then lies on the practical significance of this 
proposition. Is there going to be this sort of unity and if 
so for how long could it continue? Especially when members do 
not undertake sufficient adjustment for various reasons. Such 
transfers could happen within a single country, but within an 
MU composed of different political entities such a movement 
may be difficult. 
£.~.£. ~o~e£n~ent_Int~r~ention ~n& lh~ ~e£d_f£r_Simil~rit~ 
of Inflation Rates 
---------
Under this criterion,domestic policies can be totally relied 
on to create equilibria in the absence of exchange rate changes. 
Inflation similarity was put forward by Haberler (1970), Fleming 
(1971) and Magnifico (1973). Assuming that it is changes in 
the XB that generate the need for exchange rate changes, this 
criterion involves a change in the basic assumption on the 
principal source of external imbalances. Attention focuses 
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here on macroeconomic phenomena. The importance of inflation 
differentials is analysed in chapter three. Further, this 
criterion is not without problems. The implications for 
IB may prove intractable, jeopardising the MU creation. 
Generally all criteria point out the cases where exchange 
rate fixity is preferable as an argument for having an MU. 
They have not been sufficiently analysed, see Ishiyama (1975, 
pp 359-60). Howeve~ the costs of external adjustment emerged 
as the central concept in the choice among alternative exchange 
rate regimes. 
2.8.a. The EEC Case 
--- ------
Labour mobility seems to be rarely met even in one country 
and more rarely over the whole EEC. It could act neither as a 
sufficient nor as a politically acceptable substitute for 
exchange rate changes. Migrant workers within the EEC come 
largely from non-EEC countries except for Italy and also labour 
mobility within the 8enelux(2). Carden (1972) suggests that 
despite this low mobility, its movement to high labour demand 
areas has helped to reduce excrnnge rate changes. But this 
assumes that countries in deficit will send foreign workers 
home and migration outside the EEC will help alleviate dis-
equilibrium problems. At the present time though, apart from the 
political connotations of such a decision, the EEC is in no 
position to replace high internal labour mobility as a stabil-
ising policy. Within the EEC there have been certain labour 
migrations, but the EEC labour market is not integrated. It 
is still organised in national trade unions and contacts 
between them are rare. Each of them has different tools, 
aims and strategies. Institutional mechanisms for wage and 
salary regulation have developed along separate lines. These 
differences have not been reduced and work as a retarding factor 
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to labour mobility. Integration forces have sometimes perverse 
effects, equalising wages while productivity is unequal among 
members. However free movement of persons already applies to 
all employoos, see Fratianni and Christie (1978). Mobility, 
although legally free is also limited by qualitative factors 
and it is conceived to be an inadequate substitute for payments 
adjustment compared with demand management and exchange rate 
variation, see Boleat (1975). 
The question is if capital mobility is sufficient to bring 
automatic adjustment. Custom barriers and language problems 
do not apply to it. Howeve~ capital is not free to move in 
the EEC as a whole, being hindered by legal obstacles, even at the 
beginning of t~e eighties. National rules still exist, 
although there is evidence that these obstacles ar~ being slowly 
removed. tour members - France, Italy, Ire~and and Denmark -
still have controls limiting free capital mobility. The 1973 
entrants were to abolish controls at the end of 1977, according 
to the accession treaty. It happened, in fact, only for the 
UK in October, 23, 1979. The favourable XB situation, strict 
monetary policy control and the "petrocurrency" status of 
sterling led to control dismantling. Ireland also imposed control 
on the UK) in December 1978, in anticipation of a break in 
sterling parity, unilaterally. Eurocurrency markets have on the 
other hand) contributed to capital mobility, and also to the 
prevalence of controls; since members had easy access to this, 
market controls remain and free capital mobility has not been 
established within the EEC. Barriers to inward investment 
have reduced competition and efficient use by achieving economies 
of scale comparable to US and Japanese competitors. Nation-
alistic attitudes remainstron~ preventing a country in partic-
ular, and the EEe in general, to realise its full potential, 
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just because such capital flow could result in a cross-frontier 
acquisition. All these comments, plus the possibility that 
even if free mobility exists, it may not be fully effective, 
add to uncertainty on capital's ability to bring the required 
degree of adjustment. 
This is what seems to be happening with production factors 
in general. The difficulty in measuring factor mobility in a 
direct and unambiguous way should also be mentioned. Various 
measures have been proposed which are not without problems, 
see Vaubel (1978a). Howeve~ experience indicates that capital 
mobility prospects are better than those of labour as will be 
seen in the following parts. Furthe~ the importance of multi-
nationals increases and contributes to rising capital mobility. 
Prospects to dismantle controls depend on various factors, see 
chapter five. 
The question is how essential factor mobility is for an MU. 
That seems to depend on the whole strategy adopted. If it is 
based on automaticity, then its existence seems to be crucial 
for e~change rate fixity. But if it is to be realised that 
such mobility does not exist adequately, it may not mean that 
an MU cannot be created,assuming that the strategy is changed 
and government action to achieve XE and exchange rate fixity 
is undertaken. Additionall~ with progress on unification, 
factor mobility could be expected to rise} reducing in turn the 
amount of adjustment policies and potentially undesirable 
implications. Note that here we analyse the ability to create 
MU in the absence of factor mobility as opposed to the 
desirability of having such a mobility within an MU. 
Adjustment through internal policies could result in costs, 
uhile they could be avoided by exchange rate changes. It uill 
be shown in chapter three that there is evidence to indicate 
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lack of money illusion and exchange rate ineffectiveness to 
correct a deficit(3). Others believe that the exchange rate 
instrument can be effective. Corden (1972) considers each EEC 
country on this basis coming up with no encouraging results 
with respect to the EEC-MU. 8alassa (1973~ p 175) provides 
arguments to suggest that money illusion will be effective. 
However it is here where openness becomes important. In a very 
open econom~ flexible exchange rates could not help X8 adjust-
ment without other undesirable repercussions. Domestic policies 
and/or factor mobility would be needed. Such policies, and 
possible undesirable IB effects, will not be very large due to 
a high degree of openness of the economy. Also fixed exchange 
rates could dissuade excessive wage rise demands, which could 
impair competitiveness affecting undesirably 18 and X8 object-
ives. Openness has a role to play here too. 
Numerous definitions have been suggested for openness, see 
Presley and Dennis (1976, pp 50-1) and Vaubel (1978a). Argu-
ments are provided to support the use of the average propensity 
to import, API, and the marginal propensity to import, MPI. An 
open economy would be expected to have high values for these 
magnitudes. The MPI can be estimated by fitting the equation, 
M = a + by, where b = MPI = dM/dy. API = M/y. There is still 
the problem that b may be biased due to simultaneity problems. 
Evidence for the sixties and early seventies demonstrates that 
both OLS and 2SLS estimates are insignificantly different for 
all EEC countries. Also there is no significant difference 
between API and MPI - except for 8LEU - for the period 1958-1973. 
See Presley and Dennis (1976, pp 52-3). Our analysis covers the 
period 1967-1978. Table 2.1 shows the API for the EEC countries 
as well as the average for the 1967-1978 period. -
Table 2.1 Imports of Goods, Services and Transfers as a Percentage of the GNP 
~ 1967 1968 1969 1976 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1977 Country 
BLEU 29.4 31.9 34.1 34.5 31 .5 33.3 40.1 41.3 42.2 34.3 40.4 
0 26.6 25.0 25.9 26.5 24.1 23.1 28.2 29.4 30.5 27.9 26.7 
r 14.1 14.5 17.1 16.4 16.2 17.8 20.1 22.5 23.4 18.3 16.9 
G 16.6 17.2 17.4 18.6 17.3 18.7 19.1 20.1 22.1 20.4 19.4 
Ir 40.8 42.4 44.3 44.1 40.6 48.8 54.1 60.9 57.7 61 .0 58.6 
It 12.9 12.6 13.9 15.2 14.8 16.5 20.4 26.1 22.8 23.7 21 .2 
N 33.3 33.0 35.2 37.8 33.8 33.8 35.4 40.9 43.1 36.5 35.3 
UK 17.7 17.5 16.3 16.3 14.7 17.3 21.4 26.4 24.3 25.7 22.7 
Annual 23.9 24.3 25.5 26.2 24.1 26.1 29.9 33.5 33.3 31.0 30.1 Average 
SO 10.1 10.6 11 .2 11 .3 10.0 11 .5 12.5 13.6 13.1 13.7 14.0 
-----
Source: Constructed on the basis of data in IrS. 
1978 
39.0 
23.8 
15.1 
18.5 
59.1 
20.9 
33.3 
22.6 
29.0 
14.4 
'Average 
1967-1978 
35.99 
26.49 
17.71 
18.78 
51.09 
18.42 
35.95 
20.24 
I 
N (..3 
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Table 2.2 Marginal Propensities to Import 
~ MPI(OLS) MPI(2SLS) Average t(API-b) t(API-b' ) b b' 1967-78 
8LEU 0.4174 0.4285 0.3599 1.4375 1 .715 
0 0.2902 0.2959 0.2649 1.3316 1.6316 
F 0.2116 0.2331 0.1771 1.1775 1.3822 
G 0.2148 0.2176 0.1878 1.3039 1.4412 
Ir 0.6912 0.7016 0.5109 2.15 2.27 
It 0.2931' 0.3105 0.1842 2.32 2.687 
N 0.3816 0.3919 0.3595 0.4702 0.6894 
UK 0.3036 0.3286 0.2024 2.53 3.155 
Source: Constructed, after econometric analysis based on IFS data. 
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Table 2.2 shows this average and the MPI using both OLS 
and 2SLS. The t-statistic performs the significance test, 
comparing values of the MPI and API(4), to see whether, in prac-
tice, there is any empirical difference between the two. Look-
ing at the results,the t-statistic - OLS - seems to indicate 
that in practic~ there appear to be empirical differences 
between the marginal and average estimates for Italy and the 
UK, while paradoxically not so for Ireland at the 5 percent 
significance level. 2SLS results do not differ substantially 
from OLS ones, although the empirical difference between MPI 
and API applies here for Ireland also. Estimates above give 
valuable information especially when EEC countries are to be 
compared. When taking marginal estimates/the UK and Italy, 
two of the largest members, are as open as Denmark. France 
and Germany are of the least degree of openness. BLEU and the 
Netherlands are very open while Ireland is of the highest 
degree of openness. The difference between average and marginal 
figures would imply less effective domestic policies for the 
three members, a somewhat surprising result at least for Ireland. 
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However one cannot draw conclusions from the above estimates 
on whether members are open enough to form an MU. McKinnon did 
not specify any critical value, although he was aware of the 
difficulties in establishing one. Despite the lack of such a 
value, it could perhaps be suggested that some of the members 
may not be of the desired degree of openness to join an MU, 
with all the implications with respect to exchange rates and 
u~employment levels analysed earlier. Table 2.2 would suggest 
though, that seven out of the nine members, when marginal 
estimates are taken, seem to be adequately open to satisfy 
McKinnon's criterion. It is less clear for France and Germany, 
although they are not closed in the US sense - see Table 2.3 -
so that it could not be said definitely that they would be 
harmed by joining the MU. 
Table 2.3 US openness. Imports as a percentage of the GNP. 
Year '67 ~68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 
3.8 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.1 7.8 10.5 9.0 9.8 10.5 11.0 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IFS data. 
An important question on this problem is whether members 
become more open through time. The validity of exchange rate 
fixity would be enhanced gradually. API estimates suggest a 
significant rise since 1967 until 1975 both for original members 
and late entrants, except for the rather general decline in 
1971 and for some of them in 1972, in view of the 1971 mild 
world recession. Attempts to control inflation brought reces-
sion in mid-seventies. All members experienced a decline in 
trade as a percentage of income. Certain members tried to 
restrict their deficits. Restrictive policies were followed by each 
member, affecting other members differently. The effect was 
unbalanced since each member is not equally dependent on others. 
In the late seventies it was hoped that inflation control and 
I 
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effective demand and investment policies would restore a 
rise in growth and trade. World shocks though, attributing to 
inflation rises, have not so far let members pursue growth 
objectives. Lack of appropriate policies is also responsible. 
At the beginning of the eighties it was not certain.if the open. 
ness of members would start increasing again. Unfortunatel~ our 
tentative conclusion for the future is less optimistic than 
past suggestions, see Tsoukalis (1977, p 43), Presley and 
Dennis (1976, p 54). The trend towards increasing openness has 
been discontinued since 1975. Apart from doubts on whether 
members are open enough, another problem is that members' 
dependence on trade diminishes, although such dependence is 
higher than that in the sixties. If one hoped that openness 
would~~while progress on MU would take place, one could 
not use this argument looking at the evidence since 1975. One 
could only wish that the decreasing trend would not continue 
to reverse the long-term increa~ing· trend observed between the 
sixties and seventies. It has yet to be seen whether countries 
would check inflation and enhance growth. 
Further, standard deviations do not seem to indicate that 
members' openness converges'over time, to be used as 
an argument to form an MU. Such a result was expected in the 
absence of considerable changes in API of large members to 
counterbalance large increases in small members between 1967 
and 1978. 
In the diversification criterion too, a critical value is 
lacking. There is no common agreement of members' diversifica-
tion degree. Reitsma (1972) states that EEC economies are 
sufficiently diversified. Balassa (1975, P 192»)howeve~sug­
gests that while in US, major industries are concentrated 
regionally, each of the four large EEC members has a full 
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complement of industries. Empirically then, as theoretically, 
Kenen's and McKinnon's theories come into conflict as this 
evidence implies that closed economies are well diversified, 
while open ones are not. Presley and Dennis (1976, p 61) 
attempted an empirical estimation, computing a diversification 
statistic. Howeve~ the results were surprising for 
certain members. They cast doubt on whether their model 
reflects Kenen's model appropriately. Results could change if 
one was to take manufacturing grouping~ given that the spread 
of activity differs particularly in the export industry. Heller 
(1976) measures diversification by the share of the largest 
export commodity group in total exports. Vaubel (1978a) 
suggests that import and capital diversification should be 
included; especially imports since low export diversification 
implies high import diversification. Problems in measurement 
exist also since it is difficult to see how one can be weighted 
against the other. Looking at manufacturing groupings, 
Jacquemin and de Jong (1977, PP 1-26) suggest in their empir-
ical analysis that diversification in the manufacturing sector 
has risen, although on a national basis it varies among members 
and rises faster for some of them. This criterion may not 
facilitate MU creation as certain industrial sectors are 
concentrated on certain members. Encouraging points can be 
detected though, like the rising importance of large export 
oriented firms and the fact that the customs union did not 
lead certain industries out of businesseS). Howeve~ given the 
economic conditions of the seventies and the need for high 
technology industrial sectors, it could be that, on certain 
members, diversification may not be sufficient to prevent XB 
problems. further, ue are rather in disagreement with the view 
that SOEs with high trade sectors, in case they are not suffic-
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iently diversified, should opt for flexible exchange rates. 
The costs in terms of rising prices and implications stemming 
from these rises are very important so that, it seems to us, 
it is more preferable to exclude suchapossibility, at least 
with their main trade partners. Finally, the EEC as a whole 
would satisfy Kenen's criterion even if members would not. 
Inflation performance in the EEC - table 2.8, p 43 - does 
not seem to indicate uniformity of price movements in the last 
decade. Only subgroups depict closer uniformity. It would 
seem that the EEC as a whole is not an OCA. Members would 
have to undertake certain policies and produce uniform inflation 
rates. Implications arising out of such policies are analysed 
in chapter three. 
Generally it was found, on theoretical grounds, that some 
of these criteria are hardly operational, not only because they 
are incomplete, but also because it is difficult or impossible 
to measure them in a direct and unambiguous way and compare them 
with each other(6), see Willet and Tower (1970), Pelkmans 
(1975) and Ishiyama (1975). Empirically one could not possibly 
detect if EEC satisfied each of them adequately enough to be 
considered an ~CA. One could not decide at this stage, if all 
members are desirous to the same degree to fix exchange rates 
among themselves and follow common policies. One could not say 
though that the EEC domain~~ be considered as a small MU so 
that advantages from the use of money would be lost. While 
these comments apply for the contributions above) one is faced 
neverthelessJwith a movement on the part of governments towards 
the creation of an MU. Political decisions are taken despite 
the lack of a clear-cut suggestion from the above criteria. 
Given the firm commitment on such movement, these criteria are 
useful because they would facilitate the creation of the MU. 
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Automaticity reduces the possibility of potentially undesirable 
implications out of adjustment undertaken through other means. 
However, the recognition of the lack of sufficient fulfilment 
of these characteristics would require, since the decision to 
proceed is taken, the need for more government interference. The 
aim should be to establish the necessary economic environment, 
where domestic policies will bo effective, to create equilibria 
without the exchange rate need. Restoration of XB compatibility 
would) in turn1require knowledge of the causes that create it. 
Growing evidence of the importance of inflation would enhance 
the significance of the inflation criterion. At the same time 
it would be highly desirable that the importance of the first 
type of theories is gradually enhanced. 
2.C.a. Trade Interdependenca 
-- -----------
A strong case for an MU - analysed here because of its 
relevance to what has been discussed above - has to do with 
the high degree of economic interdependence among a group of 
countries. Cooper (1968) analyses how countries have become 
interdependent over the years in setting and pursuing their 
objectives, as a result of economic and structural changes, 
which have occurred among them. Generally interdependence 
(a) slows down the process by which national authorities, each 
acting on its own, are able to reach domestic objectives, and, 
(b) increases the number and magnitude of disturbances to which 
each country's XB is subjected, and this in turn directs atten-
tion to policy instruments to restore XE. In the absence of 
controls countries could pursue flexible exchange rates to 
restore policy effectiveness, reducing interdependence. That 
would seem rather unrealistic for SOEs. Countries though could 
appreciate and avoid imported inflation. However their trade 
prospects) at least with their main trade partners) could be 
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endangered. They would prefer fixed exchange rates with them, 
at least, and reduce inflation through domestic policies to 
the levels of their partners, realising that costs of trade 
reduction are even higher. o~ if they must depreciate to 
restore competitiveness) domestic price effects could not be 
ignored. A deficit on the other hand may not be corrected 
through depreciation. It can be seen that the response to 
greater integration could involve countries in undertaking 
counteracting motions which could leave them worse off than 
they need be(7). Countries would then prefer to form an MU J 
recognising their interdependence and agree to pursue common, 
responsible and mutually beneficial policies to bring forth a 
union-desired inflation level for each membe~as well as 
comparable XB situations among them. 
The question then is on the degree of dependence of each 
member on other members. If it is the same, then the possib-
ilities of success out of common policies are higher. Other-
wise a countr~ in view of its dependence on the outside 
lJorld,may not follow consistent "union" policies which could 
result on or accentuate problems for some or for the rest of the 
. 
members. Or if it does, it will not benefit the given country. 
Either way a fixed exchange rate agreement may not be beneficial 
to everybody. Table 2.4 indicates the evolution of coefficients 
of trade dependence on intra-EEC trade for each member. The 
importance of EEC trade to each member was growing from 196B, 
the creation of the customs unio~up to 1974. Howeve~ since 
1974,its relative importance has been reduced for certain 
members, while for others it has risen) but at a much lower 
rate than that of the pre-1974 period. for other members it 
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has remained roughly the same. If one is to look at intra-
EEC trade as a percentage of the total EEC trade, its 
importance has risen by a mere 1.6 percent between 1974 
and 1978 - EEC of the nine - as compared to 10~percent 
between 1968 to 1972 - EEC of the six - in terms of exports, 
while estimates for imports, 7.9 percent and 12.4 percent respect-
ively, are less pessimistic than those on exports. Howeve~ trade 
growth is much slower in the EEC since 1974, although the 
different number of EEC members since 1973 should be taken 
into account. As far as individual members are concerned, 
in certain cases) the trend is even slower than the above 
averages. Also since 1974, EEC trade dependence does not 
rise annually. Figures for 1978 could even be more pessim-
istic, were it not for the boosting of growth in the second 
half of 1978. It contributed to intra-EEC trade growth, 
except for Italy. Evidence on past trends does not allow 
us to draw definite conclusions with regard to future evolu-
tion. Evidence since 1974 emphasises its slower and irregular 
rise. On the-other hand 1978 was a year when new impetus 
was added to the European MU objective. If countries were 
determined this time to show a firm commitment to that, and 
if fixed exchange rate arrangements were to be equally useful 
for all members, they would have to intensify their trade 
links - some of them more than others. One has to realise 
though that there are certain items, especially raw materials, 
which have to be imported from non-EEC members. EEC members 
however, should aim to achieve high trade dependence on each 
other although rough equality may be questioned, if one is to 
Table 2.4 Exports and Imports to EEC as a Percentage of Totals 
Exports 
~ 1968 1970 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Country 
G 37.6 40.2 39.9 44.9 43.6 45.7 44.9 45.8 
F 43.0 48.8 49.9 53.2 49.1 50.6 50.4 51 .7 
It 40.1 43.1 45.1 45.4 45.0 57.1 54.1 48.0 
N 57.4 62.0 64.8 70.8 71.0 72.4 70.4 70.9 
BLEU 64.9 68.5 68.5 69.9 70.5 73.7 71.2 72.5 
I UK 33.3 32.3 35.6 36.5 37.7 
Ir 74.6 80.0 63.1 76.5 77.6 
D 40.3 44.8 45.7 44.3 47.7 
EEC 45.0 48.9 49.8 50.6 49.3 53.1 51.5 51.4 
- ----
Source: Constructed on the basis of data in Eurostat 
Imports 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1975 
41.5 44.4 48.8 48.1 49.5 
47.5 48.9 50.4 47.6 48.8 
36.2 41.2 44.9 42.4 42.9 
55.4 55.9 56.3 57.4 56.9 
54.9 58.8 64.3 66.1 67.1 
30.0 32.4 
68.3 75.8 
45.5 45.9 
45.9 48.4 51.6 46.9 48.4 
1976 1977 
48.2 49.1 
49.5 47.6 
41 .5 50.2 
55.3 54.8 
67.5 67.5 
32.3 38.5 
69.4 72.8 
47.2 47.6 
48.1 50.4 
----_. 
1978 
50.3 
52.3 
45.1 
57.6 
69.0 
38.2 
72.9 
49.5 
50.6 
t.l 
N 
, "_~ •. ~ ... ,_~ .-JJJ.d' • .-'J .... ,.Ju)J •• ,"-". Jf.'.~A~ .lt~ ... ~_.:.J.~J\" . .u ... ,\IL"'.l"~I ........ \!,'.L ...... ,U,IL)~ "' .. ,:... ... "~..I_>;> , ........... u,~""J. • ..1.I..a.A.J.. ......... -'1:... ... ~~",._,~~1.!.l!,.~ __ .... _ 
- 33 -
take into account the different sizes of the members' economies. 
In this way the integration process would become more accepted 
and successful for each member. One should not be guided 
completely by this optimistic view. Under the current 
inflationary environment, prospects for m increase in intra-EEC 
trade may not be optimistic. Success on MI and inflation 
control could on the other hand enhance it. Interdependence 
co u 1 d the n increase in the f u t u rea t a fa s t e r 0 r a s lower rat e , it 
could stop increasing, or it could even reverse its previous long-
term trend. It should also be kept in mind that slowly increasing 
trade interpenetration does not enhance the aid provided by 
it in adjusting intra-EEC imbalances. Table 2.5 provides an 
indicator of members' most important trade partners. It can 
be seen that Germany is the most important single partner to 
each member except for Ireland and the UK. The UK still has 
the lowest trade dependence in the EEC. Its trade with US is 
the most important although it has been stabilised and slightly 
decreased, while that with the EEC members has increased and it seems 
that Germany, if trends continue, could soon become its most 
important partner. Germany still remains at the centre of the 
economic area widely defined to include continental members. 
The creation of an MU could be beneficial for this group of 
members. At the same time Germany's influence has increased in 
the EEC, at a moment when each member's dependence on Germany 1s 
greater than that of Germany on any member. One could perhaps ~~t 
that Germany's policies could be more independent harming, on 
certain occasions, other members, although its significant trade 
with the EEC could restrain excessive independent action. The 
low figures estimated for the UK would suggest that its EEC 
dependence would have tom~~so that it would contribute to 
a successful intra-EEC exchange rate fixity. An encouraging 
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Table 2.5 Trade Partners in Intra-EEC and US Trade Percent 
~ 1972 1974 1976 1977 1978 (May) 
Country a b a b a b a b a b 
G 32.8 27.0 30.'1 25.9 30.1 26.9 31.5 26.0 32.4 26.4 
8LEU 15.1 17.1 13.2 14.0 11 .3 13.9 15.5 13.8 12.4 13.4 
N F 9.9 7.9 5.0 3.2 9.7 7.3 10.0 7.0 10.6 8.4 
UK 9.0 5.0 7.9 6.8 10.0 8.0 8.2 7.7 
US 3.7 8.1 5.1 6.2 2.4 9.0 3.4 8.5 3.3 8.6 
G 24.9 25.0 22.1 22.3 22.8 22.5 22.9 23.0 23.2 25.0 8 F 19.2 19.4 20.2 17.0 18.9 16.4 16.9 15.7 17.4 17.6 L N 18.7 16.5 17.1 16.0 16.5 12.6 14.4 15.9 14.1 16.4 E UK 5.0 6.0 5.2 7.2 8.0 8.0 6.8 9.4 U US 6.0 5.6 4.1 8.8 3.6 5.9 4.2 6.0 4.2 5.9 
UK 68.7 50.9 56.2 46.3 48.8 48.3 50.9 53.0 52.3 51 .9 
G 6.1 8.0 9.5 6.5 9.0 6.2 8.1 6.5 11 F 3.0 4.9 5.3 4.4 6.6 5.0 7.3 4.7 US 9.4 7.7 9.0 6.1 7.1 8.3 6.'2 7.1 6.0 7.4 
G 12.1 11 .7 12.3 18.1 14.1 21 .2 15.4 19.6 25.9 20.0 UK 21 .0 18.8 16.2 13.0 13.6 9.6 14.0 10.5 16.1 11 .3 D F 4.2 3.6 4.3 4.0 5.1 3.9 N 3.2 5.4 3.4 6.0 3.6 6.3 US 8.2 7.1 3.2 8.1 6.0 5.2 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.4 
G 5.6 7.6 6.0 8.1 7.3 8.5 8.0 10.0 8.2 10.4 F 5.1 5.4 5.9 6.9 6.8 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.9 UK N 6.0 7.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.5 lr 5.0 4.0 4.5 2.9 5.0 3.2 5.3 3.4 US 12.5 10.6 9.1 8.2 9.6 11 .2 9.3 10.5 9.0 11 .6 
F 12.8 13.8 12.1 12.0 12.2 11 .1 11 .0 10.7 11 .6 11 .6 
N 10.0 13.3 10.8 14.0 9.2 14.1 9.5 13.3 10.2 13.7 
G It 8.5 10.6 8.1 8.3 7.2 8.8 6.8 8.2 6.3 7.8 BLEU 8.2 9.8 8.0 9.1 7.8 8.8 7.6 8.3 8.4 8.5 
UK 5.0 3.0 4.3 3.7 5.3 4.2 5.9 4.7 US 9.3 8.2 8.1 8.0 5.6 7.8 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.5 
G 23.2 22.4 18.2 18.1 20.3 17.2 20.0 18.0 26.9 18.8 F 14.2 11 .5 13.3 13.0 15.6 14.1 15.0 14.8 20.1 17.4 
It UK 5.0 3.0 5.5 3.4 5.9 3.8 8.9 4.3 N 4.0 4.0 3.6 4.8 3.5 4.6 5.1 5.0 BLEU 4.0 3.0 3.6 3.0 3,5 3.6 4.7 3.9 US 9.4 7.7 9.0 6.1 7.1 8.3 6.2 7.1 6.0 7.4 
G 22.1 22.4 17.0 19.3 19.6 20.1 18.6 20.5 18.4 20.6 BLEU 11 .6 11 .5 11 .1 10.2 11 .0 10.7 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.2 
f It 11 .9 10.3 12.1 7.1 11.3 8.6 10.4 9.1 17.7 8.5 UK 7.0 4.2 7.2 4.8 7.3 5.3 7.5 5.8 N 5.1 6.1 5.2 6.6 5.0 6.5 5.6 8.1 US 6.6 8.2 6.2 6.9 4.5 7.3 5.1 6.9 5.7 7.6 
Source: Constructed on basis of data in Eurostat 
a = exports as a percentage of total exports, b = imports as a 
percentage of total imports 
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point would be that its average annual increase is at a faster 
rate compared to that of other members. 
The current degree of interdependence would suggest that 
an MU would generally not harm the members involved, with 
some reservations for the UK case, while it would largely 
benefit smaller members. One should not ignore though the 
task of forming a successful exchange rate policy with third 
countries. The trade position differences would suggest that 
this is not an easy task, see chapter six. Generally inter-
dependence trends seem to make the MU case in.the EEC a little 
more favourable by the end of 1978 than in the past. 'Howeve~ 
they emphasise at the same time how such a view can be eroded 
in the future if slow rising trends are to be replaced by 
declining ones. Contrary to past expectations which suggested 
higher trade integration in general and in the UK in particular, 
one could not possibly predict now the same for the future. If 
these trends worsen stricter exchange rate fixity could only 
bring forth results which could be the opposi te of those expected. Faster 
intra-EEC trade growth would be needed, especially for certain 
members in the future( 8 ). 
2.C.b. Capital Openness and Interdependence 
--- ------------------
Economic openness and economic interdependence, for a 
group of countries, 1n most stUdies undertaken is measured 
mainly with respect to the trade sector. Despite the increas-
ing use of policy instruments designed to affect the capital 
account, only occasionally does one find reference to another 
important aspect of openness defined in terms of capital flows 
across frontiers. Such openness should be considered)given 
its effect on domestic policies. This sort of interdependence 
provides another incentive for international Cooperation. 
Whitman (1969~ by calculating rank correlation coeffiCients) 
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suggests that capital flow openness differs from commodity 
flow openness, a useful finding, for otherwise little would be 
added to knowledge by explaining capital flow openness with 
resped to relationships already used to explain trade flow 
openness. Capital account opennes~ by financing changes in 
trade floys, strengthens the spillover mechanism of internal 
inflationary or deflationary pressures created in open econ-
omies. Independence of stabilisation policies is constrained 
not only by high marginal propensities but also by capital 
flows. 
Problems exist on measuring capital openness, see Vaubel 
(1978a), Whitman (1969, p 729) suggests that a measure of 
capital openness, compatible with trade openness, is required 
in terms not of differentials, but of proportion~ indicating 
the relative size of capital flows to domestic ones for each 
country. But data on such a scale are not available. By 
making the heroic assumption for ordinal ranking purposes that 
the size of a country's GNP can be used as a proxy for the size 
of its financial flows and using it as the denominator, 
openness could be calculated. Table 2.6 suggests that trade 
openness does not seem to coincide with capital openness. 
Small economies tend to be more open than large ones. Consid-
erable economies of scale prevail in the capital market and it 
is likely that small'.countries will be less autarkic in this 
respect than large ones. Results seem clearer if one compares 
Germany with Benelux, Ireland and to a certain extent Denmark. 
france and Italy experienced on certain occasions high ratios. 
The UK als~ especially if the two broad definitions are 
included. London's significance as the world's most important 
financial centre should be taken into account. 
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Table 2.6 Capital Openness of EEC Countries Percent 
G F It N BLEU UK Ir 0 
3.18 2.51 5.25 5.88 4.09 3.49 2.65 3.26 
1972 3.58 9.46 18.98 12.32 25.2 30.7 6.87 4.9 
4.07 9.66 19.03 12.58 26.2 31 .0 7.94 5.87 
3.21 2.68 5.93 6.48 4.7 6.59 6.39 6.16 
1973 4.08 10.33 15.21 12.11 38.7 42.05 7.95 7.59 
4.49 10.65 15.24 12.2 39.1 42.47 9.29 8.46 
4.53 3.6 5.72 5.42 5.43 7.19 8.49 1 .07 
1974 6.61 8.1 16.9 11 .72 26.51 26.7 10.11 4.5 
6.96 8.91 17.0 12.02 27.3 27.8 14.96 5.33 
2.5 2.48 1 .71 5.86 4.75 3.94 6.02 2.43 
1975 6.44 9.59 5.26 16.57 31.88 30.48 7.21 3.57 
6.95 10.03 5.41 16.7 32.47 31 .09 11 .91 4.23 
2.89 5.16 3.83 3.12 2.46 6.31 7.39 2.24 
1976 5.3 12.07 7.52 13.68 27.67 47.9 9.75 3.94 
6.11 13.3 7.54 13.81 28.46 48.6 16.8 7.77 
2.89 3.27 1.62 4.87 3.20 2.73 19.03 5.66 
1977 4.55 11 .71 3.66 13.82 35.88 10.45 23.93 9.59 
4.76 12.05 3.83 13.95 37.27 11 .89 27.7 12.85 
2.1 1 .93 1.4 4.73 3.8 4.48 n.a. 3.87 
1978 5.09 11 .6 3.76 15.32 29.41 24.9 n.a. 6.79 
5.44 12.02 4.21 15.35 30.88 25.31 n.a. 9.15 
Source: 8alance of payments Yearbook: constructed on data, on 
standard presentation section. Three definitions are used: 
a) Non monetary sectors: Direct investment in the country, 
direct investment abroad, other private l.t. assets, other 
private l.t. liabilities, other private s.t. assets, other 
private s.t. liabilities. b) (a) plus domestic money banks 
assets, domestic money banks liabilities. c) (b) plus general 
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government l.t. assets, general government l.t. liabilities, 
general government s.t. assets, general government s.t. 
liabilities, Central institutions assets, Central institution 
liabilities. 
While one could draw important conclusions on the determ-
inants of capital openness, what is of interest for the MU case 
is to what extent capital moves among members. Conclusions 
could then be drawn on capital interdependence in the EEC. 
Table 2.7 provides the proportion of non-monetary capital flows 
which account for each member and the US, with respect to the 
EEC and hence the rest of the world. It suggests that capital 
mobility within the EEC is lower than trade mobility for all 
EEC members, with the UK case being such that capital and 
trade mobility are of almost the same degree as compared with 
any other member and the US. Ireland is the exception whose 
capital flows are slightly higher than its trade flows. Never-
theless small EEC economies seem to have a high degree of 
capital mobility with their EEC partners, with the Netherlands 
scoring the lower figure. Major EEC economies depict a lou 
degree of capital mobility with their partners, Germany having 
the lowest proportion. Mundell (1957) was the first to suggest 
that it is possible for integration in commodity trade to be 
well developed without capital mobilit~ and some support to 
his argument is provided in the EEC case. Commodity markets 
are to some ~xtent a substitute ~or factor movements. The 
absence of trade impediments, implies commodity price equal-
isation and even when factors are immobile a tendency towards 
factor price equalisation. It is also possible to have capital 
mobility without much commodity trade. Indeed this is the case 
between US and the EEC. Capital interdependence between them 
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Table 2.7 Inward plus outward non-monetary capital flows with 
the EEC 1972-77 cumulative 
* ** Country G F It UK BLEU N Ir 0 US 
% of world 15.6 31.9 25.0 30.0 49.8 40.2 79.2 46.5 32.0 total 
* UK 1973-77 ** 0 1972-76 
Source: Constructed on the basis of data in Eurostat, Balance 
of Payments, Geographical Breakdown. 
is much more important than trade interdependence. Looking 
exclusively on capital interdependence, interdependence between 
EEC countries is overestimated while that of US and the EEC is 
underestimated. 
Capital interdependence between the two sides of the 
Atlantic has certain implications, analysed above. However 
these are enhanced and mostly affect Europe through the 
Eurocurrency market, which has grown considerably during the 
last two decades and by far the most predominant market within 
it, the Eurodollar market( 9). While it brought important 
benefits, at the same time it hampered Europe's sovereignt~ 
strengthening US dominance on EEC monetary affairs. Various 
factors in combination accentuate monetary interd~pendence 
~ith the US(10). Given the large disproportion bet~een US 
and Europe, ~hose ~e1ght has been d~arfed by its fragmentation 
into separate markets, interdependence has been lopsided. 
High monetary interdependence bet~een US and Europe implies 
appropriate policies for both. One has to look at IMS evolu-
tion since 1944. The central dollar position uas established 
as a ~orld reserve asset. It offered certain advantages to the USA 
in terms of seigniorage gains. While the EEC criticised US for 
frequent inflationary policies, the US sau no need for discipline 
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to maintain a system which they did not particularly wish to 
preserve, claiming that Europeans could have revalued, but 
they instead wanted to both make their exports competitive and 
escape inflation out of export surpluses and monetary inflows. 
EEC in turn argued that the main imbalance was between US and 
the rest of the world. The easiest cure would be US action. 
And so the argument continued (11 >. US policy was in terms of 
internal economic considerations, refusing to undertake dollar 
responsibility leaving it to other banks to intervene and keep 
the route of their currencies within the IMF margins. Another 
alternative for them was to accept realignments. European 
dependence was illustrated sometimes dramatically in the last 
two decades. One could refer to the events of 1969, early 
1970, late 1970 and in 1971, 1972-73 and after 1975 culminating 
with the 1977/78 crisis. EEC economies realising their inter-
dependence felt that they should counter undesirable effects 
stemming from US policies through joint action so that they do 
not jeopardise their close economic links, growth prospects and 
common policies already agreed. The move to create an MU apart 
from its own arguments, took on strong support by the impact of 
US monetary policies. It had als~as an objectiv~ to reduce 
the dollar reserve role at least in the EEC and undesirable 
effects from US policies. One would have to keep in mind the 
reasons that the dollar was the dominant reserve currency _ see 
Swoboda (1969), Strange (1979) - and the difficult task of 
European or other currencies to replace even part of it. The 
main problems of such arguments are analysed in the following 
chapters. What is more, dollar instability could impair the 
MI process in the EEC. Howeve~ there are some encouraging 
signs: since mid-1978 various decisions have been taken aiming 
at establishing uorld stability(12). further, there is nou US 
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willingness to explore the possibility of Euromarket control, 
indicated at the May 1979 regular meeting of Central Bank 
Governors in Basle. The Fed's argument was that the large 
build up of dollars outside US not only hindered money supply 
control, but was also a significant factor behind the foreign 
exchange speculation against the dollar(13). 
With respect to the Eurocurrency market there is a debate 
on the size of its power to influence activity(14). However) 
given the increasing emphasis on monetary control, there is con-
cern at the fast expansion of Euromarket activity outside domes-
tic controls. The question is how to impose controls without 
hampering the European capital market integration and recycling 
achieved so far, which is also required now with the new oil 
crisis. Although economic hardships were avoided)fundamental 
adjustment was delayed. However given the high debts of oil 
importing countries and the fact that banks approach the limits 
of capital return and any more finance would imply very risky 
banking, a reason exists for Euromarket control, avoiding undes-
irable effects on the IMS. Proposed control schemes - capital 
ratios and reserve requirements - entail difficulties in implem-
enting them. They would have to be comprehensive in a geograph-
ical sense and they depend on close monetary coordination among 
countries - although the danger of simultaneity in economic 
cycles of leading economies should not be ignored, as in 1974/75 
and the danger was also there in 1980/81. Members have to agree 
on the objectives of Euromarket regulation, something that has 
so far proved elusive. 
2.C.c. 
Interdependence 
--------
McKinnon (1963) sugges~that countries whose national 
economies are interdependent may form an MU, since the possib-
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ility for divergent price trends yill be reduced. The question 
then is to Yhat extent fluctuations in one EEC member are 
transmitted to other members. Balassa (1975, p 192) suggests 
that a possible test for the effect of interdependence on prices 
is to compare price movements among EEC members and betueen 
members and non members during the period follouing the EEC's 
establishment. Ginsburgh (1973) finds that for the period 
1955-70 the intercorrelation of prices among the EEC economies 
has remained lou and has sho~n little tendency to increase. 
Table 2.8, a less representative indicator on the question, 
shows the price evolution for the EEC members as uell as those 
of a representative group of non-EEC members -',five industrial-
ised countries - for· the period . 1972-7B •.... l,t should be kept in 
mind that earlier analysis indicated that EEC economies are 
not of the same degree of interdependence. It can be seen that 
price movements in the EEC were not of the same size or even 
trend on certain occasions. Considerable divergencies were 
experienced among them. If one is to include non-EEC members, 
certain EEC economies followed a more similar pattern with 
some of them than with their partners. A careful analysis of 
the table ~ould suggest that the effect of trade interdepend-
ence on prices cannot be said to apply in all cases. Houeve~ 
broadly speaking one could distinguish sub-groups of countries 
in the EEC experiencing price trend similarity among them along 
with trade dependence. Also the fact that this dependence is 
not equally shared, in the EEC, among members. It is rather that 
one group of countries - Benelux, Denmark, Ireland and to a 
certain extent france - have to adjust their inflation 
rates on the second group - Germany, UK - accepting on certain 
occasions unwarranted inflation levels and lack of ability to 
achieve more desired levels. Ireland used this as a pouerful 
Table 2.8 Consumer Price Movements 
~ G r It N 8 L Year 
1972 5.7 6.6 5.7 7.4 5.7 4_8 
1973 S.2 7.1 10.8 8.6 6.3 6.4 
1974 6.7 13.3 18.7 9.5 12.7 9.4 
1975 6.3 11.8 17.1 10.1 11.3 10.9 
1976 4.4 9.9 20.5 8.5 8.7 9.9 
1977 3.5 9.6 15.1 6.7 7.4 6.4-
1978 2.8 9.3 12.5 4.1 4.5 3.1 
-----
source: IrS 
Percent 
UK Ir 0 S 
6.4 8.3 6.6 5.4 
9.4 11.7 8.8 6.7 
16.4 16.7 16.3 9.9 
23.5 20.8 9.9 9.8 
16.8 18.3 9.0 10.3 
15.8 13.6 11.2 11 .4 
8.3 7.6 10.0 9.9 
Aus eN 
6.2 4.8 
7.8 7.5 
9.5 10.9 
8.5 10.3 
7.3 7.5 
5.5 8.0 
3.6 8.9 
US 
3.3 
6.3 
11.0 
9.0 
5.8 
6.5 
7.5 
J 
4.4 
4.8 
24.3 
11.8 
9.3 
8.0 
3.8 
, 
b> 
t.3 
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argument to break the sterling link and join the EMS in early 
1979. Italy seems to be the exception. It is worth mention-
ing some econometric analysis that has been undertaken, 
concerned with the international transmission in prices, 
incomes and employment. Hickman (1974) bases his study on 
the LINK econometric system, while Waelbroeck and Dramais (1974) 
develop the DESMOS model. Their results have been questioned 
by Ball (1974) due to the absence of monetary linkages, among 
other weaknesses. Hickman's results do not suggest a satisfact-
ory transmission. DESMOS multipliers imply a somewhat stronger 
dynamic pattern of behaviour than LINK ones(15). However they 
would both suggest that economic interdependence in the EEC, 
measured to include only tradeables, may not transmit economic 
fluctuations from one country to the other to a degree that 
could affect significantly the stabilisation policies of 
countries. This evidence is inadequate given that systems are 
not complex enough to include intercountry monetary linkages 
and migration(16). The transmission of foreign price disturb-
ances has been further analysed in the ppp context, which would 
imply eventual convergence of cross-country inflation rates. 
Some of them support this view, see Genberg (1978) and Cross 
and Laidler (1974). Results by Dornbusch and Krugman (1977) 
vary from one member to the other. Krause and Salant (1977), 
fourcans and Fratianni (1976), Korteweg (1975) come up with a 
substantial scope for inflation rates to diverge. Multi-
colinearity in the latter case should not be ignored. finally 
simultaneous models have been used based on the work of 
Goldstein (1974) and Calmfors (1977), see Jonson (1976), Knight 
and Wymer (1975), Sassanpour and Sheen (1977). Direct price 
effects on domestic price level are generally quite low although 
that should be expected, since suchJvariable loses in signific-
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ance uhen it is estimated in this multi-equation system, 
see Genberg (1978, p 258). Lindbeck (1980, pp 37-58) suggests 
that the long-run rate of domestic inflation is strongly 
influenced by the foreign price path. In the short-run 
domestic factors can have a considerable influence. Houeve~ 
international price developments dominate the price path 
also in the short-run in periods of violent short-term 
international price developments such as in 1972-74. 
De Grauue (197EB), (1977), (1978), and de Grauue and 
Van den Bergh (1979) have analysed monetary interdependence) 
under alternative exchange rate regimes)uith the purpose of 
developing a multi-country frameuork which allous the 
derivation of some specific relations betueen rules on exchange 
rates and rules on domestic monetary policies in a group of 
European countries. Exchange rate arrangements are analysed 
to ansuer the question of how they affect restrictions to be 
imposed on domestic monetary policies. Also)uhich arrangement 
best absorbs shocks originating both from inside the EEC and 
from abroad, assuming that monetary aggregates determine exchange 
rates. Monetary authorities of an open economy can influence 
monetary conditions, either through changes in domestic sector 
credit or foreign exchange market operations - internal versus 
external monetary policies. Shocks have the form of monetary 
base increases in the respective members during four quarters 
under fixed exchange rates, floating, moving average, reserve 
flow' target and reserve stock target. Tuo extreme types of 
<IMP) 
internal monetary policyAare considered: (a) passive, implying 
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that authorities do not try to maintain MB on a prespecified 
target path, and, (b) active. Starting with shocks originating 
in a European countr~they lead to intra European reserve 
flows, except under free floating. When internal monetary 
policy is passive these flows introduce an internally equilib-
rating mechanism. When they are active such mechanism is 
blocked. Under fixed exchange rates external disequilibria 
are maintained and amplified over time and when exchange rates 
are guided by indicators the initial shock leads to larger 
reserve flows and exchange rate changes. When the monetary 
shock originates outside Europe - US - the main conclusion 
arrived at above holds he·re too, in particular) the importance 
of IMP to judge the feasibility of different exchange rate 
regimes. So the relative superiority of some exchange rate 
systems over a floating system depends on the kind of monetary 
policies national authorities pursue. The setting of and 
adherence to - irrespective of shocks - independent monetary 
targets makes flexible exchange rates unavoidable. for a group 
of countries to follow fixed exchange rates, passive internal 
monetary policies should be implemented by the member of the 
group. The effects of foreign exchange market intervention on 
MB should not be sterilized. Sterilization by one or more 
countries leads to reserve flows and forces all countries 
affected to intensify their stabilisation policies or change 
their monetary policies altogether. If only one member 
sterilizes fully, external disequilibrium of that country will 
be absorbed by MB changes in non-sterilizing countries, with 
further effects on economic variables. Marston (1980) has 
also looked at these cross country effects. foreign 
sterilization increases the variance of interest rates 1n the 
domestic country - they would have to adjust more to a capital 
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disturbance at home - as well as the foreign exchange reserves 
of both countries. The sterilizing country succeeds in 
modifying the effects of XB disturbances on monetary behaviour -
interest rates, money supply. So,sttempts to pursue independent 
monetary policies impose costs on others(17). These costs are 
automatically imposed on a country using a reserve currency. 
If the latter'now refuse to change their MB and they too 
sterilize, policy conflicts emerge. Instability in reserve 
flous occurs since the adjustment burden cannot be shifted to 
non-sterilizing countries. But even if it can be done) reserves 
will flow to equilibrium levels very slowly. This instability 
or slow convergence is a direct result of incompatible monetary 
policies. In the absence of the proper institutions 
unilateral actions could follow like exchange rate changes 
and exchange controls. Sterilization policies would have to 
be used at moderate ratesJand indeed)at a rate up to 50 percent 
they could avoid destabilising flous. The kind of currency 
used for intervention is important as it will be seen in 
chapter four. Aoki (1977) has verified de Grauue's results 
in his attempt to establish further sufficient conditions for 
stability of monetary action under fixed exchange rates. 
Interdependence requires mutual coordination on the choice of 
sterilization coefficients. Their magnitudes should aluays 
be smaller, the larger the number of countries in the system. 
The stability of the system could be increased if authorities 
correct a sterilization policy conducted in period t-l by an 
opposite move in period t. 
The European MB as a whole is insulated from US policy 
under joint floating. Effects on individual MBs though, 1n 
the absence of sterilization, are the same either using fixed 
or flexible rates. US monetary policies remain an important 
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variable for explaining individual MBs. Only in three of 
them - UK, Italy, Germany - national influence on MB rises 
under floating, a result probably due to differences in 
relative openness of European economies vis-a-vis US, assuming 
that elasticities of international reserves with respect to 
the dollar exchange rate are equal among European countries. 
US policies are not neutral as far as their distribution 
effect on Europe is concerned, resulting in reserve gains for 
some members and losses for other~ affecting further other 
variables, when they float jointly vis-a-vis the dollar. 
Reserve pooling could be useful in this respect)reducing the 
attendant risk of suchapossibility. Even if it were not 
sufficient to discourage speculation, it could safeguard the 
joint floating making it possible for weaker members. Partial 
sterilization - 50 percent - does not allow countries to 
achieve monetary independence from the US. Although it is 
reduced, US policy influence still remains the most important 
factor, except for the UK and Germany, although their policies 
should not be too far out of line with those of the rest of 
the world and US policies. Sterilization used by a country 
to pursue substantially different monetary policy than in the 
rest of the world has to fail in the end. 
l.Q.~. lh~ Qa!n~ ~e£s~s_L~s~e~ ~PEr~a£h 
The fundamental objection to all contributions perhaps lies 
in the absence of the idea of balancing positive gains against 
losses of fixed exchange rates. While it is difficult to 
evaluate them, a multi·dimensional approach taking a uider 
range of benefits and losses seems more comprehensive than any 
single criterion approach, taking also into account that 
currency unification is a dynamic process. 
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With respect to the gains, speculation is expected to be 
eliminated enhancing the effectiveness of national monetary con-
trol. Some problems remain though, see Fleming (1971). Balassa 
(1973) questio~s such gains. Howeve~ speculation could make 
exchange rate changes unduly large, when they occur. further, 
the elimination of sporadic and unsettling speculation over 
currency prices could help greatly to establish a unified 
money market. 
A second source refers to reserve saving as cooperation 
among members progresses, see Kafka (1969), Salant (1973), 
Scitovsky (1958), (1969), Ingram (1959), (1962a), (1962b), 
Mundell (1973). The EEC could end up though with an excessive 
amount of reserves. Its interest on SDR enhancement may wane. 
Unless EEC currencies are used outside it as reserves, the 
authorities would rather press for an increasing SDR role. Touer 
and Willet (1976, p 12) point out that no reserve saving occurs 
for the world as a uhole. The EEC could then run higher 
expansive policies which might not be welcom~ at least for the 
rest of the world. Kenen (1973) suggests that saving may not 
result. 
The benefits of risk pooling have been analysed by Mundell 
(1973~ and Laffer (1973). Ishiyama (1973) points to the need 
of more research. Balassa (1973) has criticised their assump-
tions. 
The gains of complete capital market integration should be 
kept in mind. Ingram (1969) and Magnifico (1973) put emphasis 
on the easing of XB pressures. Selant (1973) and Kenen (1973) 
take a more balanced view. Cord en (1973) seems to be less 
enthusiastic. Also the size of disequilibrium is important. 
There is no question of indefinitely covering a deficit 
by non-productive borrouing and sustaining real uages to 
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unrealistically high levels. Countries involved must create 
real capi tal and then the debt to the: weal th ratio need not be 
rising as they proceed to borrow in EEC capital markets. 
Integration could also result in efficient resource allocation. 
On the other hand the problem of efficiency versus equality may 
remain,.see Goodhart (1975, p 296), Fleming (1971). 
The classical advantages of fixed exchange rates should be 
kept in mind. They refer to trade, competitiveness, production 
costs, rising competition, reduction of exchange rate uncertainty 
giving rise to market efficiency. 
A single currency in Europe coupled with capital market 
integration would fulfil the role the Eurodollar has performed, 
at least among EEC membersJreducing the impact of US policies 
in Europe. A reserVe status of a European currency though 
would impose constraints on the economic performance of Europe 
for world stability purposes. 
Finally the benefits of an MU are positively related to 
the openness of the economy, see Christie and Fratianni (1978, 
p 8). 
MI)in so far as it is successful in achieving these advan-
tages) also contributes to the achievement of other spheres of 
economic integration. In so far as an MU is expected to 
accentuate regional problemSi an effective regional policy 
could speed up economic integration. 
Turning now to the 10ssesJit is suggested that peripheral 
SOEs will see their growth prospects suffer. McCarthy (1979) 
asserts that such problems are temporary, while inflation 
reduction brought by a harder currency policy is a significant 
compensation. The loss of national monetary policy independ-
ence is also emphasised. It is questionable though if an SOE 
could follow such a policy. FurtherJmonetary discipline could 
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create significant - although, in view of new evidence, 
transimry - costs. In the EEC the McDougal Report (1977) 
placed emphasis on sUbstantial fiscal transfers to ease 
deflationary pressures on poorer regions. De Grauwe and 
Peeters (1979) claim that this is not the case of the 
European MU, since countries analysed in the Report are 
complete political and monetary unions and transfers take 
place because within them prices and costs change at nearly 
the same rate. This is not the EEC case, while one should not 
object on the desirability of such transfers. However, despite 
the absence of wage and productivity equality, capital may 
still flow to the richest areas. Also there seems to be the 
need for temporary transfers for high inflation countries for 
a successful joining in the MU, to alleviate the high transitory 
cost burdens which they are going to face. 
On fiscal harmonisation, it will be seen below that members 
are left with a significant degree of autonomy. 
With respect to resource re-allocation costs, caused by 
factor movement, Christie and rratianni (1976) explain why 
they are less than might be expected. 
It is arqued that a stable MU price level may result in 
unstable national price levels. Exchange ra~e changes are not 
permitted for each country to achieve national price level stabilit~ 
Vaubel (1978) is using the size of real exchange rate changes _ 
deviations from the relative PPP - to determine how costs and 
benefits of an MU will be distributed among members. He 
(1976a), (1960) does not come up with encouraging results. 
However) if one is to look at subgroups, the seventies exhibit 
less real exchange rate changes than the sixties. 
It would be expected that as MI progresses, it would increase 
factor mobility, and the members' mutual openness and 
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transactions diversification)reducing in turn the need for 
real exchange rate changes among them and thus it uould become 
self reinforcing and self validating, see Vaubel (1978a, 
p 320-3). 
finally Hayek (1978) emphasises that an MU creates a 
European government cartel or monopoly in the production of 
mone~ reducing currency competition and increasing the danger 
of inflation. Calculations by Vaubel (197Bb), under M1, con-
firm such~suggestion for the period 1969-77. further our 
estimates, under M1, M2, based on annual data for the period 
1970-78, seem to confirm Hayek's suggestion, .although to a 
lesser degree for the Snake members, see Table 5.8 ,p 134. 
On the other han~ an effective coordination policy could in 
the long-run avoid such costs. Vaubel (1979) also argues that 
if the prevalence of a single currency is a result of competi-
tion one should not object to currency unification. Arguments 
based on the common parallel currency approach are used here, 
whose validity is analysed in chapter seven. 
Coming nou to ueigh gains and losses, Ishiyama (1975, 
pp 369-71) analyses the reasons for uhich such an assessment 
is difficult. further, uhen countries undertake a clear 
commitment to create a complete MU and sacrifice economic 
policy freedom, the degree of integration existing immediately 
before the MI process is established) is important. Such costs 
are likely to be higher for less open and less interdependent 
economies, assuming that union policies are consistently 
followed. On the possibility of foregoing freedom to carry 
intra group exchange rate changes and improve IB and XB object-
ives, it is doubtful whether such a 
cost can be counted. lack or money illusion reduces the effect-
iveness of exchange rate changes. The long run Phillips curve 
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has been challenged for the seventies, see chapter three. The 
MU would then seem to impose only transitory costs. The 
problem is, though, how long transition is and how intractable 
are the costs it imposes. Even monetarists have recognised 
suchddifficulty,as will be seen below. 
Both Keynesians and monetarists agree however on what could 
be an important reason - for the monetarists the only reason -
to prefer exchange rate flexibility rather than currency merger. 
That refers to the possibility of national price level 
instability with a stable MU price level. The size of real 
exchange rate changes is used as a criterion for the desirability 
of the creation of an MU - based on weighttng 
gains and losses and not on the traditional criteria, whose 
shortcomings have been analysed. They are reflected though in 
this criterion. Gains are larger the smaller the costs, costs 
being shown by the size of real exchange rate changes. The 
results, mentioned earlier, indicate that such desirability 
exists for certain EEC subgroups. However, consumer 
price index (CPI) data are used, and the bulk of evidence 
does not support their use in testing PPP, even among a 
homogeneous group of countries, see Thygesen (1977, p 141). 
One should then feel uneasy about departures from PPP of CPls 
as a measure of real exchange rate changes, although the aim of 
the study was to analyse the implications for national inflation 
rates of adopting a fixed exchange rate system for the EEC, 
rather than to test the validity of the PPP theory. 
Analysis of gains and losses would suggest that a European 
MU could bring net gains to its members. These may not be 
equally distributed among them. At least for some of them)lt 
might imply that they would have to settle for a potentially 
long-time period with nationally considered undesirable levels 
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of domestic objectives. The fact that members may be affected 
undesirably at opposite directions and hence some offsetting 
might take place from a "union" viewpoint, does not conceal 
the fact that expected benefits might not come for each one of 
them. Against this, are the dynamic benefits that a complete 
MU promises out of efficient money use, certainty, larger 
market, enhanced growth and productive capacity, ameliorating 
18 objectives. These comments imply that one important factor 
on this difficult assessment is the strategy adopted to move 
towards creating the MU, as it will become evident in the 
following ~rs. Depending on the strateg~ gains and losses 
may be aggravated, reduced or eliminated. 
There is also the possibility that macroeconomic policy 
would be facing new obstacles, which could result in an uneven 
spread'of ~ains between small and large members or between· high 
and low performance areas. These are risks related to cost 
equalisation in the area at the wrong time, or members being 
unable to cope with unsynchron1sed fluctuations in national 
activity areas. Howeve~an effective regional policy within 
the MU could reduce such dangers. 
CHAPTER THREE 
_ 55 _ 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE AND THE 
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
3.s.,.!,. The .§i,n9.! e_ Cou,ntry_ Cas..!! .!n.£l ..!h.!3 !Io,!leta.,!'y_ U,!Iion_ C~s.!3 
The concepts of IB and XB and the appropriate policies to 
achieve them both simultaneousl~ made economists spend a great 
deal of time recognising that both can be considered as object-
ives of deliberate economic policy rather than targets ~hich 
can be attained automatically(1). The following analysis 
concentrates on the concepts of IB and XS for a single country 
and on to what concepts apply to an MU. Can one say whether 
IB and XB mean anything in the context of an MU? Could they 
be its objectives? 
The two main objectives of a country, according to Meade's 
(1951) model are the achievement of 18 and XB. By 18 it is 
normally meant some form of combination of full employment and 
price stability. XB is taken to be manifested in an XE(2). 
Looking at the IB of a single country, it should be 
distinguished from IE, since the latter might imply under-full 
employment equilibrium, given stable prices. If the aim of 
policy makers is to achieve full employment equilibrium, then 
both coincide by definition. If on the other hand they 
* substitute a desired level of income, V , for the full employ-
* ment one, Yf , - Y mayor may not be equal to Yf - IS'means 
* where IS intersects LM at V. Under an L-shaped Phillips curve 
price stability and full employment are not incompatible. 
Redefining IB in terms of the Phillips curve, where 18 is 
treated as a desired combination, a distinction 1s needed 
between the short-run and 10ng-run(3). In a more recent 
interpretation Meade (1978) considers abandoning the IB concept 
* ~* ~ and mcognising two distinct objectives Y and P , ~here P is 
the rate of inflation. This approach directs attention to the 
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costs involved, when the economy is not in 18, when asking 
* " "* what are the costs to the economy when Y~Y and ptp. further, 
costs attached to each objective are not the same. However, 
it has not been at all clear whether an income level has really 
been the objective. Different income levels could in practice 
be associated with the same employment level. In an 
inflationary economy, where the Phillips curve could be 
* ,,* unstable, U and p are most appropriately thought of as 
distinct, see Shone (19798). With respect to the XB situation 
the question is whether that coincides with the XE. It all 
depends on what external situation authorities desire. They 
may prefer an imbalance as post war experience indicates, see 
Robinson (1966, pp 9-10). The desired situation may well be 
* * where 8 ~o. XB is where B=B , which mayor may not be equal 
to zero. . * It can be either an equ1librium B =0 or a non-
* * equilibrium state, B to. According to MABP, if 8=8 is set at 
anything other than zero, stock adjustment forces in the system 
* would establish XE in the long-run. 8 ~o would imply a change 
in the country's reserve position, in tur~ setting in motion 
* stock adjustment until 8 =0 and AR=o, where AR denotes changes 
in the reserves. In the long-run X8 and XE coincide. In the 
short-run it could be a non-equilibrium state, but forces uill 
always exist to establish long-run equilibrium. 
What concepts of 18 and X8 apply for the MU case? Let us 
assume that the world is reduced to three countries A, Band C 
where 8 and C have formed a complete MU, treated now as regions 
of this union. Starting firstly with the internal Objectives) 
one could ~rite about the inflation rate of the MU in the way 
one would write about a country's inflation rate composed of 
various regions. Another question is if a certain inflation 
value could apply throughout the MU, i.e. if the MU regions 
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would experience the same inflation rates. Within a single 
country different regions would experience more or less the 
same price for the various commodities as a consequence of 
common currency)in conjunction with freedom of movement of 
competing goods, capital and labour among them, see Johnson 
(1972, p 331). It should be noted that this occurs inspite 
of possible substantial differences in unemployment rates among 
the regions. It should be expected that inflation rates will 
tend to be the same in each region of the country. Now let us 
assume that Band C are of about the same size, have common 
borders - minimising transportation costs - and that the bulk 
of their trade takes place among themselves. Embarking fully 
on an MU, they are treated like regions of a country, share a 
common currency and barriers to freedom of good and factor 
movement do not exist between the MU regions. The lack of 
these barriers does not provide the requisite insulation for 
each member against the impact of general influences emanating 
from each region. The independence of each member, producing 
competing goods, has been significantly impaired with respect 
to the effects it has on prices in its region and on the way 
to control them. Assuming also a more or less similar product-
ivity growth in the two regions, one would expect CPIs to move 
in unison in the two regions. Under these circumstances one 
would expect the different regions of the MU to experience 
more or less the same inflation rates and there it would make 
sense to speak about an inflation rate common to all MU regions 
" A 1\ 
PMU=PB=P C• With respect to the unemployment level} 8 distinction 
would have to be made between the short-run and the long-run. 
In the short-run the common rate of inflation (CRI) would 
result in a given level of unemployment depending on the levels 
experienced in the two regions, whereas, in view of empirical 
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evidence, in the long-run there yill be an NRU MU determined 
by the NRU of each region. 
The X8 of the MU is composed of the XBs of Band C. The 
latter are internalised within the MU so that possible payments 
difficulties of a country-member would be disguised and appear 
as regional problems within it. BMU=BB+B C• XE for the MU 
would be obtained where: BMU=TM.U+KMU;: 0: BB+C=o. Care should be 
taken though since here XB is not defined on a national basis, 
therefore transactions between the two members - now union 
regions - are excluded from the definition of XBMU • Transactions 
between Band C will be treated like transactions between the 
regions of a country. It would not matter if one region, B, 
Yas in deficit with C and country A, as long as this can be 
counterbalanced by transactions of C with Band A. The imbalance 
difficulties could be eased by fund transfers from surplus 
regions(4,5). 
The question arising now is yhether the above could be 
treated as objectives of the MU, in the sense that MU should 
look to optimise their values. An MU is established because it 
is expected to bring net benefits to the union members, like 
those associated~~ exchange rate fixity, common reserve pool 
and capital market integration. Its objective is to establish 
such conditions. The inflation level would not affect the 
derivation of these benefits. Its establishment could also 
require expenditure discipline, that could create unemployment 
for certain regions and the union as a whole. Yet the net 
benefits that an MU is supposed to bring Yill, in the final 
analysis, affect inflation, unemployment and the XB. 
One could envisage a situation where an MU 1s operating 
and CRI is high and increasing. That could imply a decline 1n 
investment, income growth, trade, resulting in a rise in 
... 
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unemployment. The inflation rise might increasingly threaten those:1 
country-regions that are less inflation prone than other MU 
regions. Expenditure discipline could threaten inflationary 
countries. Some of these problems could now be more intractable, 
being manifested as regional rather than national - or XB -
problems. It can be seen that)from one side)what is aimed at 
by means of MU benefits is the improvement of the level of 
these objectives, whereas from the other side these objectives 
may deteriorate. For these reasons an MU uould seem to force) 
for the sake of its oun viabilit~ the creation of an economic 
union(6). Economic integration would have to take place when 
moving towards the MU, bringing policy decision making about 
the level of economic objectives in the union(?). EU would 
provide the condition for the successful functioning of the 
MU(8). 
Routes to Monetary Union and Implications for the 
-------------------------
Members' External Balance 
-------------
The XB situation of a country determines its exchange rate 
evolution. An MU means irrevocable exchange rate fixity among 
members and is therefore bound to have certain implications 
for each member's XB. However the measures that have to be 
taken by each member, both from a qualitative and quantitative 
point of vieu, depend on the route adopted to create an MU. 
The XB situation of a member would not matter, when the decision 
to create an MU was taken all at once. By that ue mean the 
setting up of a complete MU, establishing within a day a 
community central bank, taking over members' reserves and 
acquiring the sole right to manufacture the legal tender and 
hence the base money. IndeedJ 1t uould be a sufficient condition 
for a successful MU to establish a single central bank over a 
domain comprising all members. Current political realities 
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though seem to make this suggestion simply unrealistic, if one I 
is to realise that such an alternative would immediately trans-
fer power to central EEC bodiesJdepriving the members of 
national sovereignty. In view of this, gradualistic approaches 
to the creation of an MU have been adopted. One such approach 
is based on the launching of a common parallel currencY("CPC)from 
the initial stages of the monetary unification process, to 
circulate alongside national monies, inflation proofed, whose 
quantity demanded would depend on market forces. Under this 
approach too, the national XB position would not matter for the 
creation of an MU. Despite XB differences among members the 
CPC will prevail and at the end establish itself as a single 
currency in the MU, while authority will be passed to a 
European central bank. The validity of such~approach and the 
reasons for not adopting it for the EEC case are analysed in 
chapters seven and eight. Instead) another gradualistic approach 
was accepted, based on policy coordination among membersJto 
approach the level of irrevocable exchange rate fixity among 
national currencies or their replacement by a common currency. 
Under this approach, to which the great part of our research 
will be devoted, the evolution of national XBs matters for a 
successful monetary unification process. During this process 
each member's XB is treated separately. It is the achievement 
of compatible XB situations that would bring exchange rate 
fixity among them. Policy coordination should aim at achieving 
such an objective. Until the final stage of the evolutionary 
process comes, there is a situation where exchange rates)although 
fixed among members with determined fluctuation margins, are 
allowed on certain occasions to change in parity, due to lack 
of complete effectiveness of coordination, which could result 
in external imbalances at different levels between members. 
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However exchange rate fixity among them should act as a 
constraint and therefore exchange rate changes should tend 
to be the exception rather than the rule, owing to rising 
effectiveness of policy coordination. 
In our three country example, each member has its XB 
composed of transactions with the other member and A. For B 
and C to keep fixed exchange rates among themselves, they 
should avoid considerable differences in their XB situation. 
Also it could be that a joint fluctuation of their currencies 
with respect to A's currency could tend to equilibrate the 
transactions of each member with A, assuming a comparable 
trade dependence of each with A. This joint fluctuation would 
not have a direct effect on transactions between Band c(9). 
ThereforeJmembers in this case would have to achieve XE between 
themselves for unilateral exchange rate changes to be avoided. 
XE would have to be achieved by means other than exchange rate 
changes(10). This policy could imply certain difficulties. 
It could be the case where members have established XE between 
themselves and both are, say, in surplus with A, but B has a 
far greater surplus with A than C has. Joint currency 
fluctuation could reduce their surpluses but also make C incur 
a deficit)perhaps of a considerable amount. C might lose 
large sums of reserves and might require at the end a resource 
transfer for intra-union exchange rates to remain fixed. 
Although the direction of the joint exchange rate change would 
depend on the XB situation of the members, the amount of trade 
of each member with A would have to be taken into account. 
Due to an unequal XB situation of each with A and the possible 
incomplete effectiveness of the joint fluctuation, additional 
domestic measures might have to be adopted by Band/or C to 
reduce the former's surplus and/or the latter's deficit with A 
.. ~ 
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or a combination of these and resource transfers. 
It can be seen that yhen forming an MU the main objective 
refers to the XB of each member. Bearing in mind that members 
do not have the sufficient degree of exchange rate freedom to 
affect XB, after they embark on an MU, each of them yould 
have to eliminate the causes of XB disequilibrium. Depending 
on the factors affecting XB, that could have certain implica-
tions for their policies, as long as XB continues to be defined 
on a national basis. One should keep in mind Meade's (1951) 
analysis of conflicts betyeen IB and XB as yell as Syoboda's 
(1973) contribution on the simultaneous achievement of IB and 
XB by the economies of a currency area. Unless IB and XB 
coincide, expenditure policies yould-not bring IB and XB 
simultaneously to all members. XB can be achieved by a country 
only at the expense of its lB. All members could achieve 
their XB objective but at least some of them yould have to 
bear the burden, departing from their IB objective. Policy 
conflicts arise because income targets are incompatible yith 
the XB objective. Due to inequality betyeen instruments and 
targets one solution could be for members to revise and coordinate 
their goals. Since XB achievement is imperative, income levels 
should be revised according to the XB constraint. Alternativel~ 
additional instruments could be used like expenditure sYitching 
policiesJachieved either through parity realignment or barriers 
to the flow of goods from one member to the other. In the MU 
context such instruments are excluded. Factor mobility could 
bring forth the XB objective although it might not be 
sufficiently effective. The solution accepted would then be 
policy coordination with its implications yith respect to 
possible abandonment of 18 objectives for certain m~mbers. 
In the following sectianwe shall analyse the determinants of 
I 
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the XB and the uay to achieve compatible XB situations among 
members. It uill also be seen uhether, in vieu of recent 
evidence, members have to abandon their IB objectives. 
Conflicts might not arise in the long-run. 
The Determinants of the External Balance 
------------------
3.8.a. 
- --
The determination of XB according to the monetary 
approach could provide a useful explanation of exchange rate 
changes for a country(11). It suggests that the reduction in 
money stock through an external deficit uill equilibrate the 
demand for and supply of money(12). Countries though, may 
~ant to use other means to restore XE, in order to avoid 
possible undesirable repercussions. Ho~ever, means such as 
import quotas, tariffs and exchange controls could hardly keep 
in line uith the MU concept, uhile exchange rate fixity is 
what should be preserved. The poor approximation of the theory 
to reality uas analysed in chapter one, as uell as some of the 
modifications needed to the theory and the need for consistent 
policies by countries(13). 
The purchasing power parity for exchange rate determination 
has re-emerged during the seventies. This resurgence of 
interest seems to be related to recent experience uith 
flexible exchange rates, uhich intensified the search for 
fundamental relationships to determine equilibrium exchange 
rate values, in a period of rising inflation. Katseli-
Papaefstratio~ (1980, pp 4-16) refers to the versions and 
theoretical interpretations of the PPP. In one of the latter, 
PPP is seen by many authors as an extension of the quantity 
theory of money in an open economy. The PPP in this framework 
is linked to the dominance of monetary disturbances, the 
quantity theory of money, and the notion that the purpose of 
~ i , 
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purchasing foreign exchange is to secure purchasing power in 
some particular currency. It is consistent with a clearly 
established causal relationship running from monetary aggregate 
rises to the price level and then to exchange rates. The truly 
endogenous variable is the exchange rate. This line of argument 
is also the core of the MA8P, see Frenkel (1976), 8ilson (1978), 
and is implicit to a number of tests of the PPP, see 
Katseli-Papaefstratiou (19BO, pp 17-26). It seems that it is 
within this framework that attempts to prove PPP validity 
demonstrate a grain of truth and in particular the relative 
version of it, see Haberler (1961), Kindleberger (1973), Metzler 
(1948), Ellsworth (1950), Johnson (196B). Machlup (1964, P 27) 
accepts the PPP rule where large exchange rate changes are to 
be experienced. The general movement in prices must be large 
enough to dominate structural factors. Inflation in one of 
the countries could change rates by huge multiples. It is for 
this reason that the explanation of very large exchange rate 
changes has to turn to monetary circulation and subsequent 
changes in price levels as causal factors. Stern (1973) accepts 
PPP holding under rapid inflation, where relative price changes 
are likely to be minimal. Despite the balanced view that 
empirical evidence generates, see Officer (1976), ppp could be 
useful in the category of high inflation rates. 
However, while this argument could be made for the long-
run PPP validity, this causal relation has been linked to the 
view in which exchange rates clear commodity markets and are 
thus determined by current flows of goods and services across 
countries. Literature on exchange rate determination incorpor-
ates the view that such rates are jOintly determined with 
interest rates in assets markets, see Tobin (1969), Branson 
(1972), (1976), Kouri (1976), Dornbusch (197~). It explicitly 
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introduces expectations as an important determinant. In a 
world where people decide to place funds abroad, t~ey may be 
important in determining FEM activity and cause even substantial 
deviations of real exchange rates from the ppp level. Whether 
the ppp rule is re-established depends on what happens in the 
goods market and what is important here are wealth effects and 
interest payments on holdings of foreign assets. The equilib-
rium exchange rate will in the long-run tend to be equal to 
the PPP level, as long as monetary factors are dominant and 
under the restrictive assumptions regarding expectations, 
interest payments and wealth effects. 
Since the mid-seventies more rigorous econometric techniques 
have been used on ppp empirical analysis. Causality tests are 
used by Frenkel (1976), (1978), Bilson (1978a), (1978b), 
Krugman (1978) and Hodrick (1978). Also long-run real exchange 
rate variability is tested to assess departures from the PPP, 
see Dornbusch (1978), Genberg (1978), Thygesen (1978)(14). 
The long-run tendency of the exchange rate to equal the 
PPP level could have important implications for MI. It suggests 
that members heading towards exchange rate fixity among them-
selves would have to follow similar inflation paths, coordinat-
ing their policies to this aim. 
The Effect of Structural Factors 
----------------
Before ue analyse the implications of this conclusion, 
attention should focus on the effect of structural factors. 
They could render inflation uniformity inadequate for exchange 
rate fixity, prodUce inflation differentials among members, 
and make a case against the creation of an MU. While the 
dominance of monetary factors may bel established, the question 
is what happens when such dominance is less pronounced. This 
analysis will be more relevant under moderate inflation rates, 
,I 
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where structural factors may be important,as empirical evidence 
indicates, see Genberg (1978, p 273), Samuelson (1964), Officer 
(1976) as well as Keynes (1923) and Taussig (1941). They could 
change relative prices internally and even cause sUbstantial 
deviations of the equilibrium real exchange rate from its ppp 
level. 
Cost-push factors could lead to external deficits, which 
result in unemployment in an attempt to correct them. This 
is relevant to the EEC case given that labour is still 
organised nationally. A case against the MU is made here. In 
the MU context a union-wide collective bargaining would be 
required to avoid an isolated wage explosion. 
further, differences in productivity, when nominal wages 
tend to be similar among members, could create problems, see 
Kaldor (1970). Productivity could be important even under the 
monetarist view on inflation, see Parkin (1976, p 235). Vaubel 
(1976) and Genberg (1976) argue that it seems unlikely to 
involve substantial deviations from annual inflation rates. 
With respect to various kinds of controls, they would tend 
to be eliminated, being opposed to the MU goals, avoiding 
interference with the workings of the price mechanism(15). 
National differences in tastes could result in different 
national weighting with respect to inflation and unemployment. 
Their elimination may have to take a long time along with 
progress towards integration of national economic and social 
fabrics. 
External disturbances could reveal large structural 
differences and induce large structural divergences among 
members. Vaubel (1978a) though, disputes the view that the 
failure of EMU in the early seventies was due to them, insist-
ing that lack of monetary coordination was the crucial factor. 
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The situation might not be the same in the eighties. Domestic 
price rises and divergences experienced in the EEC in 1979, 
were only partly attributed to the 1977/78 monetary policies. 
Dramatic increases in the price of raw materiahs occurred~ Inflationary 
pressures built up under the relative exchange rate stability. 
The decline of major currencies against the dollar - on which 
raw materials are priced - has been a major factor behind them. 
Combined with world recession, they have created external 
deficits which put pressure on the currencies of the countries 
concerned. For certain members such problems are more important 
than they are for others. Continuation of external disturbances 
could create mom intensive divergences. A danger is imposed 
on MU assuming that restrictive policies may not be continued 
as long as they are necessary. Members could instead finance 
their deficits and maintain consumption levels. Inflationary 
pressures and external deficits would remain. Recycling though, 
could bring funds to companies although recession may not bring 
forth the expected export and productivity gains. Protectionism 
might follow. Also joint exchange rate evolution along with 
progress in MI could create XB problems given their different 
trade dependence on third countries. 
Another question refers to the possibly different demand 
patterns of external transactions of each member. External 
disequilibria could then occur and become cumulative for a 
member despite inflation equality with other members. Even at 
constant growth rates, such differences could require changes 
in equilibrium relative prices. A deliberate policy to have 
inflation differentials in an attempt to bring XB compatibility 
would be required. Estimation of income and price elasticities 
for the demand for imports and exports entails problems of 
defining appropriate income and price variables. Presley and 
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Dennis (1976, pp 93-7) do not come up with encouraging results 
for the European MU. Also Stern et al (1976, p 20, table 2.2) 
derive important differences among members on trade price 
elasticities. It could perhaps be argued, although that might 
not be certain, that they would tend to get similar along with 
progress on-MI. As their determinants tend to become similar 
among members, elasticities would be expected to converge in 
the long-run. 
Structural factors could in certain cases be important. 
Members should undertake measures to reduce such differences, 
where it is possible. To the extent that such problems remain 
and become intractable, they could jeopardise the MU. 
3. B. c. .§hort-Ru..Q .Qete.!mi~nts 
- --
Evidence indicates that in the short-run currency movements 
have been greater than that justified by the underlying 
economic conditions. Some of them have also been abrupt and 
reversible. Markets have, on certain occasions,been disorderly -
cases where there was no counterpart for sales or purchases or 
when exchange rates showed erratic fluctuations(16). This 
experience was common in all major countries. Overshooting-
sometimes prolonged and substantial - from the ppp level among 
currencies, has to be analysed. Its causes will give the 
solutions necessary in order to achieve greater short-run 
exchange rate stability. Additional analysis of exchange rate 
determination is needed since PPP theory entails long-run 
considerations based on comparative statics, absence of 
structural changes, capital flows, further monetary expansion 
and any expectations other than those for further stability. 
It could not possibly be used to explain short-run exchange 
rate dynamics in a period of ongoing inflations. Capital flows) 
especially those deriving from speculative switches among 
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existing foreign and domestic assets}are for Machlup (1979, p 73) 
the most important factor for short-run changes since the early 
thirties. However)it seems difficult to find a single explana-
tion for recent events, given the numerous and frequent diverse 
influences operating in the exchange markets. Schadler (1977 » 
in her survey article)suggests that the consensus seems to be 
that exchange rate dynamics are at best studied with the assets 
market equilibrium model, and that without appeal to destabilis-
ing speculation. Exchange rates determined by portfolio 
adjustment will often overshoot their long-run equilibrium 
level given the continuous assets market equilibrium assumption. 
Values of existing money stock, real capital, bonb and foreign 
assets, the rate of flow of government purchases, the ta'x 
structure, and expectations determine the short-run equilibrium 
value of the flow of real income, the vectors of interest rates 
and prices and tm nominal exchange rate values(17). Dornbusch 
(197&) assumes a key role on the differential speed of adjustment 
of goods and assets markets. The dynamic aspects of exchange 
rate determination arise from the assumption that exchange 
rates are determined in the short-run in the asset markets, 
where adjustment is relatively fast as compared to the goods 
market. He describes the assumptions and implications for 
exchange rates out of monetary stock changes (1976~ pp 261-2). 
They are suggestive of the observed large fluctuations, while 
at the same time establishing consistency of such movements 
with national expectations formation. However) it is rather 
unlikely on a more realistic level that the oVershooting which is 
implicit in the asset market equilibrium model is sufficient 
to account for the size of exchange rate variation observed 
in the seventies. McKinnon (1976b) suggests that with instability 
in underlying economic conditions has come uncertainty about 
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how to interpret new events as they occur, which is inevitably 
reflected in market expectations about future exchange rate 
changes, and comes to playa crucial role in actual exchange 
rate determination. Instability in economic conditions 
contributes to exchange rate instability not only via the 
variability of fundamental exchange rate determinants but also via 
the uncertainty of exchange rate expectations that such 
variability generates. Uncertainty and risk become important. 
Substitutability among assets declines. Certain transactors 
withdraw from risky foreign exchange dealings. The ability of 
smoothing out exchange rate fluctuations is in turn limited. 
Instability of major currencies, considered as international 
money, makes speculation more difficult and costly. Speculators 
are driven out of the market. Flo~s based on risk aversion, 
rather than flows related to the equilibrium value of a 
currency, take place. The continuing problems of the world's 
major reserve currency, as well as those of other major currencies, 
contributed to increasing uncertainty manifested in terms of 
exchange rate instability, see Richardson (1979), Ortoli (1979). 
Schadler (1977, p 291) suggests that there has been little 
evidence to preclude the possibility that,at certain periods 
and for certain currencies) destabllising speculation has 
contributed to exchange rate variation. 8ilson (197~) indicates 
the existence of speculation not based on rational expectations 
in Europe on certain occasions in the seventies. Evidence 
also on interest rate behaviour supports McKinnon's assertion 
that the problem with floating is related to insufficient 
speculation, in addition to irrational speculation. Isard 
(1978) also suggests that overshooting highlighted by dynamic 
models does not offer a convincing explanation for exchange 
rate volatility observed in recent years. Facts do not confirm 
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Dornbusch's suggestions. Most volatility has also been observed 
in forward rates. The behaviour of market operators indicates 
that exchange rates move in speculative runs, a view supported 
by the fact that it is difficult to find evidence of major 
private market operators taking large open positions on the 
basis of long-run exchange rate expectations. They do not 
have clear long-run expectations and consequently the risk 
associated with long-run positions is perceived as being too 
high. Mussa (1976) attempts to explain why expectations are 
imprecise and how they are formed. Expectations of future 
exchange rates - formed according to the rational expectations 
hypothesis - affect the willingness to hold domestic money. 
His model focuses on the potentially"large variability of such 
expectations) which in turn leads to large scale exchange rate 
volatility. What then should be avoided is sudden shifts in ) 
expectations about the paths of certain variables which in 
turn count for shifts in exchange rate expectations and, thus, 
exchange rate shifts. Expectations are formed on the basis of 
information which is always limited. Ex post facto it is easy 
to observe that errors were made and expectations are 
subsequently revised. This is not inconsistent uith 
"rationality" of exchange rate expectations and exchange 
market efficiency. He suggests that changes in expectations 
about policy variables - particularly monetary and fiscal 
policy characteristics - may be an important ca~se of exchange 
rate volatility. They playa crucial role in the expectations 
process. Such volatility could be reduced by adequate 
dissemination of information that could allow better predictions 
on time paths of policy variables by market participants and/or 
avoiding sudden shifts in their time paths. Predictability 
and stability of policy variables become then the crucial 
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facto~ for stability and predictability of exchange rates. 
This is in accordancewi~ the monetarist framework which submits 
as essential in monetary policy pre-announced money supply 
targets, which in the futurg will only be gradually adjusted. 
Further, authorities intervene in the FEM to smooth out 
exchange rate fluctuations. Depending on the way monetary 
policy is carried out though, it can either reduce or aggravate 
exchange rate fluctuations. McKinnon (19768) considers large 
intervention amounts, undertaken since floating started, as 
unpredictable and un conducive to a desired degree of certainty 
regarding future exchange rate levels. Intervention should 
aim at stabilising the exchange rate around a target. Howeve~ 
under frequent target revision it may well increase uncertainty 
and aggravate exchange rate fluctuations. Successfillly managed 
floating would imply that there is a trade-off between control 
over domestic monetary aggregates and control over the exchange 
rate. Too much emphasis on the former makes it difficult for 
the authorities to maintain a particular intervention rule. 
Such a trade-off is intensified further under fixed exchange 
rates with less than fully effective monetary policies. 
Finall~ real shocks could affect exchange rate dynamics. 
Many occurred during the unsettled period of the seventies. 
They should supplement the monetary variables for an under-
standing of exchange rate dynamics. While it is difficult to 
incorporate them into models, experience indicates that they 
are important. They are recurrent) affecting members differently. 
They could force exchange rates to a direction different to 
that suggested by the economic developments of the country(18). 
Generally, on frequent occasions exchange rates may over-
shoot or even follow a different direction from that indicated 
by underlying economic conditions. Exchange rate stability 
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would require monetary policy coordination among countries 
in terms of adherence to:correct policies. Overshooting would 
be reduced or even eliminated, setting aside non-monetary 
considerations. Unnecessary uncertainty would be removed 
and hence unnecessary disruption. Avoidance of sudden shifts 
in the time paths of policy variables would give the private 
sector a clear basis on ~hich to make its future exchange rate 
forecasts. Adequate stabilising speculation would reduce 
official intervention or even prove it unnecessary. Further, 
fund flows among countries affect national money supplies and 
exchange rate stability. Currency diversification could spread 
such impacts more wid~y. Taking account of suchawish on the 
part of the wealth holders, certain countries, by allowing such 
diversification - as indeed is currently the case - would 
enhance exchange rate stability. Its role would be useful 
particularly until more effective national monetary policies 
have been established(19). 
~.£.~. In!l~tio~ ~n~ the Eu£o£e~n_M~n~t~rl ~n~o~ • 
.!.m.E?l.!.c~tio~s. 
Policy coordination to achieve inflation similarity among 
the MU members could have important implications, depending on 
whether the common inflation rate falls in line with the 
preference function of each member. In the Phillips curve 
hypothesis, if a CRI was to be established, different unemploy-
ment rates could be experienced by each member. Presley and 
Dennis (1976 f p 68) demonstrate that for the EEC case. Even 
if a common trade-off has been achieved, the optimal position 
could be a source of dispute. Only the member already exhibit-
ing the CRI will not be affected. A low CRl could imply 
SUbstantial rise in unemployment for high inflation members. 
Renunciation of independent national choice between inflation 
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and unemployment could be regarded as a serious cost. The Phillips 'I 
curve hypothesis-(PCH) would not seem to support the MU case. Under 
:1 
an average inflation rate, costs may be more equally shared(20). r 
In the monetarist approach, under fixed exchange rates, inflation 
is regarded as the interaction of the demand for real balances 
with the nominal stock of money. Equilibrium prevails when 
the actual and expected inflation rate are equal and there is 
no excess demand. The unemployment rate associated with zero 
excess demand is the natural rate of unemployment and depends 
on the structural characteristics of the labour market and is 
generally not affected by monetary factors. Whether or not a 
country joins an MU its unemployment in the long-run will 
settle to this rate. Policies will have only transitory effects 
on the unemployment level, producing rising or falling inflation. 
While it loses the right to determine its inflation level, an 
MU memberls unemployment rate is not affected in the long-run. 
Money has a more direct and independent role to play, in 
contrast to the cost-push view where it changes to accommodate 
objectives and authorities put more emphasis on the successful 
negotiation of an incomes policy. Having chosen the target 
inflation rate, it would be for each member to adopt an 
appropriate money stock target, determined on the basis of 
variable estimates of money demand and long-run rate of output 
growth and all being well, they would ensure that the agreed 
inflation rate would eventually be attained. 
Hines (1964), (1969), (1971) established a role for trade 
union militancy in Europe, differing among members, which can 
be eliminated only through a common system of industrial 
relations and collective bargaining. Coordination will not 
bring inflation convergence. Studies by Nordha~s (1972), 
Purdy and Zis (1974) and Ward and Zis (1974) reject this view(21). 
t 
t. 
~ 
l 
" i, 
I 
i 
I , 
- 75 -
When coming to explain the phenomenon of world inflation, it 
does not seem to apply for the majority of cases(22). With 
respect to the PCH, causal empiricism suggests that it does 
not look robust in the seventies. The long-run Phillips curve 
is a vertical line at the NRU(23). These findings do not seem 
to reject the MU case. Monetary aggregate growth has been the 
major inflation determinant. Inflation rates differ among 
members due to discrepancies in money stock growth. They would 
be equalised once they put such growth on a compatible basis, 
see Parkin (1972), (1973), (1976). Discrepancie~thoug~may 
be explained by international factors acting on domestic 
inflation. Evidence seems to suggest that, see Nordhaws (1972) 
and Cross and Laidler (1974). Even if monetary policy is an 
important inflation determinant, international factors particu-
larly in more open economies may make close monitoring of the 
rate of change in prices uncertain(24). 
With respect to the direction of causation between national 
money supply and economic activity, studies(25) point to some 
powerful presumptions reached for the existence of a causal 
chain running from monetary changes to variations in incomes. 
There iS
1 
though,a range of disagreement about the strength of 
such effects in practice, see Goodhart (1975, pp 192-3). 
Monetary expansion though has asUmulating effect upon the 
economy even if one accepts that the transmission mechanism 
is obscure and the process of uncertain timing and strength. 
The less the availability of spare capacity and the more flex-
ibly expectations of price inflation are revised upuards, the 
larger the relative effect on inflation. Thus, monetary 
expansion,!f undertaken with enough r1gour over a reasonable 
length of time/should be sufficient to cause inflation(26). 
Where output cannot change quickly, as has been the case for 
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the seventies, the link between money and prices is most 
obvious when money grows fast as has been the case for many 
countries in the last decade. Monetary expansion is both 
necessary and sufficient for price inflation and a lower 
expansion is a sine qua non for price stability. Inflation 
could be regarded as a monetary phenomenon. It may not be viewed 
as such however if cost-push factors are important and 
. . -. I~! 
accommodating inflation tak es place ..ihic·h would appear to be the lesEer , 
, ~·I 
of "t:tEtwo evils i. e. in flation and un employment. Thos e who 
consider money as the prime cause explain why this choice is 
available only in the short-run, see 8ain (1975, p 124). 
McCracken (1977, points 25, 26) provides cost-push evidence 
in many European countries in 1968/69. The major acceleration 
of the UK inflation in late 1969 is attributed to such causes, 
see Goodhart (1975, pp 219-20). Evidence of the relevance of 
trade union pressure is offered by applying the Sargan (1964) 
approach, see Henry, Sawyer and Smith (1977). Also a study on 
the mechanism of wage formation in Italy, by Modigliani-
Tarantelli (1977), is not consistent with the pure monetarist 
approach. In 1973 economic expansion was accompanied by an 
upturn in commodity price increases and world inflation even 
before the oil shack. The latter had an effect in the overall 
price increase. Inflation accelerated in 1973. At the same 
time,monetary policy tightening led to a downturn in both 
economic activity and inflation. For the UK, Davies (1980a) 
suggests that the inflation acceleration in 1974/75 seems to 
have reflected somewhat special factors, particularly the 
collapse of incomes policy and the existence of statutory 
threshold arrangements. The monetarist view places emphasis 
on what caused inflation in the first place. It is the 
outcome of past expansionary policies that could be avoided if 
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governments adhered to a constant growth rule. Walterr(1970) 
provides such an explanation for the UK inflation in the late 
sixties, where monetary expansion was rapid and trade unions 
yere by then looking to its growth rate as the best indicator 
of future inflation rates, so that it had a direct effect on 
inflation and a reduced impact on output. Vaubel (1978b) 
analyses the inflationary experience in Europe during the last 
decade. Monetary dispersion, when floating started, reached 
record levels, refuting the view that exchange rate changes 
since 1973 have been due to non-monetary factors, see also 
Vaubel (1978a). Excessive monetary expansion under the parity 
system in 1971/72 began to work its way into European price 
levels in the second half of 1973. The rising inflation led 
to expectations of further rises in 1974, not borne out by the 
facts due to monetary deceleration. It yas due to these 
inflation-induced, false inflation expectations that negotiators, 
on their nominal wage bargaining failed to take account of the fact ) 
that the deterioration of Eu+opean terms of trade by the oil pIice 
rise had curtailed the productivity rise and thus the employment-
neutral rate of real wage rise. 80th monetary deceleration and 
inflation-induced excessive wage rises led to depression and 
mounting unemployment in 1974/75. Accommodating policies were 
adopted to lower real wages through further inflation. 
Authorities thus reacted to their destabilising monetary policies 
of 1971/72. Monetary targets were gradually adopted since 1974. 
Howeve~ monetary policies continued to be unstable. Governments 
continued fine-tuning policies and some of them diverged 
considerably from their monetary targets(27). Experience also 
indicates a shortening of lags since 1975. It would confirm 
that inflation expectations have become more and more adaptive 
and rational and that as a result)employment effects arising 
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out of monetary changes are more and more short-lived(28). 
Monetary policy seems to be rapidly diminishing its effect-
iveness in influencing real economic variables implying that 
monetary policy autonomy and nominal exchange rate fixity are 
no longer important except on price level stability. This in 
turn is a stDoOg argument for a European MU. 
The final comments concentrate on the NRU. Its stability 
has been put into question. This equilibrium level is obtained 
from the grinding out of various demand and supply functions 
within a general equilibrium Walrasian system, provided that 
the characteristics of the labour and commodity markets, 
including market imperfections) are included in it. Goodhart 
(1975, pp 214-21) argues that under the current conditions of 
uncertainty, economies do not proximate to such a system. 
Forces determining the NRU are many and various. For the 
monetarist, Walrasian equilibrium will emerge from actual 
labour and commodity markets with their imperfections. Others 
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argue that imperfections are precisely deviations from the con- 1 
ditions necessary to achieve equilibrium. Monetarists on the otherl 
I hand assert that it is for this reason, because current theory is 1 
incomplete and unsatisfactory in an economy characterised by 
a mixture of competitive and monopolistic elements, that fine 
tuning should not be pursued and steady monetary and fiscal 
policies should be announced long in advance and strictly 
adhered to. The many forces determining the NRU could render 
it unstable. A steady monetary policy would reduce inflationary 
expectations, trade union militancy and excessive wage increases 
and avoid rising unemployment, reducing a great element of 
NRU instability. The relevant question is what one should 
deduce from the long-run relationship between money and prices. 
On this view, higher unemployment costs to reduce inflation 
, 
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are transitional since at the end the unemployment rate 
established will be the NRU. The question is at which level 
Is this NRU. If it is low then any costs will be transitional. 
But if it is high a member may be forced to maintain the same 
trends with the rest of the members. As an independent 
country, in view of domestic pressures, it might prefer to 
establish a lower rate and suffer higher and increasing 
inflation rates which go with it. In the EEC the NRU is 
estimated to be equal to 2.9 percent and even less for Germany 
and france, see Duck, Parkin, Rose, Zis (1974). It was found 
surprisingly low, 1.7 percent, for the UK, see Parkin-Summer-
Zis (1974). Goodhart (1975, p 220) suggests that it has risen 
in the seventies. SpitHller (1971) estimates the EEC figure 
close to 5-6 percent. These measures though, are based on 
rather arbitrary assumptions about productivity levels. 
Obtaining firstly estimates about productivity, Presley and 
Dennis (1976, pp 88-93) estimate the NRU) which is as low as 
2.07 percent for the UK and as high as 6.8 and 9.3 percent for 
the Netherlands and Denmark respectively. The EEC average is 
4.6 percent. Another question has to do uith the transitional 
costs, apart from the NRU itself. Political pressure may not 
allow governments to incur such costs, especially on high 
inflation members, where transition may involve a recession 
lasting several years(29). Such considerations have been 
recognised even by a group of monetarists when they suggested 
less painful strategies to reduce inflation and simultaneously 
achieve the endangered European MU(30). 
Assuming that the coordination approach remains and govern-
ments behave properly in the union spirit, the major problem is 
that the resulting unemployment rate may not be satisfactory 
to the populace. Governments may hope to convince it to accept, 
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for its long-run benefit, whatever rate is consistent with 
maintaining inflation at acceptable levels. However) this 
economically acceptable level may not be so acceptable politic-
ally. Governments may be pushed to run the economy at higher 
demand levels, in the hope that an incomes and price policy 
would not raise unemployment and would also have some favourable 
effects on expectations. From the MU viewpoint it would require 
a community wide collective bargaining and incomes policy. Such 
intervention inevitably has increasingly undesirable resource 
allocation effects. Its failure would intensify them, reducing 
further efficiency and productivity, exacerbating cost-push 
inflationary pressures and would)in the end) have perverse 
effects. Attempts with such policies are not encouraging, see 
Goodhart (1975, p 228). Factors that determine the NRU could 
be deep rooted and slow changing. Intervention may only 
exacerbate industrial relations or impose a temporary and 
inefficient camouflage upon underlying conditions. If trade 
unions successfully resist necessary unemployment rises, one 
is faced with an autonomously determined trade union militancy 
and an accommodating policy that follows it. Lack of success 
on the resulting incomes policy - apart from the implications 
to a particular country - could work against the MU. It is 
necessary that more attention should be paid to the NRU. 
Policies should be undertaken to reduce it, including retraining 
schemes - for a country with structural problems - and invest-
ment management policies. Apart from the national governments, 
the EEC central body could contribute a good deal to an effect-
ive regional policy, rising employment levels,especially to 
members with potentially high transitional costs, apart from 
the reasons of imposing such policy strictly on the MU context. 
In the last decade most economies have been run at less than 
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the NRU and accelerating inflation uas experienced. The more 
stable inflation rates of 1958-69 uere experienced at 
relatively lou unemployment levels too, suggesting that most 
countries must have experienced an increase in the NRU in the 
seventies. The reversal of that increase could be sought and, 
if achieved, could certainly help the adjustment needed for a 
successful MI process in Europe. 
, 
\
:1 
; 
~ . 
· ,1 
1 
· I 
.1 
~I 
• ,I 
.:1 
'. 
..: 
. ~ 
r,; 
I 
" 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER FOUR 
- 82 -
POLICY COORDINATION AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
The creation of EMU - within the permanent objectives of 
the Rome Treaty - originated from plans to expand the EEC into 
an economic and monetary union(1). The major reasons for this 
decision were: firstly, the arguments for the creation of an 
MU analysed in chapter two. Secondly, an MU is considered the 
natural culmination of a customs union. 1968 was a crucial 
year. By that time the CU was achieved. It was felt that, 
given the high degree of interdependence, a CU alone could not 
provide long-term security to the Treaty objectives. Given 
free good and factor movement, no incentive exists for a firm 
to move to any particular country. It can produce in a certain 
part and sell its product to the rest of the union, creating 
or increasing the structural problems of certain members, 
deteriorating their objectives. Protectionist actions could 
follow, destroying the CU. An economic union would be required 
to ensure the Treaty objectives. An MU is needed too, since 
it is only within it that the convertibility of members' 
currencies at fixed exchange rates can be guaranteed, thus 
preventing money market fluctuations distorting competition and 
intra EEC trade. Thirdly, the 1968/69 European monetary crisis 
represented a serious setback in what had appeared to be a 
steady road towards integration and ultimate economic union. 
It put into jeopardy what had already been achieved, namely 
the CAP and the viability of the CU. Fourthly, the massive 
growth of capital flows across the Atlantic and the effect of 
US monetary policies on the EEe members, at moments when they 
were pursuing opposite objectives) were painful experiences. 
They suggested that dollar denominated assets and liabilities 
had become uncomfortably close substitutes for similar instru-
., 
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ments denominated in European currencies. EEC members appeared 
to have lost much of their monetary autonomy. A closer link-up .1 
of European financial markets and/or loosening the fixed rate 
relationship to the dollar was expected to weaken the impact 
of future changes in US monetary conditions in Europe. 
4. A. .!he ,Eolicy_ Coo.!din~tio!! ~p.Er~a.Eh 
i.A • .!. .tlo.!!eta.!y_Polic~ 
Members would have to harmonise monetary expansion rates 
ex ante at a rate which, given the output growth level, would 
, 
be consistent with price stability to bring long-run intra-
EEC exchange rate fixity without recourse to foreign exchange 
intervention. Exchange rates are not directly pegged, but 
relative money supply targets are. Care should be taken that 
such rates do not impair growth in the union either through a 
general inflation rise or rising recession. Ex ante target 
setting gives full information on central bank behaviour, 
reducing the biggest single uncertainty in the system. 
Inflationary expectations as well as the demand for credit 
are affected by announcing long-range monetary targets. A 
commitment - absence of discretion - to a stated evolution in 
monetary growth would enlist the competitive forces of the 
market on the government side. Market behaviour is based on 
expectations about inflation and government policy. If these 
expectations are clearly defined the market system would help 
to iron out distortions rather than create them. 
With respect to the instruments used to assume a stable 
secular monetary growth, open market operations are preferable. 
They ·occurat the Bank' s discretion, can be executed smoothly 
and need not particularly influence one sector of the economy 
more than another. AlternativelY,the rediscounting mechanism 
on bills or bonds would require a continuous manipulation of 
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the discount rate for monetary control. The discretionary 
behaviour of private market operators is important. The 
question is how the appropriate degree of money supply control 
is to be obtained. One view is to control the rate of growth 
of the monetary base. Authorities often lack the means to 
achieve an effective control over broader definitions. The 
MB should be used because its secular growth is strongly 
correlated with the long-run growth in other monetary aggregates. 
By operating on the MB authorities should seek to ensure the 
desired growth of whichever monetary aggregate they consider 
most appropriate. Further, it would seem that the Bank is in 
a position to control its own liabilities and thus the money 
stock. The MB is correlated to other aggregates only in the 
absence of major regulatory changes in reserve requirements, 
effective interest rate ceilings or significant growth in 
unregulated financial intermediaries. Lack of such correlation 
due to the existence of these factors has been suggested for 
the UK case, see Foot, Goodhart and Hotson (1979, pp 151-2). 
The greater emphasis on M8 control could result in massive 
and potentially unstable interest rate movements in the absence 
of central bank intervemioo to ameliorate such fluctuations. 
Heavy financial market pressure could result. A more relaxed 
MB version could be suggested giving sufficient adjustment 
time for the banking system to absorb the shocks. On the other 
hand, although to a lesser extent, expectations may not evolve 
in a desirable way. 
The UK seems to present a good example on the M8 debate. 
The competition and credit control document (1971), shifted 
the focus from credit towards broader monetary aggregates~~) 
Minimum reserve ratios were established on banks and credit 
allocation was to be determined by the level and structure of 
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interest rates. The weakness of the system soon became 
ap~nt. The Bank introduced the supplementary special Deposit 
Scheme (SSDS), Dec '73J and used it frequently up to Mar 20, '80. 
It was a partial retreat from allocation by interest rates 
alone. It resulted in serious distortions as banks tried to 
avoid penalties under the SSDS restrictions. The M3 measure 
of monetary aggregate behaviour had been downgraded. Also 
the assets ratio distorted the yield relationships between 
short-term assets qualifying as reserve assets and others. 
This helped to inhibit the development of a broader market in 
short-term public sector debt which might otherwise contribute 
to a better control. 
It would then seem more effective if authorities undertook 
the necessary measures for a direct control on money supply 
operating on the liabilities side of banks , balance sheets. MB 
.'/ "," 
use, under a stable money supply growth to bank reserve growth 
ratios, could enable them to exercise close control of money sup-
, 
,~ 
, 
ply target~, while avoiding the problems which arose in open market 
operations because of short-term targets, see-Lomax (1979, pp 4-5).: 
It could provide them with information to respond more quickly 
to diverging monetary trends and allow them to control the 
volume of debt sales to the non-bank public more closely and. 
effectively, achieving also a smoother pattern, since M3 control 
involves sufficient debt sales to offset factors such as the 
PSD, tending to augment monetary growth(3,4), see Banker (1979, 
p 21), Wood (1979). Under MB use, interest rates would be 
altered continuously, adding another criticism to the system. 
Experience for the UK houeve~ indicates that its interest rate 
performance in recent years uas not stable, even when compared 
with countries such as Germany and Switzerland, which apply 
MB systems. One could say though that this is a consequence 
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of the fact that no monetary system can cope adequately with 
problems caused by fundamentally inflationary policies pursued 
by the authorities. Therefore short-term interest rates might 
be volatile, but under MB policy, authorities could indulge in 
smoothing operations. 
Finally) simulation models also indicate that) despite a 
greater interest rate volatilit~ speculative flows have a 
lower impact on spot exchange rate volatility under MB control, 
than when policies are conducted in terms of interest rate 
targets, see de Grauwe (1978, p 25). 
The stability of the demand for money function is another 
major prerequisite for a successful targeting. This question 
is analysed on the EEC section, see pp 89-99. 
~.~ • .E.. £i.,!!c,!!l_Polic.l 
By incorporating the government budget constraint in 
Keynesian models of income determination, one can account for 
the monetary repercussions of fiscal policy action. Even in 
the absence of discretionary fiscal policy, moreover, such a 
constraint highlights the repercussions of pure monetary actions 
on the budgetary balance. 
This constraint is the missing link closing the relation-
ship between the public sector and the rest of the economy. 
In a closed econom~ it implies that total expenditure by the 
public sector has to be equal to total financing available 
from taxes, new government bonds and net MB creation. It 
imposes a restriction on government freedom to choose arbitrary 
values for policy variables(5). The outcome of fiscal policy 
is not independent of monetary policy. The constraint can be 
written as follows: 
G + P + T = dB + dH 
where G is the public sector expenditure, P is the interest 
.' 
,.1 
... 
t 
" . 
I' 
- 87 -
payment on outstanding debt held by the public, T is the 
public sector taxes, B is the net public holding of government 
debt, and H is the MB. 
Changes in government deficit cause changes in either MB 
or privately held bonds or both, depending on the way the budget 
is financed. Changes in bonds affect interest rates resulting 
in crowding out private expenditum. If the deficit is 
financed through MB expansion, the dependence of the fiscal 
stimulus on accommodating policy is evident. Apart from fiscal ~I 
and monetary interdependence in the context of macroeconomic 
stabilisation, it also suggests that a condition for full long-
run equilibrium in a static model is that dH/dt = dB/dt = 0 
suggesting a long-run balanced budget. Moving now to the 
relevant case of an open economY,and having'in mind a group of 
such economies aiming at creating an MU, the question is what 
link exists, if any, between fiscal stabilisation, budgetary 
deficits and exchange rate fixity among the members. Given the 
importance of correct monetary targets one can see the danger 
that fiscal policy implies with regard to such policy. What 
is of importance is how a deficit is financed. Inadequate 
bond finance could lead to net money creation which could 
result in monetary target overshooting. Such a contribution 
could continue for long periods. further, uhile in the long-
run the XB structure is determined by the private sector's 
desire to hold various assets and currency, in the short-run 
the Ilportfolio approach" - an extension of Mundell's theory on 
international adjustment mechanism that incorporates both stocks 
and flous - puts emphasis on the overall government budget 
policy(6). A fiscal-monetary policy that is not in line with 
the private sector's desire to accumulate money or with the 
foreign sector's desire to accumulate the country's money as 
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international reserves, must produce a loss in reserves. An 
external deficit results. This loss cannot be sustained in 
the long-run and the government would have either to reduce 
the deficit or increase bond finance, accepting interest rate 
rises, although a small country cannot fl~t unlimited quantities 
of bonds. One can see a shift of emphasis from fiscal stabil-
isation policy)which deals with the problem of maintaining IB) 
towards a government budgetary policy consistent with the 
objective of securing intra-union exchange rate fixity. The 
implication is that harmonisation of budgetary policies between 
member states should become a major preoccupation. 
Another problem seems to be created here. Existing 
regional imbalances or the ones likely to arise out of 
coordination have to be dealt with; otherwise countries may 
not participate. In the absence of fiscal policy flexibility 
and adequate labour mobility, it is argued that excess supply 
of labour would tend to acquire strong and disruptive regional 
connotations, see Magnifico (1973), Masera (1975). Historical 
experience indicates that fiscal policies might well be left 
to local-national control, subject to dismantling all fiscal 
frontiers that could reduce market integration(7). However, 
even in the framework of policy conclusions reached above, 
national governments could still influence the timing and 
geographical distribution of aggregate demand and activity. 
The same instruments remain available. The only restriction 
is that the PSO be financed by loans at the going market 
interest rate, and provided that long-run equilibrium conditions) 
which derive from the budget constraint and the need for intra-
union exchange rate fix1t~ are not violated. 
We turn now to the question of fiscal influence, which 
refers to the right dosage of fiscal stimulus to achieve the 
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desired demand level. There is a debate on its necessity and 
effectiveness. The monetarist approach attaches importance 
only to monetary policy. It takes an essentially long-run 
view. However in the real world frequent shocks take place, 
interfering with the adjustment process or disturbing an .1 
equilibrium. The once-and-for-all adjustment to price stability 
does not seem to hold. Continuous attempts to keep price 
stability could involve significant costs. In the continuing 
presence of such shocks, where one may not be able to speak of 
a long-run adjustment process but rather a succession of 
medium terms, fiscal influence may be relevant. Monetarists 
assume that in case fiscal policy is not accompanied by 
accommodating monetary polic~ it will not be able to influence 
the real output or the price level. On this offsetting between 
private and public activity Blinder and Solow (1973, pp 52-5, 
32-3) demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that 
under a bond financed deficit, by making more realistic 
assumptions about interest elasticity of investment and money 
demand and on the wealth effects on the demand for money and 
consumption, the more plausible possibility is for an expan-
sionary effect. But it may not" in all cases) be expansionary 
enough to bring convergence towards a balanced budget equilib-
rium and close the budgetary gap. While empirical work does 
not seem to be conclusive - Balassa (1976), Modigliani and Ando 
(1976) - it would appear that in the medium term both policies 
could matter and while they are not necessarily equally suit-
able to achieve a certain objective, they may be complementary 
in their economic effects. One would then suggest that the 
size of the PSD should be agreed too, apart from the way to 
finance it. At the same time) it seems that this size has to 
do with crowding out effects, when it is large. Excessive 
" , 
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borrowing could imply abnormally high interest rates holding 
back private investment. It could also imply more inflation 
in the future, even if it is bond financed. Further, govern-
ment expenditure is usually less productive increasing consump-
tion shares at the expense of investment. There are also 
reasons why authorities cannot hope to vary this size for the 
purpose of achieving some desired monetary aggregate growth, 
see Goodhart (1975, pp 156-60). 
In a recession) a budget deficit is created or increased 
by low tax receipts and high government spending. Some increase 
in PSD as a percentage to the national income may be consistent 
with the maintenance of a given monetary target and without 
putting much pressure on interest rates. It should be 
reconciled with the monetary target and price stability object-
ives of the medium term strategy. In the long-run, the target 
should be for a balanced budget for each member. 
4.B. lh~ Ca~e_o! !h~ fULo£e~n_E£onomi£ £o~mQnit~ 
The Barre report (1969), argued for more effective consult-
ation procedures, policy coordination and gradual exchange 
rate fixity. The Werner report (Oct, B, 1970) embraced and 
extended these ideas(8). EMU was to be achieved gradually in 
three stages by 1980. The coordination process implied EEC 
level consultations on drawing up monetary policies, national 
budgets, public spending, taxation and budget finance methods. 
Power over policies would later be transformed to the community. 
Monetary and credit policy centralisation would take place and 
external monetary policy would be decided at the EEC level. 
Harmonisation could imply the establishment of free factor 
mobility, similarity in tax structure instruments and identical 
interest rate levels. Parliamentary control would secure it. 
Intra-EEC exchange rate margins would be narrowed for the first 
" , 
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stage, with subsequent further narrowing going together with 
coordination progress. 
The Council accepted the bulk of this mixture of "economist" 
and "monetarist" proposals, although the question of the fund, 
proposed by the report, was not settled but left for further 
investigation,due to disputes between the two groups)although 
the mutual aid mechanism - an element of the Barre plan - was 
activated. The intra-EEC band would be narrowed to 1.2 percent 
to move within the 1.5 percent dollar band instead of the 
2 percent IMf dollar band. 
These measures, to be implemented from June 1971, were 
shelved due to the major IMS crisis. The Smithsonian agreement, 
December 1971, made the cross rates of two non-dollar currencies 
reach 9 percent. Such a degree of fluctuation was incompatible 
with the proper functioning of the intra-EEC trade, and the 
discouraging of further dollar use by European firms. The 
dollar would otherwise have become more predictable than EEC 
currencies. It would be counter to the EEC aspiration to move 
towards an MU, if the dollar were to be used in intervention. 
Apart from affecting the members' competitive conditions, the ~ 
possibility was for US to oontinue to avoid defending the new 
arrangements. Speculative flows could result and the burden 
would fallon European central banks. They would accumulate 
inconvertible dollars with no guarantee of being able to con-
vert them into other instruments. Controls could pose a threat 
to monetary truce in Europe. Lack of progress in MU could 
jeopardise the CU and CAP. 
The Euroband was finally limited to 2.25 percent. follouing 
an agreement on intervention and debt management(9). Whenever 
the strongest currency's percentage premium Over its parity 
plus the weakest currency's discount on its parity reaches the 
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2.25 limit) either one or both countries buy the weakest 
currency with the strongest one. Under debtor intervention 
the country has first to borrow from its partner) the strong 
currency needed to purchase its own weak currency, hence the 
need for the very short-term credit facility, incorporated in 
the Snake scheme. Irrespective of the kind of intervention, 
settlement is needed by which periodically - monthly in EEC -
creditor countries can exchange the accumulation of weak 
currency for a more acceptable reserve asset, and at the same 
time obtain repayment of their very short-term credits, like-
wise in terms of an acceptable asset. Settlements should be 
affected by transfers from debtors to creditors for a mixed 
bag of assets settled in proportion to the debtor's reserves. 
The trend and width of the band would be affected by the 
global EEC dollar position, the exchange position between 
members and the volume of intervention undertaken. 
It was agreed that coordination would guarantee exchange 
rate fixity and narrow exchange rate margins. The question is 
what kind of coordination was adopted. The MU envisaged by 
the WR was something more than a pseudo-exchange-rate union. 
Firstly, because it was to be achieved in three stages within 
ten years. Secondly, the first stage would be used to make 
EEC instruments more operational. Thirdly, the first stage 
should not be considered as an end objective, but should 00 
associated with a process of economic and MI, launched with 
the determination to reach the final goal. Finally, in the 
first stage consultations should be strengthened, monetary 
and fiscal coordination and harmonisation would be intensified. 
The WR e~plicitly referred to the kind of integration of 
economic policy and the establishment of rules on the implement-
ation of national policies during the first stage. This is 
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more than a pseudo-exchange-rate union is believed to 
be as it lacks explicit rules indefinitely. However) since 
such rules were to be created during the first stage, it had 
a marked degree of resemblance to the latter at that time. 
But it did not mean that it would remain like that indefinitely. 
It goes without saying that if no such integration and 
rules occur during these stages, then the European MU would) 
de facto) become a pseudo-exchange-rate union. 
i.g.~. Qi!f!c~lti~s_i~ Mo~eta£Y_P21!cy C02rdi~ati£n 
Ex ante harmonisation of monetary expansion so as to render 
exchange rates constant without recourse to intervention was 
agreed. It was decided that in 1973) the annual growth of the 
broadly defined national money supplies should be held at the 
estimated national GNP grouth plus the common target rate of 
inflation, set at 4 percent. Members would operate a sort of 
monetary aggregate target. 
Despite this agreement)there was the problem of choosing 
the appropriate aggregate to serve as a target. This was not 
solved at that time - and even in the course of Snake 
functioning - in spite of rising concentration on controlling 
such aggregates. Broad definitions uere thought by some to be 
wrongly directed. Targets should be set for the MB for each 
member. Others did not find a close relationship between MB 
and broader definitions, which led them to propose target 
setting in terms of the latter. A variety of targets were used 
reflecting largely differences in institutional arrangements, 
substitutability of financial assets and economic openness, 
see Balassa (1977, p 95). Certain members were not even able 
to use definitions such as MB, M1, M2, M3. These disparities 
were later recognised by the Community, 1977, when it stated 
that quantitative guidelines should be defined according to 
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the monetary policy instruments available to each member and 
if possible to concentrate on more than one of these aggregates 
so as to reduce the chances of evasion by manipulating a 
particular aggregate. 
Other technical difficulties suggested that it may not be 
a simple matter to define ex ante consistent targets. No 
systematic studies existed on the stability of the demand for 
money function either at that time or even nowadays. Evidence 
for the UK suggested that it is relatively stable in the long-
run although in the short-run its stability is questionable, 
see Kavanagh and Walters (1960), Goodhart and Crockett (1970), 
Laidler and Parkin (1970), Haache (1974). Experience shows 
that major institutional changes am likely to be associated 
with shifts in the demand function. Coghlan (1978) points out 
that this is the case for the UK since 1970. An OECD study 
(1979) which includes the four major EEC members covering the 
period 1960-77 suggests that M1 definitions perform better 
only for the UK and Germany. Such evidence is not reassuring 
and disturbances from recent years have rather confused the 
picture. McClam's study (1978) points out that monetary 
targeting is likely to be more difficult in the EEC than in 
the US, and would appear unlikely to remove income fluctuations 
adequately, except perhaps in France and the UK. Money 
supply adjustment to offset shifts in the demand for money 
function could pose a number of difficulties implying target 
breaching. Operating a more flexible policy ~ range of targets _ 
could probably weaken the beneficial expectationsl effect of 
targeting. Oifficulties exist also in distinguishing the 
causes of demand shifts. 
More refined studies are required for all EEC countries to 
obtain the information required on monetary aggregate projections. 
, 
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Community efforts are lacking. Results on the demand for money 
stability depend on the country's particular characteristics 
making the whole effort even more difficult. They could 
differ substantially between members. OECD results suggest that 
significant differences exist among the four major members. 
Estimations of the elasticity of the demand for real balances 
uith respect to real income suggest that)if real growth is 
running parallel in the four countries at 5 percent per annum 
and inflation rates are also simila~ the real-money stock ·growth 
compatible with stable interest rates and exchange rates varies 
from 4.5 in France to 13 percent in Italy under M1 and from 
6 to 13 percent under M2. While more studies are needed, it 
can be seen how difficult it is to define a priori compatible 
policies. A rough parallelism in the observed growth rates of 
monetary aggregates offers no guarantee of exchange market 
stability. 
There are also problems on the money supply side. Countries 
like Belgium and Denmark do not use monetary targets. Among 
other reasons they feel that their vulnerability to external 
disturbances and the possible need to give priority to interest 
rate adjustments) weights more against a commitment to specific 
targets~ in favour of maintaining fixed exohange rates(10). 
There are also problems on short-term targeting if one is to 
take into account the extent of market limitations on debt 
management and open market operations. 
The conclusion would seem to be that it is dIfficult to 
define a priori compatible monetary policies and that the 
community needed, and still needs, much more analytical work 
to develop a solid basis for ex ante evaluation of compatible 
announced targets and continuous monitoring of current policies. 
Under these circumstances, where coordination was far from 
\ 
· 
.' 
· 1 
"I 
• 1 
- 96 -
effective, the narrowing of intra-EEC exchange rate fluctuations 
would seem to be of questionable durability. ThereforeJif 
exchange rate arrangements are to be kept, intervention might 
have to take place in the future, until the above condition 
is fulfilled. The situation would de facto seem to bear more 
resemblance to McKinnon's solution (1977), where authorities 
attempt to define both ex ante monetary policy coordination 
and ex ante exchange rate arrangements. When money supply 
targets turn out to be inconsistent, official intervention 
would take place to keep them within the targets. It may 
appear contradictory to have also an exchange rate target, 
since it would seem that one cannot control both. On the other 
hand) to focus on intervention alone to peg exchange rates may 
prove a weak arrangement. Countries may not allow reserve 
changes and undertake parity changes instead. Further, even 
despite intervention, suspicion of the given currency would 
continue and the country could, for example, lose the bulk of 
its reserves and at the end change its parity. At that stage 
therefore, where despite the problems members wanted to move 
towards MI, consistent monetary targets should be arranged to 
reduce considerable uncertainty. Intervention should take 
place in case such arrangements prove inconsistent. Countries 
should then change their monetary targets until the basis for 
ex ante compatibility of announced targets is established. 
Intervention, unless for reasons of a different nature)would 
be eliminated. In view of lack of studies and preparation on 
the subject)a time consuming process would be needed to 
accomplish this objective. What is important though, is that 
until that time comes, consequent adjustments on monetary 
targets should be accepted. Monetary arrangements combined 
with exchange rate ones should avoid interference or inflation-
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ary bias, with undesirable implications for the members and 
the MU, because monetary and exchange rate policy would be 
predetermined by consent(11). 
The obligation to intervene in order to prevent exchange 
·1 
rate deviations beyond preannounced limi ts implies changes in 'I 
" 
national money supplies. Indee~such intervention is undertaken 1 
to correct the money supply level. Short-run monetary expansion 
or contraction should not be sterilized, since here the object-
ive is to keep the exchange rate targets. The application of 
sterili%ation policy could result in failure in maintaining 
certain exchange rate targets, see chapter two, pp 45-8. 
Disequilibrium in the markets could remain and necessitate 
even higher exchange rate adjustment. While the rationale of 
using it has often been that it isolates domestic money markets 
from destabilising external influences, an important source of 
instability seems to be sterili~ation policies themselves(12). 
Using McKinnon's analysis (1977, pp 45-6) in terms of the 
MB some general conclusions can be reached: assuming no direct 
FEM intervention, each national MB expands pari-passu with 
expansion in domestic credit from its central bank(13). The 
question is)how fast central banks should expand credit. 
Firstly) it should be kept in mind that maintenance of fixed 
exchange rates implies that prices of tradeables would be tied 
together across borders although national CPls need not move 
in unison. The rule governing the secular increase in the 
domestic nominal stock of money) would be one which equals the 
projected increase in the domestic money supply to the projected 
increase in real GNP) plus the expected percentage change in the 
GNP price deflator, assuming tradeable goods prices were approxim-
ately constant. Having each bank expand credit smoothly ) as 
described above)could ensure that relative exchange rates do 
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not move persistently in one or other direction)and the action 
of speculators, by having full infor~ation on central bank 
behaviour, could become of a more stabilising character. Any 
inconsistency on money supply growth rates with exchange rate 
targets set, would result in non-sterili~ing intervention. If 
the domestic central bank credit is set at a secular growth 
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path, it can be expected that FEM intervention will dominate 
short-run money supply changes. This is in accordance with 
consistent monetary behaviour. If the expansion of the domestic , 
MB component approximates the long-run demand for MB in the 
economy, then the foreign reserve component will fluctuate 
'. 
according to short-run changes in the domestic demand for the ~ 
M8. The harshness of the short-run adjustment to imbalances 
in international payments could be ameliorated through various 
channels, see McKinnon (1977, pp 51-4). 
Concluding, it could be said that intervention in the lack 
of coordination would be a futile process in terms of prevent-
ing exchange rate changes. The MU would be ~eplaced by 
a pseudo-exchange-rate union with parity realignments)whose 
frequency would depend on the degree of divergence among the 
economies and on the frequency of external shocks falling on 
diverging economies. Given that effective coordination would 
take time, economies were diverging and apart from general 
guidelines no specific rules were established, the possibility 
of realignments could not be excluded. The important point 
though)is that such realignments should become less frequent 
in the course of time along with economic convergence. The 
effect of external shocks could serve as a major test, at a 
moment of time. The need to intervene for quite some time in 
the future and the necessity of the non-sterili~ing rule implies 
that this policy may not be compatible with strict monetary 
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targetry. Control has to be directed more towards domestic 
credit growth. This would ensure that monetary growth is 
controlled in the union group as a whole. 
Finally)it is not only money supply that matters. The 
factors that could disturb or even jeopardise the coordination 
process, have been analysed earlier, see chapter three pp 64-7. 
4.~.~. [i~c~I_P~lic~ 
The WR provided for fiscal coordination and harmonisation. 
Howeves it did not spell out in detail the reasons why fiscal 
policies are important. An answer was attempted above, while 
here)we deal with the possibility of transferring fiscal policy 
at the union level. Such a case has been put forward)within 
the concept of federalism) which argues for stabilisation policy 
at the union level, given that the scope for an active counter-
cyclical policy tends to be highly restricted for governments 
of small and highly open jurisdictions, see Oates (1976). 
Federalist arguments are relevant on the direct and indirect 
effect on aggregate demand and employment, while the close 
connection between fiscal and monetary stabilisation pointed 
out above is important for its implications on net wealth 
effects and the XB. 
A community fiscal policy is a key element in any MI 
program. The link between fiscal and monetary stabilisation 
policy implies that proposals for fiscal anti cyclical action 
become fully effective when they are supported by community 
control over monetary conditions. The community could not 
have adequate debt-financing power and mechanisms for anti-
cyclical budgetary policy in case capital markets and monetary 
conditions are under national control. Howeve~ community debt 
issuing and management policy could play an important role in 
the creation of a truly European capital market, a major step 
I 
'I 
I 
J 
4 I 
1 
- 100 -
forward in the direction of MI. A Community fiscal stabilisation 
policy requires occasional deficit financing and burden 
distribution of the resulting government debt. If monetary 
policies remain national, it is rather unrealistic to expect 
governments to finance Community fiscal initiatives through 
monetary expansion. Debt financing entails difficulties. 
Issuing debt and interfering strongly in the capital market 
could affect national monetary control. If bonds are floated 
on separate national markets much depends on goodwill and 
policies of national monetary authorities. If national monetary 
conditions diffe~the amount allocated on each market is 
important. Under these circumstances a community debt manage-
ment policy - implied by a credible and workable community 
fiscal stabilisation policy - can be operated successfully 
only in conjunction with effective monetary arrangements between 
members. 
4.B.c. ImElic~tio~s 
The narrowing of exchange rate margins had various implic-
ations referring mainly to reserves, the dollar role, interest 
rates and the adjustment burden. 
Reserves are needed for exchange rate stabilisation. Grubel 
(1973, pp 357-9) argues on the social productivity costs 
incurred, justified on the grounds that social production is 
attached to them because their use buys stability. The union 
"internalises" dynamic externalities. 
The use and predominance of the dollar as an intervention 
currency internationally and in transactions for private use 
was due to various reasons, see Strange (1979). On its 
intervention and reserve use the EEC exchange rate narrowing 
uould become relevant only if it was coupled with EEC currencies 
instead o~ or in conjunction uith,dollar intervention. EEC 
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members could hold EEC currencies as reserves and third 
country central banks might find interest in holding them too. 
US monetary policy dominance could be reduced internationally(14). 
It was finally agreed that dollar intervention would only take 
place when the Snake hit the tunnel while intervention inside 
it would be in terms of EEC currencies. Discretionary power 
on the kind of intervention was curtailed and it was to be 
seen whether members would abide by that. The Ansiaux report 
(1970) put emphasis on the need for intervention only in dollars) 
at least in the initial stages. Liquidity threats existed too 
under a possible EEC currency reserve role with likely 
destabilising effects, given the vulnerability existing in 
speculative shifts between currencies(15). Williamson (1977, 
p 80) on the other hand explains why intervention in EEC 
currencies would be necessary for the exchange rate arrange-
ments to be maintained. 
However)despite these measums, success would very much 
depend on outside pressure on the entire bloc, if one was to 
realise that major currencies were highly susceptible to fund 
flows in and out of dollars and given the semi-integrated state 
of the EEC, with OM being more preferable than other currencies. 
Continuous desire to, say, go out of dollars, with or without 
the tunnel, could lead to pressures inside the Snake, realign-
ments and/or controls or even break down of the arrangement. 
Success of the Snake arrangements would be for EEC currencies 
to move closely together, without intervention, against the 
dollar and the task of smoothing out any day to day fluctuations 
within the Snake would be fairly easy. The bloc would move up 
and down but changes in the bloc would be modest, evened out 
by small intervention amounts. EEC exchange rate stability 
and dollar stability would seem to go together. One would be 
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difficult to achieve without the other. Stability would very 
much depend on cooperation between both sides of the Atlantic 
(16) 
on exchange rate policy • EEC exchange rate'stability would be 
a part of a worldwide stability problem. A common EEC stance 
on external challenges would simplify the problem of inter-
national negotiations and adjustment. 
Howeve~ the reality was that, apart from the US attitude, 
there had been opposing views within the EEC on how the Snake 
should operate reflecting not only XB positions but also differ-
ing economic philosophies. The EEC dollar level would not be 
wholly determined by market forces and agreement on the 
appropriate level might not be a simple matter. The Ansiaux 
report foresaw this by suggesting that for the establishment of. the 
EEC dollar level, reserve changes experienced by members and 
the direction and size of the EEC XB vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world should be considered. Given the conditions required until 
an MU is achieved)all difficulties for exchange rate fixity in 
the EEe stemmed from the different national economic situations 
making certain member currencies more preferable than others, 
which could be intensified under a dollar crisis(17). 
The narrowing could raise the sensitivity of interest rate 
differentials. Capital flow responsiveness to interest rate 
differentials is enhanced under fixed exchange rates, see 
Crockett (1977, pp 150-166). Due to the repercussions of such 
increased sensitivity the scope for national independent 
monetary policies would be reduced(1B). It was doubted though} 
if such sensitivity would be higher than that of such differ-
entials between any EEC member and the Eurodollar market given 
} 
that margins were narrowed to levels applicable to dollar 
rates(19). 
It was argued that margin narrowing reduces the potential 
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of exchange rate recovery by affecting the volume of stabilis-
ing short-term flows. Under confidence crises such a reduction 
would be intensified. Lambert and de Fontenay (1971) explain 
why such an implication would result only as far as EEC 
speculators are concerned dealing with EEC currencies. Currency 
instability could result. Huge sums could be paid out to 
reduce it, due to attractive dual speculative opportunities 
created by multi-currency intervention. If one accepts the 
dollar as a numeraire, speculators make profit on both their 
short position with respect to an EEC currency, say Lira, and 
long position on another, say the OM. However) the narrowing 
was expected to reduce speculation) relieving the authorities 
from frustration of their monetary control. 
Under the arrangements members may not be able to use their 
full allowable fluctuation margin ~ainst the dollar. In contrast 
to the EEC as a whole each member would loose part of its 
exchange rate flexibility vis-a-vis EEC and third currencies. 
Hence some of the Smithsonian exchange rate flexibility would 
be nullified(20). 
The motivation of the Bretton Woods system was to promote 
integration by keeping costs of exchange rate uncertainty at 
a low level. Truly fixed exchange rates imply approximate 
inflation equality among countries and dependent monetary 
policies. However, they have suffered major drawbacks(21). It 
is suggested - Vaubel (1979, p 17), Korteweg (1979, pp 33-5) _ 
that a parity system can function consistently only if there 
is a dominant currency. If anything it will be smaller 
countries adjusting to larger ones. The dominant currency 
role would be performed by the largest economy currency in the 
region, for the Snake the OM, because the largest economy and 
its currency tend to count for the large~ part of transactions 
~" 
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of smaller countries and because being least open vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world)it can best afford to adopt a passive 
policy. But since benefits from exchange rate constancy are 
not fully internalised by the dominant currency countr~ it 
may not carry out policies acceptable to all group members(22). 
It could mean high adjustment costs for high inflation countries 
and high gains to the pivot country. Risks would remain as 
long as governments retained the right to opt out of the agree-
ment. However voluntarily such a dominant currency could be 
accepted by smaller members, both economic and political 
reasons would lead major ones to opt out, especially in the 
absence of effective regional policies. The adjustment burden 
was an important question. BWS demonstrated that such a burden 
fell on deficit countries. Germany had declared that it would 
not accept more inflation for the sake of exchange rate constancy 
in Europe. A deflationary bias in the Snake could then be 
encouraged. Members should undertake consistent policies to 
bring genuine exchange rate fixity. A Derman surplus out of 
consistent policies compared to those of other members would 
mean that the latter should impose such policies too, since 
it is the condition of success for the exchange rate arrange-
ment. Surplus members though, should make their contribution 
to adjustment within the limits imposed by these policies. In 
the absence of effective measures one is faced with massive 
speculative flows, encouraged by the band existence, large 
scale intervention and abrupt parity changes and/or controls. 
If parities are adjusted) especially with considerable and 
unnecessary delay, expectations of all those who based their 
plans on the government's promise to maintain parities are not 
fulfilled. Exchange risk is the consequence of national 
monetary sovereignty and any government pledging parity fixity 
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uithout giving part of its monetary autonomy makes a promise 
uhich it cannot fulfil. Once parities have been adjusted a 
number of times they tend to be distrusted, even where they 
happen to be durable, so that their declared purpose, namely 
reduction of risks and costs as obstacles to world transactions, 
is not attained. If at the same time the probability of controls 
increases, the risk barrier may in fact be raised by the fixing 
of parities. If finally new controls are introduced, exchange 
'I 
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rate stabili ty is bought by economic disintegration, misallocat- "1 
ing resources internationally. ..I 
4.8.£. Te£h~i£a! Ar£a~g~m~nts 
These refer to the kind of exchange rate flexibility adopted, 
the offsetting mechanism and the degree of multilateralisation 
as uell as the method of debt settlement. 
The intra-EEC exchange rate margin determined the degree of 
flexibility among member currencies. Looking at the long-run 
commitment to complete fixity) the task should be on the short 
and medium run action to make convergence towards such a long-
run goal credible. It would require a delicate balance between 
limiting central rate changes to a range that ensures enough 
discipline to lead to inflation rate convergence)and not post-
poning such changes so much as to lead to loss of credibility 
in their maintenance. Success would require sufficient short-
run realism to avoid an inflexibility that would, given the 
scope for harmonisation in practice, only lead to currency 
crises, combined with a credible long-term commitment to fixity. 
The disadvantages of the band approach have been analysed by 
Machlup (1973), Balassa (1975), Magnifico (1973, pp 85-133), 
Goodhart (1975, pp 302, 309). A crawling peg system was thought 
to be more appropriate avoiding disruptions, see also Williamson 
(1965). The need for discipline would still force authorities 
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to avoid excessive inflation. Coordination pressures would 
remain high, since each member's action should be such as to 
avoid harmful effects elsewhere and since it is proposed only 
for a transitory period before the establishment of a complete 
MU. The MI efforts should not be undermined and a diminishing 
rate of crawl should be the objective. Other reasons to 
enforce integration exist too, see Balassa (1975, pp 216-7). 
Events also would not seem to suggest that it provides less 
incentive for coordination than the adjustable peg, which inter-
fered with the CAP operation, making a-=-greement on other policies 
difficult'also. It created distortions in intra-EEC trade 
as well as in resource allocation between agriculture and 
industry. The MCA system invented - see Shone (1980) - put 
the adjustment burden from exchange rate changes to the 
industrial sector, reducing also the effectiveness of exchange 
rate changes to bring XE. With respect to the CAP, changes 
under the crawling peg, although frequent, would be small and 
at fixed time periods. Members would have time to undertake 
the necessary adjustment, which may be small without the 
prevalence of disturbances. It also had the advantage of 
preventing disturbances from accumulating, preventing possible 
large parity changes that could create crises oi a possible 
blow. It would rather be facilitated under the circumstances 
where the exchange rate instrument was still needed, being 
more consistent with its aims, see Bloomfield (1973, p 27). 
Agreement on crawling peg would necessitate central bank 
cooperation, so as to support decisions taken on it and smooth 
out fluctuations, due to non-recurring flows, without attempt-
ing to move against the trend(24). Also,possible deflationary 
measures could be reduced, since the exchange rate instrument _ 
even in its limited use - would not cease to exist. The 
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necessity for fiscal coordination and harmonisation would be 
facilitated. Members should accept more of it improving 
resource allocation. Other controls could also be avoided(25). 
However)members were not enthusiastic in accepting the 
implied rules. This sort of discipline would affect the degree 
of autonomy they wanted to maintain, see Wortmann(1973, p 131-3), 
Williamson (1977, p 64). At the end there was still the 
problem of how to assure parity adjustment in case parities 
become unrealistic. Parity changes would still be determined 
by men who pussibly could not make up their minds as to the 
appropriateness and timing of parity changes. 
Turning now to the offsetting mechanism bilateral compensa-
tion operations were allowed to be carried out to the extent 
that they were reciprocal transactions. The more frequent the 
reversal in balances and the closer the network of foreign 
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exchange operations the greater the efficacy of the offsetting '! 
m~chanism. Postponement in the settlement of their operations 
as a technical means for carrying out offsetting operations 
was for the purpose of cancelling out with subsequent operations 
of the opposite sign. Its effectiveness would rise by aiming 
at a multilateral offsetting mechanism, see Masera (1973), the 
most efficient being the one expressed either in EEC currencies 
or in dollars by providing the Fund with reserves which would 
utilise these sums to make the necessary settlement. It would 
also link the short-term monetary support mechanism (STMSM) with 
the very shtirt-term credit mechanism (VSTCM), see Tsoukalis (1977, 
pp 142-50), both deciding and carrying out support operations. It 
would bring forth more efficient reserve harmonisation instead 
of the approach envisaged by the agreement where it was a by-
product of reimbursement of financing. Reserve pooling was 
connected to 'credit expansion with the known division between 
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debtors and creditors and the latter's preference for bilateral 
credits. 
The limited Fund role, finally adopted, would make it 
simply an agent facilitating Snake operations and administer-
ing the operation of the short-term credit mechanism. 
Those who favoured an autonomous Fund role, bringing true 
multilateralisation, insisted that the Snake necessitated an 
effective STMSM. Debt settlement would also be facilitated 
and community responsibility would be extended to dollar inter-
vention resulting in risk pooling. By receiving dollars and 
issuing units of account, it could be seen as a first step 
towards the final objective of placing all intervention under 
EEC responsibility. The unit of account could ultimately lead 
to a fully fledged European currency managed by a European 
central bank. National central banks did not seem to be will-
ing to give up control of their assets and the loss of national 
monetary independence implied. A driving force towards policy 
coordination was therefore shelved. "Economist" arguments 
were used for opposing pooling. France opposed it on sover-
eignty grounds, whereas Italy being faced with pressures to 
remain in the Snake supported community responsibility. 
The method of debt settlement had inherent problems due 
to IMS events and the instability of an inconvertible dollar, 
given the different reserve preferences. Fortunately this 
method was suspended, see Masera (1973, pp 279). Gold at that 
time was a problem. Had there not been such a huge discrepancy 
between the official and private market price, had not gold 
become frozen, the EEC) in trying to lessen its dependence on 
the dollar and yet unable to create its own common currency 
would have had a common monetary medium freely available for 
use on the intra-EEC settlements. The world - central banks and 
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individuals -were not quite ready to do without gold. Members 
against the deposit of gold as collateral would be credited by 
the Fund with units of account. 
!.~.£. Th£ ~PEr~a£h_t~ ~Q and £o~cludi~g_R£m~r~s 
The gradualistic approach to MU is justified if one is to 
realise that coordination takes time to become effective. Other 
reasons offer justification for such an approach too, see If 
Vaubel (1979, pp 28-9). 
In the WR there was the principle of parallelism. Both 
monetary and economic policy coordination decisions should take 
place simultaneously. But while decisions on the monetary 
field are of a rather automatic nature, this does not apply 
to economic integration. Even if consultation procedures are " 
strengthened, one does not necessarily arrive at compatible 
national objectives. The official approach to EMU was rather 
unbalanced, since de facto it could be possible that the 
monetary measures taken could not be followed by adequate 
economic integration that would validate them. That could not 
be described as a stable exchange rate situation. The approach 
could prove to be doubly unbalanced since within the overall 
monetary approach the requirement of an exchange rate union 
was emphasised to the detriment of other MU ingredients. 
Monetary measures though were to be carried out at the first 
stage, gradually. However, it was necessary that a certain 
threshold should be crossed from the outset. The Fund question 
could be used as an example here. Adequate reserve pooling 
could have a significant effect in maintaining the Snake parity. 
No agreement was taken. There was the position of claiming 
that Snake membership would help to harmonise"members' policies 
but at the same time declining to accept possible consequences 
for reserves of a common exchange rate policy implied. Gains 
" 
'f 
. 
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and losses of reserves following upon its acceptance would 
continue to be national gains and losse~not the EEC's as a 
whole. The fact that coordination had not gone far enough was 
another factor opposing pooling. But to oppose it on these 
grounds was tantamount to saying that coordination would not 
be enough to save the Snake either. On the other hand an 
autonomous Fund would make coordination effective. 
Essentially it was a problem of transferring powers from 
members to EEC bodies. It did not take place and it was to 
be seen if that would happen in the future. It required prior 
transfer of political power, which governments were not prepared 
to do. The trouble was that separate monetary authorities 
stayed in existence exercising fully their discretionary power. 
Decisions lacked the commitment to accept the consequences 
stemming from MI. 
Acceptance of the WR meant acceptance of the whole process 
since transition to the second and third stage would be auto-
matic. Arrangements were finally to be limited to a five 
year period since the beginning of the first stage, to be 
extended indefinitely depending on progress towards MI. It 
gave the right to countries to opt out in the absence of 
measures to check inflation differences or else they would 
make good other countrie's inflationary gaps. railure to 
implement a system of credible money supply targets made this 
proviso necessary. The arrangements were more modest than 
Europeanists envisaged, and served national interests. Members' 
goals were convergent rather than identical, with the possibility 
of dispute and rupture as latent conflicts came. to the surface. 
In the absence of a common front, members could find themselves 
engaging in time consuming and often"frustrating negotiations, 
unable to reach conclusions. This could inhibit international 
~ 
, 
Ii 
I' 
I, 
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negotiations also. 
The Snake was basically a means to an end. It was a 
disciplinary device. The MU would not be served by short-term 
stability followed by realignments indefinitely. Coordination 
had not proved effective. The past had shown that consultation 
after each crisis did not include coercion and its practical 
significance was rather unsatisfactory. The Commission was 
not at all times critical of members' attitudes. Enthusiasm 
used to wane, consultation to become a sUbstitute for collect-
ive action while the lack of achievement became reinforcing. 
In the lack of unified policies) at least on key areas, economic 
differences could remain and aggravate, rendering the exchange 
rate structure unrealistic. This view was reinforced if one 
were to consider other discouraging signs: regional 
policy had not proved effective. Italy, Ireland and the UK 
were committed to EMU under the precondition that something 
ld b d t th . . . I bl (26) wou e one 0 ease e~r ser10US reg~ona pro ems • 
The WR did not seem to have recognised adequately the EMU 
costs and did not suggest ways to overcome the difficulties. 
Various authors suggest that the fault of national regional 
policies has been their selectivity, see Magnifico (1973, 
pp 214-21), Dosser (1978). Instead they should be based on 
general non-selective measures to facilitate economic adjust-
ment. Secondly, capital market integration was far from 
complete. Despite Articles 6, 7, 108, 109 of the Treaty, 
which set down the principle of abolition of restrictions on 
capital movements, the 1960-62 Directive, the Segr~ report 
(1966) and the fact that members wer~ by the early seventies 
) 
mid-way towards capital market integration, considerable 
exchange rate instability with massive capital flows led to 
new controls on a national basis. A unified capital market 
" 
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was one of the MI objectives. The EEC should not only have a 
common exchange rate system but also a common system of control 
over capital flows. At that time it was difficult to combine 
arrangements to control capital flows between each member and 
the outside world}in the interest of XE of each member with 
free capital mobility among them. Studies, see Krause (1973, 
pp 114-41), described in detail the innumerable regulations in 
all members that restricted flows and prevented interest rate 
structures. Exchange rate freeze may not be enough to bring 
capital market integration. In Europe at that time,capital 
controls were not unified and were also applied to intra-EEC 
transactions, meaning disintegration and distortion of flows. 
Attempts to avoid their application to other members were not 
made. furthe; it would be uneconomic to permit free flows 
between members, if flows between the outer world and each 
EEC part were subject to different incentives. flexible 
exchange rates to permit a uniform degree of hardness or soft-
ness in the member currencies run against the exchange rate 
rigidity objective within the EEC or would make it difficult 
to be achieved. This difficulty could not be recovered by 
joint floating. Nor could it be removed, though it could be 
disguised, by the provision of XB finance to deficit members. 
The maintenance of exchange controls, although it could 
contribute to exchange rate fixity, could delay corrective 
action needed for genuine exchange rate fixity. They could 
also delay parity realignments with all the implications stem-
ming from that. finall~ the IMS situation should not be 
ignored at that time. The IMS crisis and the EEC economic 
background could create tensions inside the Snake. In the 
absence of "calm weather conditions" in the IMS, they would be 
intensified. 
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All these would seem to cast doubt on the results expected 
from this venture. The prospects for the achievement of 
eventual EMU would fundamentally depend on members' willingness 
to accept the changes required. Whether that would happen in 
the place of many economic and political obstacles, only the 
future would tell. In the presence of discretion, even 
coordination could not make exchange rate evolution always 
predictable. 
The coordination process entails serious difficulties and 
disadvantages which could lead to doubt as to whether irrevoc-
ably fixed exchange rates can be obtained in this way. Should 
one look for alternative strategies? The empirical evidence 
on the Snake and analysis on the alternatives, which follow 
below, will help us answer this question. 
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CHAPTER FIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SNAKE PERIOD 
~.!.~. Er~limin~r~ Ob~e£v~tio~s_f£o~ !h~ ~n~k~ fV2l~t!0~ 
The Snake evolution is well documented in the Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletins, see also chart 5.1 and appendix I. 
We refer here to some useful observations stemming from this 
evolution to be kept in mind ~hen going deeper into the analysis. 
Early sterling problems led to speculative flows and reserve 
losses. Sterling left the Snake, June, 26, 1972, demonstrating -
like the Lira later - that national economic divergence 
intensified by unfavourable influence of international factors) 
makes a fixed exchange rate system untenable even when it is 
confined to a region. Absence of calm weather conditions, 
resulting in continual pressure, leads currencies to leave the 
Snake. Sterling set EMU its first test, ~hich gave rather 
unsuccessful results. After sterling's independent floating 
and under dollar ~eakening, members felt that they had to 
protect the system from the dollar flood. Benelux supported 
a joint float against the dollar. France and Germany opposed 
it, insisting that lack of coordination ~ould break it, destroy-
ing the CAP, and that it would require heavy support at least 
for certain currencies. They proposed instead exchange controls, 
keeping the arrangements, since the principal conditions for 
free capital flo~s - whose justification would be that they 
ensure the best possible distribution of financial resources 
in a fully functioning IMS and the observance to rules which 
apply to it - did not exist. The degree of capital market 
freedom would have to be weighted against the dangers that it 
may entail for monetary order in a country. Behind these argu-
ments both members uanted to protect their industry, uhile 
France wanted to check also US investment inflows through a 
dearer capital franc. At that time there ~as little hope for 
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coordination yhile regional and industrial policies yere 
inadequate. The UK constituted another problem. Sterling yas 
a major EEC currency. 8eing more Yidely held it yas liable to 
destabilising speculation. The UK had small trade and financial 
links yith the EEC compared to the outside Yorld. If all EEC 
currencies yere floating against the dollar, that yould be 
expensive for the UK in terms of non-EEC trade and cause 
sterling to be expensive to its partners. 
At the beginning of December 1972, the Lira came under 
strong pressure requiring substantial support. The dual exchange 
market further unsettled the markets. The dollar crisis also 
continued. Markets were dominated by a confidence crisis in 
february and March. The Lira under persistent pressure left 
the Snake on february 13, 1973, depreciating significantly. 
The dollar flood continued despite the 10 percent dollar 
devaluation in february 12. Germany intervened heavily. Snake 
members imposed~rong controls. The path towards EMU was not 
the one that had been envisaged. The tunnel yas finally 
abandonned on March 19, , under the pressure of heavy capital 
flows. The dollar crisis tested the Snake in the tunnel. 
Unlike the reaction in Spring 1971 yhere plans Yere shelved. 
this time there was a common response, in the form of a joint 
float. Members realised the fundamental change: the sound 
international reserve currency that BUS experience had shown 
to be needed to make sense of the fixed exchange rates, was not 
there. They learnt that after December 1971. their determina-
tion to preserve a given structure likely to bring XE was not 
sufficient to avoid heavy reserve losses on the dollars pouring 
in. The outcome had been that the Snake floated upyards whenever 
inflows had been,or threatened to become,large. The reserve 
currency country'.s ini tiative to change its exchange rate 
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magnified the risk of exchange losses. The upward float 
posed a threat on the competitiveness of each member with 
respect to third countries, but such a joint float was 
desired because of the high trade interdependence among the 
members. Exchange rate movements, identical in size and 
direction, would have similar effects for each member, although 
structural differences could lead to different results. The 
implication, however, was to diminish the chances for the UK to 
rejoin as long as its trade was mostly Yith third countries. 
The joint float was safeguarded by a high number of exchange 
controls. The outcome of this crisis was crucial for the 
future of the IMS, marking the abandonment of dollar pegging 
by major countries. The dollar problem remained. Heavy upward 
OM pressure and intervention led to its revaluation on June 29, 
to preserve the Snake and safeguard German monetary policy. 
Changing its Snake position there was expected to be no further 
support and so inflows would subside. However, under these 
conditions) the Bundesbank was better placed to continue, and 
adopt further. restrictive policies, putting pressure on its 
partners. The Snake stretch remained and support to hold it 
was increasing. Germany kept preserving its domestic objectives 
at a moment where the OM had been revalued twice in four months, 
making nonsense of exchange rate stability and the CAP. The 
consequence of this kind of floating was to undermine currency 
confidence in general. The sufficiency of revaluations was 
questioned, something that would not be raised under free 
floating. Germany with a surplus should be expanding to pre-
serve the Snake. By keeping the OM inside, it was meeting 
cost-push inflation with liquidity squeeze. The OG was revalued 
on September 17, at a. time of slight tension. This kind of 
attitude,combined ~ith the.tYo previous OM revaluations, created 
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an opposite private reaction to an important question. If 
the Snake exerts no discipline to currencies yithin it, yhy 
should it be kept? It seemed to be anything else but a symbol 
to MU. It was not necessary for the strong to inflate by 
importing speculative money from the weak, since they could 
simply change their central rates,cutting the inflow automatic-
ally. In this kind of Snake)both Sterling and the Lira could 
stay. Nevertheless)the Dutch decision - part of an anti-inflation 
package - came as a surprise. The fragility of the joint float 
uas exposed as key currencies inside it came under pressure. 
It was redesigned three times in six months. It provoked 
speculation on other possible changes since strong OM pressure 
developed against the frfr requiring heavy support to maintain 
it. 
Despite the realignments there was still the hope that 
after the dollar trouble was over, coordination would take 
place. But the frfr was in trouble since October 1973 due to 
trade problems and a weak anti-inflation package compared to 
that of Germany. There was growing support to avoid any damage 
in Snake's reputation that another realignment would bring. 
finallYJit left the Snake on JanuarY·19i 1974, in what french 
authorities described as a temporary six-month independent 
floating. 
The diminishing oil shock in the first half of 1974, US 
political reasons, removal of US controls, XB problems and low 
interest rates brought back the dollar problem, OM upward 
pressure and revaluation expectations. Belgium asked for more 
interest rate harmonisation and inflow discouragement but 
without effect. In uhat was nou a OM-zone, Germany uas setting 
the pace. The scepticism on parity correctness uas not irrat-
ional, comparing German inflation with that of major countries 
- 118 -
and Snake partners. The Snake partners had to run harder to keep up 
~ith Germany. Its importance to them ~as greater than 
they were 
dilemma. 
to Germany. OM devaluation confronted them with a 
While it could stop speculation, it could also intensify 
domestic inflation by pushing up the prices of German goods ~ported 
by them. Also, experience had sho~n that even uith OM revalu-
ation there ~as no sign of turning down the J-curve working in 
an opposite ~ay for Germany, where in 1974 it recorded high 
surpluses. 
The frfr advanced in 1975 assisted by domestic interest 
rate policy and rejoined in July '76, after eighteen instead 
of six months. france had serious unemployment problems at 
that time. Up to that time it can be said that radical IMS 
changes and numerous influences had imposed Snake strains 
while coordination was lacking among members. frequent real-
ignments permitted it to withstand the crises. The Snake came 
under a strong attack in february 1976 ~ith a ~ide gap bet~een 
the two key currencies. Such a Snake gave little hopes for 
further EMU progress. The Commission blamed national govern-
ments for lack of coordination. french, Germans and Dutch 
~anted to keep the Snake since a move away from it would be 
tantamount to dropping EMU aims altogether. If strong currencies 
were unable to stay together there was little hope for weak ones. 
Realignment should not mean Snake dismantling since that ~as 
the only sensible Snake at that time. But the danger ~as that 
this mood would set a precedent for using realignment as an 
alternative to domestic discipline. Although that was true, 
the worst case would be if parities were irrevocably fixed, 
making any movement towards MU unrealistic from the beginning. 
Apart from the frfr,other currencies - 8Fr, Dkr - required 
support too. Intensification of FrFr pressure forced authorities 
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to leave the Snake. They blamed the sterling crisis. Houeve~ 
France rejoined in 1974 because it uanted to submit its 
economy to discipline. By March 1976 it had double the 
inflation rate of Germany. At the end only four members -
45 percent of EEC GNP - remained. Sterling and FrFr ueakness 
led to heavy OM demand, Snake strains, sharp OM appreciation 
against the dollar and finally another Snake realignment on 
October 17. It took place after months of suspicion that the 
OM uould burst the EEC exchange rate arrangement. While prov-
ing that realignment uas still feasible and still keeping the 
Snake, it raised again the question if that uas uorthuhile. 
It facilitated trade among Snake members although it endangered 
German money supply and inflation due to support to preserve 
it. This Snake uas the remains from the great EMU plans. 
Currencies that left it initially were in no position to return 
in view of their economic problems. Intervention at the end 
did nothing to conceal fundamental economic differences among 
countries. Talks on how the Snake could be used for further 
economic and monetary order failed due to Germany's refusal to 
reflate, sticking to its domestic objectives and other countri~ 
refusal to what they considered to be inability to conform to 
the rules. 
A surprise realignment took place on April 1, 1977, said to 
help Sweden's IB and XB problems. The most important observa-
tion uas that it came after little expensive, protracted and 
futile intervention efforts to keep the weakest currencies, 
which were doomed to complete failure in the past. The Snake 
uas transformed twice in six months. But Germany had suffered 
two destabilising inflows .in 1976, bringing in OM17 b. In the 
past - 1973/74 - they had intervened heavily to preserve the 
Snake, hoping that such intervention would be reduced in the 
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future. After a calm year in 1975, even heavier intervention 
started yith no signs of retreat. That was the turning point 
in the Snake history. 1976 yas a particularly dramatic year 
with the plummetting of Sterling and Lira, FrFr trouble and 
realignments. The GeIlTlBrs realised that economic convergence - to 
prevent crises - uas not going to come in the near future. 
There was no reason to embark on heavy intervention to protect 
exchange rates, with the hope that these would remain. At the 
end,parities would change, threatening Germany yith inflationary 
pressures. From that point on, Germany became interested in 
short-term exchange rate stability followed by prompt parity 
changes, ~henever capital flows started posing threats. The 
Snake stopped being the disciplinary device, forcing members 
who yanted to remain in it to coerce their economies to the 
German path by changing their internal policies. It was widely 
believed that EEC members were far away from MU, so far that a 
Snake according to its initial principles nou uas a premature 
decision and the new philosophy adopted uas rather one of 
trying to establish the preconditions of an MU, not even its 
first stage. That was the way the Snake evolved after that 
period at a time uhen consistent monetary targets Yere 
lacking. The Snake came closer to the pseudo-exchange-rate 
union concept. 
The dollar crisis has cbminatooforeign exchange markets since 
mid-1977. Substantial support measures did not stop it from 
falling sharply at the end of 1977. Action in early 1978 
brought a brief recovery but with US economic problems remain-
in~new pressure developed from June and throughout the summer. 
This crisis)taking place in a background of diverging Snake 
economies,led to severe Snake tension for three and a half 
months - mid-July to October"- leading to record inflows in 
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Germany - OM10;b - out of Snake intervention. While the Snake 
was at full stretch, Germany insisted on exchange rate fixity, 
trying to avoid endangering their exports to their Snake 
partners - 20 percent of their total exports - at a moment 
where Germany's competitiveness was falling in the rest of the 
world. At the end the realignment took place. The lesson to 
be learned from this realignment was .not the ease with which 
it was carried out at the end but the wastefulness of months 
of heavy intervention preceding it. The US economic packages 
that followed on October 24 and November 1 took the markets 
by surprise,having immediate favourable dollar effects greatly 
assisted by intervention in the US and other countries. 
Anxieties about German, Swiss and Japanese economic problems 
contributed to the relatively small dollar weakness. 
Developments among Snake currencies had as a backcloth the 
EMS negotiations. Norway left the Snake on December 12, 1978 
at a time when there was no econc:mic justification for doing so. Various factors 
accounted for it, stemming from the EMS agreement, see Thygesen 
(1979, pp 25-8), which. for Norwa~would delay realignments 
leading to crises. They believed that there was lack of 
assurance that the Snake implies a high degree of effective 
exchange rate stability. Also the OM no longer seemed an 
insurance for less short-term exchange rate volatility or XB 
discipline. Finally domestic efforts to lower inflation and 
strengthen confidence in industry were considered more important 
than efforts through the OM, after the downward exchange rate 
adjustments which had started taking place since 1976. 
The Snake found.it possible to accept realignments largely 
due to ·the fact that it contained only one major currency. A 
steady devaluation of a little-traded Nordic currency could be 
easily managed. Not so, if four of the world's seven largest 
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economies were included in it, lagging market forces instead 
of anticipating them. Parity questions became complex, 
demonstrated by the circumstances which l~ France to leave the 
Snake after its second entry. Attempts to change intra-Snake 
parities with OM rising against the FrFr and the FrFr falling 
against the OM, failed because the whole thing became difficult 
to cope with. Institutional problems in getting parity changes 
were severe. A change in one currency involved changes in all 
others,When realignments become a matter of inter-government 
agreement the desire is to avoid them for political reasons if 
possible. The Snake developed a pattern where pressures had 
been building up through speculation and realignment followed, 
By mid-1977 the EMU dream was forgotten, with lack of 
coordination of monetary and budgetary policy and the prospects 
of three new applicants. There was no common line on external 
policy either. The Commission also blamed the US for damaging 
world stability, boosting world inflation and encouraging oil 
price rises. Most EEC countries wanted to avoid any new action 
toward MU, fearing the possibility of ending with severe 
unemployment problems •. Three out of four major EEC members 
were out of the Snake most of the time. Their domestic problems 
did not allow them to abandon the exchange rate instrument. 
From the point of all EEC members the Snake failed, since it 
did not keep them all,and especially the major ones, inside it. 
Intervention alone could not save it. It uas incre~sing instead 
of being gradually reduced. Realignments were taking place 
and after 1976 it was officially recognised that the Snake uas 
not, and under the circumstances could not b~what it was 
expected to be. It turned to be an adjustable peg, where 
realignments had to take place, given Germany's economic 
superiority, if further FEM disorder was to be avoided.) The 
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fact that the last one was delayed by two months cost Germany 
its largest inflow. 
Only one major currency was involved. The fact that 
smaller country currencies floated with it, does not change 
the above conclusion, given the reasons for which they prefer 
stable exchange rates with Germany. In fact all small countries 
had problems.and significant economic divergences from,Germany, 
especially since 1976. They could be kept inside it despite 
their problems, because they could obtain adequate XB finance, 
intervention funds and, given the low trade demand of some of 
these currencies, satisfactory disciplinary action was avoided 
although it was questionable if it would continue in the long-
run, see chapter six. 
It was explained in chapter four why the OM dominates 
smaller currencies. The fact that Germany did not normally 
negotiate with its partners or anybody else on its exchange 
rate policies with third currencies, meant that the OM floated 
independently like the other three major EEC currencies. 
~.B.~. On_the_O!r~cti£n_a~d_S!z~ £f_C~r£e~c~ Mo~e~e~t~ 
The resolution of the European Council on March 21, 1972, 
reduced the fluctuation margin between the EEC currencies to 
!2.25 percent. Therefore success of the EEC exchange rate 
arrangements would mean that EEC currency movements should be 
identical in direction and size, allowing for this fluctuation 
margin. 
Table 5.1 provides for the deviations of EEC currencies 
from their central rates, with respect to April 1972, during 
~he Snake period. The OM, OG, Bfr, OKr and frfr appreciated 
.. -
in general while Sterling and the Lira followed the opposite 
direction. Table 5.1 provides an indication of substantial 
exchange rate moveme~ts during that period. It is difficult. 
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to distinguish a period of relative calm. 
Table 5.1 EEC currency changes against the Central Rates, 
with respect to April 1972 
Percentages, End of Year, Each currency against the Dollar 
~ 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Currenc 
OM -0.7 14.9 24.2 17.5 25.7 33.8 42.5 
OG -0.22 9.5 22.1 16.5 23.7 29.2 38.8 
BFr 0.18 6.3 18.2 10.5 16.4 25.4 34.8 
OKr 2.2 10.1 19.3 11 .8 17.3 17.5 27.3 
FrF~ -2.0 6.4 10.6 10.8 1.2 1.2 17.2 
f, 
-12.1 -13.3 -12.0 -30.0 -56.4 -56.4 -28.9 
Lira 0.2 -4.1 -11.2 -17.1 -49.8 -49.8 -41.0 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IFS data. 
Snake success would imply that fluctuations of a Snake 
currency against member currencies, should not exceed 
4.5 percent. Table 5.2 provides such estimates with respect 
to the OM. They suggest that no such pattern was depicted. 
Table 5.2 EEC currency changes against the OM, with respect 
to April 1972 
Percentages, End of Year, OMs per unit of currency 
~ 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Currenc 
OG 0.05 -3.1 -2.6 -1.2 -2.6 -6.3 -6.1 
BFr 0.01 -9.1 -7.3 -7.9 -8.8 -11.2 -12.5 
DKr 3.0 -5.4 -6.0 -6.5 -10.0 -19.7 -20.7 
FrFr -0.01 -9.0 -14.1 -7.3 -24.7 -29.1 -30.1 
£ -13.6 -27.8 -34.9 -39.0 -53.8 -53.9 
-55.3 
Lira -1.5 -31.3 -31.3 -28.9 -50.0 
-55.3 
-59.1 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IrS data. 
:Substantial deviations occurred, some of them inside the Snake. 
Estimates include realignments. Some of them were substantial, 
see Appendix I. They were dra~backs to the Snake and implied 
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higher potential fluctuation. Further, these annual figures 
conceal even higher short-term deviations. For example} the 
fluctuation of the DG in 1973. It can also be seen that most 
of the BFr deviation was due to' the 1973 OM revaluations. The 
opposite applies to the DKr uhose deviation uas enhanced after 
the mid-seventies, like that of the three major currencies. 
One can see the considerable differences that existed among 
the EEC currencies during that period. When the Snake was 
created it uas exactly this sort of divergence that it uanted 
to eliminate. The EEC currencies did not shou a generalised 
pattern and did not move in line. The weakest EEC members 
have in fact moved more against the OM than against the dollar. 
At that period there was a lack of dollar confidence and the 
US economy had serious problems, in contrast to Germany. They 
were in many occasions similar to those of the ueak EEC members 
although not of the same degree of intensit~ at least with 
respect to the UK and Italy. Taking percentage changes for 
each year ue can then compute the average and standard deviation 
for each currency against the OM, see Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Average Currency Changes and Standard Deviations 
against the OM 
Percentages, seven years, Twenty-six Quarters 
Annual since 1971 Quarterly since 1972 II 
Changes Standard Changes Standard Currency Deviation Deviation 
OG -1.36 1.93 -0.28 1.75 
BFr -2.11 3.52 
-0.37 1.75 
DKr -4.71 5.23 -O.B 2.2 
frfr -5.0B 8.67 
-1.13 3.4 
i. 
-10.6 10.80 
-3.16 4.7 
. Lira 
-12.90 12.60 
-3.1 6.27 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IrS data. 
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These figures conceal even higher changes as it can be seen 
from table 5.4. The considerable size as well as the fluctua-
tion of EEC currency movements become obvious if one is to 
concentrate on table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. Rising currency values 
and/or large short-term currency fluctuation is bad for business, 
imposing real costs on international trade appearing either in 
the form of uncertainty traders face over the domestic value 
of future sales or in terms of insurance cover. Table 5.5, 
depicting the average changes and standard deviations of E£C 
currencies against the OM, for every year and quarter, points 
also in th~s direction. 
With regard to our main question, the conclusion drawn is 
that major EEC currencies did not move together. They could 
be regarded as separate currencies by market operators and 
investible fund holders. This is not what happens with small 
EEC currencies which move more together in the O~ path, the 
OG being the closest currency to move with. it. Theoreticall~ 
exchange rate stability could be assured if central banks were 
willing to intervene in f£Ms in the amounts offered to them. 
This was the basis of the BWS which finally collapsed because 
of unwillingness or inability of virtually unlimited central 
bank intervention. Dealing with capital movements is the key 
to achieve success in stable exchange rates. The bigger the 
movements the greater the problem and vice versa. Capital 
flows from one currency to the other tend to be smaller the 
greater the extent by which currencies are linked economically. 
The OM, the DG, then the Bfr - and to a much lesser extent the 
DKr - usually move together against the dollar. Evidence 
shows that investors regard investment in OM and DG as invest-
ing in one as good an alternative as in investing in the other. 
Not so with the major currencies. Any attempt to link them 
Table 5.4 Range of Annual and Quarterly Currency Changes against the OM 
~urrency Annual Quarterly 
~ 0.0-4.5 4.5-9.0 9.0-18.0 18.0- 0.0-2.25 2.25-4.5 4.5-9.0 9.0-
DG 7 
- - -
23 3 
- -
I 
Brr 6 1 
- -
24 1 1 
-
DKr 5 1 1 
-
21 3 2 
-
FrFr 3 3 0 1 13 6 7 
-
£ 1 2 3 1 9 4 10 3 
Lira 2 1 2 2 8 6 6 6 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IrS data 
Table 5.5 Average Changes and Standard Deviations of EEC currencies against the OM 
~r 1972 1973 1974 
AAC -1.96 -12.4 -5.84 
SO 4.43 7.53 8.35 
QAC -0.2 -0.6 -4.2 -8.1 -1.0 1.9 -4.3 0.8 2.3 
SO 2.9 1.6 4.7 3.9 4.3 3.03 3.2 2.3 1 .17 
1976 1977 
AAC -15.4 -5.98 - -
SO 17.04 5.02 
-3.2 
- .-
-1.-8 QAe 
-6.8 -2.4 ~0.6 -2.0 -1.1 -3.1 -1.2 
SO 8.0 3.0 5.0 2.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 2.7 2.9 
AAC = Annual Average Change, QAC = Quarterly Average Change 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IrS data 
1975 
- -0.38 
4.6'6 
-4.06 1.12 0.7 -1.5 
3.4 1.14 4.5 2.8 
1978 
-3.85 
3.95 
1 • '2. -1.5 -2.2 
2.1 1.2 2.7 
-0.8 
1 .11 
Percent _ 
"" CD 
Table 5.4 Range of Annual and Quarterly Currency Changes against the OM 
Currency Annual Quarterly ~ 0.0-4.5 4.5-9.0 9.0-18.0 18.0- 0.0-2.25 2.25-4.5 4.5-9.0 9.0-
OG 7 
- - -
23 3 
- -Brr 6 1 
- -
24 1 1 
-OKr 5 1 1 
-
21 3 2 
-FrFr 3 3 0 1 13 6 7 
-
£ 1 2 3 1 9 4 10 3 
Lira 2 1 2 2 8 6 6 6 
Source: Constructed an the basis of IrS data 
Table 5.5 Average Changes and Standard Deviations of EEC currencies against the OM 
~I 1972 1973 1974 
AAC -1.96 -12.4 -5.84 
SO 4.43 7.53 8.35 
QAC 
-0.2 -0.6 -4.2 -8.1 -1.0 1.9 -4.3 0.8 2.3 
SO 2.9 1.6 4.7 3.9 4.3 3.03 3.2 2.3 1.17 
1976 1977 
AAC -15.4 -5.98 - -
SO 17.04 5.02 
qAC ';"2.4 -3.2 .' -1~8 -6.8 ~0.6 -2.0 -1.1 -3.1 -1.2 
SO 8.0 3.0 5.0 2.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 2.7 2.9 
AAC = Annual Average Change, QAC = Quarterly Average Change 
Source: Constructed on the basis of If 5 data 
1975 
-0.38 
4.6'6 
-4.06 1.12 0.7 -1.5 
3.4 1.14 4.5 2.8 
1978 
-3.85 
3.95 
1.'2.. -1.5 -2.2 
2.1 1.2 2.7 
-O.B 
1 .11 
Percent ~ 
I 
I 
N 
CD 
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together may be expensive in terms of necessary central bank 
intervention. It could also in the end be ineffective1and 
realignmentfwould be inevitable given the economic realities. 
These economies do not move together, which in turn does not 
result in the same degree of confidence for each currency, 
unless there are different reasons. 
s.c. Economic Coordination 
-- -----------
The determinants of exchange rates were analysed in 
chapter three. An exchange rate structure is expected to 
change in response to the dispersion of these factors, which 
in the case of short-run determination) are too numerous to 
permit a single explanation of this variability. The assets 
market equilibrium would suggest that periods of rapidly 
shifting interest rate differentials, sudden imposition or 
relaxation of exchange controls and changes in exchange rate 
expectations are apt to be periods of large short-term exchange 
rate fluctuations,even when prices move slowly. The influence 
of changes in exchange rate expectations requires a special 
note because of many factors influencing them and because the 
factors themselves are subject to frequent chang~ especially 
in a high inflation environment and irregular economic growth. 
While these factors are not directly observable, it is known 
that they include, inter alia, monetary and fiscal policies, 
relative cyclical positions, current and trade account balances 
inflation differentials, relative competitive positions, 
political uncertainties, rEM intervention and the change in 
the exchange rate itself. Changes in expectations are partic-
ularly important because exchange rates may already reflect 
all publicly available information. Hence~it is only new and 
unexpected information that will cause market partiCipants to 
c~ange their evaluation of the future exchange rate and thus 
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the present exchange rate as well. 
Other factors could also be important affecting exchange 
rate dynamics. 
~.£.~. lo~g~R~n_D~t~r~i~a~t~ 
Table 5.6 indicates the evolution of inflation rates for 
the EEC as a whole, Snake members and each EEC country. The 
average inflation rate for the nine in the seventies may be 
compared with that of the periods 1961-64 and 1965-69 when it 
uas 3 percent and 4 percent respectively. Of greater relevance 
for the Snake operation were the substantial inflation 
differentials among the members, especially after 1973. The 
EEC exchange rate pattern could not be robust to this sort of 
dispersion. SUbstantial exchange rate adjustment required 
under these economic realities was unlikely to be smooth, 
timely or easily accepted, enhancing instability. On the other 
hand a movement towards exchange rate fixity could require 
substantial adjustment for certain countries. for the EEC 
countries as a whole it was the final two-year period that 
gave some hopes for the reduction of the inflation rate 
differentials. looking at table 5.6 and the earlier exchange rate 
tables, it could be suggested that experience since 1973 seems 
to indicate that high inflation rate periods,. uhich are also 
likely to be periods of high inflation differentials, carry a 
greater probability of large changes in the exchange rate 
structure. 
Members did not follow a common trend on the evolution of 
their XBs as can be seen from table 5.7. Looking at the 
EEC as a whole these differences uere significant. That did 
not seem to be the case for the Snake members although differ-
ences developed since 1974. Current account developments 
indicate substantial differences among EEe members. Countries 
Table 5.6 National Inflation Rates, Average Rates and Standard Deviation of National 
Rates around this Average 
~ Year G L It B r N UK 
1971 5.3 4.7 4.8 4.3x 5.5 7.5 9.4+ 
1972 5.7 4.8 x 5.7 5.7 6.6 7.4 6.4 
1973 5.2x 6.4 10.8 6.3 7.1 8.6 9.4 
1974 6.7x 9.4 18.7 12.7 13.3 9.5 16.4 
1975 6.3 x 10.9 17.1 11.3 + 11.8 10.1 23.5 
1976 4.4 x 9.9 20.5+ B.7 9.9 8.5 16.8 
1917 3.Sx 6.4 15.1 7.4 9.6 6.1 15.8+ 
1918 2.ax 3.1 12. S+' 4.5 9.3 4.1 8.3 
~ 
x indicates lowest figure, + indicates highest figure 
Source: IrS (CPI) 
Percent 
EEC Snake 
Countries Countries 
Ir 0 Average SO Average SO 
8.9 5.8 6.24- 1.89 5.52 1.24 
8.3+ 6.6 6.35 1.04 6.04 0.99 
11.7+ 8.8 8.25 2.17 7.06 1 .5'7 
16.7+ 16.3 13.3 4.07 10.9 3.68 
20.8 9.9 13.5 5.67 9.7 1.98 
1B.3 9.0 11.7 5.4 8.1 2.13 
13.6 11.2 9.92 4.28 1.04 2.16 
7.6 10.0 6.9 3.43 4.9 2.93 
Table 5.7 Balance of Payments of the EEC Countries Million Dollars 
~r 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Coun " 
BLEU 846.0 1142.0 1153.0 911.0 705.0 -296.0 -373.0 -567.0 
295.0 344.0 914.0 367.0 533.0 -602.0 -280.0 -433.0 
OK -423.0 -63.0 -464.0 -981.0 -491.0 -1909.0 -1647.0 -1476.0 
179.0 91.0 446.0 -438.0 -40.0 -60.0 798.0 1532.0 
r 
530.0 297.0 -691.0 -5942.0 -3.0 -6048.0 -3301.0 3794.0 
3290.0 1639.0 -1893.0 -353.0 3503.0 -2755.0 169.0 3053.0 
G 875.0 747.0 4371.0 9804.0 4059.0 3902.0 3799.0 8930.0 
4620.0 4946.0 9277.0 -640.0 -820.0 3406.0 4729.0 9813.0 
Ir -190.0 -135.0 -234.0 -671.0 -24.0 -262.0 -287.0 -300.0 
209.0 87.0 1.0 146.0 271.0 320.0 620.0 99.0 
It 2040.0 2289.0 -2234.0 -8039.0 -556.0 -2855.0 2285.0 6286.0 
1419.0 -38.0 80.0 -4612.0 -2652.0 -317.0 5740.0 5426.0 
N -182.0 1302.0 2214.0 1960.0 2001.0 2691.0 245.0 -1430.0 
140.0 843.0 723.0 183.0 317.0 329.9 301.0 -766.0 
UK 2686.0 413.0 -2298.0 -8254.0 -3932.0 -1833.0 644.0 845.0 
6145.0 -3709.0 352.0 -2862.0 -120.0 -898.0 4132.0 -3855.0 
-_. --
-
first line indicates current account. Second line indicates bfficial settlements' balance 
plus errors and ommissions. 
Source: IrS 
~ 
tJ.l 
'" 
- 133 -
in deficit were those that recorded the highest inflation 
rates and, as it will be seen, money supply growth. Small 
Snake countries were not without problems especially since 
1975 as far as Belgium and the Netherlands are concerned. 
Denmark had chronic deficits and the weakest Snake currency. 
They wanted to avoid depreciation. Further, they did not under-
take adequate economic adjustment, although it would be 
inevitable in the long run. 
Compatibility of national monetary aggregates is important 
to achieve similar inflation and XB positions. Table 5.8 
provides such information. 
An important point on money supply evolution should be 
made: the absolute money supply level as uell as the standard 
deviation do not have the same meaning as such estimates have 
on the inflation variable. It was explained in chapter three 
why it may be that one member would need to have a high money 
supply target compared with that of another, to obtain 
inflation similarity. There has to be then a certain degree 
of dispersion between the national money supply levels. Despite 
that, one cannot ignore the fact that an inspection of inflatio~ 
money supply and real GOP ~ Table:S.9 - growth rates shows 
a tendency for the fastest money supply rates to inflate fast-
est. Money supply of certain members should have:to be set at 
lower levels and hence the desired dispersion should be smaller. 
Further, members did not fulfil the arrangement for the 1973 
M2 rise~ Since 1973, in their attempt to tight inflation they 
established monetary aggregate targetr- Germany, Italy in 1974, 
France, UK in 1976, the Netherlands in 1977. There is no 
common aggregate used, while BLEU and Denmark concentrate on 
DCE. They envisaged targets as a means to reduce inflationary 
expectations and avoid policy delays. Targets have for some 
Table 5.8 National Money Supply Rates, Average Rates and Standard Deviation of National 
Rates around the Average 
EEC 
Countries 
~ Year G F BLEU N UK It Ir 0 Average 
1971 12.3 13.8 10.6 16.7 13.6 21.8 7.6 7.4 13.0 
15.1 19.7 12.7 14.8 13.7 18.1 9.4 8.2 14.0 
1972 14.6 13.9 12.3 18.9 16.5 20.0 9.7 15.8 15.2 
15.6 20.2 15.0 15.0 29.9 19.3 9.4 14.7 17.4 
1973 4.3 9.8 12.7 6.2 7.0 19.3 19.8 3.2 10.3 
12.6 15.2 16.0 18.9 25.5 25.4 23.4 8.1 18.1 
1974 6.5 12.8 8.6 4.0 5.5 14.1 5.4 3.5 7.6 
8.1 16.9 B.8 12.6 12.6 19.9 18.2 7.7 13.1 
1975 14.1 10.5 3.3 18.5 2.1 10.1 16.5 18.1 11.6 
13.7 15.2 7.8 12.4 7.9 21.8 20.4 21.3 15.1 
1976 8.9 .13.6 6.9 10.9 15.5 20.7 18.7 16.9 14.1 
10.2 13.5 19.6 19.1 11.2 18.4 13.7 16.9 15.3 
1977 8.5 8.5 8.2 14.5 14.2 20.0 18.5 7.4 12.5 
9.2 13.0 8.3 12.7 9.6 21.5 19.1 9.0 12.8 
1978 14.2 8.9 8.0 5.8 19.5 24.0 25.0 10.4 14.8 
10.2 11.5 8.7 12.2 15.0 18.5 22.4 4.0 12.8. 
- '-----
first line indicates M1. Second line indicates M2 (M3 for the UK) 
Source: Constructed on the basis of IFS data. 
SO 
4.76 
3.92 
3.36 
6.02 
6.45 
6.32 
3.97 
4.78 
6.36 
5.68 
4.83 
3.66 
5.0 
4.97 
7.48 
5.76 
Percent 
Snake 
Countries 
Average 50 
11 .8 3.87 
12.7 3.18 
15.4 2.75 
15.1 0.37 
6.6 4.25 
13.9 4.6 
5.7 2.36 
9.3 2.25 
13.5 7.08 
13.8 5.6 
10.9 4.3 
16.5 4.3 
9.7 3.26 
9.B 1.97 
9.6 3.4 
8.8 3.49 
~ 
tN 
~ 
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members contributed positively in fighting inflation. In the 
UK inflation decelerated significantly in 1977/78. For 
Germany it was kept at very low levels although OM appreciation 
contributed to that. The same comments cannot be said for 
Italy. However, inflationary expectations were not adequately 
reduced. Such policy has not been followed consistentl~ at 
least for certain EEC members, see Richardson (1979). That 
was the result of frequent policy adjustments. The practiced 
"fine tuning" was unsuccessful. Some members felt free to 
diverge considerably from the pre-announced targets. The 
average deviation of the actual from the target rate was 
largest in Italy - 4 percent - then in the UK - 2.4 percent -
while in Germany it was 1.2 percent. As a result} the inflation-
ary climate on certain members became chronic. Persistent 
inflation expectations remain the root of the problem. Together 
with the unpredictability of demand management policies in the 
face of conflicting aim~ it increased unce~tainty and under-
mined business confidence. Certain governments even at the 
end of 1978 still had the task of restoring confidence in the 
framework of the system. One can also see the lack of any 
community action in undertaking the necessary studies for 
compatible monetary aggregate policies. The EEC set such 
Table 5.9 GOP Growth Rates Percent 
~ Yea B 0 F G Ir It N UK EEC Av 
1973 5.4 4.2 6.0 5.3 7.2 6.3 4.2 5.4 4.6 
1974 3.75 2.0 4.5 0.4 1.5 3.4 3.5 0.3 2.4 
1975 -1.4 -1.0 -2.5 -3.4 -2.0 -3.7 
-2.5 -1.8 
-2.3 
.1976 3.5 5.5 5.0 5.6 3.7 5.4 3.5 3.4 4.5 
1971 2.0 1.7 :5 .1 2.4 6.0 1.7 2.5 1.4 2.6 
1978 2.0 1.3 3.2 3.4 6.7 2.0 2.3 3.3 3.0 
Source: DECO 
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targets for the first time in 1977 - 9-10 percent for Germany, 
11-12 for Denmark, 12.5 for France, 16 for Ireland, 12 for the 
UK, 1B-19 for Italy, 11 for the Netherlands and 15 for 
Belgium - at a moment where inflation was undermining recovery and 
threatening EEC cohesion. This agreement was not honoured by 
France, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. Even if it was 
fully honoured though) one would doubt its effectiveness given 
the lack of analytical work to specify the right targets. The 
task was difficult if one was to realise that even at the end 
of the seventies there was no automatic mechanism to prevent 
members from violating the coordination agreement. Members 
should)on the other hand)be willing to conform to Community 
policies since by opting out they adopt a self-defeating pro-
cess ending up with more inflation and other undesirable 
repercussions. 
It was analysed in chapter four why members should have 
to concentrate on DCE control. They would have to secure the 
domestic components of their money stocks with a smooth secular 
growth path. looking at Chart 5.2 one could say that such a 
smooth path is not the general picture. The situation was 
uorse before 1975. Countries then tried to achieve a steadier 
path and some of them lower growth rates. A more uniform 
pattern was established in 1976 although since then the situ-
ation uas less satisfactory for Ireland and the Netherlands. 
The latter though,followed a deliberate policy of excess 
liquidity to prevent capital inflows from emerging uhich were 
difficult to stop once they gathered momentum,due to exchange 
rate adjustment expectations. The UK and Denmark followed a 
very variable pattern. Countri~s like Denmark and Belgium 
paid attention to this aggregate rather than to any other 
definition of money stock. Unless these countries impose tough 
. ·30 
25 
20· 
15 
·10 
5 
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Chart 5.2 Evolution of Domestic Credit Expansion. 
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controls they cannot make the growth rate of their monetary 
aggregate differ much from the average in Germany, having to 
maintain fixed intervention limits yith the OM. Denmark was 
less successful, experiencing a dramatic DCE increase in 1975 
and tried to reduce it afterwards and bring it to the pre 1975 
path. Germany experienced the smoothest path although, like 
other individually floating countries, it focused on both DCE 
and foreign assets. The fact that it intervened more in 1978 
and that it would continue in the future, given that two more 
major members participate in the EMS, uould mean that, as in 
1978, the monetary target could not be preserved. More 
attention could then be paid to domestic money sources. The 
same could apply for France and ItalY,although the latter 
yould rather be somewhere in the middle because of its greater 
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exchange rate flexibility in the EMS. 
Turning nou to fiscal policies, the economic recession 
since 1973 uas important in their evolution. Rising costs 
since that time reduced the share of industrial profits making 
investment financing more difficult. Productive capacity uas 
not increasing as fast as the labour force, uhich largely 
explains the upsurge in unemployment in most industrial 
countries. Under these circumstances expansionary demand 
management uas undertaken by the governments to prevent employ-
ment from falling. Deficit spending uas practiced and caused 
the public sector's expenditure to suell in some countries to 
about 50 percent of the GOP. Budget deficits uere grouing for 
almost all members. Their size in some cases exceeded the 
equivalent of 10 and sometimes 15 percent and made it difficult 
to finance them uithout recourse to the central bank, that is) 
printing money, despite the use of instruments by the govern-
ments to finance them through other means. They contributed 
to excessive money supply grouth. Deficit spending became 
increasingly inflationary - see p 145 - affecting monetary 
variables, prices, and less real ones like production invest-
ment and unemployment. Current expenditure and especially 
social transfer payments became the component of public expen-· 
diture that grew fastest)implying long-run inflationary 
pressures since it uas increasing the shares of consumption 
at the expense of the shares of investment. 
The ratio of PSD to the GNP uas for some members tuo to 
three times larger than the EEC average. The situation deteriorated 
dramatically in 1975 and the Council of Ministers - 10th EEC 
General Report, point 200 - asked that fiscal policy should 
be directed touards stabilising the econom~ reducing pressure 
on prices and improve, uhere necessary, the XB, uhile the 
• 
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medium term target was to return to the balanced budget. Indeed, 
there was a convergence except for the small Snake countries. 
The fact that they were Snake member$, able to obtain easily 
XB finance, intervention funds and expand through budget 
measures is perhaps no coincidence. Budget deficits were 
reduced in 1977 in Germany and the Netherlands. Also a dramatic 
amelioration took place in the UK following the collapse of the 
exchange rate in 1976 and the government's adoption of monetary 
targets and tight fiscal policy. However they rose - in certain 
cases considerably-for other members. In 1977 the Commission, 
in view of rising unemployment, recommended a temporary relax-
ation from the medium term target 'since a rise in growth yas 
wanted. That policy continued in 1978, reinforced by the 
"concerted action" program adopted by the European Council in 
Copenhagen, April, 13-14, 1978. Public expenditure contributed 
to growth although the EEC was still,at the end of 1978)at a 
transitory stage with respect to its economic situation. How-
eve~ such policy resulted in sUbstantial PSD increases in Italy 
and Ireland creating inflationary pressures. It was recommended 
to them to reduce their PSDs while the opposite was recommended 
for Germany and the Netherlands. The UK government responded 
to the reduction in inflation by pursuing an expansionist 
policy - PSBR rose from £4 b to £9.3 b - affecting money supply 
and inflation increasingly, see Rose (1979) • 
Generally the budget yas used under the recession exper-
ienced since 1974. The movement towards a balanced budget uas 
not fulfilled. Authorities used the budget to step up demand, 
impr~ve economic outlook and performance at moments uhere they 
also had to fight inflation and restore stability. 
While there was a movement towards more compatibility _ 
looking at inflation rates and XBs - the necessity of moving 
: ~ 
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touards more permanent restoration of this kind still remained. 
Money supply figures at the end of the period did not allow 
for much optimism. What was experienced during most of the 
period was a continuous appreciation of surplus members -
notably Germany and its Snake partners - and a continuous 
depreciation of the deficit ones. Certain members considered 
the exchange rate instrument as being useful in affecting 
competitiveness and growth. It will be seen in chapter six 
why domestic adjustment is needed too, to avoid undesirable 
feed-backs and maintenance of imbalances. Opposite policies 
were folloued. Germany produced highly restrictive policies 
only to enhance the deflationary effects of depreciations and 
keep and increase its surplus. Italy in contrast produced 
highly expansive policies. National authorities would have 
to adopt proper domestic policies from the EEC exchange rate 
stability point. Germany declined on many occasions to expand -
although given the deflationary effects of depreciation, it 
seems that it could expand within the limits of inflation 
control. Because of stagflation, it wanted to avoid augmenting 
its PSD. further appreciation though was threatening to hamper 
growth and maintain upward exchange rate pressure. UK, Italy 
and france tried to avoid deflationary measures which would 
raise unemployment. Since 1977 wider exchange rate fluctuations 
and forced deflationary policies on some of them enhanced 
exchange rate "real effects" and contributed to XB correction. 
Such movement, it was demonstrated, could not last long when 
appropriate domestic policies were lacking. Within a group of 
countries aiming at exchange rate fixit~ the need for correct 
and compatible policies is even stronger if exchange rate 
pressure among them is to be avoided. 
.' j 
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S.C.b. 
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Short-Run Determinants 
-----------
Evidence suggests that frequent and severe exchange rate 
fluctuations are likely to produce sUbstantial and prolonged 
deviations from the ppp level. Exchange rates have on frequent 
occasions been abrupt, significant and reversible. Disorderly 
markets occurred, yhere there yas no purchases or sales counter-
part or yhen exchange rates shoyed pronounced erratic fluc-
tuations(1), in a background of unstable economic and financial 
conditions. 
Herring and Marston (1977, pp 227-62) provide an analysis 
of the domestic and foreign factors affecting ~ country's 
interest rates, given the openness of the economy. Their 
study on European interest rate determination suggests that 
domestic factors have retained importance. The Eurodollar 
rate is not the sole determinant of national interest rates. 
In deciding a particular interest rate policy authorities are 
often faced yith a dilemma, ending up yith a compromise accept-
able in the face of conflicting internal and external require-
ments. It should be emphasised though that in a yorld of 
fixed exchange rates and highly mobile capital, theory suggests 
that interest rates in different countries Yill be highly inter-
related. Moreover, interest rate behaviour of smaller countries 
Yill tend to be directed by the interest rate behaviour in 
larger ones. The strength of these relationships among interest 
rates depends on the degree of international, in our case intra-
EEC, capital mobility. 
There is a negative relationship between interest rate 
differentials and the exchange rate, see Bi1son (1979~J pp 214-5). 
What seems important for the EEC members 1s hoy much their 
/ 
interest rates deviated from each other. The lesser the 
deviation the greater the intra-EEC exchange rate stability, 
" 
. 
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Interest rate .. ' 'oJ·-ffetentials of each member with the rest 
of them would be required. In our analysis we concentrate on 
uncovered and covered IRDs betueen the domestic interest rate 
of each member with the common Eurodollar rate, since that 
could give us an approximation of the IRD among EEC members(2). 
Further, as experience shows, the bulk of funds enters or 
leaves the Eurodollar market. Money call rates are used -
inter-bank rates for the UK. There was lack of data on short-
term rates for Italy which has not a short-term money market 
comparable to that of Germany or the Netherlands. Italian long-
term rates are usually employed in international interest rate 
comparisons, see Herring and Marston (1977, p 241). Long-term 
government bond rates are used here. Also the interest rate 
on government bonds is usually used for Denmark. For both 
countries there was lack of data on forward exchange rates. 
Chart 5.3 indicates that IRDs did not evolve in a similar 
way for the EEC members as a whole. There is a similarity in 
the trend between the UK and France up to the end of 1977 
although interest movements are more pronounced in the UK. 
Italy seems to be closer to France and the UK after 1974 II. 
Furthe~ there is a difference between these three countries 
and Germany which most of the time experienced negative 
uncovered IRD. The Netherlands and Belgium depict a close 
pattern between themselves. They-both seem to have, for most 
of the period, a close pattern with Germany except between 
1973 II to 1974 I and the dramatic period of the second half 
of 1976. In fact all members, except Germany, experienced 
more or less the same pattern during the second half of 1976. 
From chart 5.3 one can see how markets considered currencies 
throughout the period. Further· these findings conform with 
gradual exchange rate evolution. Periods of rapidly shifting 
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Chart .5.3 .Interest Rate Differentials. 
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lADs were associated with significant short-run exchange rate 
changes. for German~ sharp lADs in 1975 III and in 1978 were 
associated with abrupt exchange rate movements. Such an 
association is not observed in the three quarters of 1973. 
Howeve~ a month to month analysis indicates that the exchange 
rate rose by 12 percent in february 1973, where there was a 
sharp reduction in IRD. It remained at the same level for 
the next two months while the IRD rose sharply. A reversal 
of this trend in IRO for the next two months was associated 
with a significant rise in the OM. It should be kept in mind 
that it was a period of considerable dollar and sterling weak-
-...- - t - _ k..'i 
ness. The OM remained strong at a moment where it was considered 
the only alternative. With respect to the Benelux, the 
Netherlands case in 1973 and that of both countries in 1976, 
do not seem to be associated with a close relationship in the 
exchange rates. The diagram shows why the 1973 Dutch revalu-
ation took the markets by surprise, Sep 17, 1973. With respect 
to 1976, significant positive lADs were associated with a 
small - 2 percent - devaluation while the Snake was climbing. 
Given the policy of these members, they kept the actual 
exchange rate away from the equilibrium. The UK was pursuing 
the same policy in 197~ contributing to the persistence of 
difference between the two rates. 
In the assets market equilibrium approach, the interest 
parity condition, the primary link between world financial 
markets, summarises also the importance of expectations about 
future exchange rate values in determining the exchange rate. 
It ~as concluded in chapter three that in order to avoid 
frequent changes in expectations, predictability and stability 
of policy variables becomes a crucial factor for the predict-
ability and stability of exchange rates. 
• ::r::: :, 
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Houever, during the period under revieu these factors uere, 
for certain members/subject to frequent change within the 
environment of high inflation, considerable inflation and XB 
differentials and irregular growth. Despite accepting 
monetary targets, actual divergence from them uas considerable 
for some members. Authorities continued their "fine tuning" 
policy. It has been admitted that in central bank policy, 
discretionary policies dominated regular response patterns. 
These policy changes uere unsettling - disturbing in themselves -
and there had been reaction against them in the form of 
substantial changes in both exchange rate expectations and 
the exchange risk that took place, see Richardson (1979, pp 50-4). 
Further, there uas lack of consistency between monetary and 
fiscal policies. The rising. PSD made) on many occasions, a 
major contribution to excessive money supply growth, see 
Bain (1975, pp 75-6), Magnifico (197B, p 68) and the Chancellor's 
speech (1980)C 3). Not only uere these policies incompatible, 
but also they uere subject to frequent change. That resulted 
in failure to predict future policies and made forecasting a 
futile exercise. Market operators had to change expectations 
all the time. Exchange rate overshooting, it is suggested by 
de Grauwe and Peeters (1978, p.22), is to be explained more 
than anything else by the governments' frequent and unsmooth 
changes in their fiscal and monetary policies. Lack of orderly 
economic and financial conditions put emphasis on the need of 
the policy decision making to become more stable and predict-
able. Unpredictability on demand management in the face of 
conflicting aims raised market uncertainty. It rose further 
as governments were frequently forced to raise the exchange 
rate targets that they would have to support. Continuous 
intervention became either too costly or created serious risks 
I 
j 
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on money supply control. In the end, officials Yere forced 
to revise their exchange rate targets. Such changes generated ever 
further changes as investors tried to assess the extent of 
official policy change. Uncertainty contributed to exchange 
rate variability. Also the fact that it reduced the amount of 
speculation created exchange rate variability, see 8ilson 
(1978~,p 71), Schadler (1977, p 291). External factors 
contributed to that. The Sterling case in 1977 could serve 
as an example, where the increase in reserves led to the danger 
of money supply rises followed by a depreciation. Exchange 
rate targets were finally revised. On the Snake, many upward 
movements took place to avaid money supply effects resulting 
from sUbstantial intervention, especially for Germany. Erratic 
US monetary and fiscal policies led to continuous revising of 
expectations and contributed to exchange rate variability and 
overshooting among the EEC currencies, see Yperselle (1979, 
p 136). Given that reversible flows into and out of Europe 
were more marked for the case of some European countries than 
others, sharp movements in major third currencies, apart from 
widening the difference between Snake and non-Snake EEC 
currencies, created tension inside the Snake bloc. Coping 
with capital flows, under the joint float, required large 
intervention on certain occasions to maintain the agreed limits, 
while realignments took place. Rules on how to deal with these 
external problems were needed and there was little improve-
ment on that during the Snake period. These were important 
because it was difficult to stop an inflow resulting from dollar 
instability and since European capital markets operated as 
independent units and there was no way in which capital inflows 
could be effectively choked off in the interest of currency 
stability in Europe. 
: [ -,. -. .. --"""....-. ~ 1 
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With respect to official FEM intervention, no uniform 
agreement exists on what has been achieved. Opposing views 
exist on the degree of sterilization undertaken by each Snake 
member(4). Our own findings - see pp 161-81 - indicate that 
certain members had the ability to carry such operations and 
some of them implemented them. It is also suggested that at 
least in crisis periods members operated in a stabilising way 
and that the Snake survival even in its transformed form is 
due to such policies. Sections 5.C.c., S.C.d. and S.C.e. analyse 
the important question of intervention and sterilization. 
Irrational speculation - speculation not based upon 
rational forecast - seems to have affected short-run exchange 
rate dynamics. Bilson (1978a pp 69-71) provides evidence on ) 
the effect of destabilising speculation for the exchange rate 
between sterling and the OM for the 1975/76 period. Schandler 
(1977, p 291) maintains that at least over particular periods 
for certain currencies, destabilising speculation has contrib-
uted to exchange rate variations. 
Overshooting therefore has been created as a result of a 
variety of factors. Apart from the asset market equilibrium 
model one has to add the effects of risk and general uncertainty 
and destabilising speculation affecting some EEC members more 
than others and at different directions. To that one has to 
add the effects of real shocks both external and internal 
ranging from supply and price crises of goods and raw materials 
to recession and political uncertainty within the EEC states 
and abroad, see Balassa (1976, pp 298-9), Scharrer (1979), 
Lamfalussi (1977). External shocks, experience indicates, had 
different effects on each individual member due to different 
dependence on goods affected by crises, different national 
economic structure, different national political decision 
----------------------------------------------------------------~;<\ 
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making process, policy response and reactions of various 
economic agents. The XB effect of the oil crisis for example 
varied from one member to the other depending on their reliance 
on imported oil, policy reaction to this shock in the form of 
price adjustment and varying conservation measures. 
S.C.c. Intervention and Sterilization 
---------------
Intervention was intended to take place only at the margins. 
Intervention within the limits needed prior authorisation by 
central banks whose currencies are bought or sold. Adverse 
effects should be avoided. Success on exchange rate fixity 
would depend on undertaking EEC currency intervention. Houever 
besides that, dollar intervention was increasing in importance, 
primarily intended to ensure orderly conditions in the dollar 
market and smooth any unduly pronounced movements at market 
rates vis-a-vis the dollar over longer periods. 
In practice intra-marginal intervention has been frequent. 
Participants preferred dollar intervention and keeping away 
from mandatory intervention obligations at the Snake margins. 
They used this more flexible procedure to prevent a currency 
from being driven rapidly at the margin, where it may find it 
d iff i cuI t to remain the r e • The Bun des ban k (1 976, p 28) in its 
monthly report, characterised it as an efficient and useful 
mechanism and that concentration ensured highly coordinated 
intervention. However, in the course of their intervention 
central banks used repeatedly large amounts. further, virtually 
all intervention by central banks came·~to take place in dollars. 
france, from 1974 to 1976, demonstrated that the maintenance 
of Snake margins uas closely related to the problem of dollar 
fluctuations. Under dollar intervention by either one or two 
central banks but in unequai amounts, the cross rate intervenes 
as a constraint. If sa~ the dollar goes doun less in Paris 
I 
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than in Frankfurt, the Banque de France sell dollars and the 
Bundesbank buy them in order to bring the dollar down especially 
vis-a-vis the FrFr, so as to obtain a rise in the latter against 
the OM and remain within the 2.25 percent band. If the 
Bundesbank wished to stop OM from rising against say OG it 
intervened in dollars. So did other members when they wanted 
to increase the value of their currency against, say, the OM. 
Such a system inevitably put pressure on the Snake relationship 
because it had a double disadvantage appearing in both direct-
ions: firstly intervention in dollars has several times 
influenced the US currency, and, secondly the difference in 
behaviour of one of the currencies vis-a-vis the dollar created 
important tension within the Snake, that originated outside 
the Community(5). 
The question is if these effects would be avoided under 
EEC currency intervention. It all depends on the scale of 
portfolio adjustments linked to the fate of the dollar. If it 
L! 
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kept being strongly attacked and very large portfolio readjust- , 
ments were desired, it would not be sure if the Snake arrange- j 
ments could be maintained. Under the existing economic 
environment)the fear was that one particular currency would be 
the refuge and uould be subject to mom pressure than others. 
Joint floating uould be interrupted by realignments. 
At this stage)interesting simulation results should be 
mentioned with respect to the differences of dollar and EEC 
currency intervention, see de Grauwe and Van den Bergh (1979), 
(19BOa), (1980b). Under dollar intervention, the effect of 
German credit expansion on other members is substantially 
higher than 1n the case of OM intervention. In the absence of 
sterilization the purchase of OMs by other members reduces 
money supply in Germany, diminishing the expansionary effects 
i 
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exerted by German credit expansion. This is not so under dollar 
intervention, where dollars purchased by other members have no 
monetary repercussions in Germany. Further, the size of 
intervention is substantially larger under dollar intervention 
due to the asymmetry of this system. It is less effective 
from the point of other members co~pared to OM intervention. 
In the latte~ interventions are helped by the contractionary 
effects they produce in Germany. 
Interesting results are also obtained in the case of an 
expected OM appreciation, where under dollar intervention a 
strong upward pressure in other members' interest rates occurs. 
This asymmetry is reduced under OM intervention. OM sales by 
other members reduce German interest rates, reducing upward 
interest rate pressure on other members. Another useful 
implication is that the upward OM pressure against the dollar 
is reduced. 
Assuming now that a small country's currency is expected 
to depreciate, under dollar intervention it has to bear the 
whole adjustment burden. Under OM intervention pressure is 
lessened. Other members' interest rates move downwards. 
Asymmetry remains though, because of the small size of 
the given economy. 
Now under sterilization, its systematic use affects the 
inter-country transmission of monetary shocks within the union. 
Also)FEM intervention is less effective and does not manage to 
reduce exchange rate volatility and leads to substantial flous 
of international reserves. 
One can see from the above the advantages of intervening 
in EEC currencies - and in a non sterilizing way - rather than 
in dollars. It should be mentioned though that de Grauwe's 
results should be expected since the two cases here - EEC 
l 
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currency intervention and dollar intervention - are not 
similar and in this sense they do not entail an equal sharing 
of the adjustment burden among members. When other members 
purchase DMs, Germany automatically participates in the adjust-
ment process and will therefore accept part of the adjustment. 
Not so when they intervene in dollars while Germany follows a 
"benign neglect" intervention policy. Asymmetries arise since 
it is only these countries who act to correct a disturbance 
created by Germany and will therefore accept the burden 
implied by this intervention. It seems that asymmetries 
would not arise under dollar intervention and German partic-
ipation in the process. Generall~ dollar intervention would 
be equivalent to Snake currency intervention as far as its 
monetary effects are concerned assuming that all dollars sold 
(bought) by a country are bought (sold) by the other country. 
In that case,monetary contraction (expansion) in the former, 
is exactly offset by expansion (contraction) in the latter. 
Asymmetries will develop under dollar intervention, if one 
country follows a "benign neglect" policy as far as its dollar 
exchange rate is concerned. 
One could perhaps consider certain cases where authorities 
allowed or did not allow the monetary effects of their 
imbalances to make themselves felt in the money market and 
what they gained from such policies. In Italy substantial 
liquidity was largely caused by money creation for the govern-
ment in the form of direct credits from the central bank. 
This policy forced Italy to leave the Snake as early as 
1973. Substantial money creation continued unabated 
averaging 20 percent annually, contributing largely to the 
50 percent effective Lira depreciation since 1971 and effects 
on prices and wages. Authorities spent %7.5 ~, between 1973 
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and 1976, to avoid undesirable depreciation effects. Annual 
liquidity outflow averaged 3 percent of money supply in the 
period 1971-76. Despite such outflows,money supply increased 
strongly, implying that monetary effects of outflows were 
compensated. France) before leaving the Snake in 1976, spent 
~4.0 b in intervention. Here too) authorities did not allow 
monetary effects to make themselves felt on monetary conditions. 
In 1976 I, a period of large reserve losses, money supply rose 
by 15 percent per annum, after an even larger rise in the 
previous year. Reserve losses would continue indefinitely 
unless France were to leave the snake, which it did. Authorities also 
announced that they would keep FrFr close to the Snake. By 
1978 I it dropped effectively by 19 percent, preventing 
inflation control. Sweden spent $1.5 b in 1977 to remain in 
the Snake. Interest rates hardly rose at all during this period 
indicating that monetary effects were compensated. So depart-
ure from the Snake was the only possibility left to stop 
reserve losses. By 1978 its effective rate fell by 12 percent. 
The Netherlands kept for most of the period easy monetary 
conditions to discourage inflows. During 1976 II-III inter-
vention reached ~1.0 ~ to prevent depreciation in DG. The 
Bank compensated the monetary effects of this intervention. 
In August when developments began to assume crisis proportions 
the Bank put an end on commercial banks to further augment 
their recourse to them and finance purchases of foreign 
exchange. Interest rates rose considerably, while the call 
rate rallied for a short while ataSO percent high on an annual 
basis. The Bank gave precedent to maintaining the exchange 
rate which it considered appropriate over its concern for 
orderly markets and depreciation effects. The DG did not 
finally avoid the 2 percent devaluation in the Frankfurt 
\ 
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realignment. The DKr was also devalued by 6 percent. Denmark's 
DeE rose,by about 20 percent over the year to October 1976. 
German authorities have - since 1975 - allowed inflows to push 
the growth rate of the MB target above its predetermined level. 
The 8 percent annual growth target was overshot by 2 percent 
in 1975, 1.2 percent in 1976, 2 percent in 1977 and 3.5 percent 
in 1978. Intervention in 1978 obliged the Bundesbank to review 
in 1979 MB target, see Emminger (1979, p 19). 
For the small Snake countries it is suggested, see Szasz 
(1978~ that they should adhere to the non-sterilization rule, 
especially in crisis periods, and repel speculative attacks 
on their currencies, given that they have a vi tal interest on stable 
exchange rates with their main trade partners. However 
chart 5.4 seems to suggest that on a number of occasions -
some of which coincided with crisis periods - capital flows 
did not seem to offset domestic monetary policy measures. 
Thi! happened to a lesser extent for the Netherlands although 
the frequency and duration of the incidents increased af'ter 1976. for Belgiun this 
happened more frequently) while for Denmark it covered more 
than half of the Snake period. The diagram for france indicates 
such operations) especially until the end of 1976
1 
II, although 
to a lesser extent later and especially after 1978 I. ror 
I 
Germany it indicates long periods of MB control by the 
Bundesbank. The change in the second half of 1978 is evident. 
It should also be kept in mind that Germany on certain 
occasions appreciated its currency and avoided large inter-
vention amounts. 
further, this evidence is far from convincing. A strong 
negative relation between changes in domestic and foreign 
assets is open to two precisely opposite interpretations. It 
is evidence that monetary policies are offset by changes in 
-154- \. 
Chart 5.4 The Monetary Base. Monthly Changes in Domestic and Foreing Components. I 
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foreign assets and also evidence of sterilization operations 
and hence some control on money supply. That seems to be a 
serious problem. A reduction, say,. in domestic assets is 
offset by a rise in foreign assets, but also it could be that 
a rise in foreign assets is offset by a reduction in domestic 
used in our analysis, in order to check for members' ability 
to sterilize during the Snake period. Our analysis concentrates 
on tuo forms. The first refers to the macroeconomic model of 
the financial sector developed by Kouri and Porter (1974). It 
provides the basis for an empirical analysis of capital flous. 
It is a portfolio model for an SOE, in uhich capital movements 
occur through adjustments in the financial sector. The latter 
is specified in terms of the domestic demand function for base 
money and for domestic and foreign assets. The supply of base 
money is a function of the floy of the central bank's foreign 
assets and its control over the domestic MB component. The 
real sector of the economy is exogenous to the model so that 
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changes in income, prices and current account of the XB are 
exogeneously given as are wealth at home and abroad, which 
serve as a portfolio constraint. Kouri and Porter assume 
perfect capital mobility as the limiting case. A simple 
monetary model of an open economy is then obtained. The model 
is reduced to the following equations: 
Md = M( If, Yd, Wd, ne_n) ( 1 ) 
Ms = NDA + NfA (2) 
.t:.NfA = C + CA (3) 
Md = MS (4) 
""here Md is the demand for money, If is the foreign interest 
rate, Yd is the gross national product, Wd is the domestic 
wealth, n e and II are the expected and current exchange rate, 
Ms is the money supply, NDA and NfA are net domestic and 
foreign assets, C is the net capital flow and CA is the net 
current account. 
In equation (1), since the model considers the case of an 
SOE under perfect capital mobility, yields on assets at home 
and abroad are equalised at all times. Kouri and Porter 
translate this equality as between domestic and foreign 
interest rates. Md, Ms, NFA and C are endogenous variables 
in the model. NDA - determined by the central bank - CA, V, 
W, rI e and II are assumed to be exogeneously determined. By 
using first difference transformation of (1), (2) and (4) and 
substituting into (3) and solving the system for C, the result 
is a reduced form that can serve as a basis for regression 
analysis. The wealth variable is dropped from the regression 
equation due to lack of quarterly data and the fact that in a 
regression equation of a first difference form, a constant 
can serve as a scale variable. The difficulty in deriving a 
testable hypothesis that·could satisfactorily describe the 
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behaviour of speculators has resulted in using a set of dummy 
variables - OSP - for speculation against the peg, while 
speculation within the band is unexplained, which partly 
substitute for the divergence betueen expected and actual 
exchange rates. From the transformation we obtain: 
so: 
Now let 
4Md = M(~If,~y,4\Jd,~(ne_n» (1') 
~Ms = 6NDA + ~NFA (2') 
flMd = 6Ms (4') 
ilN FA = 6Ms - LlNOA 
= C + CA 
C = ~Ms - ~NOA - CA 
~Md = sa + a, ilIf + a2 6.y + as OSP 
(5 ) 
(1") 
Then ue can urite the reduced form equation 
C = aO + a, ill f + a2 fl y - .6 N OA - CA + as OS P ( 5' ) 
For regression purposes ue have 
C = aO+a,AIf+a2~y+a3ANOA+a4CA+a50SP+u 
uhere the expected signs are: a1<0' a2>0' 0>83 , a4>_" a5>0 
in the case of speculative capital inflows and Bs,o in the 
case of speculative outflows, providing a base for one tail 
test, u is the error term. 
(5") 
~If and ~y variables indicate the response of C to changes 
in the demand for money. a, measures the effect 'of a one per-
centage change Of the world interest rate on C, when the 
domestic interest rate is allowed to adjust completely. A 
rough measure of the effect of a one percentage change in If 
on the capital account)when the domestic interest rate is fixed 
by sterilizationJis given by a1A1+a~ see Kouri (1975, p 26). 
CA and ANOA indicate the response of C to current account 
imbalances and to monetary instruments affecting money supply. 
These two variables are important in this analysis since their 
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coefficients should reflect the degree to uhich, other things 
being equal, addition or subtraction from the domestic component 
of the money base are offset by capital outflows and inflows. 
Under perfect capital mobility Kouri and Porter assume complete 
offsetting in which case dNDA and CA would have a coefficient 
of -1. No lag in the adjustment of capital flous to independent 
variables is implied. When capital mobility is zero, they are 
equal to zero. They should also be equal to each other. 
4NDA is the monetary policy instrument. Empiricall~ other 
refinements are necessary allouing for such factors as changes 
in reserve requirements - ~RR - intensively used in Germany. 
The coefficient on CA indicates also the extent to which 
private capital flous finance fluctuations on the CA. Implica-
tions on the direct inflationary effects out of the CA follow. 
The possibility of lagged adjustment of capital flows to 
independent variables can also be tested. A one period lag 
is entered in the ~If, Ay, ANDA, and CA variables. 
One should expect a non-zero interest rate coefficient as 
long as the demand for money is interest sensitive, see Kouri 
(1975, p 25), Kouri and Porter (1974, p 460). Its significance 
though is likely to be reduced, the probable reason being the 
fact that the behaviour of the foruard premium - FP - is not 
incorporated in the equation. Since it often moves in a 
direction which is opposite to that of If, its exclusion is 
likely to suppress the If coefficient. In our analysis we 
also include 4FP as an explanatory variable. 
In addition a seasonal dummy variable - OS - is included 
to capture the pronounced end of year inflow and subsequent 
outflow. 
Statistical estimation of the mOdified equation (5") is 
beset with difficulties, which have been analysed in appendix II. 
oj. 
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These refer to mis-specification of the reaction function, 
thereby not eliminating the simultaneity between a change in 
domestic money supply and the change in foreign assets as 
dependent variables. Little confidence is then attached to 
some of the key coefficients in the regression equation (Sit) 
based on the reduced form equation, which may be biased while 
the direction of the bias is not clear. Argy and Kouri (1974) 
attempt to isolate the offsetting and sterilization effects by 
a two stage procedure. They incorporate a reaction function 
into the equations estimating capital flows. They suggest a 
simultaneous system in which both ANDA and ~NFA are determined, 
see Argy and Kouri (1974, pp 209-22). So)apart from the capital 
flow equation above, sterilization policies lead to the second 
relationship among 6NDA, C, and CA. 
4NDA = fCC, CA, Z) (6) 
where Z stands for all other variables explaining ~NDA. The 
resulting regression equation for sterilization is the following: 
( 6' ) 
where RCU is the rate of capacity utilization taken as a proxy 
for the domestic target of monetary variable~ ~is a trend 
variable included to capture the secular increase in domestic 
money supply. Such an increase is given by bO+b4J: Since 
quarterly data are used, seasonal dummies are also included 
for the first, second and third quarter. v is the error term. 
Coefficients b1 and b2 measure the extent to which the 
effect of capital movements and CA fluctuations on the MB are 
sterilized by monetary policies. When b1 and b2 are equal to 
-1 trn balance of payments has no effect on the MB. 
Equation (6 1 ) i~ used in conjunction with (5") in a two-
stage least squares estimation of capital movements and ANDA 
as dependent variables. 
!j 
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Both forms of analysis are used, so that the results 
obtained can be compared. In the second form, in contrast to I~ 
other analyses, ue are going to include discount borrouing in il 
the monetary policy variable, so that a certain degree of bias 
of the coefficient is excluded. Both total and short-term 
private capital flows are considered with a modification in 
the monetary policy variable for Germany as it will be seen 
belo\J. Prior empirical \Jork has concentrated in the sixties 
and early seventies. Our analysis refers to the full Snake 
period. We check for sterilization operations for Belgium, 
Netherlands, Denmark, france and Germany, using quarterly data. 
We can also give ans\Jers to other questions such as to what 
extent current account fluctuations are financed by private 
capital flows, what are the effects of changes in the world 
interest rate, to what extent capital flows accommodate cyclical 
and secular movements in income and how much of capital flows 
is due to speculation. Answering these questions one could 
perhaps have an idea of the feasibility of independent monetary 
policy, by means of sterilization operations in open economies 
which permit capital flow freedom. 
With respect to expectations on exchange rate adjustment 
they should be reflected in fP and international interest rate 
differentials, rather than in large capital flows. Howeve~ if 
the expected exchange rate change is even moderately large, 
experience shows that the system breaks down because negative 
interest rates would be needed to eliminate speculative profit. 
, , 
Interest rates do not fall belay zero - in case of inflows _ !; 
at least in the absence of exchange controls. Speculative 
flows based not on interest rate considerations but on revalu-
ation expectations would still continue. The speculative 
dummies attempt to capture the most important speculative 
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episodes, avoiding losing ·many degrees of freedom and the 
impairing of the explanatory power of the equations. 
Finally, according to Kouri (1975, p 27) OLS estimates of 
the capital flow equation, compared to those of the 2SLS model, 
are not likely to be seriously biased in the case where in 
central bank policy, discretionary changes in policy tend to 
dominate regular response patterns. 
On the proposed scheme for econometric analysis on capital 
flows in the EEC members, while there are many questions 
requiring structural models to be satisfactorily analysed, 
the reduced form approach seems to provide the critical inform-
ation needed for our analysis, although it should be received 
with caution in view of the comment made above and in appendix 
II. The proposed empirical analysis to check for sterilization 
operations will make use of both the single equation regression 
analysis and the analysis based on the 2SLS macroeconomic 
approach. Both total private capital flows (TPC) and short 
term private capital flous (STPC) are analysed. In the second 
case CA refers to the basic balance. Equations will take the 
form: 
A. Capital flow equation, macroeconomic approach. OLS. 
A1. Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, France. 
C = aO+a1bIf+a2Ay+a3ANDA+a4CA+aSDSP+a6DS+a7bFP+u 
A2. Germany 
c = ab+a1AIf+aiAy+a3ANDA+a4CA+aSDSP+a6DS+a7AFP+a8ARR+~ 
In an alternative specification ~NDA and ARR variables are 
replaced by the (hNDA-ARR) variable which is equal to the 
domestic component of the extended MS. 
For all five countries regressions will also be run without 
the AFP variable. 
~~., ----------------------------------
!·I 
I 
. 
. 
~ 
. 
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B. Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis, Macro-
economic approach. 
B1. Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, france. 
C = aO +a1'41 f+a2 lly+a3 ANDA+a4 CA+a5 DSP+a6 DS+a7 ll FP+u 
ANDA = bO+b1 C+bi CA+b3 RCU+b4 T+bS DSI, +b6,DS2+b7 DS3+v 
B2. Germany 
* C = aO+a1Alf+a26y+a3 llNDA +a4CA+a5DSP+a6DS+a76FP+~ 
ANDA * = bO+b1 C+b2 CA+b3 RCU+b4T+bSDS1 +b6 OS2+b7 OS3+v 
where llNDA* = 6NDA-6RR and ARR t = (rt-rt_1)Lt_1 
~RR represents the policy induced changes in reserve 
requirements, rt stands for the average reserve requirements 
ratio, and Lt is the stock of liabilities subject to reserve 
requirements at the end of the period. 
Equations are also run by incorporating a one period lag 
in Alf, Ay, 4NDA and CA RCU variables. For other technical 
issues see Appendix III. 
~.C.~. EmEi£i£al ~n~lys!s 
From a detailed consideration on the Snake period based on 
available information we can suggest a set of dummy variables 
designed to capture pronounced capital inflows and outflows 
during a number of speCUlative episodes in the period 1972 II 
to 1978 IV. They approximate the expectations variable on 
exchange rate changes. The dummy variables that are included 
on a priori grounds for our analysis are presented in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Belgium: 
Speculation Dummy Variables 
01 = +1 in 1972 IV, +1 in 1973 I, 
-1 in 1973 II; 
02 = 0.5 in 1973 IV, +1 in 1974 I; 
03 = -1 in 1975 IV, -1 in 1976 I, +1 in 1976 II, 
+1 in 1976 III; 
04 = 0.5 in 1977 II, 0.5 in 1977 III, -1 in 1977 IV, 
+1 in 1978 I, 0 in 1978 II , 
-1 in 1978 I II. 
. 
P' 
'1 
~~-------------- ---"~'~', 
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Netherlands: 01 = -1 in 1972 IV, +1 in 1973 I, -1 in 1973 II; 
02 = -1 in 1976 II, +1 in 1976 III, +1 in 1976 IV; 
03 = +1 in 1978 II, -1 in 1978 IV. 
Denmark: 
france: 
Germany: 
01 = -1 in 1973 III, +1 in 1973 IV; 
02 = +1 in 1975 IV, -1 in 1976 I; 
03 = +1 in 1977 III, -1 in 1977 IV, +1 in 1978 I. 
01 = +1 in 1973 I, 0 in 1973 II, -1 in 1973 III; 
02 = +1 in 1974 I, +1 in 1974 II, +1 in 1974 III; 
03 = +1 in 1975 III, +1 in 1975 IV, -1 in 1976 I; 
04 = +1 in 1976 III, +1 in 1976 IV, +1 in 1977 I; 
05 = +1 in 1977 IV, 0 in 1978 I, ~1 in 1978 II. 
01 = +1 in 1972 II 
02 = +1 in 1973 I, 0 in 1973 II, +1 in 1973 III, 
-1 in 1973 IV, -1 in 1974 I, 0 in 1974 II, 
-1 in 1974 III, -1 in 1974 IV; 
03 = -1 in 1975 II, -1 in 1975 III, -1 in 1975 IV, 
+1 in 1976 I, -1 in 1976 II; 
04 = +1 in 1977 IV, +1 in 1978 I, -1 in 1978 II, 
+1 in 1978 III, 0.5 in 1978 IV. 
Results for the capital flow equation are presented in 
tables5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14. They seem to be disappoint-
ing in the cases of Belgium and france. No conclusions can be 
dralJn on the authorities' ability to sterilize the liquidity 
effects of capital flolJs. This approach does not seem to be 
useful for these tlJO countries where the response of capital 
movements to changes in monetary policy was not established. 
In the case of Belgium, one has to take into account the dual 
exchange market operating which differed from those that 
assume perfect market dichotomy. According to Boll (1978), 
the quantitative implications of the exceptions to market 
J, - ~2"h,.*._:itrt_..,.. ____________ -.. ...... ,""",.!:.'t~'-...o-'~_, . .....u. 
f 
i 
I 
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The OS variable equals to 1 in the fPurth quarter, zero otherwise. 
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dichotomy are considerable. The important implication for 
our analysis is that the test of the hypothesis of offsetting 
capital flows on the basis of published current and capital 
account data might be misleading as a result of the lack of 
a hard and fast rule by means of which XB can be split up into 
an official and a free market part. 
However,there seemed to be~strong effect of exchange rate 
expectations in generating speculative capital flows in both 
countries. 
More optimistic results are obtained for the Netherlands 
and Denmark. In the former's case the inclusion of the ~FP 
variable is significant and enhances the significance of the 
AIf variable, while under lagged adjustment both ~NDA and CA 
coefficients are significant and have the right sign, indicating 
that current capital flows do not significantly offset domestic 
monetary policy measures of the previous quarter. last quar-
ter's current account seems to be moderately financed by current 
capital flows. Both current and lagged Ay variables seem to be 
significant in accordance with previous evidence. The ANDA 
coefficient seems to be significant)taking values between -0.56 
to -0.6B)and is significantly different from -1. On the other 
hand the CA coefficient, while having the right sign and being 
significant, takes inconsistent values. Taking into account 
the standard error, it could be within the accepted limits. 
further the D.W. test here is inconclusive. If autocorrelation 
exists, there yill be a bias in the estimates. 
that the tyO coefficients are not very similar. 
HoweverJ it seems 
SUch findings 
the sixties. conform with previous research during Our calcu-
lations indicate that private capital flows COunt b 
er a1anced 
almost 65 Percent of current account fluctuatio . 
. n durlng that 
period. If such flows finance1to a large extent 
) current account 
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our analysis is that the test of the hypothesis of offsetting 
capital flows on the basis of published current and capital 
account data might be misleading as a result of the lack of 
a hard and fast rule by means of which XB can be split up into 
an official and a free market part. 
However,there seemed to be~strong effect of exchange rate 
expectations in generating speculative capital flows in both 
countries. 
More optimistic results are obtained for the Netherlands 
and Denmark. In the former's case the inclusion of the ~FP 
variable is significant and enhances the significance of the 
~If variable, while under lagged adjustment both ANDA and CA 
coefficients are significant and have the right sign, indicating 
that current capital flows do not significantly offset domestic 
monetary policy measures of the previous quarter. Last quar-
ter's current account seems to be moderately financed by current 
capital flows. Both current and lagged Ay variables seem to be 
significant in accordance with previous evidence. The ANDA 
coefficient seems to be significant, taking values between -0.56 
to -O.6B,and is significantly different from -1. On the other 
hand the CA coefficient, while having the right sign and being 
signifi~ant, takes inconsistent values. Taking into account 
the standard error, it could be within the accepted limits. 
Further the D.W. test here is inconclusive. If autocorrelation 
exists, there will be a bias in the estimates. Houeve~it seems 
that the two coefficients are not very similar. Such findings 
conform with previous research during the sixties. Our calcu-
lations indicate that private capital flows counterbalanced 
almost 65 percent"of current account fluctuation during that 
period. If such flows finance}to a large extent)current account 
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fluctuations in a country highly integrated into world credit 
markets it could imply that the need for market intervention, 
and hence the need for official reserve accumulation, does not 
arise so much from the need to finance trade imbalances as 
from the pursuit of independent monetary policy or from the 
need to offset disturbances on the capital account. 
One could perhaps auggest, although with cautionJgiven the 
difference in size between the two coefficients, that author-
ities seem to have some ability to sterilize, at least in the 
short-run if the central bank is willing to accumulate or lose 
reserves. Further, in the Netherlands)while authorities left 
the impact of speculative attacks to be felt in the money 
market)there were long periods where they compensated the 
monetary effects of their interventions. Also they insisted 
on keeping substantial liquidity in the economy in order to 
discourage inflows. That might imply sterilization in case 
of capital outflows which occurred on frequent occasions. On 
the other hand)sterilization could be expensive for a small 
country in the short-run and much more so in the long-run, 
since a larger proportion of additions to wealth could be 
allocated to domestic securities - no result can be obtained 
on that by our analysis. Further, it is likely that 
speculators will soon react to reserve accumulation by the 
central bank and make the pursuit of independent monetary 
policy difficult even in the short-run. Other difficulties 
may exist too. For exampl~ results above suggest that in order 
to reduce the MB by DG100 m the Bank would have to reduce the 
domestic component by DG312 m to offset a reserve accumulation 
of DG 212~. Authorities then, despite having the ability, 
may have reasons not to follow such policy in most cases. 
With respect to the CA coefficient, its high value seems 
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to suggest that the direct link betyeen inflation and the 
current account through the liquidity effect seems to be 
broken. 
Finally) this approach does not seem appropriate yhen 
analysing short-term capital floys. One cannot say to yhat 
extent short-run adjustment takes place through short-run 
capital floys and compare the results betyeen TPC and STPC. 
In the case of Denmark the ~NDA coefficient is significant 
and has the right sign taking values betyeen -0.40 and -0.51 
significantly different from -1. Hoyever,no definite conclu-
sions can be drayn on sterilization,given the insignificance 
of the CA coefficient. One could say that in their attempt to 
preserve orderly marketslDanish authorities folloyed non-
sterilization policies. Hoyever,it seems that there yere 
periods in Yhich authorities sterilized their external imbal-
ances, as in the 75/76 period yhere high monetary expansion 
Yas experienced and the DKr yas under significant pressure. 
It has been suggested by Thygesen (1979, pp 95-6) that]despite 
Denmark's persistent current account deficits,authorities kept 
real demand and employment at high levels and did not put 
adequate emphasis on adjustment throughout the Snake period. 
All this means a greater scope for independent monetary policy. 
Such pattern of policy contributed to exchange rate instability. 
Further, no definite conclusions can be reached in STPC on 
sterilization, given the insignificance of the CA variable. 
rinallY,the importance of exchange rate expectations in 
generating capital floys should also be stressed for these 
two countries. Some of the speculation variables though, 
especially under STPC, do not seem to be statistically signif-
icant. One should keep in mind that the magnitude of a dummy 
can be different from that expected either because an infloY, 
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say, can be extended over a longer time period than an out-
flow that follows an upward exchange rate movement or because 
an inflow could induce an outflow so that it will offset 
partially the XB effect of the speculative inflow. The 
coefficient of each dummy captures these two factors. 
Coming now to the case, of Germany, it should not be ignored 
that it is a country whose tight monetary policies, low infla-
tion levels and expectations on OM revaluation~ coupled with 
frequent crises of other major currencies) resulted in substan-
tial inflows to Germany. Outflows also took place on certain 
occasions. Their relative quantitative significance was higher 
compared to that of other members and took place in more 
frequent time periods. 
On the domestic monetary policy and its relation to capital 
* flows, it is only under the ~NOA variable that we have both a 
correct sign and significant coefficients ranging from -0.25 
to -0.44. The strong suggestion of sterilization cannot be 
definitely supported given the insignificance of the CA 
coefficient. The lagged CA coefficient is both significant 
and has the right sign, indicating that capital flows fully 
finance the last period's current account imbalance. Our 
calculations also indicate that current capital flows finance 
only 11.3 percent of the current imbalance. Implications 
follow with respect to the relationship between the current 
account and domestic inflation, see Kouri (1975). However the ) 
existence of lags does not seem to completely offset the con-
ventional view of imported inflation,given the one quarter lag 
of capital flows to offset the current account liquidity effects. 
'Speculation dummies seem to be statistically significant 
although with some exceptions on certain equations. The 
comments on their size made for the case of the Netherlands 
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apply here too. So for DSP2 subsequent outflows took place 
after the substantial inflows in 1973. The size of DSP4 
appears small compared with the magnitude of inflows that 
took place since 1977 II. Despite the fact that interest 
rates were at low levels,inflows kept coming. The whole period 
was dominated by such inflows. Expectations about exchange 
rate changes were largely reflected in large capital movements. 
Adjustment took place by capital inflows, given the high 
capital mobility and the exogenous world interest rate. The 
extent to which such speculative disturbances were due to 
currency weakness or strength, indicates the integration of 
capital markets which rapidly transmit disturbances whenever 
they occur. With respect to STPC no definite conclusions can 
be drawn on sterilization either. Howeve~ CA coefficients 
ranging from -0.34 to -0.47 indicate a moderate finance of the 
basic balance by short-term private capital flows. A somewhat 
surprising result seems to be the insignificance of the DSP, 
which refers to the massive inflow that prompted the sterling 
crisis. Turning now to the important question on the ability 
of German authorities to sterilize the effect of their external 
imbalances on the M6, the following comments can be made: 
firstly, as in the case of the Netherlands, current account 
finance in a country highly integrated into world credit markets 
could indicate a scope for independent monetary policy. The 
econometric analysis does not give a complete picture on 
current account finance. Howeve~ our calculations indicate 
that capital flows, financed only about 11 percent of these 
fluctuations during the 1972-78 periodJuhile the figure rose 
to 42.5 percent for the 1974-1976 period and 53 percent for the 
1976-78 period. All these would in turn suggest that the 
pursuit of independent monetary policy in Germany was not 
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perhaps as rigorous as it might be expected. On the other 
hand,during the 1972-78 period) there was a dramatic change on 
the amount required to control the MB. Kouri and Porter (1974) 
and Kouri (1975) suggest that for the 1960-70 and 1961-72 
periods Germany would have to reduce the domestic MB component 
by OM «439 m), (333 m» to offset a reserve accumulation of 
OM «335 m),(233 m» if it wanted to reduce the MB by OM 100 m. 
Our estimates indicate that for the period 1972-78 the domestic 
component has to be reduced by only 166 m to offset reserve 
accumulation of 66 m(6). 
Further, there are certain indications on the carrying of 
sterilization policies. Since early 1973, and for most of the 
period of this year, substantial inflows took place. Non-
sterilization behaviour would suggest an easing of interest 
rates. However, on the contrary,interest rates were rising 
and were kept at high levels. Later in 1974 and 1975 and 
parts of 1976 when capital outflows were taking place, inter-
est rates were falling and were kept at very low levels. 
further, the Bundesbank in its monthly report (1976, pp 28-9) 
commenting on the Snake arrangements, admitted the undertaking 
of sterilization policies and that its monetary policy was not 
significantly impeded. Generally Germany was not prevented, 
despite the capital flow~, from maintaining a strict control 
over its monetary conditions, giving most of its weight in 
protecting domestic objectives continuously. Authorities did 
not adjust the external imbalance, since they would have to 
give up sterilization and accept inflationary pressures. On 
the other hand one could perhaps detect an easing in monetary 
conditions since 1976 which became more evident in 1978. While 
inflows dominated the final period, interest rates were kept 
at very low levels. HoweverJthe use of exchange rate 
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appreciation as an instrument to control inflation - see 
Emminger (1979, p 19) - seemed to have contributed to such 
behaviour. The OM appreciated significantly and contributed 
to inflation control at home, although it created tensions 
frequently among the Snake currencies. Germany, one way or 
the other, paid paramount importance to its domestic object-
ives, creating on certain occasions instability in the Snake. 
Finall~ the rising OM status as a reserve currency must have 
contributed to monetary policy independence, ensuring steril-
ization of the effects of private capital flows on the German 
MB. To the extent that it was desirable by the German author-
ities, the liquidity effects of conversion of OM balances in 
primary reserves by foreign banks could be offset by the 
Bundesbank by adjusting the domestic component of the MB. 
Generally the capital flow equation failed to give results 
for Belgium and france while no definite conclusions can be 
obtained for the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. The Euro-
dollar rate was not the relevant rate except for France and 
the Netherlands while the forward premium enhanced the results 
only for the Netherlands. Exchange rate expectations and 
speculative flous proved significant for the period under 
revieu. Changes in income were significant for the Netherlands, 
France (TPC) and Germany under STPC, implying that capital flow 
behaviour reflects divergent growth rates and cyclical phases 
between countries, with capital flows accommodating the result-
ant fluctuations in money demand. Fluctuations in money demand 
are important uith income fluctuations explaining demand shifts. 
The incorporation of lagged variablesJuhile it provides 
additional information) does not change the conclusions above 
uith respect to the important questions. TPC results in 
general seem to be more satisfactory compared to STPC ones. 
TPC 
D I
, ~.441 0.1~h 
i ~ 
__ . _ J . _ ~_~~~.~-)--- ( 1 • ~_6) 
r I 1.133* -0.615* 
I (1.46) (-1.29) 
(7.1:)) 
l.007 
(1.A9) 
(-Fi./,~) 
)I-( _ 1 • [j ill 
, , 
_'1. (122 _1-1.11'~ 
1.')r~r 1.:('Cl 
(7.>;"; «il~\ 
( _ 0 .. 5 P ) * I ( - n .. 9 7) )I- ( ~ • ? '( '< t 4 • 7 F ; 
':3.818 
f ) )(-
,1.57; 
i 7 .. 1 31 
1(/i.1/) 
I 
I 
-4.fiRS 49.32 
(-1.91) (1.:;5) 
0.58 2.172 
0.A77 74.20 0.60 1.632 
----.- - _ .. _------- ------------- .-- -.-
5.57' 2.151 
.. - .- - .--
----4----r----.- t -- -.-A 4.072 i -0.441 
-II- , ) 
, (1.67) (-n.7 A 
0.766 A .. 90 62.35 6.442 r-- -' -- =11.69----
* (1 .. 19) (-1.78) 
j : ---~.177 I -r.~27 2~.~~ Z7.SQ -19.62 
* * I) ( ,* ( _ 0 • 55) ( - 1 • 1 9 ) ( (j • : q : l<4 • n q / - 1 • 93 i 
46.05 
* (-0.85) 
_._.-----_ ... -----------+-_._-._- _._-' ----_.--- .. _._---_. 
0.007 
* ( ;-. 43) 
STPC 
--t------- -- -. --- -..... -.-.. - . 
N 1.171 
- lj. 4 q4 
( 4 • 76 ' : ( -:~ • :' 5 ) 
-- .. --------+ ..... 
o -0.103 -0.230 
_________ . __ . _________________ 4-________ ~ ----------- ----- ~ -~---.---f____----------- -.-- .-- ------ ----------
_ ~ • '} A 4 _ fJ • /' n ~ 3 .' " ~ 'l • 1 (] q O. 9 9 3 
-. ~ 
(7.78) 
0.024 
-II-
* *" ~)* ( ,* (-1.55) (_1.1(1) (,.~./:..,~ .0.15; 0 .. A66/ 
-n.fi13 
(-3.95) 
-O .. ~77 
(-2.62) ( 2 •. / \ • ..l 
-: 2 I 
-- _ • 4/,7 
(4.ArJ) 
MI 
1.465 
(2.61) 
- -
-5 .. 091 
(-2.91) 
-6.205 
* (-n.77) 
0.514 3.H2 
0~815 15.53 
0.87 1.354 
0.67 1 .791 0 .. 747 
(1.32) 
". - .. __ ~ ___ . __ ,,~---- - --' ,,--I-- -.- .. - .. - -~-.- - «-_. (-0.217) (1.89) 
0.628 4.69 '- -+---2-. -8-7-6---i--~-0-·.--6-1-4-+----0-.-0-0--1 -- -----0-.0·14- - -_o''-o-15-f---~ r;. !~-7 =' ""'5. 7A g 5.949---- 7.511 4. 752 -2. OOA * 35.91 7.1 5'. ? 11 2 
(1.74) 
F" ( 3.31 ) (-1 .16) * (-0.20) * (0.33) * (-0.12) * ('2. r~ ~ ~ (3. (17) ( 3. 23) ( 4_ •._4_.? ___ ) -+-(_2_._4_4 _) ~(_-_O_._6_9 _) +_(_0_. _8f3_)-T---t----f-----+----~ rl----+----+--C-o~-s-t·-a-n-t-+--·-p~c----+- 'CA '---RCO--- ·--·-·----r--+----O-S-1-·· -~_-n-_c;.-?_-._-_  -l-I-_·-.. ~~_-DS-3--~~~ .~~. ~~ .. -. ---- -- -- ~- ~ ~ - I 
t---+---+--7-8-7-3-~-0-.-2-5-3-1--0-.-0-8-6-j1--0-.-8-6-4---jI---O-.-7-9-8---1r_-1-6-·.-=9---1:--·--t---' 6. 6 A <1 1 3 • 5 a _ O. 377 j • 1 6 1 4 0 • 40 7 • 1 23\ 
B -. * * * -II- (* * ~~ _~~( ___ 1_._0_8_)_*~(_1_._5_7_)~_(_0_._1_6_)~_(1_._1_9_)~~{1._._1_2_)~_(-__ 2n-.·~~1l6~n),' _1~·B1) (-1.~) ----~- - 1 
I ) 3 767 0 611 1.194 -0.027 -0.217· .1.065 -1.823 - B:623 6:Ga 1.70 3.051 
~M1~N_~_(_0_:_3_3_)*_~I~(_=_2_:_7_3_)~_(_-_3-.3_4-)~-{ ___ 0_._2_4_)*~( ___ 0_._2_2_)_*~(~~~~~-27_)*~~~~---.~~-- .. --~~----~--" 
0.606 6.72 1. 63 2.541 
4.007 i -0.695 -0.855 -0.463 -0.025 _4.611 ~1 .. 496 -2.833 
~D--i-~(~3~.~3=-4~) _~Ii (.=.-=.4 :..:. 6~5~)-l-(~---=3~._4 _6 )~~( _-_1 ._6_6~) _* ~(_-_o_. -:7 6 ___ )_*+-( --:5~.-=2-=-3 =-) -+(_~ 2:;-.-;0;-;;8-;:;-) _+-(---;-3~. 2;:;-;2:-;:;):--t-;;-:-:;~t---t---1----+--- ---- -- .----.- ... - .. 
I -0.501 0.835 1.802 0.872 -3.552* l 1.689 * 1.888* 36.32 0.372 2.85 222.40 1 .. 573 
f" 
8 
N 
-169.0 
(-1.97) I (-O. 82) * ( 1 • 4.~~:. _~~:-~.2_)--1-_{ _1 ._2._1._)_*+-(_---:::0_.~3=-6 _) -+-(I'"-; ... O=-.-=1~9-=-) -+--:(-::0_. -:-22:-)_-r--( 3_. O~ ______ . - --- .'-
+-----6---~--0-.-118 1.216 0.814 -15.97 5.275 -15.16 - I 
1 .074 I 0.0 1 * * * *) * I (-1.48)*! (0.30)* (-0.27) (1.62) (1.37) (-2.12) (0.56) (-1.68 _. __ . ___ + ______ ._._ .-.- .. -~ 
13.32 -0.204 -0.583 -0.127 -0.174* 0.527* 2.309 -2.192 - I 
( 0 • 8 8 ) * (_ 0 • 57 ) * (-1. 83 ) ( - 0 • 8 3 ) * (-1. 21 ) ( 0 • 5 5 ) ( 2 • 3 6 ) ( - 2 • 262___ _ __ . __ J 
__ ~.--.L---.--_+_-----.-I--------I 
0.295 2.49 158.90 2.163 
~-' -"- -_ .. _--_. 
0.406 3.34 269.50 2.312 
_. - -----1---'-, -- - - - --" ~ .. 
0.726 11.33 1.09 2.371: 4N 0 A 2 t--I----l...:=-::...::...:.:.. --- .:------+----1-0 -51--1,--- 0 324 _ 0 .927 - 3 .. 069 -: 0 • 623 -1 • 92 5 
2.691 _0.566 -. -. * I_D-+-~(~2:.:. • .:..91:...:.)=-+.:...( -_4~._1_3.:....) +--=-{_-_6 "_0_4_)-+-_(-1-05-2_)---+-(_--5-. _82_)-+-._( -_5 __ 0_8_2 )-+--r~_1 _.0_2_)_* +-{_-_2_. 7_3_)_+----r--- _-+--.----+------1-.---.-+----1-.-- .... - - .~.' 
0.799 1.666 0.842 -0.471 ~1.894 -2.397 38.52 0.334 2.57 2~5.60 1.342 
-155.9 -0.580 * ~ I * * ~ ____ ~_f"~_~(1.~7~7L)~(~-~0~.7~0~)_*Li _{~1_._25~)_*L__(1_._8_2_)~_(1_0 __ 14~)~(~-_O_.0_4-)-L~-0-._2_1_)~_(0_._2_7~) __ L(_3._1_2-)-1-----L------L----J----L----J-----~--~ 
OM is a dummy variable 
1.See 'f"ootnotes of Table 5.11. 2. Circumflex indicates comput d values. 4NDA1 refers to TPC, ~NOA2 refers to STPC. 
",, ___ ~~ance, 19~4 IV = +1, 1975 I = -1, zero otherwise. It refers ,~" unusual changes in money supply. 
c~ .. J- : • -. _..- ,.. ...... , • _~ __ • _____________ ---- ~r ~i!;;: t 
~ ... " ' 
Table 5.16 T St L t 5 1 YO age eas quares Regression Analysis 
Ind Qap Country Constant A I f 
N 
TPC 
o 
r 
N 1.641 -0.562 -0.028 -0.236 
* * (3.25) (-2.4) (-0.41) (-0.64) STPC 
-----------r----------- '----------- --------- --- --------
o 0.322 
* (0.15) 
2.009 
* r---+----+-~( 1 .34 ) 
8 
N 
0.176 
* (1.58) 
0.002 
* (1.14) 
-0.787 
(-5.03) 
-0.176 
* (-0.83) 
-0.625 
(-3.58) 
Macroec anomie Approach. Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, France .. 
21.31 
(4.91 ) 
DSP2 
23.08 
DSP4 DSPS os LI.. FP 
-0.302 
-0.007 0.026 
(-1.14) * 
: J , 
Ll.lt-1 
-----+-----~~---­~ , 
(-0.01)* (0.14)* 
"---r------~------~------~------~----~+_------
CA-1 
-0.079 
* * (-0.47) 
LlFP-1 F -" SE ow 
28.54 2.623 
0.859 11.03 0.38 1.974 
0.55 1.562 
8.02 5.32 1 .671 
6.25 63.07 2.071 
68.13 3 07 * 0.590 • 
(1.41) 
8.22 1.921 
0.250 1.83 173.10 2.271 
0.575 4.11 1.98 3.163 
0.652 5.68 1.45 2.042 3.077 -0.756 -0.823 -0.447 -0.010 -4.96 1 -1.398 -3.356 _ -0.108 0.292 0.475 
1 __ 
O
_-+--.!.{...:::.2-=-... 4_3......:.)-+-(-=--_4_._84~)~-{ _-3_._3_2_) _--+--(_-_1_._6_6_)_*+-(_-_0_.2_9_)_*+_( -_5_._1--,.5)-+_( -_1_._9_9 )--+_{_-3_._7_6_) -+-__ -+-(_-_0_. _73_)_*-+-_(_0_. 9_6-'..)_*+_(0-1_._76-...::)---+-_______________ ..--- -i------if----+--t---r--,--I 
-77.94 0.540 0.350 5.333 
r * * * ( ) r---t-__ ~(L-~O~. 9:::..:9::....!)~~( --=0:..:. •..:...9~9~) -t-~_O_. 5_B_)-+-_3 ._72 ___ _ 
B -88.74 
(-1.04) * 
0.061 
* ( 0.24) 
-0.077 
* (-0.15) 
0.641 
* (1.09) 
0.310 
* (0.46) 
_8.492 -0.531 -1.064 44.51 )* * * (-0.96 . (-0.07) (-0.14) (3.94) 
0.949 -20.B1 
(1.26)* (-2.0A) 
2.947 -13.52 
* * (0.27) (-1.29) 
-0.179 
* (-0.26) 
-0.223 
* (-0.94) 
0.564 3.82 16.02 2.531 0.307 -4.427 
* ( 0.59) ( - 3. 0_1~ )'----+----------- -________ +-------- .-I-----t----+--t---r---r---1 
0.159 -0.638 0.191 1.56 188.40 2.471 
* * (0.30) (-0.45) 
3.618 -0.295 -0.468 -0.09 -0.041 0.3ffil 2.156 -2.581 _ -0.324 0.312 0.672 
N 
0.332 2.14 3.11 2.333 
(0.18)* (-0.68)* (-1.24)* (-0.36) (-0.2)* (0.3~* (1.98) (-2.21) (-0.62)* (0.78)* (0.291* 
ANDA2r-----4-~----~------~-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------~------~----~-r-~~~~+-~~~+-----_4------_+------
o 1.883 -0.643 -1.031 -0.327 -0.013* -4.3S4 -0.541 -2.472 -0.129 0.777 9.71 0.92 2.281 
r----I--!(..::.2.:..;. O:...:3::..!)_*~(~4....:... _0 3-.:)~....:..( -_6_._3_9_) +(_-_1 ._4_9_)~* ~(_-_o_. 4_3_)-+{_---:5:-. ~61:;r-)_: +-(_0_. 9_2"':)_*-1-(~_-=3:...:.. =3 5~)~ __ -_+l(.=.'-~ ~~'? )~ 
0.644 0.722 5.662 0.278 -6.4~ -1.027 
(0.92)* (1.25)* (4.19) (0.43)* (-0.7~)* i:d.13)* r 
0.169 0.439 
* LQ _._?J3..l____L2 • 1 31-f-_____ -+-_ -~_1_--_:_. ~r_--_+---+_:_::-:-i__:_-:::_t~~~I:;"":-;;:;1 
-1.572 47.23 -0.279 0.241 -4.908 0.594 4.19 149.20 2.482 
(1.02)~ (4.49)* (-0.315)* (0.45)* (-3.62) 
-61.31 
* (-O.81) 
1 • See footnotes of Table 5.15 
').17 
-
Inri , A 
*" '" 
x-
-2 Constant /\ I f t:.. y , ~"J [)A CA iiSD? r: ') p ~~ f}S PI) SD ~FP L11f-1 6 y-1 6NfJn-1 CA-1 ,1 F P-1 ep , ~ R SE ow F 
I ~- . --
TPC1 0.417 C!.475 _:1. n n n I -O.26n -0.002 7 • 1 il fi 1t.?9S 5.~fi1 2.567 15.69 0~7B3 
*i -If 
, 
* * * .*" (0.38) (n.79) (-fl.gfi) (1.84) (-n.D1) (~ ')" ~ :>.30) (7.74) (1 .07) (0.60) , •• ,J , 11.18 9.68 2.404 
STPC1 0.599 -f).CllA rJ.'JR? -0.376 -0.451 ~.nfFl .--:.2? 1 ?Afin 1.326 -18.15 
* -If ·It ->I- \l-
*" (0.61)t -If 0.718 (O.5S) ,(-0.n7) (r:.7q) (-1.9S) (-2.65) (1.fifi) (1.,g:?) (1.49) (-0.79) 
~ I 
7.78 8.44 2.521 
t -- ~ . ~-- - -----
TPC2 4.281 I n.'1(]S n.741 -0.196 0.095 -1.46 7 ~).4/11 n.032 -6.158 -16.27 -0.344 -0.061 -0.0276 -1. ~55 -13.95 I 
-\I- * * 0.931 I .. ('J 17) (-2.26) * * I(- * (4.76) (1.lA) (2.134) (-5.84) (0.51) (n.fiS) . . , (n.02) (-0.73) (-0.89) (-1.15) (-0.31) 1(-4.11) (-0.78) 23.01 3.27 1.933 
.------~ 
.~ t---- - -
---
-----
-
STPC2 1.502 0.396 0.279 -0.517 0.032 1.421 1.102 -2.661 -5.155 -14.25 -0.408 -0.004 0.044 -Cl.893 -21.2R 
* * * * (.~.51) * * * 0.911 (1.74) (1.14) (3.95) (-3.22) I (0.23) (0.73) (-1.79) (-2.99) (-0.69) (-1.45) * (-1.38)* 10- (-0.08) (0.49) (-5.71) 
17.71 2.77 1.892 
- --
" 
-- --
Constant PC CA RCU T OS1 o S2 OS3 PC-1 CA-1 RCU-1 R2 F SE OW 
~BA~i -22.62 -0.814 0.022 0.280 0.260 -11.57 -1 .91 2 -8.093 
* * * * 
)* ( -1.88) 0.655 (-0.57) (-3.61) (0.03) (0.69) ( 1 .02 ) (-3.13) (-a.sA, 
7.77 32.67 3.021 
:!)A2 * -7.212 -0.783 -0.509 0.146 0.207 
-12.41 _7.673 -1CJ.B2 
-. 
* * * * (-3.13: /1)* (-2.73) ~.583 (-0.15) (-2.93) (-1.12) (0.29) (0.74) (-0. 7 
5.99 39.45 3.059 
tOA3* -43.64 -0.977 -0.355 0.238 0.396 -6.942 1.$9 -5.112 -0.172 -0.982 0.257 (" ) * * * * * ('].13)* (-0.83)* * * * 0.643 "-0.96 (-3.63) (-0.04) (0.22) (1.33) (-1.30) (-0.67) (-1.35) (0.23) 5.32 35.16 3.018 
to- _~.1i1 
* -39.91 -0.810 -0.625 -0.463 0.341 -12.91 
-10.98 0.103 
-0.173 .:.n-.97Z NDA4 * 
* * * (_1.U (-1.93) * * * 0.511 * (0.97) (-2.45) (0.28) (-0.32) (-0.84) (-0.66) (-2.01) (-1.14) (-0.43) 
3.51 48.16 3.011 
.. 
1. See footnotes of Tables 5.11 and 5.15. 4NOA1* refers to TPC1, 6NDA2* refers to STPC1, ~NDA3* refers to TPC2 and ~NDA4* refers to STPC2. 
- 17S -
Turning now to the two stage least squares analysis, here 
too, no meaningful results can be reached in the cases of 
Belgium and France. Results for the Netherlands, in the 
capital flow equation, reinforce those of the OlS(7). 
Turning to the sterilization equation we obtain signif-
icant TPC coefficients. CA coefficients are significant also 
and looking at the standard error) they could be as small as 
-0.8 and -0.7. Both TPC and CA coefficients indicate that the 
Dutch authorities systematically pursued a policy of steriliza-
tion, in accordance with evidence in the sixties. 
This approach, like the previous one,fails to give satis-
factory answers under STPC. With respect to Denmark, the 
capital flow equation corresponds to that of the OLS approach, 
although as for the Netherlands - coefficients are higher. 
From the sterilization equation one can derive a systematic 
policy of sterilization. This indication is provided by the 
TPC and CA coefficients which range from -0.69 to -0.76 and 
-0.82 to -0.85 respectively. It was explained above why author-
ities have probably embarked on such policies. The proxy for 
the domestic target of monetary policy - the rate of inflation 
in the absence of data on the rate of capacity utilisation/(RCU) _ 
was found significant in its lagged form, but with'the wrong 
sign. Results improve under STPC. C~ fluctuations seem to 
be offset by capital flows whose range varies between 47.7 to 
62.5 percent. On the sterilization question,we cannot draw 
definite conclusions given the significant difference between 
STPC and CA. Eurodollar interest rates seem to be significant 
under this approach. There seems to be a clear trend in ~NDA. 
Results for Germany do not seem to differ significantly 
from the OlS ones, although ~y seems to be significant here 
with the right sign in the equation that incorporated lagged 
- 179 
adjustment. 
With respect to the sterilization equation, given that 
theCA coefficient is either insignificant or has the wrong 
" ! 
sign, no definite conclusions can be drawn. We referred above ~ 
to the possibility of sterilization policies in Germany. A 
surprising result seems to be the insignificance of the RCU 
variable at a moment where authorities tried primarily to 
protect their domestic aims and especially income and inflation 
fluctuations. Howeve~ one has to analyse the RCU. Rises in 
RCU in excess of its equilibrium value lead to monetary policy 
tightening, that would in turn lead to capital inflows and the 
authorities would perhaps sterilize to avoid liquidity effects, 
with further implications on reserve stability. It seems 
questionable though) if this is the proper variable to be used 
for Germany(B). During the period under review, RCU was at 
low levels and falling. Theory would suggest the opposite 
sequence of events from those described above. However, author-
ities were more determined to fight inflation than unemployment. 
Huge capital inflows resulted out of revaluation expectations. 
Inflation control led to interest rate rises and avoidance of 
reflation to eliminate XB surpluses. Better results are 
obtained for STPC under the 2SLS approach. Significant and 
* right sign ANDA andCA coefficients range from -0.37 to -0.52. 
The insignificance of the speculation dummies comes as a sur-
prise. With respect to the sterilization equation the same 
comments apply as .. under. T-PC. 
Generally)wi~ respect to the econometric analysis employed, 
while the two forms produced in certain cases different results 
on the importance of certain variables, they do not seem to 
produce different answers on the key question of sterilization. 
The 2SLS approach though,reinforces the OLS findings and comes 
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up with more definite results. It also improves results under 
STPC. 
Similarity which by and large exists between the results 
of the two forms, uould indicate the importance of discretion-
ary changes in central bank policies. 
Indications of systematic sterilization policies come as 
a surprise for the SSC at a moment uhere it has been frequently 
claimed that they tried to preserve orderly markets. Even if, 
as it has been asserted, they behaved properly during crisis 
periods, the carrying out of such operations must have contrib-
uted to the build up of exchange rate crises. Results above 
suggest that more analysis is required to establish uidely 
acceptable conclusions. More proper explanatory variables are 
required to enhance the fit of most of the equations. The 
behaviour of each central bank has to be analysed in more 
depth. The econometric estimation of a complete model would 
certainly be more revealing although it entails difficulties, 
see appendix II. Such models uould also have to be constructed 
in a multi country frameuork, so that more correct offset coef-
ficients will be obtained. 
Our results above indicate that sterilization has been car-
ried out by more than one country. It is not that just one 
member sterilizes and others accept the adjustment consequences. 
Instability in reserve flous folious when the adjustment burden 
cannot be shifted to non-sterilizing members, and policy con-
flicts arise. The fixed exchange rate system becomes unstable , 
although, as evidence suggests, sterilization operations 
initiated by sse - while they could have considerable effects 
for the country itself - have rather smaller effects on its 
pirtners, creating problems only if such policy continues for 
a longer time period. 
A "d'" _r -z=-rr--.; 
- 1 e1 -
Further, it does not mean that when one country - especially 
a major one - sterilizes and others accept the adjustment impli-
cations, much exchange rate instability can be avoided and that 
such a system could continue. It could be that other members 
do not want to adjust further, after a certain point, due to 
18 consequences. A country cannot maintain indefinitely free 
and unencumbered transactions with its neighbours at a fixed 
exchange rate, while at the same time pursuing domestic object-
ives differing from those of its neighbours. If German policy 
makers had chosen to adj~t to the external imbalance while 
maintaining fixed exchange rates, it would have been necessary 
to submit to the external inflationary pressures and give up 
sterilization policy and the domestic objectives that they 
protected. Instead,when confronted with the enormous specul-
ative flows which were the ultimate consequences of this con-
tradiction between internal goals and external pressures for 
adjustment, Germany chose to give up fixed exchange rates 
rather than abandon its domestic objectives. The price paid 
was in terms of mounting external imbalances accompanied by 
an increasing instability of its foreign reserves and conse-
quent strain in its relations with other countries. 
5.C.f. 
We analysed above the evolution of the objectives and 
policies of the EEC members. These countries did not follow 
a common path. Economic divergence meant divergence in the 
evolution of their currencies, accentuated by third-currency 
crises and other shocksJmost of which resulted in exchange 
rate adjustment expectations and sUbstantial capital movements 
flowing, unfortunately, disproportionately uithin the EEC mem-
bers. This divergence continued in the absence of corrective 
action. The Snake was a one to one relationship and led under 
) 
'j 
~---~~---.. -----
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the circumstances, to three major currencies leaving it since 
they could not bring their economies into the German path, 
~hile Germany refused to reflate. Smal~ very open economies, 
depending heavily on Germany, stayed in it. Their economic 
performance though was not as good as that of Germany. While the 
exchange rate evolution ~ould seem to reflect the economic 
situation of each EEC member, a larger fluctuation ~ould be 
expected for the currencies of the SSC. For example}prices 
in Belgium rose by 36 percent between mid-1974 to February 1978 
whereas in Germany by only 17 percent. Yet during that period 
the OM had been revalued by only 2 percent against the BFr. 
sse tried to avoid undesirable currency depreciation effects. 
Some of them though did not avoid frequent and on certain 
occasions large devaluations against the OM. For various 
reasons, see p 124, they managed to stay in the Snake. However, 
although their divergences were not as great as those of major 
independently floating members, they nevertheless built up 
slowly and finally created mOre problems, see chapter six. 
Further, sterilization policies within the Snake contributed 
to exchange rate instability. Under the coordination strateg~ 
an MU comes out of policy coordination among members. No such 
conclusion could perhaps be justified here even with respect 
to the members that remained within the Snake. 
Given the necessity of coordination, it also became evident 
that a considerable amount of analytical work had to be under-
taken in the Community for exchange rate fixity to come about. 
No significant progress has been achieved in this field. 
5.D.a. Financial Market Integration 
--------------
Further progress on capital mobility became slow. Decisions 
taken, see C. Johnson (1979, p 3), would take rather a long 
time to implement in detail. In some areas capital flow 
--~-~ .. --.-
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con troIs have been increased, see MC.K enz i e . ( 1976, pp11 5-7), slow-
ing down the pace.towards capital liberalisation) starting with the 
considerable exchange rate instability during the 1970-73 period, 
and intensified by the EEC enlargement. Also,forms of 
dual exchange markets were operating in six of the members -
BLEU since 1955, france since 1971, Italy since January 1973, 
the UK since 1947, Holland since 1971. This system means 
mainly that all current account transactions are put in the 
"official" market and those of capital account on the "free" 
market. The official rate can be pegged or floating, uhile 
the free rate is floating. The purpose is to maintain stable 
exchange rates for commercial transactions and also relieve 
authorities from speculative pressure and uncertainty imposed 
on monetary policy by capital flows under fixed exchange rates. 
The main preconditionfot this qualitative control system to 
operate,is that the links between the tuo markets and the 
possibility of foreign exchange holders to move from one mar-
ket to the other) are brought down to a minimum. The advan-
tages and the degree of effectiveness of suchqsystem have 
been analysed, see fleming (1973, pp 143-4), Magnifico (1973, 
pp 155-6). In the BLEU the pre-1971 OEM uas one of imperfect 
market dichotomy. A major reseparation occurred in May 1971 
uhen the Brr became a strong currency and the OEM apart from 
preventing a reserve drain uas charged nou with preventing a 
reserve rising out of capital flows. An analysis of the 
Belgian OEM is provided by Boll (197e), (1978). He concludes 
that the effectiveness of this system at a moment where there 
were not serious problems of evasions, uncontrollability and 
authenticity of transactions uas higher in stemming outflolJs 
than inflows. There still existed links between the two rates 
and additional links via direct and indirect intervention in 
-- - - ... 
- 184 -
both the free and official spot market. At the time of heavy 
speculation in favour of BFr there existed small free premia 
and hence the OEM was ineffective in stemming capital inflows 
and reserve accumulation. In practice the difference between 
the official and the free rate was almost always very small. 
France and Italy introduced similar versions, while the 
Netherlands introduced a system to discourage inflows. Italy 
accepted them at a moment of rising interest rates in Europe, 
when arbitrage outflows were added to speculative ones putting 
unsustainable reserve strains. It had few choices, since it 
desperately needed to restimulate economic activity. In all 
three countries these measures were not effective and were 
abolished before long, see Tsoukalis (1977, pp 133-6). In 
the UK controls initially aimed at restricting portfolio invest-
ment outflows. By 1974 all direct investment was made con-
ditional on finance by foreign borrowing. While the argument 
for putting on controls was to ease XB problems, experience 
shows that controls changed little from one crisis to the 
other, see Cairncross (1973). Authorities were looking to 
secure capital for domestic investment. Such controls were 
effective only on limiting portfolio investment overseas. In 
so far as they were used to permit or encourage foreign borrow-
ing they were reinforcing economic incentives, although the 
more expensive it became to borrow the greater uas the like-
lihood of a larger reflection on the XB. 
From the MU point, these controls during these turbulent 
years, implied that capital transactions betueen EEC members 
were either prohibited or subject to a strict control system. 
The Commission proposed a common external controls policy in 
order to secure intra EEC capital freedom. Instead, each mem-
ber chose its own system, applying controls to both EEC members 
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and third countries. Even under this system exchange rate 
stability uas not achieved uithin the EEC. Controls uere 
tending towards reinforcement rather than dismantling, meaning 
failure of convertibility. The process touards an MU uas 
negative. 
fixed exchange rates led to control intensification, see 
Morsberger (1977, p 31), uithin the European currency bloc, 
throuing a significant light on the assertion that parity 
fixing in the Snake acted as a stabiliser and thus encouraged 
European integration. Capital controls are not usually regarded 
as measures to encourage integration. When Germany lifted its 
controls in January 1974, pressure uas put on the Frfr and france 
finally left the Snake. 
New restrictions uere imposed by Italy in May 1976 and by the lJ( 
in August 1976. In December 1977 Germany alSJ imposed new measures on 
inflows. Even at the end of 1978 the prospects of removing 
such controls uere remote. five members - UK, Ireland, france, 
Italy, Denmark - had controls on limiting capital outflows. 
Those were countries in external deficits. Members had not 
decided yet on a ring fence of controls in the EEC in the \Jay 
a common external tariff exists. Some of them had no controls 
on third countries and would be reluctant to impose such 
measures, at a moment where other members could not do without 
them. Permitting free flows to other members would mean per-
mitting free flows to non-EEC countries as well. 
The Eurocurrency market, as it was analysed in chapter two, 
was a retarding factor on control dismantling. Members had no 
particular incentive to press for greater freedom of national 
currency flous. further) such market by enhancing US monetary 
policy effects in Europe, given the different performance of 
EUropean currencies, further contributed to the prevalence and 
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control intensification among members. 
Currency convertibility, a necessary MU ingredient, comes 
after exchange rate stability has been achieved inside Europe. 
Countries do not need controls to defend their exchange rates 
uhich uould be unlikely to come under pressure with respect to 
their fixed relations. Policy coordination has then to be 
achieved to make intra-EEC parities durable. Speculative 
flows among members will be reduced and controls among members 
will be relaxed uith equinimity. Unfortunately coordination 
did not come in Europe, exchange rate crises took place and 
members tried to preserve stability by abandonning convertib-
ility, in their fear of undesirable IB and XB effects. To the 
extent that exchange rate instability was stemming from XB 
problems, imposition of controls to stop exchange rate fluc-
tuations had the undesirable effect of delaying exchange rate 
adjustment. 
Capital controls remained for various reasons and countries 
varied them .. according to their XB, economic activity and struc-
tural problem requirements rather than as a structural shift 
touards a more permanent MU. They sloued doun the process 
touards MU. Countries}by using them,and to the extent that 
they were effective, avoided corrective measures in their 
economies. The coordination process was impaired. Like the 
first, the second EEC enlargement could make free capital 
mobility more difficult given the problems of the new part-
icipants. 
Coming nou to measure financial market integration 
C. Johnson (1979) uses non-monetary flows, as measured by 
the intra-EEC flows as a percentage of worldwide flows _ for 
each country. Our estimates - see Table 2.7, p 39 - indicate 
that small countries score highly, while for large ones there 
appears to be an inverse relation between trade and financial 
market integration. Howeve~ this may not be sufficient to 
prove a trend towards more perfect integration of financial 
markets at this period of enormous capital movements growth. 
Growth in the sixties was largely an adaptation of US controls 
which sought)although with limited success) to separate national 
capital markets. Although the US abolished controls in 1974, 
many EEC countries erected new ones continuing even to the 
present day. 
Logue, Salant and Sweeney (1976) among the alternative 
concepts of financial market integration which they analyse, 
suggest one which focuses on the relationship between interest 
rates in various countries. Studies on this alternative focus 
into two broad categories. Firstly, those which examine levels of 
interest rates in groups of countries - the less the divergence 
among them, the greater will be the degree of integration - and 
secondly, those concerned with the testing of the interest 
parity theory. 
The question is whether there has been a trend 
towards closer financial market integration among the EEC 
members. Kenen (1976) suggests that although national interest 
rate differences should not be used to measure the degree of 
integration at a point in time, they can be used to trace out 
short-term changes in the degree of integration. They should 
be used with caution however because the dispersion of national 
interest rates has many causes. A number of stUdies have been 
undertaken for the sixties and early seventies. Argy and 
Hodjera (1973) find no evidence of a continuing decline in the 
dispersion of interest rate movements, while Hawkins (1972) 
concludes that the tendency for differentials to narrow between 
members' interest rates was not strong, irreversible or even 
_ 188 -
sustained over the integration period. Cooper (1971) draws 
similar conclusions. Despite the growth of capital movements 
and the development of large non-national markets, the integ-
ration process slowed down. Our analysis belo~ for the 1972-78 
period, see chart 5.5, indicates that initially money call 
rates evolved more or less similarly for all members. The 
similar trend and the closing in dispersion seems to break 
after 1975:2. If one is to exclude Italy and Denmark(9) where 
government bond rates are used, the situation improved for 
the rest of the members after 1977 IJ although a divergence has 
occurred since the end of 1978 I. There are similarities bet-
ween certain subgroups - Benelux rates, Benelux and German 
rates, French and British rates, although French rates are 
closer to the Benelux and German ones. Markets moved towards 
closer financial market integration during the 1973:5 to 1975:2 
period and,when Italy and Denmark are exclude~ during the 
1977:4 to 1978:4 period. A sustained irreversibility of the 
integration process did not seem to have been established even 
during the seventies. 
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Marston (1976) has analysed the interest arbitrage on the 
Eurocurrency markets, suggesting that the interest parity 
holds quite uell for short-term maturities, in a market gen-
erally free of official restrictions on short-term capital 
flous, largely unaffected by the risks involved in shifting 
funds betueen markets. Each non-dollar Eurocurrency rate is 
linked to the rate of the dominant Eurodollar market through 
arbitrage operations undertaken by the Eurocurrency banks. 
Houever)uhen considering national markets things do not 
seem equally satisfactory. Looking at chart 5.3, the interest 
parity does not seem to perform as uell uhen tested against 
domestic interest rates. Deviations betueen the covered dom-
estic rate and the Eurodollar rate increase dramatically for 
certain periods}mostly during speculative episodes. Certain 
deviations remained for long periods, more marked in the case 
of some currencies. Further, the fact that there uas no close 
adherence to the interest parity for the 1972-78 period is 
also verified by the estimations of the equations for the money 
call rates, table 5.18, based on the form: 
ix = aa + a, i e-a2 FP x + u 
uhere ix is the money call rate of country x, ie is the Euro-
dollar rate, FP is the foruard premium of currency x and u is 
the error term. 
The money call rate of a country is related to the Eurodollar 
rate and the foruard premium of that currency by the relation-
ship(10). 
i = i - FP x e x 
If arbitrage dominates the determination of money call 
rates, then the interest parity relation uill hold and the 
coefficients ai, a1 will equal unity and the intercept 8
0 
uill 
be zero. From theory ue knou that uhen interest parity holds 
.-
Table 5.18 Money Call Rate Equations: Monthly Estimations 
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between two countries, that is in equilibrium, the yields to 
investors in both countries from holding assets in either 
currency are the same after adjustment for the forward cover. 
Uncovered interest rate differentials will approximate the 
forward premium or discount between the two exchange rates 
W) 
avoiding profitable arbitrage operations. Interest parity 
holding indicates market integration. Arbitrage would result 
in unifying the European money markets so that supply and 
demand pressures in any member market are spread throughout 
other national markets. Fund transfers that will take place 
from one national financial centre to the other will in due 
time establish interest parity. Domestic arbitrageurs, by 
responding to profit opportunities, bring equilibrium. On 
frequent occasions though, that does not seem to have occurred 
among members. Interest parity did not hold, meaning 
profit opportunities, and domestic arbitrageurs were prevented 
from responding to such opportunities. The ability or willing-
ness of wealth holders to acquire and deal in claims on for-
eigners can be influenced by a number of factors ranging from 
restrictions found in any list of capital controls1 and govern-
ment powers to tax to the costs of buying knowledge and from 
the risks of acting with incomplete knowledge. Arbitrage 
among national money markets is not as free as it is within 
the Euro-currency system. We have already elaborated on the 
existing controls, as well as on the risks of the period under 
Concern. There is also the risk of controls being imposed on 
the centre where funds are invested. It is generally acknow-
ledged that exchange controls in the UK, Italy and the Belgian 
OEM prevented domestic arbitrageurs from responding to appar-
ent profit opportunities. In this sens~controls have contrib-
uted to slowing down the financial market integration process 
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among the member countries(12). 
5.E.~. Re~i£n~l_P£l!c~ 
We have already referred to the cases where an effective 
regional policy is required within the MI process, see chapter 
one, p 13, and chapter two, p 51. Countries like Italy, the 
UK and Ireland relied-a great deal on such policies. All of them, 
including France when it left the Snake in 1974, used the lack 
of effectiveness on these policies as an important reason for 
their early departure from the Snake. The Council of 
Ministers created the European Development Fund in March 1975 
after recommendations of the Thomson report (1973) on the need 
to ease regional disparities. It was alloted UA1.3b for a 
three year trial period. The question is how effective such a 
policy was up to the end of 1978. It moved slowly. There 
was hardly any indication that the economic gap between poor 
and rich regions had narrowed. The Commission rates as a 
success that subsidies and infrastructure projects preserved 
185000 jobs. It admits however)that the EEC has hardly changed 
any of its regional imbalances. The overall EEC growth should 
be taken into account since it eliminated hope pinned on the 
EDF. Only an above average growth rate in the problem areas 
would have narrowed the gap. There was a lack of a policy 
oriented by European yardsticks and criteria. The EDF finances 
only projects selected by member governments, subsidised within 
the framework of fixed national quotas. Priorities assigned in 
various capitals are based on criteria other than European. 
No government allows the Commission to interfere in its dom-
estic policy. There were no strings attached in practice. It 
is not certain that these subsidies contribute towards the 
development of regions and supplement national efforts. At 
P!esent members' budgets do not even itemise fund contributions. 
I-
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An encouraging evolution towards a more genuine policy was 
the agreement, after Italian pressure, that 5 percent of the 
EOF - UA80.0b by 1980 - would be assigned without regard to 
" 
, .-
national quotas. Although it is in the right direction it is • 
far too little to be sufficiently effective in view of enor-
mous regional problems. Moreover the amount of the EOF is 
too small to permit more than moderate success in fighting 
unemployment. Its main disadvantages with respect to redis-
tribution among regions are the lack of resources, constraints 
imposed by national quotas and a prejudice against poor nations 
by those who have to pay, see Dosser (1978), (1979). Changes 
are needed such as arrangements analysing and assessing all 
regional economies and detailed information on changes in 
important parameters, facilitating diagnosis on regional 
problems. Indeed in June, 26-7, 1978 the Council of Ministers 
approved the Commission's proposal on such a comprehensive 
system of analysis and also on the assessment of the regional 
impact of other Community policies and the coordination of 
national regional policies. 
The EOF could create ventures to restrain redundant work-
ers in depressed regions financed from schemes such as pay 
roll taxes on firms of prosperous sectors. They met opposi-
tion by objecting to higher VAT rates, while at a time where 
higher business investment is the objective, higher business 
taxation does not seem likely. The alternative of EEC schemes 
replacing regional and unemployment benefits runs into equally 
difficult obstacles of surrender of member state sovereignty. 
Members during the period concerned were on frequent occasions 
outbidding each other to attract investment. The Commission 
tried to ensure similar aid to similar regions and create new 
profitable industries. It had a certain degree of success in 
• 
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making members adjust their policies on EEC rules(13). 
Ho~ever,such rules to coordinate for an efficient resource 
use can do little because the Commission has very little 
. , 
, .-
lee~ay from national authorities. It still has to foster the • 
adjustment process, ~ithout which uncompetitive industries 
would be kept artificially alive. A retreat to protectionism 
and re-emergence of barriers ~ou1d then be unavoidable. Indus-
trial ~orkers should be re-absorbed in the economic system. 
Investment credits will be needed to finance the creation of 
new jabs where structural change is taking place. 
The McDougal report (1977) argued for substantial budget-
ary transfers to reduce income differences and make up for 
trade deficits in weaker regions, reducing deflationary impacts. 
Several criticisms have been raised with respect to the pro-
posals in the MU concept - see chapter two, p 51, also Dosser 
(1979). The Forte report (1979) was set up to examine some 
aspects of the McDougal report. While it shares many of the 
" 
same criticisms, a good aspect is its insistence on using funds " 
to promote convergence. 
The Community budget is, among other things, to help ease 
these inequalities. But its current size means it is regarded 
as no mare than a book-keeping operation. Any substantial 
expansion of the budget, allowing the development of nan-agricultlJral 
policies like those of growth and progressive redistribution, 
would appear to be formidable - at least for the next feu 
years. Various programs are all difficult to implement and a 
funda~ental political shift would be needed, if it is to redis-
tribute uealth successfully and assist in the achievement of 
macroeconomic goals for the EEC and its constituent parts. 
Member states are insisting on a IIjuste-retour" receiving as 
much from it as they pay in. Given the current impossibility 
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of ircreasing its size, substantial budget restructuring is needed. 
Its largest part - above 70 percent - is spent on the CAP. '" 
High support prices have been established creating surpluses 
on certain products. The CAP leaves only a small amount for 
regional policies while as the CAP support finance is contin-
uously rising, this amount is getting progressively less. No 
doubt,if the current CAP continues the EEC will exhaust its 
resources, under the given budget arrangement and will not be 
able to fulfil even its CAP obligations, let alone those of 
other policies. Given that the circumstances that led to CAP 
creation in mid-sixties have now changed, it does seem that a 
reform is required based on supporting, at least from the EEC 
part, efficient farmers and reducing high support prices which 
are currently above world levels. 
Further, not even "juste-retour" has been fulfilled since 
there are less prosperous members which have been net contributors 
for a l~ t~e. For a proper budget) functioning countries like 
, .-
• 
• 
the UK, Italy and Ireland should be net receivers for at least .. 
a number of years. The UK's large contribution is also greatly 
a result of historical trade links with the majority of imports 
coming from third countries and are subject to tariffs handed 
to the EEC. By raising its trade with the EEC its net con-
tribution would decline. But money has to flow in for redis-
tributive purposes. Also under the MCA system due to sterling 
depreciation it had to pay large amounts to the EEC. The situ-
ation uas reversed in 1979 uith the sterling appreciation, 
although due to its small agricultural sector UK's contribution 
remained high. One should also keep in mind that MCAs were 
invented to maintain the CAP and insulate the agricultural 
sector from the consequences of exchange rate adjustments. It 
is however, overlooked that this puts the burden of adjustment 
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resulting from exchange rate changes on industry and that at 
the same time it reduces the effectiveness of exchange rate 
changes to equilibrate the XB. 
National Interests versus Social Unity 
-------------------
Convergence rather than identity of reasons among members 
meant that the possibility of conflicts existed, risking EMU 
in the absence of solutions or compromises. Prior to 1972, 
national attitudes had been shown. Members faced the 1971 
crisis disunited. 
The Snake started functioning while coordination was absent. 
Members took measures suiting their national interests ignoring 
repercussions on EMU. Germany adopted deflationary policies 
and high interest rates aggravating outflows from Italy, which 
led to the imposition of a OEM in Italy to defend the Lira. 
Central banks complained that they had been forced to adjust 
to German interest levels in order to avoid outflows. When 
the Lira took a dramatic fall in the next six months, Italy 
was accused of trying to raise competitiveness through exchange 
rate changes, instead of domestic measures, a policy detrimen-
tal to EMU. Protectionism took place. Such measures were 
taken in Italy in 1974 and 1976, in france in 1975. france 
and the UK also took measures to protect their steel and textile 
industries. There was a lack of social unity prior to joint 
floating. Not all members were consulted on the choice between 
OEMs and joint floating. As a result the Dutch revalued con-
suIting Belgium only. On certain occasions, members made unac-
ceptable proposals to their partners in order to avoid 
participating in the joint float. There was opposition to 
Commission proposals for an increase in the monetary support 
mechanism, reserve pooling and the plan suggested to include 
all currencies after the second dollar devaluation. Italy and 
, .-
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the UK blocked decisions,being dis-satisfied with progress on 
regional policy. Members reacted and combined various is sues '11 
together in a way serving their own interests instead of the 
Community ones. Germany and France demanded that the UK and 
Italy join the Snake so that they would agree on regional 
policy. Not even they themselves believed that this could be 
done given the problems of the two economies. Attitudes were 
an excuse for blocking issues. Germany asked for a common 
energy policy before agreeing on reserve pooling. France 
opposed it in the absence of solution on the gold problem. 
Lack of coordination remained since members kept pursuing 
their own objectives. A turbulent world environment discouraged 
the Commission proposals. Large reserve holders did not want 
to give up something uhile taking nothing in return. Members 
were disunited under the energy crisis. Mistrust among members 
developed. When Italy asked to borrou $2.0 b from Germany for 
five years in 1974, Germany insisted on gold transfers as a 
collateral of the deal. 
The UK disagreed over supporting the neu account unit to 
reflect collective weakness or strength of tho EEC currencies 
in August 1974, maintaining that it would be against UK interests 
when used for EEC budget calculations, since the old one over-
valued 5 terling. 
The terrible lack of cohesion was emphasised by the Marjolin 
report (1975). It derived no progress in EMU. Monetary 
policies had never been more discordant and divergent in the 
last 25 years. The CAP uas affected. Capital liberal-
isation uas less than in the sixties. Considerable external 
imbalances made fixed exchange rates impossible, with protect-
ionist threats. No progress on "European \Jill" \Jas generated 
but instead a display of a series of nationalist wills more or 
.. -
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less unaware of those of others, each one doing its best to 
make its own way out of trouble. National governments 
repeatedly blocked all proposals that did not suit their 
interests precisely. The economic situation was deteriorating. 
1976 was a dramatic year for all EEC currencies. Countries 
controlling inflation wanted to avoid commitments with those 
fighting double-digit inflation rates, before the latter reduced 
them. Germany would not lend unless the borrower presented a 
series of deflationary policies at home. Aid, it was main-
tained, would raise imports and hence Germany's exports lead-
ing to inflation rises in Europe. They rejected the 
Commission's plan for a new EUA1.0 b loan facility to boost 
investment, in July 1977. They refused to reflate and were isolated 
by both their partners and the US, at a moment where EEC 
achieved a lower, instead of 4 percent planned, real income 
growth in 1977, and where trade continued declining 
during the 1976-77 period. Weak members did not 
want to bring price stabili ty quickly, fearing an elimination 
of their chances to catch up economically with other countries. 
The world crisis also made each member try and recover by any 
means, not all of them compatible with EMU. 
The EEC control body had not yet proved effective with their 
policies being blocked or vetoed. Measures against the EMU 
concept were taking place and the EMU plans were shelved. 
More analysis on the Snake period follows in chapter six. 
Then general conclusions will be drawn. 
, ,. 
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CHAPTER SIX OTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE SNAKE ANO GENERAL 
CONCLUSIONS 
£.~.~. lh~ Bu~d~n_of ~diu~t~e~t 
Thygesen (1979) maintains that participation in the Snake 
resulted/for German~ in more expansion and inflation due to 
delayed upward OM adjustment, real depreciation and interven-
tion. One may doubt though whether Germany fulfilled its 
Snake obligations adequately. A country's currency appreciates 
continuously because its inflation rate is lower than elsewhere. 
Intervention would imply an upward inflation adjustment although 
much depends on intervention undertaken by other members. How-
ever} its inflation rate was declining faster than that of its 
partners,in a period of highly restrictive German policies. 
Further, the OM, being a major antipode to the dolla~ under-
went real appreciations since 1977 which could reduce Germany's 
surplus. Howeve~ it exerted deflationary effects, which helped 
to maintain the surplus, in the absence of adequate expansive 
policies. Also joint floating was based on German policy 
which reflected the view of more independent floating and less 
intervention. Its insistence on OM appreciation created 
strains among Germany's partners. Both Snake and non-Snake 
members and the Commission asked Germany to reflate, although 
in vain. 
For small Snake countries having to keep up with the DM 
and appreciate with it meant a deflationary bias for them. 
There is evidence of real appreciation(1), see Table 6.1, for 
most of the period that members were inside the Snake, although 
not very large for the great part of time due to members' con-
siderable economic openness. While this deflationary impact 
added to the problems of reconciling more satisfactory employ-
ment and XB, it is believed that the pressure for XB adjustment 
• 
• 
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Table 6.1 Effective Real Exchange Rate changes, percentage 
change from previous year 
~y Iv ear BFr DKr OM DG NKr SKr 
1973 +5.2 +10.6 +8.9 +1 .7 +5.8 +2.8 
1974 +1.7 -1.6 -0.5 -2.2 +8.2 +4.2 
1975 -4.7 +1.3 -3.1 +0.8 -1.4 +3.2 
1976 +1.9 +2.1 +1 .6 +1.8 +1.4 +2.2 
1977 +0.5 -2.1 +2.1 +3.7 -1 .8 -3.8 
1978 -2.4 -0.1 +1 .4 -0.5 -7.9 -8.9 
Relative wholesale prices used as deflator. (+ indicates 
real appreciation; - indicates real depreciation). Source: IFS. 
has diminished. Further, exchange market nervousness was 
avoided through adequate intervention funds, avoiding also a 
deterioration in credit worthiness for certain members given 
their external deficits. At the same time authorities had 
the freedom to expand real demand higher than would otherwise 
have been feasible. Loss of output appeared unlikely due to 
Snake participation. The Snake also imposed precise and 
credible inflation targets" By having to set a target similar 
to that of the hegemonial country, given also the desire to 
reduce inflation and that Germany's inflation was the lowest, 
it benefited the sse. 
Firstl~ one does not observe similar price discipline. It 
is not reinforced everywhere, judging from declining wages in 
Holland and, although to a lesser extent, in Belgium and rising 
wagesin Denmark. Secondl~ our main objection is on the long-
run validity of the view that no deflationary bias existed in 
the sse. Their task was to adjust and keep XE and exchange 
rate stability. Snake appreciation meant avoidance of deficits, 
implying deflationary effects. sse incurred deficits. Their 
XB situation has been deteriorating since 1975. They did not 
" 
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deflate though. Does it mean that they avoided XB adjust-
ment? The XB situation of the Netherlands deteriorated 
dramatically since 1976. Nominal exchange rate appreciation 
was believed to have beneficial inflation and trade effects. 
However the economy was facing structural problems. By 1976 
the surplus was falling and unemployment was rising dramatic-
ally. Growing fiscal expenditure and budget deficits were 
increasing consumption shares at the expense of productive 
investment. Gas revenues were diminishing. These factors 
reduced foreign confidence on the economy and led to capital 
outflows in recent years. The high PSD and the XB deficit 
would suggest the need for adjustment if Snake pressure was 
to be avoided. These weaknesses became apparent in 1978 III 
where the DG was devalued by 2 percent against the OM. Given 
the insistence of the authorities on avoiding devaluations, 
the seriousness of the situation can be detected. 
The same comments apply for Belgium, except that its prob-
lems are even more intensive. Its industries could not attract 
fresh risk capital, while when in the absence of equity capital 
they were foced into debt financing, they met severe state 
competition and were squeezed. State spending was rising 
alarmingly. Borrowing resulted in significant interest rate 
increases affecting investment. Drastic deflation was needed to 
keep the franc in the Snake, avoided through sUbstantial inter-
vention. Continuous market pressure led to large outflows and 
devaluation which - like in the Netherlands - was too small to 
change things significantly. Falling franc confidence would 
have pushed the deficit higher, had the government not decided 
on borrowing from abroad for the first time in ten years. 
Such borrowing continued into the eighties. Intervention had 
not sufficient deflationary effects to stop the currency 
',1 
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pressure. A simultaneous wage increase and currency apprecia-
tion could squeeze profits in the traded sector, depending on 
what happens to domestic costs. Increases in the latter lead 
also to higher output prices in the non-traded sector. Relat-
ive price changes will re-allocate factors from the traded to 
the non-traded sector. The overvalued currency affects also 
the demand pattern) increasing the demand for tradeables and 
causing the current account to deteriorate. Howeve~ deflation-
ary effects out of appreciation and external deficits and 
productivity rises out of rationalisation schemes work as a 
form of correction mechanism. The latter could be retarded 
or made impossible. An expansive fiscal policy for example, 
may prevent demand from declining thereby preventing the 
deficit from disappearing. Evidence from the Belgian case, 
see de Grauwe (1980), suggests that the relative price shock 
from rising wages and the appreciating currency had important 
implications. The strong decline in the relative price of 
tradeables contributed to the sharp decline of the rates of 
return in the industrial sector. Employment in industry dec-
lined significantly - the phenomenon of de-industrialisation. 
Despite significant productivity effects, franc overvaluation 
contributed to a continuing XB deterioration due mainly to 
rising state spending. It contributed directly to the external 
deficit and indirectly by maintaining inflationary conditions 
in the non-traded sector while the franc was appreciating. 
Budgetary policies prevented automatic XB adjustment triggered 
from an overvalued currency. Also price discipline out of 
appreciation was far from exemplary. While industrial prices 
were reduced much less was done to reduce domestic costs. 
Budgetary policies added to domestic cost increases. Currency 
appreciation combined with government policies helped to create 
• 
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a deflationary bias in Belgium. Further, the necessity to 
reduce the PSD,points to additional deflation required to 
stop currency pressure. Denmark was in an even more serious 
situation. It incurred dramatic external deficits. The for-
eign debt was tripled in two years, 1976-78. High interest 
payments were intolerable for such a small country. Its XB 
situation seems to be in accordance with the Krone's real 
appreciation or small depreciation, despite four devaluations 
since 1976 at a period where budget deficits, expansion and 
inflation were rising(2),(3). 
All the above would lead to the question of how long could 
real adjustment required be avoided.. The view that no def-
lationary bias existed cannot be used as a dynamic argument 
for the future even for the SSC. The Snake period, especially 
since 1976 when the problems started, was too short to lead to 
conclusions on the absence of such bias given the size of SSC 
where they could afford more time before they adjust. It was 
doubted though if such policy could be continued under sustained 
pressure. Currency pressures continued in 1979 where the SSC 
devalued against the OM. Denmark, having the worst performance, 
undertook a 10 percent devaluation, despite significant discount 
rate rises. In November 1979 it announced an austerity package 
to cope with the rising external deficit. Its highly expansive 
fiscal policy had sUbstantial inflationary pressures. The need 
to reduce PSD was recognised. Demand cuts in 1980 would reduce 
the GDP growth rate by 1.5 percent. Interest payments on for-
eign debt would reach half of the country's external deficit 
by 1980. Officials feared that the credit worthiness of the 
country was impaired. Finally, under the pressure of economic 
realities, Denmark curtailed this freedom. 
Belgium's sustained lack of confidence continued in 1979 in 
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the absence of corrective adjustment. The franc remained 
almost always very weak. The external deficit continued. PSD 
cuts did not take place. The political environment did not 
assist in such changes. 
sse deviated from their policy of maintaining XE. However 
such policy does not lead to long-run stability. At some stage 
they have to apply real adjustment in order to stay inside the 
Snake. It is there that the problem of adjustment burden arises 
and the possibility of deflation even for the sse, given 
Germany's insistence on restrictive policies. 
Deflationary effects could also be . due to interest rate 
, .-
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increases. Some of these increases occurred because of the necessiw 
of remaining inside the Snake.It could imply that the Snake exerted 
such a bias. Despite the debate on such effects, empirical 
studies confirm that they could have quite substantial effects 
upon investment, see Bain (1975, p 113). Monetary policy 
seems then to reinforce the effect of fiscal policy in shift-
ing demand towards a composition unsustainable in the long-
run. Growth is affected and an external deficit follows. 
Interest rate rises could also lead to currency appreciation 
and put another squeeze in industry. Or they could undermine 
the monetary restraint, create deficits, necessitate restrict-
ive measures, due to a secondary crisis(4). 
However)B general agreement exists that such an interven-
tion policy could not continue if major currencies participated, 
especially after the relaxed attitude adopted where deficits 
persisted. Intervention would not be in such a modest form 
as it was with the SSC. They could also be reversible in view 
of realignments or following domestic measures. for major EEC 
members to participate they would have to achieve comparable 
XB situations, otherwise intervention could not save the Snake. 
, : 
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Deficits of the range of 4 percent of the GOP, ~ as in Denmark, 
could not persist in the former. The key issue of symmetrical 
adjustment will reappear. 
Advantages arising out of the Snake are the result of fund-
amental differences between a Snake anchored to the OM - although 
some of them might not be certain for the small size partners 
in the longer run - and those, far less positive, of the Snake 
as it functioned with major currencies. In the latter case 
instability has been important. The frfr case indicated that 
france was not able to apply the necessary deflation for part-
icipation in the Snake. The Bundesbank acted analogously. 
Interventions inside the Snake were minor to those of third 
currencies or when the frfr participated, except for the period 
prior to the October 1978 realignment. These forced Germany 
to change its attitude towards the Snake and EMU. 
Spaventa (1979, pp 112-3) also suggests that Snake countries 
are far more homogeneous than they are with respect to other 
EEC members so that the ranking of policy objectives is more 
or less simila~ avoiding tensions in the system. 
£.A.~. li~ely_P~rit~ ~e~lig~m~n!s 
Early realignments were a result of considerable dollar 
instabili ty. Then followed a period of almost three years wi th-
out any realignment. It was an eventful period. Members 
diverged considerably, while market pressure was relatively 
low mainly due to OM weakness against the dollar. However the 
deterioration in competitiveness of certain members would sug-
gest parity realignments. The situation was not the same though in 
1976. Record intervention took place delaying realignments. 
At the end it was a futile effort, under the considerable 
national economic divergences. It was then decided that fut-
ure realignments would be timely to avoid provoking speCUlative 
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pressure. It was doubtful if that would be the case, see 
Scharrer (1979), given that realignments require consent of 
all participants(5),(6). The first three realignments avoided 
speculative pressure. That was not the case for the. last one. 
The belief of timely realignment was not strongly established 
among members. The behaviour of the hegemonial country, 
imposing policies based on its national interests can be 
detected. The arguments on why realignments are delayed should 
be modified. A great deal depends on the highly independent 
policy of Germany. 
It is believed that these realignments were small and 
devalued currencies appreciated against the DM after they took 
place. Speculative gains were not offered. Non-sterilization 
policies further decreased such gains. Realignments have been 
followed by a period of calm, reflows took place and inter-
vention credits were reversed. Flexible intervention tech-
niques have added to stability. 
However certain realignments have not been small, see 
Appendix I. Speculative build ups have not been avoided. 
Confidence in certain currencies was not brought about, either 
because their size was small or because additional corrective 
action was absent. The case of the 8Fr and the DKr demonstrate 
that. Further, non-sterilization at the peak of a crisis does 
not mean that the absence of continuity in such~rule does not 
contribute to market pressure. When the situation becomes 
dramatic members behave properly because they cannot consider 
any other alternative. Germany observed such rule in 1977/78 
in its attempt to avoid reductions in its competitiveness. 
It would be beneficial for the MU if it was to be continued. 
Given Germany's paramount importance on inflation control 
though, it is doubted whether it would have allowed substantial 
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deviations had the exchange rate instrument not proved effect-
ive in checking inflation. Further non-sterilization may 
prove less effective under speculative inflous uhen interest 
rates, in the absence of controls, cannot fall belou zero. 
Flous uill continue on revaluation expectations. Flexible 
intervention techniques could create instability inside the 
Snake, see chapter five pp 148-50. Lastly) it uas not the case 
uhere one currency appreciates (depreciates) against another. 
Most cases were more complex and) despite the consultation 
procedure,undisciplined intervention took place. 
There is a debate on whether objective cr.jteria are needed 
for a smooth adjustable peg functioning(7). They may be use-
ful but they could reduce the credibility of the system if 
coordination is not coming. Realignments become frequent, 
although it uould not seem to affect much the credibility of 
the Snake since 1976. Under the Snake envisaged in 1972 such 
criteria uould seem to be needed with a strong commitment on 
coordination to make realignment less frequent, given the final 
objective of MU creation. Criteria uere needed even uhen EMU 
plans uere shelved, given the economic realities in Europe, 
the capital flous and the need for timely realignments. There 
uas also the danger of avoiding realignments by imposing con-
trols. The Netherlands' case demonstrates that. More flexib-
ility in monetary policies uould seem to be needed in order to 
avoid such movements. 
Given the economic .realities,more emphasis should be put 
on adjustment rather .than on pegging, to avoid any presumption 
that a change will be associated uith a discrete change in the 
market rate. A related Question is whether realignments would 
be easier if they involved all EEC currencies. The nth cur-
rency issue is involved here and dominant currency issues as 
. " 
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well as arguments about the efficient way for the adjustable 
peg to function, see Vaubel (1979, pp 16-7). The hegemonial 
currency in the Snake was the OM. Experience indicates though 
that no major country can adopt a policy unacceptable to other 
major members and still expect them not to leave the Snake. 
After 1975 the UK and France refused to join mainly due to 
the restrictive policies of Germany. When major countries are 
involved purely national policies must be avoided for a smooth 
adjustable peg functioning. Otherwise instability will be 
greater, as well as intervention and realignments. Heavy pres-
sure would develop much earlier after each realignment. In 
chapter four we expressed preference for a crawling peg with 
a diminishing rate of crawl. Of course,under strong divergences, 
when all EEC members are included, even in this system large 
realignments are unavoidable. 
~.~.£. fx£h~nse_R~t~ Po!i£y_t£w~rds_T~i£d_C~r£e~cie~ 
The Snake was criticised for focusing on a limited range 
of currencies. Stable exchange rates in it can be consiste~t 
with rapidly changing and different effective rates for the 
participants. Members subjected 50 percent or less of their 
exchange rate relationship to the adjustable peg leaving the 
rest to floating. If the Snake comprised of all EEC members 
it would raise the peg's relative importance, see Commission's 
figures (1976). 
EEC exchange rate arrangements fell short of assuring 
participants effective exchange rate control. The danger was 
that if they conformed to the average price performance in the 
EEC and did not change their EEC parities, their global com-
petitiveness would not develop parallel to those of other mem-
bers, due to varying importance of the individually floating 
currencies and notably the dollar. It was used as a strong 
... 
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argument for the UK, see Richardson (1979). 
The Commission's general guidelines offered no safe solu-
tion. Failure to agree on a dollar policy has been considered 
as an important weakness of the Snake at a time where an effort 
on both sides of the Atlantic was required to restore stability. 
Absence of dollar policy could increase tensions inside the 
Snake. How the dollar should be managed was important to 
Europe because of the way the IMS developed. The Lira crisis 
in 1973 provides one of the many examples. Recurrent dollar 
crises undermined Snake stability. Erratic dollar movements 
contributed to overshooting among European currencies. 
lamfalussi (1979) explains why financial markets are more 
important in determining the dollar rate, affecting other 
reserve currencies. In the DM case, volatility is implied 
among the Snake currencies, with undesirable implications. 
The Commission blamed the dollar decline which impaired econ-
omic activity in Europe particularly in 1977, impeding recov-
ery and jeopardising EMU(8). Inflationary pressures arising 
out of capital flows led members to abandon non-sterilization 
rules. Dollar intervention and the national mixtures of mot-
ives about the exchange rate further aggravated instability 
under an unstable dollar. 
• 
Joint attempts were undertaken only twice throughout the ,. 
period, when dollar pressure resulted in dramatic currency 
fluctuations in July 1973, see Solomon (1977, pp 276-9) and 
in 1975 after a further severe dollar drop. Record swap arrange-
ments were agreed in the first case, while in the second case 
members agreed to limit the daily dollar movements of all 
currencies to 0.75-1 percent except in cases of underlying 
market trend. The latter never became operational. Nothing 
was done during the 1976 EEC currency crisis which had a 
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strong impact on their effective rates as well as during the 
1977 dollar crisis. No action was taken despite the prevail-
ing view of excessive currency fluctuations. 
Inability for a joint policy vis-a-vis third currencies 
was the main factor behind new proposals for a more broadly 
based exchange rate system in the EEC. Those were the Fourcade 
plan and the Duisenberg plan, see Thygesen (1979) and Dort 
(1977), and the Commission's plan in 1977 based on a modified 
version of the Duisenberg plan. They were given little atten-
tion. Weak members with accelerating inflation refused to 
undertake even a modified commitment to their exchange rate 
behaviour. Strong ones feared conflicts with the Snake rules 
and price instability. They were accused by weak members of 
creating a two-tier Europe. European countries were not pol-
h d . (9) itically prepared w~le t e dollar trouble starte aga1n. 
World inflation in recent years should have strengthened mem-
bers' willingness to undertake stability actions. It was only 
in mid-1978 when dollar fluctuations contributed to sizable 
exchange rate changes and the EEC seemed to be pushed into a 
more inward looking behaviour,that new attempts to link all 
. 1. . (to) EEC currenc1es, po 1t1cally backed, were agreed. 
It seems that given the 1976 crisis, Europe needed the 
'. 
• 
target zones solution proposed in the Duisenberg plan. Wide 1 
swings on cross rates were threatening EEC cohesion. Countries 
would be able to determine their effective rate evolution 
within a target zone with no positive obligation to defend 
this zone, but they should not take action to move away from 
it. However) after the initial stages/they should try to remove 
the causes of economic divergence more firmly. The target 
zones proposal has this dynamic potential in the direction of 
coordination. Members would still control their effective 
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rates within the zone. 
Conflicts with the adherence to nominal bilateral limits 
could be created though. The political commitment was still 
on Snake survival which was necessary to break the vicious 
circle. Members then should) after a certain stage,assume 
stricter coordination commitments which would lead them to 
join the Snake. While things did not develop in this way the 
nominal fixity commitment remained. The possibility to lose 
competitiveness control remained although a difficult task, 
the evolution of the currency bloc was important. Complete 
symmetry may not be achieved given the different preferences 
on dollar evolution of each participant. Attention should be 
paid to the empirical findings of the OPTICA Report (1975). 
It derives a strong link of a ppp rule based on effective 
rates. It could achieve symmetry although it could create 
problems on bilateral fixing. Howeve~ inflation rate reduction 
could do a lot to make members' competitiveness evolve in a 
similar way. At the same time)while the bilateral exchange 
rates are in operation it should be made sure that the weighted 
average of the currencies in the bloc conform to the ppp rule. 
Stronger pressure for policy coordination will be induced too. 
Significant fluctuations of the bloc against the dollar should 
be avoided for all members to participate. Certain members 
use appreciations to check inflation. New members are added 
to this policy. It will be seen below why such a policy does 
not promote world stability. Further, the rise in intra-EEC 
trade relations could greatly assist in making the joint 
policy successful. 
A successfully functioning EEC bloc suggests that a frame-
work is built up within which monetary turbulence can be 
effectively contained. It would seem though that despite 
" 
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such stability it may be difficult for Europe to be success-
fully insulated on certain occasions. Experience demonstrates '. 
that EEC exchange rate stability may not be achieved or be 
long lasting in the absence of world wide stability. It would 
seem that global action is required to bring with it a stable 
IMS. 8y the end of 1978 there were some encouraging signs as 
\Jill be seen from the analysis that follows. 
6.8.a. Th~ lnte£n~tio~a! Mo~eta£y_S~ste~ ~u£i~g_the_S~a~e 
Period 
The switch to floating is explained by the need to restore 
(a) short-run effectiveness of monetary stabilisation policy 
and, (b) mitigate the impact of external disturbances at home. 
Peeters (1977) explains \Jhy high capital mobility makes domes-
tic interest rates equal world rates augmented by exchange 
rate expectations. With respect to insulation Cooper (1976, 
pp 159-60) suggests that it all depends on the nature of the 
disturbance. Further)there are reasons \Jhich make Difficult 
the use of econometric models to check for the degree of 
effectiveness of floating, see Lamfalussi (1979, p 45), 
Swoboda (1979, pp 80-1), Machlup (1979, p 71). Floating rates 
seem nevertheless to provide an incomplete insulation for real 
external disturbances. An open economy is open, no matter 
\Jhat the exchange regime is. But flexible rates do permit 
different long-term inflation rates. The IMF reports (1976) 
(1977) stated that it is real exchange rates that matter for 
XB adjustment. Exchange rate effectiveness was impaired by 
the lack of appropriate accompanying domestic policies. The 
1979 report stated that economic and financial conditions in 
recent years contributed to a remarked exchange rate variation 
which contributed to adjustment stressing also the importance 
of supporting domestic policies. Lamfalussi's study (1979) 
~ 
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points to such adjustment for deficit countries. No such 
adjustment occurred though in surplus countries where apprec- '. 
iation went hand in hand with surpluses. The deflationary 
effects of appreciation, which in the absence of domestic 
expansive policies keep the surpluses, should be kept in mind. 
The situation roved more taJaI:d equilibrium in 1979. However domes-) 
tic economic policy has not been liberated by the external 
constraint. Surplus countries though used such an instrument 
to combat inflation and faced more monetary freedom. Flexib-
ility also brought benefits while major dangers did not mat-
erialise, see Emminger (1979). 
Concentrating now on the post 1977 period, the dollar dec-
lineJwhile it may reduce inflation of other major countries, 
could also have undesirable growth effects especially at a 
time when sizable PSD rises are avoided. XB adjustment is 
also delayed. 
A continuous dollar decline was experienced since 1977 II. 
Growth was the important US objective, recording current 
account deficits to which neither the capital balance nor 
official finance were adjusted in time. The US task to provide 
the key currency proved too onerous under the economic real-
ities. The dollar's burden was not lessened by artificial 
units and the lack of willingness of other currencies to 
enhance the reserves status of their currencies. Exchange 
rate fluctuations went beyond compensation of inflation 
differentials. The dollar embarked on a self-propelling 
decline magnified by capital flows. All this contributed 
to a changing mood: deficit countries realised the need for 
domestic adjustment, otherwise exchange rate depreciations 
would only affect prices. Surplus ones realised that rapidly 
appreciating currencies without a corresponding slow down in 
• 
.,' 
" 
- 214-
prices threatened growth. They intervened to reduce apprecia-
tions - Germany depicting now the signs of an open economy 
with less monetary autonomy compared with the period since 
floating started. Further world economic activity was threat-
ened by overshooting. The gravity of the situation was recog-
nised on both sides of the Atlantic. The USA was originally the 
foremost supporter of pure floating which, by itself, would 
restore XE. This opinion did not last. Floating did not give 
full autonomy over the dollar rate. It has now become a more 
open economy and the impact on domestic prices will not be 
negligible, despite being less pronounced. The weakness of 
the transmission mechanism is offset by the scale of overshoot-
ing. Acceleration in domestic inflation coincided with dollar 
depreciation with the one feeding on the other. There was now 
little conflict between stabilising the dollar and the prim-
ary objective, namely inflation control. Anti-inflation and 
dollar stabilisation packages followed in October 24, and 
November 1, 1978, accepting also that domestic policies are 
needed together with exchange rate changes to avoid disorderly 
markets, see Midland Bank Review (Autumn, 1979, pp 14-9). 
Recognition of the costs floating imposes implies that 
countries should look for a system to reduce exchange rate 
fluctuations so that they are in line with stable long-term 
economic trends. The degree of stability is debated. Some 
argue for an urgent restoration to fixity. One has to look 
thou~ at experience, the reasons for which the BUS broke 
down, and the similarity between the early and late seventies. 
Any premature movement is doomed to failure. H i owever, 9 ven 
that instability was produced out of economic divergence, a 
closer approximation to reasonable price stability and a 
strong commitment not to depart from it are needed. Neither 
" , 
" 
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of the two groups could afford its currencies to continue in 
the same direction. Further, currency appreciation as a 
counter-inflationary force does not seem to contribute to 
exchange rate stability. At least one currency has to fall 
or at best not increase in value, over a sustained period. 
Absence of cooperation adds to the instability problem. With 
respect to exchange rate dynamics the problem is with their 
implications and that, given their short-run real effects, it 
becomes a concern of government policy. It can be used as a 
policy instrument with the possibility of policy conflicts. 
International exchange rate surveillance and intervention 
rules are said to be necessary. Models of exchange rate dynam-
ics though point out that what matters for the exchange rate 
is the total money supply in relation to its demand. No 
external depreciation can continue without additional support 
of money creation. Overshooting without over-expansion will stop 
or reverse itself. Long-run exchange rate stability and 
absence of overshooting are matters of coordination of money 
supply policies. Countries have to specify clearly their 
policies and prove to the world that they fulfil them. A 
movement towards exchange rate fixity has to be completely 
justified by underlying economic conditions. Of such a commit-
ment for the world we are rather sceptical at least for the 
foreseeable future given the frequency of shocks and the fact 
that they have proved to unsettle the markets. More stability 
also means that countries that profited by fighting inflation 
through appreciations will now have to count on domestic 
measures. Encouraging signs of exchange rate stability can 
be detected. Firstl~ price and monetary stability now enjoy 
a higher priority everywhere. Secondl~ in mid-1978 surplus 
countries recognised the need to expand. Thirdly the decision 
) 
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to implement the EMS in Europe and undertake proper measures 
to make the arrangements viable. FourthlY,the change in the I' . 
economic stance of the USA which is now geared to external 
objectives no less than to internal ones. Such measures con-
tinued in 1979 and 1980. 
The November 1, 1978 package included measures to reduce 
the amount of dollars outstanding. The SDR though did not 
play the expected role. Apart from its traditional disadvan-
tages it was hit by the lack of confidence in paper currency. 
Gold-backed SDRs did not receive the expected support by major 
members, trying to raise the reserve status of their currencies 
in order to finance their external deficits. Such a move 
though was important in enhancing stability given that the 
previous crisis could be reduced if such policy was implemented 
at that time. Germany now contradicted itself since a major 
reason behind the EMS creation was to avoid raising the OM 
reserve status. 
Two alternative solutions seem to exist: (a) a multi-
currency system and (b) a single standard based on the SOR, 
reinforced by the April 1978 IMF Articles, as the centre of 
the IMS. At the same time one is faced with a movement to 
enhance the gold's importance in the IMS, compared with its 
passive role in recent years. Firstly, the explosion in its 
market price since 1978. Gold purchases were different from 
previous crises. Gold was frequently rising in relation to 
all currencies, to some noticeably more than others, with no 
direct pressure of crisis proportions to be exerted directly 
on anyone so that authorities as a result do not have an 
imperative spur to action, as in the Smithsonian Agreement. 
There was a general lack in paper currency due to rising infla-
tion, doubts on government ability to reduce the money supply 
.... 
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required, oil price-and exchange rate uncertainty. Secondly, 
its role was enhanced in the EMS agreement. Thirdl~ the I' 
attempt to provide gold-backed SORs against exchange risks. 
Fourthly the growing number of countries to bring their val-
I 
uation procedures more in line with the market for various 
reasons. Fifthl~ US authorities came to accept in the late 
seventies a more pragmatic view that despite decisions on 
gold's use, it remained a significant part of central banks' 
reserves available at times of need. 
Rumours of gold remonetisation took place, establishing 
a link between currencies and a commodity of intrinsic value 
with genuine convertibility to establish confidence in world 
money rather than any number of domestic monetary targets, 
indispensable though the latter are. A number of serious 
problems and implications arise. The first is at what level 
or range to peg the gold price. Secondly it could be an 
unsuitable standard for the IMS given the volatility of its 
price and the fact that it is concentrated in industrialised 
countries with production mainly in South Africa and the Soviet 
Union. Political considerations exist too. further, European 
central banks fear an accumulation of depreciating dollars as 
when they tried to keep its price at USi3S.0 p.o, which col-
lapsed in 1968. 
A multicurrency system seems to be rather what we will 
experience in the near future, which reinforces all recommend-
ations earlier in this section. Further) the US seem now more 
sympathetic to floating - with the modifications analysed 
above - implying that it is nolongerwilling to undertake the 
nth currency status. No other country seems to replace it. 
An important characteristic of a fixed exchange rate system 
will be absent. The impossibility of countries floating 
independently would lead to the creation of currency blocs, 
the European bloc being one of them, floating against each 
other. Monetary cooperation among the members of each bloc 
and among the blocs is reinforced. 
6.C.a. Conclusions Stemming from the Snake Period 
------------- -------
EMU had as an ultimate objective to secure a steady growth 
path and full employment, if it was to safeguard the EEC 
achievements in the long-run. It started functioning under 
a major world monetary crisis. Unemployment was adding new 
problems with no economic synohronisation and no EEC exchange 
rate system to ensure cohesion. At the end convergence was 
not achieved. Snake countries did not avoid realignments. 
8eing inside the limits helped them achieve certain goals. 
Closer convergence occurred between Germany and the 8enelux. 
The Community's efforts though,did not stop major members 
from using policies almost exclusively for their own national 
interests. However by the end of 1978, it was the determina-
tion of all members to restore stability. Despite a reduction 
though in inflation in 1977/78 doubts remained. 8y mid-1978 
inflation rates were rising by the picking up in growth and 
raw material price rises were aggravating an already deterior-
ating trend. The EEe had yet to return to the path of price 
stability and growth. Uncertainty existed on how quickly 
that could be achieved. Strong members feared inflation rises 
while weak ones did not want to damage their growth prospects 
and chances to catch up with the strong members(11). The kind 
of policies to be undertaken is important. Problems facing 
the industrial world came mainly from internal difficulties 
in industrial countries and lack of any clear agreement on 
how to tackle them. Inflation and unemployment kept co-exist-
ing. Subordination of investment management policies to 
I ' 
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demand management policies has not worked in the present 
inflationary climate. A more direct role should be given to 
the former in conjunction with cautious demand management. 
Progress towards the MU will not be hampered. By avoiding 
inflationary pressures they would also break the arguments of 
rich members on fund transfers for productive purposes. The 
Commission has an important role to play by pursuing an effect-
ive investment policy, and creating the conditions for the 
structural transformations to be carried out(12). An effect-
ive budget restructuring is needed. Enthusiasm is currently 
lacking among members, although rich ones will benefit from 
this transitory phase. Less prosperous ones should not be 
allowed to have,at this stage, the uncertainty of a gain under 
this group of benefits whileJat the same tim~ they lose even 
in the form of cash receipts and payments. Currency convert-
ibility is a basic MU ingredient and brings forth benefits. 
Howeve~ failure to bring EEC economies into line halted this 
process. 
The IMS reforms in early seventies, the dollar evolution 
and other EEC reasons suggested that members must develop a 
common dollar policy. Its absence greatly assisted the break-
down of EMU. European monetary policy was limited to technical 
aspects. There was absence of binding commitments on coordina-
tion. Ultimately there was lack of political will to abandon 
sovereignty. The concept of exchange rate stability changed. 
Lack of credibility in EMU took place. Small EEC members 
have long recognised the limitations interdependence imposes 
on their actions. They align their policies to Germany's. 
Germany sets its targets independently. SSC have declined to 
set monetary targets recognising that their monetary policies 
must be geared to exchange market requirements and their 
I • 
commitment to the Snake. This asymmetry reflects the true 
nature of the Snake, a OM zone strongly dominated by the strong 
economy held together by the need of SSC to keep a close tie 
with Germany at the expense of losing monetary autonomy. How-
eve~ in a Snake comprising all EEC members this asymmetry 
would seem impossible to continue and the maintenance of bal-
ance among near equals has to take place with all the difficult-
ies it implies. With respect to the Snake members one could 
distinguish some positive aspects although not equally shared. 
Further for the SSC the effect on growth was questionable in 
the longer-run. By trying to avoid deflationary policies in 
1974-76 they ran into heavy unemployment in the traded sector 
and current account deficits in the latter part of 1974-78. 
They were forced to devalue between 1976 and 1978. Some of 
them left the Snake. Further deflation through domestic poli-
cies was still needed. On the other hand one cannot perhaps 
say that Germany did not benefit. It pursued highly independ-
ent policies and kept its economy more competitive. Both 
domestic and exchange rate measures encouraged investment in 
contrast to the sse where long periods of declining competit-
iveness were the result of Snake participation. 
By the end of 1978 the EMU goal was not fulfilled) even 
within the Snake problems remained. Exchange rate flexibility 
is still needed in the possibly less disruptive way. Complete 
fixity is an eventual long-run goal and requires the proper 
short-run actions. 
The effectiveness of the Commission should be mentioned. 
It failed to impose its opinion, initiate policies, make co~­
sUltation effective and mediate in disputes. It lacked the 
power, which national governments refused to transfer. Its 
authority has been declining since the mid-sixties. The power 
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has shifted to the Council of Ministers although this is not 
totally the Commission's fault. Governments have moved into 
new areas of policy cooperation) beyond those specified in the 
Rome Treaty} in which the Commission's role was more clearly 
defined. Nationalism of certain members has militated against 
central institutions. The Commission itself however is not 
without blame. Its members have to an increasing degree 
become representatives of their national governments and 
interests rather than the defenders of EEC interests as the 
founding fathers intended. Rather than trying to lead govern-
ments, the Commission acts as a forum for pre-negotiations 
between competing national interests. When it takes an indep-
endent stand, it climbs down only too readily when it runs 
into opposition. 
Of course the whole strategy adopted was based on transfer-
ring national power gradually. Even under this approach 
though, there comes a stage when transfer of power has to take 
place to lead to a complete MU. Otherwise EMU will not succeed 
and will finally proceed in the opposite direction. A directly 
elected parliament was expected to enhance such transfer. 
Unfortunately it was not created during the Snake period and 
that was a barrier to EMU given the functions it was expected 
to undertake. 
Finall~ it has been suggested that the coordination approach 
cannot lead to an MU in view of what is described to be its 
inherent weakness of lack of automaticity manifesting itself 
in many ways. An approach based on reform has been proposed 
instead. We turn to analyse and compare the two strategies 
and possibly suggest the most appropriate one for the creation 
of an MU. 
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PART THREE 
CHAPTER SEVEN MONETARY POLICY COORDINATION AND THE MANIFESTO 
PROPOSAL 
7.A.a. Criticisms 
--- ----
Monetary policy coordination aims at stabilising exchange 
rates without market intervention. The implications of such 
a policy were analysed in chapter four as well as how one is 
led to the intermediate solution until coordination policies 
become fully effective. Doubts have been expressed even with 
this approach. The problems of annual potentially lengthy, 
painful and unproductive money supply negotiations, political 
friction due to national preferences hindering compromise, 
have been emphasised. Estimates on the appropriate set of 
expansion rates may not be publicly reliable. There could be 
errors in real GNP growth projections and high stability of 
income elasticity may be absent. Research on these matters is 
limited in Europe although there is evidence to suggest struc-
tural differences among members. Elasticities differ and depend 
crucially on the money definition, observation period and the 
use of quarterly or annual data on the observation equation. 
Important implications exist for the perspective durability of 
any money supply agreement that might, despite these difficult-
ies, be concluded. It may imply undesirable 18 situations for 
certain members and they may withdraw and disappoint the expect-
ations it has nurtured, or resort to restrictions, which is 
even more harmful for integration. The coordination strategy, 
critics say, has crucial weaknesses which do not lead to a 
complete MU. It relies on discretion instead of automaticity 
which manifests itself in the following ways: (a) there is no 
way of ensuring automatic ex ante consistency of exchange rate 
, . 
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and money supply targets, (b) since members retain their power 
of discretion and instruments to exercise it there is no autom-
atit mechanism to prevent them from violating the coordination 
agreement, (c) there is no way of ensuring that the coordination 
agreement will be automatically renewed, and (d~ there is no 
automatic process by which discretion, possibility of opting 
out, is reduced over time. 
7.A.b. 
Criticisms have a great deal to do with past experience 
and especially the way coordination de facto took place in 
Europe. It was not implemented properly. Once certain deci-
sions, filling the gaps, are undertaken a substantial degree 
of automaticity builds into the system which could lead to a 
complete MU. 
It seems that the key factor to move towards an MU is the 
establishment of a Fund to develop eventually into a European 
central bank. We argued for such a Fund in chapter four in 
the concept of Snake support operations, by pooling reserves 
to enhance effectiveness. However, its functions should not 
be predominantly technical in character, leaving almost intact 
the operational autonomy of members with respect to foreign 
exchange policies, given that each country retains title of 
its quota reserves paid to the Fund(1). The major advance 
that has to take place, bringing automaticity in the coordina-
tion approach is that the Fund should not be limited to the 
roles of an agent, keeping in practice the existing situation 
or even enforcing greater divergence. It should be given its 
own resources, also achieving in this way true multilateral-
isation. Reserve pooling would give Community institutions 
the power to make coordination effective by gaining control 
over assets of national central banks. The assignment of 
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supervising the EEC exchange rates, including interventions, 
would greatly contribute to exchange rate stability. The Fund 
would be responsible for the intra-EEC exchange tate ~ttange­
ments and for the coordination of the intra-EEC exchange market 
intervention. It would also control the exchange rate policy 
towards third countries. Furthermore, reserve pooling would 
give the Fund the means to grant credits to members. The Fund 
could promote economic convergence by enforcing conditionality 
on these credits. Monetary spillovers from the Fund, through 
these policies, would tend to diminish gradually national 
monetary independence. National monetary policies would be 
increasingly determined by the policy pursued by the Fund. 
Therefore, a major weakness, namely the retaining of national 
discretionary power, would be gradually reduced. The irrever-
sibility of the venture would be secured and the credibility 
gap would be closed. 
Attempts to create such a Fund failed in the past mainly 
because national authorities did not want to give up control of 
their assets. It is doubted though whether an exchange rate 
agreement making it easy for members to violate the coordination 
process and opt out is a useful solution. Labour groups assume 
that the government will yield to their pressure, as compared to 
a solution where governments are commited to fixity. The vicious 
circle cannot be broken unless they renounce their policy of 
discretion. 
However another major problem, namely that of fixing consist-
ent monetary targets avoiding errors and uncertainty, would still 
remain despite the ease with which results would be implemented. 
No systematic studies have been provided by Community institu-
tions. A limited number of studies would indicate the need for 
the Community to undertake substantial analytical work and 
I 
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develop a credible and solid basis for ex ante evaluation of 
the compatibility of announced monetary targets to secure long-
term exchange rate stability. All these would imply a long-
term process. Authorities would have to predict future real 
GNP growth rates with greater accuracy. The period of observa-
tion and the estimation equation would have to be chosen. They 
could affect crucially the real income elasticity of the demand 
for real balances. Depending on the combinatio~ different 
results could be obtained. A firm decision though on the above 
problems would lead to the establishment of the value to be 
.] 
chosen, coming closer to the proper target levels. The creation of " 
the Fund, assuming powers and putting emphasis on the irrever-
sibility of the venture, would provide a strong incentive to 
reach and establish successful policies. The main question 
would be whether complete consistency can be ensured. While 
recognising the difficulties, and keeping in mind the need of 
inflation similarity to bring exchange rate stability, one could 
not exclude the possibility of a country achieving low inflation 
rates through an effective monetary pOlicy(2). Moreover, 
experience indicates that high inflation periods are also 
periods with substantial inflation differentials among members. 
Given the Fund's power it could force low inflation policies. 
An almost permanent move such as this, would further reduce 
exchange rate fluctuation margins among members, reducing further 
the effectiveness of independent national monetary policies. At 
the same time, the formulation anouncement and more successful 
implementation of monetary targets would enhance the predictive 
power of the elasticities. This process would be continued, 
suppressing margins further. What one achieves is a movement 
towards centralisation of EEC monetary policy. However, while 
exchange rate stability may be enhanced in this way, complete 
fixity may not come. Despite the rise in the effectiveness of 
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monetary policy, the question would remain, given the difficult-
ies, of the ability to determine the rates of money supply 
growth which would produce exchange rate constancy. While 
exchange rate stability may be enhanced, permanent exchange 
rate fixity may not be ensured. 
7.~.£. ~0~eta~y_P2lic~ C02r£i~ati2n_a~d_the_C2m~0~ 
£a~all~l_C~r~e~c~ iC£Cl 
Within this strategy the common parallel currency approach 
has been proposed, that is the creation of a new currency to 
circulate in parallel with national ones. Initially its use would 
be restricted to official transactions and later it would gradually 
be extended to replace the national currencies as a result of 
greater convenience of a currency, which would come to be freely 
accepted throughout the EEC(3). It is proposed because of the 
economies of scale it would provide on the MI process. The Fund 
would also be responsible for launching and encouraging CPC 
adoption in international transactions. Members, by depositing 
reserves and a quota of domestic currency to the Fund, would 
receive in return CPC deposits. These arrangements would be 
within a preliminary stage where restriction of EEC exchange rate 
movements and intervention arrangements would take place. The 
CPC use, defined as the EUA, at the official level would be 
paralleled by its acclimatisation in private credit markets fos-
tering financial integration. When it is sufficiently widely 
held privately to alloy it to replace the dollar as an inter-
vention currency, transition to the intermediate stage would be 
made. Central banks should intervene, if the need be, to defend 
the rate between their currencies and CPC while the Fund would 
defend the CPC/dollar rate. Maintenance of the intra-EEC band 
would require coordination among members. The CPC would 
'1 
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make the exchange rate between the dollar and EEC currencies 
vary in any direction and there would be a greater ability of 
the whole EEC area to absorb "hot money" without being over-
whelmed, as compared to the case where the whole or most of 
the weight) frequently in the transitory stage, falls on certain 
member currencies. Transition to the final stage would be con-
tingent on satisfactorily completing the coordination process(4). 
The CPC is a central feature of the proposed strategy and 
the Fund is assigned the key role of fostering MI. The implica-
tions from the dollar role were analysed earlier. The use of 
a members' currency instead could have hegemonial implications, 
while SDRs were designed as an official money at a moment where 
the need is for a private one. The way the Fund would develop 
the CPC has been described, see Magnifico-Williamson (1973), 
Magnifico (1978b, pp 70-4), as well as the importance of the 
private markets in accepting it. It is also suggested that it 
is neither necessary nor desirable to define the CPC in a way 
that would make absolutely sure it would be stronger than the 
strongest national currency, implying insoluble problems for 
the system in which the CPC would initially coexist with EEC 
currencies. It would be sufficient and desirable to make it 
a tendentially strong currency. Semi-indexation clauses should 
be introduced to provide partial inflation COver. The proposed 
clause is that if price rises exceed a threshold figure, there 
would be across-the-board CPC revaluation to offset price 
rises exceeding the threshold. The CPC use as a private asset 
would insulate intra-EEC relationships from instability emanat-
ing abroad. By taking the place of the dollar role in the EEC 
it would enable the EEC to exercise some measure of control over 
this effective EEC money supply component and flexibility against 
the world, without disrupting the stability of intra-EEC 
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exchange rates. It would generally give the EtC the -
power to implement systematically and more effectively an 
EEC money supply policy, bringing closer to control all money 
creation in EEC which is the crucial factor to bring exchange 
rate stability. 
In the preliminary stage the CPC would not be yet an inter-
vention currency. National currencies would be used instead. 
It is interesting to comment firstly on some technical aspects 
of this proposal: the CPC would be linked to an agreement on 
nominal exchange rate evolution of the EEC currencies in terms 
of the CPC itself. It would playa central role in the exchange 
rate management system, used as a numeraire in it with respect 
to the central rate definition. The official CPC price in 
terms of currency i, is the weighted sum of official exchange 
rates of currency i. The share of a currency in the basket 
increases (decreases), when it appreciates (depreciates) in 
terms of the CPC. A strong appreciating currency) having a 
large share,could dominate the CPC. Depending upon the period 
in which the system is supposed to function, it may therefore 
be necessary to agree on rules for periodic share review. 
Looking at the methods of changing CPC parities we can compare 
the two kinds of intervention mechanisms, compatible with the 
existence of the CPC. When the operational intervention targets 
are the bilateral exchange rates between national curren-
cies, if one currency changes its bilateral rates then other curren-
cies will have to adjust their CPC parities too(S). This would 
reduce the CPC use as an account unit. Furthermore, predictab-
ility problems and costs involved could hamper the CPC use as 
an exchange medium for private transactions. When the CPC is 
the operational target, a consistent structure of CPC rates is 
determined to be maintained. They- imply a given bilateral rate 
" 
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structure. Banks intervene to keep these bilateral rates. If 
a currency's parity is now changed) it implies a change to some 
or all CPC parities. The most appealing way would be to change 
them so that bilateral rates between currencies which did not 
initiate the change, remain unchanged. This method would then make 
this kind of intervention similar to the previous one. In both 
systems however all CPC parities are affected by a country's 
decision to alter its own parity(6). 
The argument on CPC use is to turn it to an intervention 
currency. Extra-economic arguments also exist. It is based 
on political decisions emphasising European approaches to creat-
ing monetary stability and the CPC could be the precursor of a 
future European currency. The important conclusion is that 
the danger exists that the CPC will not succeed as an instrument 
and symbol of MI, because it will remain less attractive than 
existing alternatives, due to the standard basket formula used 
for the CPC. For the present situation to change, either this definition 
should be abandoned or alternatively, its use should be ·subsid-
ized by using a purchasing power guarantee. Indeed such a 
solution has been foreseen by those who proposed it, also 
suggesting indexation although not complete in order to avoid 
other disadvantages. 
Other technical questions concern the ex ante intervention 
process. When operational targets are defined in terms of 
cross rates, margins around the bilateral rate are identical 
for all countries. These determine in turn CPC margins dif-
ferent for all currencies) given that basket Weights are differ-
ent. The higher a currency's weight in the basket, the lower 
will be the maximum deviation of its CPC market rate from the 
CPC parity. If the CPC becomes the operational target, fluc-
tuation margins around parities would be also expressed in CPC 
.. 
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terms. Many intervention policies exist to maintain CPC rates 
within the chosen fluctuation band. Currency 1 can be at one 
of its limits requiring intervention to avoid any further 
deviation) while there is no other currency at the other endofits 
band against CPC. No automatic mechanism exists to indicate 
to country 1 in which currency to intervene and maintain its 
currency within the CPC band. This indeterminancy could resultin 
the need for continuing consultation and could be a serious disad-
vantage resulting in speculative runs) difficult to reconcile 
with the exchange rate stability aim. Automatic rules would 
be needed such as translation of CPC margins to bilateral rate 
margins. Intervention rules would become identical to the Snake 
system with a few minor differences. The potential asymmetry 
problem in adjustment could also be solved. Further, a large 
intervention to keep a currency within the CPC limits could 
modify the CPC rate in terms of all member currencies. But 
the impact of a change in the CPC rate of a currency on other 
CPC rates would depend on the currency t s share in the bask et. A 
large share currency could, say, drag CPC upwards, forcing 
other central banks to intervene and take their currencies up 
in step. For the major currency country the burden would be reduced. 
'" 
Such a burden would remain primarily in the small currency coun-
try. Weak members oppose the Snake intervention system arguing 
that adjustmE:fit would fallonthem, while according to the second 
scheme a currency can reach its upper limit against CPC with-
out other currencies reaching their lower limit. The apprec-
iating currency country alone would have to intervene. De Grauwe 
and Peeter~' (1979, pp 42-3) suggest that such a proposal 
could realise in the Snake too. 
possibility exists that a currency reaches its lower limit 
without any other currency reaching its upper limit. The 
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burden would then lie entirely on the weak currency country. 
However, the important conclusion would be that while these 
technical questions have to be settled, it is not just such 
arrangements that will bring EEC stability. What matters most 
is to make the coordination process effective. Intervention 
and parity adjustment would also be needed in the transitory 
stage. Inflation rate evolution would be the major guide on 
correctness of a given exchange rate structure. 
Supporters of this proposal aim to avoid the dominant cur-
rency problem. At the same time they maintain that the CPC 
should not be stronger than the strongest national currency. 
It seems though that this version implies a CPC with character-
istics similar to the strongest EEC currency. CPC definition 
might in practice become a complicated way for EEC to move to 
a DM standard. That could have efficiency advantages but also 
potential drawbacks in the absence of assurances as to the 
course of the monetary policy of the hegemonial country. One 
would be sceptical on the materialisation of such agreement. 
However, the encouraging point is that we accept the CPC prop-
osal under a strategy which includes also a powerful Fund able 
to impose European policies on members. 
This kind of coordination-cum-centralisation strategy would 
enforce limitations and binding commitments with respect to 
members' internal policies and would gradually reduce their 
discretionary power. The CPC would become an international 
private money and would greatly facilitate the MI process. 
It would enhance the EEC monetary control. Furthermore, 
together with the rise in coordination, active measures would 
be taken by the Fund to enhance the CPC private role. It 
would gradually replace the national currencies. The EEC 
monetary policy would then be fully determined by the Fund. 
\ 
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7.8.a. 
Pr~p~s~l 
Some of the coordination strategy critics provide all argu-
ments analysed earlier, which led them to conclude that the 
coordination approach will fail because it involves exchange 
rate locking without monetary reform. They propose a radically 
different proposal, achieving an MU through monetary reform 
based on the free interplay of market forces(7). They analyse 
the advantages derived from a single stable purchasing power 
currency, but they also recognise the difficulties posed by 
the transition to reduce inflation and especially high infla- 'I 
tion levels. Since in the long-run the need to reduce high 
inflation rates seems inescapable and the consequences of red-
ucing it have to be borne whether a country joins an MU or not, 
transitional costs would be minimised if the inflating national 
currencies) instead of being stabilised,are replaced by this 
new currency subject to value guarantees and issued by an 
independent institution. Reform will become more urgent the 
longer the inflationary situation lasts) offering a unique 
opportunity of carrying it out through a CPC, setting the pace 
for MI at the same time. Given the need for gradualism and 
automaticity the inflation-proof CPC will be circulating together 
with existing national currencies. Manifesto signatories 
explain why such money simplifies the problems to be tackled 
when itcould prove difficult under national monies. Monetary 
reform will prevent inflation, and it is also the reason for 
linking EMU with it. Also during the transitional period it 
is easier to achieve a constant purchasing power of CPC than 
of national currencies. The mechanism of the inflation-proof 
CPC, defined as the EUA, has been described by Peeters, de Grauwe 
and Vaubel (1978). Jhe rate between the CPC and each 
I 
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of the national currencies will be adjusted according to a 
crawling peg formula, based on a weighted average of inflation 
rates of consumer prices expressed in national monies. When 
the CPC ultimately replaces national monies, its supply should 
be subject to a monetary rule, guaranteeing its purchasing 
power stability. An institution will eventually replace nat-
ional monetary authorities once CPC reaches some predetermined 
proportion of each member's national money. At this time mon-
etary authorities would have passed to a European central bank. 
The Manifesto participants realised also the possible necessity 
of policies to cope with regional imbalances, which may be 
created when wages of peripheral regions rise to levels of 
high productivity regions. Its supporters suggest that this 
approach}apart from gradualist advantages,is superior to a 
coordination process because market forces would be independ-
ent of political fluctuations, frictions and frustrations. It 
ensures that the CPC is used by those fearing most from infla-
tion and exchange risk, where discretionary national monetary 
policies have lost their effect on employment. It avoids 
rivalries, hegemony, competitive inflation and stabilisation 
crises. It works without market intervention avoiding mutual 
interference and moral hazard or ex ante agreement on national 
rates of money supply growth. It avoids discretion and provides 
a common standard value, means of payments, store of value, 
facilitating market integration. 
l·g·£· Critic~l_AEP£ais~l_of !h~ ~a~ife~t2 £r2p2s~1 
Under this approach. national authorities lose the ability 
to control inflation and achieve their desired macroeconomic 
targets, although they could not possibly claim that otherwise 
they could achieve better results. At the end)a stable pur-
chasing power CPC circulating alone would continue eliminating 
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inflationary expectations and unjustified real wage rises which 
raise unemployment. Authorities may also be less enthusiastic 
about such a move due to loss of benefits out of national money 
supply control, unless they accept the full implications of MI. 
Such a ~ss refers to the use of inflation as a tax, or source 
of revenue, to finance part of public expenditure. Parkin 
(1976, pp 236-9) on the other hand)presents arguments to sug- I' 
gest that power to levy on inflation tax can hardly be regarded 
as a loss. Another benefit to be lost is the seigniorage out of 
issuing national money. However)governments could arrange 
sharing the CPC seigniorage which will more than replace that 
of the national currency issue. Laidler (1978) suggests that 
if national currencies are to be driven out of circulation 
members must stop issuing them. Even if the public hold the 
CPC, it does not mean that governments will stop issuing their 
currencies given the revenue they extract, even if they are 
held by the European Bank. For this loss to be made good, 
governments would have to go far beyond simply permitting their 
nationals holding the cpe. Manifesto signatories suggest that 
each national bank should compensate the European bank. How-
ever) there are reasons for national banks to cease issuing 
their currencies, see Salin (1978). Also}if a Bank is to pay 
for its currency depreciation, the inducement to create money 
would diminish. Klein (1978) challenges the Manifesto scheme, 
claiming that it greatly simplifies and thereby misunderstands 
the nature of the competitive process in the market for monies. 
It is incompletely analysed by ignoring or blurring various 
analytical distinctions. For Klein, historical evidence does 
not suggest perfect substitutability among alternative monies. 
Also consumer confidence in money takes time to be created and 
could be costly. Failure to consider explicitly these 
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costs results in misleading analysis and policy conclusions, 
when analysing the social saving out of such reform proposals. 
and perfect predictability would further support substitution 
of CPC for national currencies, see O'Mahony (1978). Zis (1978) 
attempts an alternative historical analysis uhich suggests 
that Klein's interpretation may not be unambiguously well 
founded. They accept that there is not any analogous historical 
precedent to provide information that CPC will be accepted. 
This uncertainty though about the final outcome could have 
undesirable implications. If such a venture failed, it could 
be a drawback to MU plans) even raising the possibili ty for MU 
efforts to be halted permanently. On the other hand/we would 
rather not agree with Klein's kind of dominant currency prop-
osal (1978, pp 84-6) given the potential implications of such 
a solution. A stable purchasing power CPC could enhance EEC 
monetary autonomy and reduce undesirable consequences created 
abroad. Vaubel (1978b) explains how the benefit of stability 
of value affects the money functions differently. He also 
analyses how the CPC will expandJas well as the factors that 
will determine which member currencies it will replace first. 
With respect to both real exchange rate risks and costs, the 
CPC uill primarily spread in the most open and central members and 
regions, a pattern which is in accordance uith the traditional 
DCA theory. One should keep in mind ,though/why it might not 
prevail primarily in those areas due to factors/such as the 
dome~tic inflation risk and the ~ariance of domestic inflation, 
uhich are ~t· present relevant for currencies of the peripheral 
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member countries. In this case for the whole venture to have 
a "centralist" bias, it would be necessary that inflation is 
higher at the centre than at the periphery. 
We can now examine the crucial question on reducing infla-
tion with or without transitional unemployment. Parkin (1976, 
pp 232-6) analyses how deflationary effects will be avoided. 
Laidler (197B) challenges Parkin's views and also explains wh~ 
because of different conditions, historical evidence should not 
be used to apply in contemporary Europe. He argues also that 
deflationary effects could follow due to the rise of other 
taxes. Salin (197B) has questioned Laidler's views. Vaubel 
(197B~ describes the way to ensure absence of inflationary 
expectations. A stable currency performing all main money 
functions permits the market to deal with a money which need 
not be stabilised. Inflationary national currencies need not 
be stabilised due to their gradual displacement as more contracts 
are determined in the new currency and provide payment for it. 
Price stabili ty comes because of currency sUbstitution rather than 
stabilisation, reform instead of monetary deceleration. No 
stabilisation crisis occurs due to lags in the adjustment of 
expectations and contracts because there would be no stabilisa-
tion. Since one currency displaces nine existing ones,reform 
coincides with monetary unification. All this would provide 
the strongest arguments to move towards MU since arguments 
against it are in the fom of the costs of reducing high inflation 
rates) and that the surrender of the exchange rate instrument 
implies excessive unemployment in structuraly weak areas. The 
key element in the absence of such,a crisis is that the CPC 
expected inflation is brought down to zero. The CPC will elim-
inate inflationary expectations because it has a value guarantee 
in the form of an exchange rate guarantee vis-a-Vis currencies 
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circulating in the same area. This procedure though works only 
as CPC remains a parallel currency. For CPC to make sense its 
introduction has to be gradual. If existing currencies were 
to be driven quickly out of the market, the advantage of launch-
ing CPC over a once and for all reform, would be rather illus-
ory. Expected inflation will not be brought down to zero. 
If such a case existed and the CPC was introduced, 
immediately replacing national currencies, a single currency 
prevails requiring a quantitative rule. It would then be doubted 
if such rule will guarantee its purchasing power stability in 
such a short time, when such a rule is missing from each 
member and the EEC. Remaining inflationary expectations 
could lead to excessive real wage rises and unemployment. Anti-
inflationary policies could raise unemployment further. There 
are contrasting views on the speed of CPC substitution, see 
Vaubel ('978~, Masera (1978). 
As it is suggested above, another crucial problem lacking, 
a clear answer arises from the different speed of the CPC spread 
over the EEC. This could mean that,the extent to which 
stabilisation-induced unemployment will be avoided)will differ 
throughout the EEC. It may not guarantee that a stabilisation 
crisis will be avoided, where it is needed most, i. e. in coun-
tries with the highest and most unpredictable inflation rates, 
where the stabilisation threat is greater. The regional bal-
ance problem also exists out of factor payment equalisation. 
If a minimal degree of wage and exchange rate illusion still 
exists in these areas it could alleviate this regional problem. 
A rapid CPC spread there could increase structural problems. 
The CPC then has to penetrate initially these regions where infla-
tion is most ineffective in reducing unemployment HOwever 
• I 
from the point of avoiding a stabilisation crisis, CPC is needed 
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most in weak high inflation areas. There is no agreement on 
where CPC is going to prevail primarily. Further unemployment 
problems would not seem to be avoided in the periphery irres-
pective of this question. Assuming now that CPC prevails in 
both areas simultaneously, in each for different reasons, 
unemployment problems because of structural difficulties in 
weaker areas, may not be avoided. 
Another major question refers to the final stage. In the 
intermediate stage CPC's value guarantee can be validated with 
certainty and precision. However)to the extent that it out-
competes national currencies, it can no longer use them as points 
of reference for exchange rate adjustment. Like a national 
currency, it would require a supply guarantee instead of an 
exchange rate guarantee. While one cannot ignore the benefits 
of such an effective rule) the question is)if such stability 
can be guaranteed at the final stage. Is such currency going 
to be administered better than present national ones? If it is 
mis-managed it could have more serious consequences than the 
mis-management of any single national currency. European mon-
etary authorities must be independent and the monetary rule to 
be embedded quite rigidly, not to give room for discretionary 
policies. While such a proposal may not require ex ante agree-
ments on national money supply growth rates) it requires one at 
the EEC level. One cannot escape from such necessity and res-
earch required. Due to difficulties entailed in establishing 
the successful rule, research is required long before the new 
currency has out-competed national ones. We do not exclude 
the possibility that a successful rule may be achieved at the 
first trial. Howeve~it may notandprice stability, at least 
initially, may not be achieved. Are the public going to be 
compensated for such an eventuality? No clear answers are 
! 
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provided. What is more, despite having a successful rule)one 
cannot exclude the occurrence of shocks. EEC in order to main-
tain zero inflation, may have to implement on certain occasions 
strong deflationary policies. Further, lags operating in the 
process, at a moment where the future cannot be completely 
foreseen, may imply inflation rises for certain time periods 
at least. Also circumstances may cause the new currency to 
depreciate. If no other measures am taken, should the public 
be compensated for depreciation losses? No agreement exists 
here either. Given the factors which, beyond the monetary rule, 
could influence the inflation rate, we are not fully convinced 
that EEC authorities are able to permanently guarantee a stable 
purchasing power currency at the final stage. A credibility 
gap would seem likely to be created and a failure to give perm-
anent guidance to expectations would seem possible. 
Manifesto signatories seem finally to fall into a contrad-
iction. On one hand)they claim that in the coordination 
approach the monetary rule cannot achieve a given inflation 
level that ~ould guarantee exchange rate stability among them, 
while on the othe~they maintain that the monetary rule in 
their proposal at the final stage will guarantee a given infla-
tion rate - zero in their case. 
7.C.a. Conclusions 
------
A comparison between the two approaches will be attempted 
here. Firstly, even in the coordination-cum-centralisation 
approach there is a certain degree of substitutability between 
the CPC and national currencies. Therefore, the implications 
analysed in the Manifesto approach, based on substitutability 
alone, would seem to apply in the former although they would 
rather be less marked. The fact that economies will progress 
on coordination and establish low inflation levels would suggest 
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that one would not envisage a complete switch from national 
currencies to the CPC. The low and predictable CPC inflation 
rate would make it attractive. It could be that both CPC and 
national currencies circulate together. That would not create 
problems in the coordination-cum-centralisation approach, 
since it is not sUbstitution alone that will bring the MU, 
but also effective coordination. In fact the CPC is introduced 
to enhance it. The performance of the CPC though has to be 
more satisfactory or at least as satisfactory as that of the 
dollar in order to bring forth the exp~cted benefits. 
In the Manifesto approach the question that remains is how 
quickly)and in which areas, the CPC would firstly replace nat-
ional currencies and the relation to stabilisation. Questions 
remain on the successful implementation of the monetary rule 
at the end. Unemployment in certain areas may not be avoided. 
A less than fully indexed CPC seems to offer greater chan-
ces for gradualism. The CPC would gradually become an inter-
vention currency. Supporters of this alternative, to be 
launched within the coordination approach, accept the possibil-
ity for transitional costs for certain members) apart from those 
created} due to structural factors and call for an effective 
regional policy. further, under this approach one avoids the 
problem of where the CPC will primarily prevail and the impli-
cations for stabilisation. In~"the Mani festo approach a cred-
ibility gap could be created, having grave consequences, if 
countries believed that they would avoid deflation/while in fact 
they could not do so. The coordination-cum-centralisation approach though 
avoids it by explicitly asking for the proper measures to be 
implemented for countries that have to undertake considerable 
adjustment. Assuming that the CPC prevails primarily at the 
centre) it offers no advantages on the stabilisation question 
I' 
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compared with the coordination-cum-tentralisation strategy. It 
seems to be inferior to the latter, since the unexpected crisis 
could have far more serious implications. Measures to ease 
problems would tend to come too late and the burden would 
remain for longer periods. 
Both approaches take into account the regional problems 
created by nominal factor payment equalisation throughout" the 
[EC. However,such an occurrence seems to take place at a 
faster rate, and with greater proportions, under a widespread CPC use 
in the periphery. 
Coming to the final stage, there is the problem of an 
effective monetary rule. Both approaches share this problem. 
Members have to be convinced that the zero inflation rate will 
be agreed. The Manifesto approach could face a credibility gap. 
The problem seems less acute under the coordination-ctJTl-CPC approach 
where it does not establish the zero inflation target but it 
instead refers to a threshold level. At the final stage the 
single currency has to be well administered. However, one 
should not refer to an explicit level given the danger that 
such a target might not be fulfilled. What is therefore needed 
is a firm commitment by Community authorities to the aim that 
inflation should be kept at the lowest possible level. Success 
of their policy will be judged on the inflation prevailing on 
other parts of the world as well as on past experience of mem-
bers, especially the ones with the most successful record. It 
would seem that coordination offers more favourable chances of 
success primarily because until the final stage is reached 
successful coordination will have established 101.1 inflation 
levels and policies to guarantee success in the future. The 
Manifesto entails also the danger that monetary aggregate con-
trol would diminish temporarily during the intermediate stage 
'\ 
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since it does not argue for strict discipline and does not call 
for target harmonisation among members. That could also make 
a successful policy at the end more difficult. 
The Manifesto approach could bring forth the benefits 
claimed by its supporters. However) uncertainty about the pos-
sible outcome, indeterminances and contradictions, all manifested 
in various ways would rather lead us to be more sympathetic to 
the coordination-cum-centralisation approach. That of 
course does not mean that such an approach will not succeed if 
the dollar is stable and the chances of the CPC to become an 
intervention currency at the level required will be reduced. 
Although the CPC could spread even if it was as good as the 
dollar, one should realise that the CPC is launched to contrib-
ute to a better EEC money supply control, since that provided 
by some EEC governments and the USA, is not the one that would 
make coordination successful. Under a stabilising dollar pol-
icy which does not create monetary unrest in the EEC, coordina-
tion will be more effective in the EEC, uninterrupted by 
undesirable external factors in the intermediate coordination 
stages. The coordinatio~cum-centralisation process will reach 
its final stage successfully. 
One should mention though a'common weakness of both approa-
\ 
ches and that is that they both seem to be inward looking. The poten-
tial international reserve role of the CPC should not be ignored. 
It could cause large upsets in the IMS. Nor is there any dis-
cussion on how the international CPC role would be restricted 
to acceptable proportions. Balassa (1977) suggests that this 
could be an attractive alternative for EEC countries) as well 
as those with strong links and corporations having the bulk of 
their activities with the EEC area. Th CPC ld e cou spread fur-
ther. Restrictions on its circulation could curtail the 
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economies of scale and efficiency gains of having it. Also 
rationing itssupply could make impossible to control its value 
according to the indexed-basket formula. The problem remains 
to reconcile the need to make the new currency acceptable to 
European markets and not to upset a desired composition of 
world reserves, avoiding international conflicts. The need 
of cooperation between the two parts of the Atlantic is once 
more emphasised. Further problems may arise within the EEC 
due to the reserve CPC role - EEC authorities have to reconcile 
the policies needed for such a role with those for domestic 
monetary management(8). 
From all above it is evident that for a complete MU, trans-
fer of power to EEe bodies is required. Interdependence has 
already forced members to seek coordinated policies. Howeve~ 
the MU involves greater limitations to the ability of individ-
ual governments to determine their own economic policies. 
Political willingness to surrender more than the current degree 
of their sovereignty is a pre:t~quisi te for the changes, as suggested 
above, to come into force. Such willingness has not been shoun so 
far by the members. As long as it is absent, the possibility 
of applying the proper policies is distant and the prospects 
for a complete MU are uncertain(9). 
\ 
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CHAPTER EIGHT THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
~.~.~. ~i~sL De£i~i£n~ an£ Un£e~lyi~g_R~aso~s 
The move to create an EMS was aimed at establishing closer 
monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary stability 
in Europe. It was regarded as a fundamental aspect of a com-
prehensive strategy aimed at sustained inflation-free growth, 
progressive restoration of full employment and narrower dis-
parities within the EEC. It would facilitate convergence and 
give impetus to the European union process. Rules revolved 
around the elaboration of the system itself and study of action 
needed to strengthen, under the system, the less prosperous 
members. The arrangements approved referred to the initial 
stage and within two years from the EMS introduction, they 
would be consolidated into their final form entailing the 
creation of a European Monetary Fund and full utilisation of 
the European Currency Unit as a reserve and settlement asset(1). 
They had four main aspects: the ECU, central to the system, to 
be the basis for a divergence indicator, denominator of claims 
and liabilities arising in the intervention and credit mechan-
isms and a means of settlement between central banks and the 
Commission. The exchange rate and intervention mechanism, 
which borrowed some of the Snake features, but also involved 
innovations - the divergence indicator calculated in ECU terms. 
The credit mechanisms to operate under the existing rules. 
Finally, the transfer mechanism to strengthen the less pros-
perous members and facilitate convergence. 
The EMS was proposed when experience from the past two years 
had proved disappointing with respect to both European and 
world economic prospects, in order to prevent divergence and 
protectionism. It was considered as a means of strengthening 
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the EEC mechanisms in view of the second enlargement and as 
a self-defense against US policies. It aimed to minimise the 
impact of world economic problems in Europe and especially 
exposure to volatile currency movements which, it was believed, 
stunted trade and growth and aggravated inflation. Germany, 
one of its two main initiators, wanted to protect its compet-
itiveness. However, it did not look more at the unsatisfactory 
pivotal dollar role and less on exchange rate fluctuations by 
reducing its role, since it wanted to hold the OM reserve 
status down. It preferred to avoid capital exports, achieving 
it by tying the OM to other EEC currencies. The Bundesbank 
still considered the USA as the natural reserve currency coun-
try and wanted also to avoid a loss of national monetary con-
trol. France was committed to a programme to reduce inflation 
and enhance industrial efficiency and believed it could be 
better achieved inside the EMS, although past experience was 
not encouraging. Richardson (1979, pp 50-4) also explains the 
reasons for which, since the mid-seventies, there was a conver.gmce 
of ideas among monetary authorities in Europe 
contributed to a common solution(2). 
B.A.b. ~n~l~sis_of th~ ~r£a~g~m~n!s 
which greatly 
The technical arrangements dominated most of the negotiat-
ing period, involving the question of who bears the adjustment 
burden. The basket formula and the parity grid were proposed 
for placing ECU at the centre of the system. Comments on both 
approaches were made in chapter seven. Additional problems 
could be created under the basket formula when a currency 
leaves the agreement, or when members do not favour involuntary 
debtor or creditor positions when their currencies have not 
reached their limits. However, when their turn comes they 
could bear the entire adjustment(3). According to the EMS 
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resolution ECU parities derive a grid of cross parities. ECU 
margins - compatible with the bilateral margin - different for 
each currency, were established. However) the intervention 
organisation was based on the grid. A set of bilateral rates 
is determined and each central bank intervenes to maintain 
these rates within the predetermined margins, making, essen-
tially, bilateral rates as the operational targets and when 
it is necessary cross-rate realignments can take place. ECU 
parities also change. Therefore, de facto, ECU parities are 
derived from bilateral ones and not the other way around. 
This is reinforced by the fact that a currency could reach its 
bilateral limit without having firstly crossed its divergence 
threshold(4). Realignments can be forced, i.e. setting new 
bilateral rates which will in turn determine new ECU parities. 
The most preferable solution from the symmetry point, also 
minimising uncertainty on intervention decisions, would be 
the one based on bilateral rates coupled with EMS currency use 
in intervention. The grid was finally adopted in intervention. 
However, a policy more compatible with placing ECU at the centre 
of the system would be to use ECU rates to determine bilateral 
rates. The basket formula would be more compatible then, 
although if certain problems are not solved bilateral rates 
would be forced, bringing forth the problem of de facto ECU 
derivation. The "Belgian compromise" reconciling the oper-
ational simplicity of the grid with the advantages of an 
objective indicator does not alter the above analysis. One 
could propose arguments for using the ECU with the purpose of 
becoming an intervention currency. In fact this longer term 
objective was assigned to ECU. However, certain characteristics 
would be required, such as ECU being stable in terms of member 
currencies, official support, avoidance of a complex formula 
II' 
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and having a central bank to develop the ECU market. It was 
to be seen whether strong national resistance would subside. 
Other factors affecting its use were analysed in chapter seven. 
Opting out by a currency could hinder its use. It would not 
be a problem if ECU parities remained unchanged, as indeed it 
was decided. One should deduct from the premium or discount 
shown by the market ECU rate, the share of appreciation or 
depreciation attributable to overstepping the bilateral margin 
of currencies opting out. Furthermore, restrictions on ECU 
creation and utilisation(5) do not correspond to full ECU 
official use as the resolution proposed. 
A discouraging sign on symmetry has to do with the absence 
of foreign exchange markets in European currencies. Dollar 
intervention could de facto become the rule. 
While the grid would be the basis, ECU rates are to be used 
as an indicator of systematic deviation of one currency against 
the other. Using it,the presumption would be that the country 
should initiate adjustment measures, see EMS Resolution, Annex 
II (1978). Thygesen (1979) explains why this indicator pres-
ents)for the first time) an agreement to use an objective 
indicator to trigger coordination. However,the divergence 
threshold was an early warning signal rather than a fundamental 
disequilibrium signal. Although it could prove useful, it was 
not mandatory. This could reduce its practical significance 
creating also a credibility gap and speculation on realignments. 
There was also uncertainty as to whether the indicator or the 
bilateral limits would respond first. A lower threshold could avoid 
this problem although it may seriously diminish the indicator's 
operational significance. Also if diversified intervention is 
not accepted, dollar use could have undesirable implications. 
Korteweg (1979) asserts that it complicates, without improving, 
, , 
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the EMS functions and creates asymmetries due to its mechanics. 
However)symmetry could occur between the two parts under div-
ersified intervention, implying also less contraction for 
weak members. On the other hand a member could opt for ECU 
realignment rather than adjustment. This would seem to be 
the case where ECU parities will determine bilateral parities(6). 
There was also an extension in the amount and duration of 
credit facilities. Multilateralisation would seem more effect-
ive compared with the Snake period. However) the minimalist 
view on the Fund was accepted for at least the first two years. 
There were massive Fund assets to prevent short-term exchange 
rate instability and this could be a factor inspiring confid-
ence and stability. Credit facilities rose substantially too. 
They consisted of borrowed funds so that the increase in liquid-
ity could only be temporary. However/they could contribute to 
divergence. Severe conditions for borrowing could avoid such an 
eventuality(7). Others - Richardson (1979, p 54), Walter (1980), 
de Grauwe and Peeters (1979) - do not consider them as an 
inflationary danger while they would not be sufficient to pre-
vent adjustment. The situationisdifferent though on the [CU crea-
tion mechanism, which results in effective gold mobilisation, 
which was previously sterili%ed. Another major inflationary 
potential would be if the Fund started creating ECU against 
national currency deposits. Internal policy commitments, 
provision for potential parity realignments and other measures 
are important. A Fund with powers to ensure that undesirable 
conditions will not develop was needed. 
EMS negotiations concentrated on technical issues. Crucial 
issues for its success were not sufficiently dealt with. One 
of them referred to effective coordination, acceptance of 
limitations and binding commitments. Analytical work was not 
" 
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undertaken. There was no real understanding on what policies 
were to be adopted. Conditions for undertaking realignments 
were needed. Disagreements existed with the danger of delays. 
The dominant currency problem could arise even inside the EMS 
A policy towards third currencies was absent. Finally, dis-
agreement emerged on the amount of resource transfers for the 
UK who decided to remain outside the EMS. 
Members expressed determination to ensure EMS success by 
policies conducive to greater stability at home, price level 
stability, and abroad, exchange rate stability. Experience 
demonstrated the need for discipline. Risks in terms 
of unemployment and inflation could even be greater and more 
complex(8). If the EMS did not bring the economic and monet-
ary impulses expected then a union would follow which proves 
untenable, causing disappointments and bringing setbacks with 
a resulting deterioration in objectives. Real decisions on 
the MU could be made difficult and the cost of restoring 
stability could be higher than otherwise. The whole strategy 
could change, involving policies directly aimed at reducing 
unemploymen~with all the implications that such reversal may 
entail. Ability to force convergence was questionable. Dif-
ferent expectations though could make different people more or 
less optimistic. The EMS was beset with the problems of fixed 
but adjustable exchange rates in its internal relations. The 
causes that led to the BWS collapse were present in the EMS. 
Short-term stability followed by rea~ignments would seem to be 
the major EMS feature. If it could bring greater short-term 
stability in the EEC something would have been achieved. It 
would be difficult to guarantee long-term fixity given its 
unresolved issues and the power of national discretion. How-
eve~ it could be a much wider enterprise if genuine steps on 
.j 
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MU creation were taken. The crucial time will be in early 1981 
when decisions on the Fund will be taken. It would seem 
then, that the first two years of the EMS appeared more like a 
precondition before starting the move towards MU. The extent 
to which it is successful will create a more favourable envir-
onment to take more important decisions later. 
8.B.a. The Attitude of Members during the Negotiations 
------------------------
An analysis of the attitudes of members during the negot-
iations is important since the questions raised are directly 
relevant to the viability of the EMS. 
Little can be said about the desire of the smaller members 
opting for the stability MU offered. Belgium also expected 
that the Lira and sterling would provide a cushion to the 
weak Franc. The Dutch were somehow worried, a larger EMS 
could become weaker and more likely to collapse than the Snake. 
The UK, while supporting stability, justified the reasons 
for opting out. It put emphasis on the durability of the 
system, the basket formula, it argued for an external exchange 
rate policy and policies to avoid deflation out of coordination 
by asking for net budget receipts, see HMSO Green Paper (1978). 
However, the EMS was launched to tackle the economic problems. 
This takes time and so does durability. In the Snake,strong 
members did not expand sufficiently, while under the basket 
formula it could be that weak members undertake the entire 
burden. The UK though had an important point with regard to 
.... 
the lack of external policy. Finally)on the budget question, 
it seems that the UK linked something not directly involved to 
the MU implications. The Budget redistribution problem existed 
even if the EMS was not created, given the Rome Treaty object-
ive. The UK was not benefiting under this source of revenue 
while one could not say that its gains from the other source 
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expanded EEC market - were larger than those of Germany or 
France. In strict MU terms this argument should not be used 
for not joining. However)the EMS could create its own defla-
tion and transfers should take place for that purpose. One 
can then see the residual validity of the UK argument in the 
sense that even transfers ~ue to MU implications could be 
large enough to necessitate restructuring. 
Some of the UK fears were also shared by France and Italy. 
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Italy favoured moves to strengthen intra-EEC links. It viewed ,. 
the EMS as a design made from three complementary elements: 
the exchange rate agreement, the EMF and measures to reduce 
divergences, see Sandini (1979). Italy's requests were part-
ially met and she finally joined, receiving resource transfers, 
although with a higher margin - 6 percent - given that infla-
tion was still higher even with respect to the EEC average and 
the gap was to remain wide for some time. It was planning to 
introduce a three-year plan in early 1979, to improve its object-
ives and remain an active EEC member, implying a return to the 
2.25 margin. 
Ireland, despite its strong links with the UK, joined. 
Arguments for joining are provided by McCarthy (1980). Author-
ities hoped that the Punt would also remain close to sterling. 
However) Ireland's independent exchange rate policy was cur-
tailed. The Irish wanted to break the ten year inflationary 
period. Independent monetary control though cannot be achieved 
inside the EMS. Success would come only if the EMS inflation 
is lower to that of the UK. 
In Germany there was a desire for exchange rate stability, 
although the ~undesbank and private institutions spoke with dis-
qUiet,emphasising two points: (a) expected benefits would not 
(fully) materialise as the conditions for smooth functioning 
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of fixed - though adjustable - rates are not met, and, (b) econ-
omic costs mainly in terms of inflation risk and consequently 
unemployment risks were too high. The system had a built-in 
inflationary bias, see Scharrer (1979) for an analysis of these 
points. The Bundesbank was not prepared to fully obey the 
rules and was not ready to accept symmetrical intervention, 
especially if reali.gnments were delayed. Rather than having 
inflation rising to the EEC average, it seemed determined to 
bring it down. It wanted to avoid erosion of its autonomy and 
preserve its main objective. It was to be seen whether it 
would be successful. 
Political decisions were reinforced. Decisions were taken 
when MI had been demoted from policy issues. The feasibility 
issue caused a divorce between expert opinion and political 
action. Delicate opinion on highly technical matters was left 
to decisions of final political meetings. All major members 
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took their decision most lyon political grounds. Technical <I 
decisions were on political grounds too. Finally the French 
veto preventing EMS from starting on January 1 and the French 
Placet on March 12, seemed more like tactical moves, if one 
was to realise that many problems had been left unsolved well 
before the veto and remained so after March 12. Concessions 
~ ,. 
were minor and complex due to the German and Sri tish attitude. I. 
Political reasons forced France to such a move and this affected 
the EMS credibility. State heads took a unanimous decision on 
what for them was of "historic importance" on December 5, and 
permi tted discord among their (ar.m ministers to undermine it 
on December 19. 
The EMS was criticised by non-EEC officials; (a) as being 
further evidence of EEC isolationism. The EEC could impose 
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controls for the system to hold. Reform should be made on a 
world not a regional basis and Europeans could lose interest 
or act contrary to the IMF. (b) The EMS will not succeed and 
its inevitable collapse will be damaging to the IMS. Foreign 
exchange markets were unsettled by the plans to link currencies 
and the question was on the rates to be fixed at the beginning 
of the EMS implementation. It was feared that rates would be 
preserved expensively and too long having undesirable implica-
tions. (c) It threatens the dollar. The EEC would not try to 
fix a rate against the dollar. Its stability would be threat-
ened by poorly coordinated dollar intervention. 
Baquiast (1979) provides arguments to suggest that the EMS 
respects the IMF objectives and Articles. Emmerson (1980) also 
suggests that Europe would have a more coherent negotiation 
performance over world monetary questions(9). Nevertheless 
the ECU replaces the SOR at least in the EEC. It could also 
be used by countries with strong links with the EEC. Also, 
the final EMF form is crucial. If it was to be a credit 
creation institution it could turn the ECU into an interven-
tion currency becoming an alternative to the dollar undermin-
ing also the SORe Increases to EMF resources could be more 
important to Europeans than IMF quotas(10). Triffin (1979) 
maintains that ECU development may be beneficial to the USA 
in the long-run. The USA may have to restore XE and monetary 
stability whose excessive relaxation contributed to dollar 
overvaluation abroad and inflationary weakening of its pur-
chasing power at home. The EEC decJsion had to do with the 
dollar although the Commission argued that it was not directed 
against it. It would retain .its leading role, although in the 
future) responsibility might be more widely shared with the 
ECU and the yen. Evan if the dollar stabilises}the MU move 
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should continue since the question was whether the dollar should 
continue performing as the only international exchange medium. 
The EEC insisted on a more constructive US attitude since the 
EMS could greatly contribute in solving the dollar problem, 
while a strong EMF could make joint intervention more effect-
ive. There was also a possibility of introducing a substitu-
tion account to exchange dollars for ECUs. One should not 
expect that, at least during the initial stages, the EMS is 
sufficient to stop the OM from appreciating. By itsel~ an ECU 
alternative to reserve holders could increase dollar pressure. 
Hence it would be beneficial for this account to be introduced. 
The US attitude was closely linked to the dollar role as 
the world's single real reserve currency in the absence of a 
better alternative. The initial reaction was that the EMS 
would be a useful challenge and of potential assistance to the 
world's monetary order. However by 1978 III it was changing, 
emphasising global solutions and greater flexibility until 
more convergence comes forth(11), while it considered the 
Eurocurrency growth as a manifestation of rising financial 
integration and interdependence and it should not be blamed 
for tensions that go with it. Some take an offensive view on 
the US attitude, the only third party whose policies and reac-
tion really matter for the future of the EMS. Strange (1979) 
presents arguments to show that US actions are on pure self-
interest. However, the evidence for this case is not strong 
and certainly the last two years do not suggest a "benign 
neglect" towards the dollar. Stability between certain key 
currencies will contribute a lot to world monetary stability 
in general and to EEC stability in particular. 
In the long-run no contradiction exists between the idea of 
IMR and the creation of a specifically EMS. The need for global 
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stability has been emphasised. If the EMS succeeds to bring 
forth such stability among interdependent members, it could 
prove a good example on the global stability question. The 
EMS was a strategic retreat from full flexibility into organised 
floating, encouraging the creation of such areas, ,stable inside 
them,' cooperating among them to hold exchange rates in a 
broadly stable relationship. Such a path however could not 
make the SOR and currencies like the ECU competitive 
or mutually exclusive alternatives. A properly devised ECU 
could be compatible wi th international, rather than purely 
regional) reform and also a strengthened SDR in the future. 
The IMF role will also be important in ensuring that bilateral 
discussions between blocs take into account the interests of 
the rest of the world. 
8.0. lm£l~m~ntati£n_of !h~ gu£o£e~n_M£n~t~r~ ~y~t~m 
8.0.a. ~i~t£ric~l_a~d_Q~a~t!t~tiv~ ~n~lysis 
The EMS started functioning officially on March 13, 1979. 
However, all nine currencies were behaving as if they were 
Chart 8.1. Evolution of the Divergence Indicator 
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inside the EMS since the October realignment. It acted as a 
prerequisite move, anticipating possible tensions between the 
OM and other smaller currencies, while the US policy stance 
achieved dollar stability which lasted up to the end of April. 
All these contributed to a smooth start. However, the sterling 
strength forced the break in the sterling link soon after the 
EMS started, on March 30. Ireland could not manage the best 
of both worlds. It was a reminder of modern exchange rate 
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volatility and the form of pressures that the EMS was set up ~ 
to contain. If sterling was inside the EMS,pressures and an 
"upward" crisis would develop. Dollar pressure came back in 
May and continued in the summer. The familiar Snake pattern 
evolved. The BFr and later the OKr slipped to the bottom. 
Intervention was taken to counter pressure and at times bGth 
currencies passed their divergence thresholds. More restrict-
ive German policies and interest rate rises, after four years 
of credit ease, brought renewed OM demand. Economic trends 
inside the EMS were suggesting that it would collapse. The 
Bundesbank had to spend OMB.O bn. Pressures were finally eased 
with the October 1979 realignment. It took place after a 
restrictive policy on the part of Germany, trying to preserve 
its goals, and other members had to follow. That was a Snake 
problem and a major EMS question. The DKr was further devalued 
against the OM in November 1979. Since December 1979 and up 
to early 19BO political shocks were dominant. Dramatic gold 
price rises took place. The dollar showed considerable resil-
ience due to the XB situation of major countries, the October 
1979 US measures and fears for world peace. During that per-
iod the EMS was fully stretched. A new interest rate rise did 
nothing to relieve pressure until the OM, affected mostly by 
the dollar rise, occasionally replaced the Bfr as the weakest 
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currency. German authorities, trying to avoid imported infla-
tion, intervened heavily and eased inflow controls to fund the 
current account deficit. In Italy} economic deterioration and 
political uncertainty led the Lira to become, from being the 
strongest, the weakest EMS currency at the 6 percent margin. 
The period from May to the end of summer was quiet. The OM 
was the weakest currency at the 2.25 margin and so relieving 
pressure on other weak currencies. These countries subsequently 
relaxed their monetary policies. Uncertainties arose in Germany 
for investors) in view of inflation increases out of depreciation. 
Germany continued its tight policy. 
The average change of EMS currencies against their ECU 
central rates, Table 8.1, demonstrates a significant degree of 
stability, remarkably enhanced in the course of 1980. 
Table 8.1 EMS currency changes against ECU central rates. 
I~c~ Year BFr OKr OM OG IRL FrFr Lira Average 
Dec 79 -2.21 -B.BO 0.90 -0.60 -1 .10 -0.10 -1.00 -1.84 
Aug 80 -1.60 -9.20 0.52 0.03 -0.29 -0.12 -3.70 -2.05 
From March 12, 1978. Source: Eurostat, Monthly Statistics. 
Such stability should be compared with the almost 6 percent 
average change between 1972 and 1978 and about 7 percent in 
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the most unstable years, 1973 and 1976. The average variabil- ) 
i ty would have beS1 even smaller had it not been for the DKr and the 
Lira troubles in 1979 and 1980. Bilateral rates against the 
dollar, Table 8.2, indicate a generally more stable period, 
enhanced in 1980, with the exception being sterling which under-
took considerable appreciations. A combination of heavy inter-
vention and collaborative economic policies by major governments 
reduced currency fluctuations. The divergence in the XB situa-
tion between the US and other major countries narrowed in late 
J 
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Table 8.2 EEC currency changes against the US Dollar and the OM. 
Percent 
~~ Year BFr DKr OM DG IRL FrFr Lira f. 
Dollar Dec 79 4.44 -3.32 6.45 4.80 4.03 6.03 4.50 8.39 
Aug 80 2.20 -7.70 3.53 2.66 3.29 2.87 -1.00 15.35 
Dec 79 -3.46 -11 .10 - -1.78 -3.03 -0.97 -2.10 1.90 DM 
Aug 80 -2.25 -9.60 - -0.67 -0.90 -0.71 -4.90 12.10 
From March 12, 1978. Source: IFS. 
1978 and in 1979. The UK shifted into deficit too, although 
other factors, as will be seen below, kept sterling strong. 
With respect to the OM, remarkable stability was demonstrated 
by the FrFr and the OG. It was less so for other currencies 
while the situation was disappointing for the OKr. The situation 
improved considerably in 1980. Table 8.3 indicates the average 
currency changes against the OM and the standard deviation for 
the period March 12, 1979 to August 31, 1980 for each currency. 
Table 8.3 Average Currency Changes and Standard Deviation 
against the OM, March 12, 1979 to August 31, 1980 
Percent 
BFr OKr OG IRL FrFr Lira f. 
Annual Av. -1 .15 -4.88 -0.34 -0.46 -0.35 -2.06 6.15 
SO 3.26 8.73 2.03 3.63 0.87 0.05 6.01 
Source: IFS 
These fig~res are significantly smaller compared to those of 
the 1972-78 period, except for the OKr •. Direct comparisons 
though cannot be made given the different time periods. Taking 
now all currencies together for each year against the OM, 
Table 8.4, differences arise depending on which currencies are 
included. St9 ndard deviations in 1979 are smaller. Average 
changes though are higher to those of 1972 and 1975. The sittati~ 
deteriorat~ when sterling and Lira are excluded due to their 
low fluctuations. The high OKr depreciation created the rise 
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Table 8.4 Annual Average Currency Changes and Standard 
Deviations against the DM. 
Percent 
EEC EMS EMS less Italy 
Average SD Average SD Average SD 
1979 x -2.92 3.99 -3.14 4.31 -4.06 4.03 
1980 xX 2.04 3.91 0.65 1.44 1 .18 0.65 
X1979 from March 12, xX from January to August. Source: IFS. 
in the figures. Average changes though are significantly 
reduced in 1980, however they are no smaller than those in 
1975. Sterling's high appreciation accounts for that. Stand-
ard deviations though are smaller. The position dramatica.lly improves 
when sterling is excluded. The results with respect to the 
rest of the currencies are more satisfactory compared to any 
other period in the seventies, if one is to look at both the 
means and the standard deviations. 
One would be rather surprised at these results. This stab-
ility, considerably enhanced in 1980, was not matched by econ-
omic stability among members, see Tables 8.5, 8.6. In fact, 
the situation at the end of 1978 was worse than that of 1971. 
Such divergences indeed created exchange market pressure, com-
bined with dollar weakness and German restrictive policies. 
Intervention, substantial for certain currencies, and real-
ignments followed. However, certain currencies were surpris-
ingly strong given the economic problems of these countries. 
Divergences increased in the course of 1979 and 1980, but 
currency fluctuations became even more stable. A monetary 
explanation would be that Germany's monetary policy is less 
restrictive given that money demand has shifted from the DM 
to the dollar. This does not seem to be a convincing answer. 
A non-monetary explanation would be the unfavourable terms of 
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Table 8.5 EEC Inflation Rates, Annual Percentages 
EEC EMS EMS less Italy 
B 0 F G Ir It N UK l Average SO Average SO Average SO 
1979 4.6 9.8 10.7 4.1 13.2 14.7 4.2 13.4 4.5 8.76 4.46 8.18 4.38 7.25 3.81 
* 1980 6.8 13.7 14.1 6.1 17.6 21.4 6.9 19.8 6.4 12.50 6.17 11.60 5.90 10.20 4.76 
--
* January-July 1980 except for Ireland (January-May 1980). Source: IrS 
Table 8.6 Percentage Change in M1, M2 in 1979 
EEC EMS EMS less Italy 
B 0 F G Ir It N UK Average SD Average SD Average SO 
M1 2.5 9.9 11.7* 3.6 8.1 23.7* 2.8 10.2 9.0 6.9 * * 8.9 7.3 6.4 4.0 
* * * * 
* * * I M2 13.2 10.3 13.1 6.9 13.6 19.4 11 .5 12.9 12.6 3.5 12.6 3.8 11 .4 2.8 
-- --
Asterisk indicates larger figure than in 1978. Source: IFS 
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trade for Germany due to rapid price rises of imported goods. 
Further, recession reduced considerably the positive trade volume 
for Germany. XB problems, Table 8.7, largely checked the upward 
1 
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DM pressure enhancing EMS stability. One would expect though infla-'j 
tion differentials to feed through the XB and create strains. l 
Table 8.7 The Balance of Payments of the EEC Countries in 1979 ~1' 
Million US Dollars ~r 
B D F G Ir It N UK 
Current 
-3837 -2965 1575 -8510 -1495 -1010 -2359 -4922 Account 
Official 
-2864 161 -35 -3540 • • • 218 -7529 -2864 Balance 
Source: I FS 
Inflation rate convergence exists only inside the hard core 
Snake members, excluding Denmark. Inflation performance though, 
should not lead one to have misgivings about rigid exchange 
rates in the future since; (a) policies induced by the system 
may need more time to become effective, (b) external cost-push 
factors, affecting members differently make it difficult to 
attribute recent price level developments to recent economic 
and exchange rate polic~and (c) price indices have been affected 
heavily and differently for each country, distorting the meas-
urement of inflation. Nominal interest rate evolution since 
1978, chart 8.2, seems to indicate more monetary cohesion 
among the members. Our calculations thoughJon real interest 
rate development) suggest that the policy to fight inflation is 
more pronounced in the Benelux and Germany, much less so for 
France, Denmark and the UK and far worse for Italy. However) 
the factors attributing to inflation should not be ignored as 
well as the fact that some countri~ financial systems func-
tion more through quantitative controls. 
The UK case deserves special attention. The political 
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environment was now more favourable to a positive decision on 
_I 
·1 
the EMS issue. Secondly, while fears in 1978 were on the costs ~ 
of holding sterling up)the situation was now reversed due to 
the North Sea oil production and high interest rates in spite 
of serious economic problems. Arguments to join the EMS 
emerged, assisted by internal reasons to fight inflation and 
improve industrial competitiveness. Uncertainty existed 
though on whether sterling would not fluctuate widely, given 
that the oil price might fall as it did in 1974, economic 
problems remained, and interest rates, due to their effect on 
sterling, could be a factor contributing to instability. The 
oil factor and world political uncertainty could make sterling 
an unst~?le currency. EMS instability could be aggravated 
once sterling joined. The abolition of exchange controls 
-- +--------'"--, - +_. . ---,..-
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though could contribute to a more realistic sterling level, 
avoiding potential instability if controls were abolished once 
sterling was inside the EMS. Sterling had shown considerable 
instability against the ECU, appreciating 11 percent in the 
January-July 1979 period, depreciating by 10 percent by 
November and then appreciating again by 11 percent up to 
September 1980. The UK still worried about the lack of exter-
nal EEC policy and the level at which sterling should join. 
Other disputes existed too, raising the anti-EEC feeling, as 
well as the question if the UK could miss the second stage 
once it got off the ground. 
~.Q.£. Is~u~s_Risins out ~f_the_OEe~ati~n_of the fu~oEe~n 
Mo!!.eta,£y_Syste!!!. 
The short period does not allow for a proper assessment on 
the EMS performance, especially when measured against its 
ultimate objectives. However, a number of issues can be raised 
here. 
The EMS has so far achieved greater exchange rate stability 
and curbed overshooting. The Lira experienced larger fluctua-
tions within its wider margins. All fluctuations though are 
considerably smaller than those of the Snake period. 
However policy coordination has yet to become effective. 
Optimism only exists if one comes to explain current inflation 
rates. Also wage settlements seemed more restrained in con-
trast to the post-1973 period and more convergence in members' 
strategy seemed to take place. By August 1980, six of them 
applied restrictive budgetary and monetary policies while 
Germany, france and Luxembourg applied restrictive monetary 
policies and neutral budgetary policies. All gave priority 
to combat economic imbalances manifested in various mixes of 
inflation, public finance and XB. The Question though is if 
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such policies would continue if the recession deepens further. 
As a result of lack of effective coordination the familiar 
Snake pattern evolved. Different preference on EMS currencies 
continued as well as the inevitability of periodic tension on 
the system linking the DM with high inflation currencies. 
The Bundesbank was firm on its restrictive policies. Before 
the realignment, and despite the EMS pressure, it raised its 
interest rates. That, combined with its intervention tactics, 
rejected the view of holding the DM down to assist other weak 
EMS members and indicated the Bank's high priority to fight 
inflation and keep the virtuous circle. The EMS ranked second 
to these objectives. Signs of the dominant OM role were also 
present in 1979. Further, German money supply was very much 
inside the target, for the first time(12). Germany was looking 
for the best of both worlds i.e. improved intervention coopera-
tion and tough interest rate policies among major countries 
leading to exchange rate calming without Germany making any 
monetary concessions, and so trying to reduce the inflationary 
twist brought out of the exchange rate stability. 
The two realignments indicated the deflation need even for 
smaller members. This point has been extensively analysed in 
chapter six. Also, the September realignment was delayed, 
given that intervention reached disquieting proportions. 
The dollar kept being the usual intervention currency. 
Furthermore intra-marginal interventions have risen subs tan-
tially. Howeve~not all of them served to support member 
currencies falling below their threshold. The effects of 
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these techniques coupled with dollar rise have been analysed ~ 
earlier. 
The UK authorities did not manage to maintain a stable 
relationship between sterling and the ECU in order to serve 
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as a precondition for a future UK entry and the Irish authorit-
ies did not achieve a close relationship between the Punt and 
sterling either. Ireland's inflation was not much better than 
the UK one. Ireland also had serious XB problems and a high 
fiscal expansion. The current account deficit was not matched 
by capital inflows in the absence of free access to the London 
market. Exchange rate risks and inflation differentials had 
not established for Ireland a kind of credibility to encourage 
inflows. However, in mid-1979 the government introduced res-
trictive measures citing the EMS membership as the principal 
reason. The Punt's depreciation against sterling created 
inflationary pressures. 
With respect to the divergence indicator the EMS highlighted 
some of the problems of managing the system. Members often 
reach their intervention points without having passed their 
divergence thresholds. The indicator has also other technical 
complications, see Vaubel (1980). They have introduced a bias, 
impairing its role. It has been distorted, confusion has risen, 
while on certain occasions there was secrecy on EEC decisions 
on the indicator. All these have created a credibility gap, 
eroding the EMS. Members do not feel obliged to keep their 
currencies inside the threshold. The BFr stayed below its 
lower threshold from April to July 1979 while the same occurred 
with the DKr for four weeks in June 1979. They triggered some 
sort of policy response, although given the problems of these 
economies more action was needed. The Commission is more 
optimistic on its effectiveness, although it recognises the 
effect of the technical complications. A better test would be 
if major currencies had passed the threshold too. 
Intervention debts were to some extent settled 1n ECUs. 
Howeve~ dollars remain the main means of payments. Limitations 
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on ECU use remain. ECU was to be a fully fledged and perman-
ent asset whose risk all members should fully accept. Limit-
ations may be interpreted as a no confidence vote especially 
by the private sector. Changes have to take place, as men-
tioned earlier. Some initiatives were taken by both the 
Commission and private banks. However, further ECU develop-
ment requires important decisions at national and EEC levels(13). 
The Commission rates the EMS as a success and that the 
latter should not be confused with absence of realignments. 
It seems though that the realignment need has not been genuinely 
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diminished. Further, part of the inflationary build-up arose :~ 
oo~~exchange rate stability. Given the EMS structure)it 
may not reduce inflation to the extent that inflation of low 
inflation countries rises, making disinflation of high infla-
tion countries less likely. Given the current influence of 
real factors)such a possibility may not remain. More time is 
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needed for definite conclusions. Monetary impulses may reduce ~ 
differentials, otherwise a frequently adjusted peg will not be 
without problems, especially when other major currencies part-
icipate too. 
Increased subsidisation and credit facilities were feared 
to reduce economic adjustment. Such facilities though were 
not used at all except for Belgium on certain occasions. Coor-
dination did not rise though. The reason was that members' 
reserves rose significantly after the dramatic gold price rises 
and they did not ask for activation of EMS credits. 
Nominal exchange rate changes are important to assess the 
profitability of capital movements. However) the competitive 
position of members is assessed through real exchange rates. 
Conclusions can also follow on deflation effects rising out of 
the EMS evolution. Bilateral competitive positions(14) seem 
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to indicate an improvement in the competitive position for 
1979 for Denmark and the Benelux. All other members seem to 
have lost vis-a-vis Germany, Table B.B. The situation did not seem to 
improve in general during 19BO and implied' a need for a 
realignment inside the EMS for competitiveness purposes. Look-
ing at general competitiveness, Table 8.9, results do not seem 
to change substantially for major members, while a continuous 
improvement takes place for the smaller ones~15) 
Table 8.8 Bilateral Competitive Positions of EEC Currencies 
vis-a-vis the DM. 
Percent 
~y Year BFr DKr DG FrFr IRL Lira £ 
197B -3.8 3.3 1 .1 0.2 -0.7 -2.B -0.7 
1979 -2.0 -9.7 0.2 6.3 6.1 B.8 10.0 
1980 II -1 .5 8.0 0.5 -0.1 4.6 B.4 17.3 
- denotes real depreciation, + denotes real appreciation. 
Source: Calculations based on IFS data. 
Table 8.9 Real Effective Exchange Rate Changes 
Percent 
~y Year BFr DKr DG FrFr Lira £ OM 
1978 -2.3 -0.2 -0.4 2.9 
-3.0 4.7 1 .4 
1979 -1.0 -2.4 -3.1 3.8 2.7 9.9 0.9 
1980 II -5.5 -7.6 -2.5 1 .1 6.1 12.4 
-4.3 
Source: Calculations based on IFS data. Wholesale prices. 
Another deflationary bias comes out of Germany's restrict-
ive policies and members (e.g. Belgium) frequently complained. 
Also a deflationary bias may not be excluded in the longer-run 
in order for certain members to remain inside the EMS. 
The problem of policy towards third currencies remained 
and it emerged early. Belgium and Denmark complained of 
Germany's policy towards the dollar. Dollar weakness created 
pressures among the EMS currencies and disagreements emerged 
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showing that central banks had a lot to learn on a vital 
aspect of EMS durability, namely intervention coordination 
towards the dollar. Among the serious difficulties existing 
in the EMS, the relation to the dollar ranked foremost among 
them. The world continued to rely on the dollar to the degree 
of 70-80 percent with no-one anticipating or being anxious to 
bring a major change. US monetary policy continues to set the 
tone for global monetary affairs. 
Encouraging signs though come out of EMS stability, which 
could further enhance it. The FrFr has been in demand inter-
nationally(16). The OM role in the EMS has risen and france 
eased some of its stringent exchange controls. 
However,by 1980 III, there were fears that currencies had 
moved out of line with the underlying inflation differences 
and EMS stability remained for other reasons. The Bundesbank 
wanted a OM revaluation to avoid imported inflation. 
Germany and Holland expressed unease about the effective 
mobilisation of gold reserves which gave large gold-owning 
countries an increased amount of financial leeway to withstand 
pressure on their currencies. Gold turned-into-ECUs was valued 
at market prices, which more than doubled since the beginning 
of the EMS. Members draw on their gold reserves without actu-
ally selling them. Liquidity creation takes place with pot-
entially dangerous effects. 
Nationalist attitudes were still present inside the EEC. 
Various protectionist measures took place. france defied even 
the European court in the "lamp war" and finally managed to 
include lamp in the CAP opening the way for lamp mountains and 
export subsidies. The budget row divided the EEC. The UK 
insisted on CAP cuts and reduction on its oun large net con-
tribution. Rebates were finally agreed in May 1980, although 
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at the expense of a 5 percent farm price increase adding 
£1.1 bn to the CAP increasing its total cost to £16.6 bn. A 
promise was also made to solve the budget problem in 1981 and 
convey more funds to regional policy. However)the Fisheries 
dispute remained and a breakdown in the attempt to create a 
common policy could bring back the familiar EEC crises even 
before the CA P refo rm begi ns. 
The Europarliament, being directly elected, was not as 
strong as it was expected. Its members gave up the fight to 
reduce CAP spending on May 23, 1980 five months after they took 
it up. They came closer to their national parties instead of 
seeking independence to pursue pan-European objectives. They 
did not hold their initial position, lacking support from their 
constituencies. 
We are finally left with the EMF question. During the 
initial EMS stages it became evident that the deadline would 
not be met. No negotiations took place and major uncertainties 
remained for the second stage, due to extensive disagreement 
about the EMF's orientation, objectives and competence. Polit-
ical reasons were included too. Analytically, the delay stem-
med from; (a) procedural considerations. It was a "quality 
jump" requiring changes in the Rome Treaty. National legislat-
ive action was needed too. All these usually require a lengthy 
ratification by national governments. (b) EEC central bank 
reserves were now much higher)making members less worried 
about delays in the proceedings and (c) Unresolved issues exist-
ing over the EMF's true nature, involving the status of national 
central banks. One view was for the EMF to develop into a 
Federal Reserve system. The other was to develop in a form of 
a regional IMF. Furthermore, the status of national central 
banks was not uniform. The Bundesbank was greatly autonomous, 
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assured by law. Public opinion holds it in high esteem as a 
guarantor of monetary stability implying that any curtailment 
of power would be unacceptable. Other members though object 
just as forcefully on any solution leaving the Bundesbank in 
overall control. The Bundesbank was somehow disappointed by 
the current EMS. I t was not involved as much as it wanted to be and 
J. (. 
... 
it feared excessive liquidity effects. It supported a power- ! 
ful Fund, with effective control on European monetary policy 
and that the EeU should become as strong as the strongest EEe 
currency. In addition it would be independent from national 
government decisions, compatible with the aim of developing a 
zone of monetary stability, modelled on the independent 
Bundesbank itself. The German government did not want to go 
that far, being urged by the opposition to be cautious and 
avoid EEe liquidity rises, causing an increase in inflation. 
France also objected to the Bundesbank proposals given its 
different views on central bank freedom. The French views 
varied though. They said that they would support a powerful 
Fund if stability and attractiveness of the EeU could be 
guaranteed, the role of gold was enhanced and easy gold and 
ECU mobility existed in the EEe. The EMF role should be com-
pletely clear and members in XB problems should be allowed to 
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draw on EMF reserves without agreement from the country whose ,; 
currency is used. It is doubted though whether the Bundesbank 
would agree to this last request. The Italian view was for a 
powerful Fund, like in the Snake. Once Lira was faced with 
pressure they began favouring EEC responsibility on intervention 
and credit extension. The Dutch view was divided. The Governor 
avoided supporting any solution, emphasising though the need of 
some control, to take place through the Europarliament whose 
powers were uncertain. The government supported a FRS, while 
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the Treasury objected to the government rules on the ECU role. 
The Commission was cautious and undertook technical explorat-
ory work slowly, justifying it on world events. It supported 
though a maximalist solution and unlimited ECU convertibility. 
While national central banks would keep intervening to support 
their currencies, foreign exchange will be provided by the EMF. 
Opposite views existed on the speed towards the creation of the 
EMF. The Ortoli view suggested a slow move in order not to 
deter the UK from joining. The Jenkins view suggested a speedy 
move to encourage the UK to join,underlying the long-term 
political importance of the EMS. The US view considered the 
maximalist solution with caution. An ECU rise might weaken 
the dollar. IMF considerations also existed. Apart from the 
sovereignty question there was the gold problem which made 
certain members unenthusiastic to move towards the second 
stage. The Bundesbank favoured a modification of the gold-
into-ECU mechanism making less automatic the link between the 
gold price and the amounts of ECUs distributed to central 
banks. However)this problem would have a vital bearing on 
upgrading the EMCF into a fully fledged EM~ to have complete 
ownership of gold and dollar reserves and administer credits. 
The EEC monetary committee, in a report to the EMF Commission 
in early 1980, threw down the major political and technical 
challenge by arguing for a maximalist solution, making the EMF 
the responsible central bank to develop fully the ECU and meet 
the objectives set down in the Bremen and Brussels 1978 summits. 
An ECU with the widest possible degree of acceptability would 
be tantamount to an increase in international liquidity, neces-
sitating a powerful Fund. It acknowledged though/that incorpor-
ating gold into the system is regarded as a major political and 
technical obstacle. The future ECU role and the EMF structure 
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are greatly related. The ECU role proposed by the committee, 
argues for an institution with such responsibilities to imply 
centralisation of vital aspects of national monetary sover-
eignty(17). While the delay was certain to take place, it 
could be better, if it was not too long to avoid freezing the 
issue, keeping in mind the question of a complete MU rather 
than establishing a regional IMF, blocking additional progress 
for an indeterminant period of time. It is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to put new proposals for ratification before 
parliament every couple of years. Also it could not foster 
coordination and bring the changes advocated earlier under the 
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maximalist solution and eliminate the current EMS disadvantages. ~ 
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THE STRATEGY FOR THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
MONETARY UNION 
This chapter has a twofold purpose. Firstly, it states the 
thesis and secondly, it relates the analysis contained in the 
preceeding chapters to the conclusions reached. 
Section 9.A. answers the basic question of why the EEC needs 
a monetary union (MU), then it considers the various strategies 
which exist for the creation of an MU in the EEC, and states the 
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thesis. The strategy, which the EEC members should follow, is ',l' 
proposed as uell as the conditions which have to be fulfilled 
during the monetary integration (MI) process. Furthermore, the 
advantages of using this strategy are mentioned. The next four 
sections refer to the analysis on which the thesis is based. 
Section 9.8. deals with the theory which is relevant for the MI 
process and examines the policies which members have to follow 
and the questions arising under the various strategies. 
Section 9.C. analyses the implementation of the EEC exchange rate 
arrangements during the seventies, which were based on the coor-
dination strategy and examines, together with the analysis in 
section 9.8., the ability of this strategy to lead to an MU in 
Europe. Section 9.0. deals with the ability of the centralisation 
strategy to lead to an MU. Section 9.E. analyses why the 
coordination-cum-centralisation strategy should be preferred to 
the coordination strategy or to the centralisation strategy. 
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Section 9.F. summarises the chapter and traces the future prospects; 
for an MU in the EEC as well as the further research which is .1 
necessary in various areas. 1 
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9.A. 
- -
The Thesis Stated 
---------
This section, based on the analysis that suggests that 
Europe needs a monetary union (MU), states the economic strategy 
that must be chosen for the creation of an MU in Europe, given 
its advantages over other strategies available. 
The analysis relating to the arguments for the creation of an 
MU in chapter two, and to the decisions to move towards monetary 
integration (Ml) in Europe in chapters four and eight, leads to 
the major reasons which exist for Europe to look beyond the 
customs union and towards MI. These are: 
a) The necessary long-term security for balanced growth and 
competition which grew out of the growing interdependence inside 
the EEC. 
b) The need for common policies in order to provide an environ-
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ment for price stability, economic growth and full employment. ;~~ 
,~ !. 
c) The international monetary system (IMS) would be strengthened - . .,. 
by creating a currency which would share with the dollar and yen 
the responsibilities associated with key reserve currencies. 
d) To safeguard the achievements of the EEC - by securing a 
", 
steady growth path wi thin the EEC and helping to resolve the prob- \; 
lems of the IMS. 
e) To consolidate the EEC enlargement - by creating a fully 
operational EEC that has set itself definite objectives and also 
" 
t 
1" 
.. 
gives present and prospective members definite objectives. \':' 
The analysis in sections 3.A.b., 4.A.a. and chapter seven, ~ 
derived three major strategies for the creation of an MU in Europe. t 
~:~ ::: ::::::::::::o:t:::::::y , and, l 
~. 
(C) The coordination-cum-centralisation strategy. i 
Strategy (C) is composed of strategy (A) and a form of central-
isation which is different to the one entailed under strategy (8), 
to be explained below. 
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These strategies can be subdivided into variants. 
The coordination strategy has three variants: 
(A1) To limit intra-union exchange rate variability, by narrow-
ing gradually the fluctuation margins and/or restricting the 
scope for parity adjustments. This also involves central bank 
intervention rules. The commitment to exchange rate unification, 
together with intervention, is de facto expected to achieve the 
required harmonisation of monetary policies. 
.. / , 
I It 
" 
" I 
~. 
" 
. ,
'" ' 
,. 
.~ ", 1 
(A2) To achieve ex ante harmonsation of domestic monetary policy ", 
, , 
directly, which would gradually result in exchange rate fixity. ~ t 
(A3) To combine exchange rate commitments together with ex ante 
monetary agreements - i.e. a combination of A1 and A2. 
The centralisation strategy also has three variants. 
, (, 
(81) To establish all at once a single central bank which issues 
a single currency over a domain consisting of all member currencies.~~ 
(82) To abolish all intra-EEC capital controls and establish 
competition among national currencies. The most stable currency 
being expected to outcompete too others. 
(83) To confine currency competition and substitution to a process 
where only the prospective community currency circulates freely 
alongside each national currency. It will eventually outcompete 
the national currencies since it will have a more stable value 
than the value of its competitors. 
The coordination-cum-centralisation strategy entails the 
creation of a central institution which can be combined with any 
one of the three variants of the coordination strategy. This 
institution is equipped with the power to ensure enhancement of 
the coordination process and to establish a parallel currency. 
80th measures are expected to enhance MI and eventually bring 
forth the MU. 
The strategy to be chosen requires political feasibility apart 
from economic viability. It was shown in section 3.A.b. that 
'., L 
If._ , 
'1.. 
,. -
" 
" i 
I, , 
''', 
" ! 
. ~, 
, I 
. 
';; 
, 
• 
• ~r 
-276-
political realities would suggest the need for gradualism,allowing 
for institutional adjustment and a slow erosion of national 
sovereignty. Variant B1 would then seem unacceptable. The same 
is true for variant B2, despite its claimed gradualism, since 
national currency competition could exacerbate national rivalries 
and frictions and so damage prospects in Europe. 
One is then left with a choice between (1) the coordination 
strategy, (2) the B3 variant of the centralisation strategy and 
(3) the coordination-cum-centralisation strategy. 
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This study proposes that the coordination-cum-centralisation ,I t 
strategy should be the one chosen to create an MU in Europe. 
Based on the analysis contained in earlier chapters, this partic-
ular strategy requires that members should accept limitations and 
binding commitments on policy areas, which will guarantee the 
absence of discretion and will lead towards a complete MU in the 
long-run. They should be willing to establish dependence and 
consistency among their domestic economic policies. Given the 
initial stage of coordination, the credibility of the venture 
would be enhanced if members also set parities and fluctuation 
margins around their currencies. Increasing coordination would 
tend to reduce these margins. Intervention and/or parity adjust-
ments may occasionally be needed, due to lack of complete policy 
coordination, during the transitory stages. JOintly agreed and 
applied rules for these requirements are important for the smooth 
functioning of the arrangements, together with the commitment to 
enhance policy coordination. All these suggest the A3 variant of 
the coordination strategy. Union policies with third countries 
should also be established, while a regional policy, directly 
relevant to MI, may not be excluded in certain cases, to ease the 
MU costs. 
However, national policy coordination alone uill not bring forth 
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the MU. It would have to be assisted by centralisation. 
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A transferl: 
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of power to a central institution is necessary to promote MI 
and bring about monetary reform. Both measures will in turn 
establish a complete MU. 
Such an arrangement is chosen because it has the following 
advantages: 
a) It is based on gradualism, which reduces and spreads the 
transitory costs linked to stabilisation policies. It also 
facilitates the adjustment of expectations of economic agents 
and so reduces possible errors when they try to anticipate policy 
changes. 
Such an advantage is disputed under the centralisation strategy. 
b) It brings automaticity, which is important for the MI process. 
Governments try to avoid unconditional commitments and retain 
their power of discretion and the instruments to exercise it. 
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They keep open the possibility of either violating the coordination .~ 
agreement or opting out. This strategy provides a mechanism to 
prevent members from such a discretion and the various frictions 
that could follow. Automaticity also increases the predictability 
of decision making by reducing uncertainty and risks and so avoids 
efficiency losses. It also results in the central institution 
continuousl~ searching for ways to promote national economic 
convergence. 
Furthermore, such an automaticity is absent in the coordination 
strategy (A). 
c) It enhances the credibility of the MI process. The other 
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strategi es could face a large credibility gap if certain condi tions .. t . 
are not fulfilled, as will be seen below. 
Thus, the coordination-cum-centralisation strategy meets the 
two major conditions of gradualism and automaticity which make it 
able to lead to the creation of an MU. The MU will in turn pres-
erve and enhance the EEC objectives, set out in the beginning. 
The particular choice of this strategy and all its policy 
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implications are derived from analysing (a) the policies that 
members have to follow for the creation of an MU, (b) the imple-
mentation of the European arrangements in the seventies, which 
uere based on the coordination strategy, and (c) comparison of 
this proposal with the centralisation strategy, 63. 
9.8. The Theory on Monetary Integration and Implications 
--------------------------
for National Policies 
---------
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The analysis concerning the way to move towards MI, in section 
3.A.b., suggests that the policies which members must follou depend I 
, . 
on the particular strategy which has been chosen for the creation ) t 
of an MU. The centralisation strategy, 83 uould only require 
members to allow the common currency to circulate alongside their 
national currencies. Under a strategy where coordination is 
required, however, a number of policies may be needed, given that 
external balance (XB) compatibility is required among the members 
in order to bring about exchange rate fixity. 
Our purpose in this section is to point out that under the MI 
process, members have to undertake domestic policies which must 
also be consistent. We shall in addition specify the kind of 
consistent policies which have to be folloued, and those required 
to cope with the various problems which arise from these policies, 
so that progress towards MU will be assured. 
The analysis dealing with these issues concentrates initially on 
three main areas: (1) The domain of an MU, (2) the theory of 
monetary policy in open economies under fixed exchange rates, 
and (3) economic interdependence. These lead into additional 
analysis concerning the policies which members must follow, which 
is undertaken by analysing the determinants of exchange rates and 
their policy implications. The formulation of these policies 
directs attention also to the control of money supply, the stab-
ility of the demand for money and the interdependence of monetary 
and fiscal policies. further questions which arise also 
require 
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analysis, namely, the choice of the exchange rate regime during 
the MI process, the policies towards third countries and whether 
income redistribution should be linked with the progress towards 
MI. 
The analysis concerning the domain of an MU, in sections 
2.A.a. and 2.8.a., reveals that automatic adjustment is not 
sufficient to bring about internal balance (18) and XB in the 
EEC. Members require to undertake domestic policies in order to 
create X8 compatibility among themselves. Their degree of open-
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ness suggests that an MU is rather advantageous for them and also ) t 
reduces the size of policies to maintain XB. 
Further, the analysis in sections 1.8.a. and 1.8.b. and appendix II ~. 
suggests that the monetary theory to the balance of payments, as 
formulated by Mundell and Swoboda, is a rather poor approximation 
to what one may observe in the real world. Offsetting capital 
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flows may not succeed sufficiently and governments may have a " 
degree of independence in their monetary policy which could frus-
trate the self-adjustment process. Members embarking on MI must 
then be willing to undertake the policies which would eliminate 
such independence. 
The necessity for a group of countries to follow common pol- '" , . 
" , 
t, • 
icies is indicated by the degree of their economic interdependence. " 
The analysis in section 2.C.b., based on both trade and capital 
flows, indicates a rather high degree of interdependence among 
the EEC members, and between the USA and the EEC. Attention then 
is focused, in section 2.C.c., on the transmission of economic 
fluctuations among members arising from interdependence. The 
comparison of price movements among the members, the analysis of 
the transmission mechanism in the purchasing power parity (pPP) 
context and evidence from LINK models, give both positive and 
negative answers. Such evidence, though, would appear to be 
unsatisfactory given the limitations of some of 
the models used. 
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Generally. the analysis on long and short-run exchange rate 
determination suggests the need for predictability and stability 
of the policy variables. Preannounced money supply targets, 
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which in the future will only be gradually adjusted are essential • 
in monetary policy. 
Members embarking on MI would then have to coordinate ex ante 
their monetary expansion rates at a rate which, given the projected 
growth in real GNP, would be consistent with price stability among 
them so as to bring forth intra-EEC exchange rate fixity. The 
analysis in section 4.A.a. also suggests the use of the money base ,,';, 
(MB) as a means of controlling the money supply. Certain institu-
tional changes may be required to ensure a correlation between 
MB and broader aggregates. The A2 variant of the coordination 
.. , 
.... 
strategy would seem to be suggested. This solution, however, is ":,' 
not without problems, as t~e analysis in section 4.B.a. points .~ 
out. Major difficulties exist in estimating correctly future GNP 
growth rates and income elasticities of the demand for money, 
while differences in the national structural characteristics of 
the demand for money would suggest that a rough parallelism of 
comparable monetary aggregates is inadequate. A lot of analytical 
work is required to develop a solid basis for ex ante evaluation 
of the compatibility of announced monetary targets and exchange 
rates. Mistakes could lead to divergence among the EEC currencies. 
A more attractive solution, to start with,would then be variant A3, 
If which sets both ex ante monetary targets and exchange rates. 
the money supply targets turn out to be inconsistent with the 
exchange rate targets, central banks would intervene in the 
exchange markets. It is important that the consequent money 
supply adjustment be accepted since in this way the money stock 
would be brought. closer to the level required for exchange rate 
stability. The way to control the money supply for EEC monetary 
and, exchange rate stability would require members to pay attention 
to the domestic MB component. Assuming no direct intervention, 
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The analysis on monetary interdependence, however, reveals effects 
which are important to the policies of the members, one of them 
being the need for non-sterilizing policies to avoid exchange 
"j11 
• ' • \ I 
rate instability. The importance of the US monetary policy for 
the EEC is also revealed. 
Given that small open economies can hardly envisage floating 
individually, there is a need for consistent policies among the 
EEC members and between the USA and the EEC, so that national 
domestic objectives will be reached and the number and size of 
XB disturbances will be reduced. 
Having established the need for consistent national domestic 
policies, the next question refers to the specific policies which 
must be adopted. This requires analysis of the determinants of 
the exchange rates and their policy implications for exchange 
rate fixity, and this is undertaken in section 3.8. 
With respect to the long-run determinants the analysis demonstrates 
the importance of the PPP theory within the context of the quan-
tity theory of money. The dominance of monetary factors is crucial 
for the continuation of the PPP rule. Although one should not 
ignore the variety of structural factors, the experience of infla-
tion in the EEC, analysed in section 3.C.a., appears to demonstrate 
the importance of monetary aggregate policy. 
The long-run tendency of the exchange rate to equal the PPP level, 
suggests that members heading towards exchange rate fixity, would 
have to follow similar inflation rates and coordinate their pol-
icies to this aim. 
The PPP theory, however, entails long-run considerations. further-
more, overshooting from the PPP level could occur in the short-run. 
The analysis suggests the importance of the assets market equil-
ibrium model, following a monetary shock, in the short-run. Risk 
and uncertainty, due to instability in underlying economic con-
ditions, and destabilising speculation could also contribute to 
exchange 
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rate variability, however, at least over specific periods. 
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Generally. the analysis on long and short-run exchange rate 
determination suggests the need for predictability and stability 
of the policy variables. Preannounced money supply targets, 
" 
, . 
.' 
which in the future will only be gradually adjusted are essential " .• 
in monetary policy. 
Members embarking on MI would then have to coordinate ex ante 
their monetary expansion rates at a rate which, given the projected 
growth in real GNP, would be consistent with price stability among 
them so as to bring forth intra-EEC exchange rate fixity. The 
analysis in section 4.A.a. also suggests the use of the money base ~'; 
(MB) as a means of controlling the money supply. Certain institu-
tiona1 changes may be required to ensure a correlation between 
MB and broader aggregates. The A2 variant of the coordination 
... ' 
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strategy would seem to be suggested. This solution, however, is ":." 
, I 
not without problems, as t~e analysis in section 4.B.a. points .~ 
out. Major difficulties exist in estimating correctly future GNP 
growth rates and income elasticities of the demand for money, 
while differences in the national structural characteristics of 
the demand for money would suggest that a rough parallelism of 
comparable monetary aggregates is inadequate. A lot of analytical 
work is required to develop a solid basis for ex ante evaluation 
of the compatibility of announced monetary targets and exchange 
. t.'. 
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rates. Mistakes could lead to divergence among the EEC currencies •. 
A more attractive solution, to start with, would then be variant A3, :'~~t 
which sets both ex ante monetary targets and exchange rates. If 
the money supply targets turn out to be inconsistent with the 
exchange rate targets, central banks would intervene in the 
exchange markets. It is important that the consequent money 
supply adjustment be accepted since in this way the money stock 
would be brought. closer to the level required for exchange rate 
stability. The way to control the money supply for EEC monetary 
and exchange rate stability would require members to pay attention 
to the domestic MB component. Assuming no direct intervention, 
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each national MB expands with the smooth secular expansion in 
domestic central bank credit. Any inconsistency between money 
supply growth targets and exchange rate targets would result in 
non-sterilizing intervention. The resulting disequilibrium in 
the official settlements would contract or expand the MB, depend-
ing on whether authorities sell or buy foreign exchange. 
Under this variant,studies are also taken to suggest the monetary 
expansion rates which would reduce and eventually eliminate the 
need for intervention and establish genuine exchange rate fixity. 
Even under this solution, however, the difficulties of establish-
ing completely effective monetary rates should not be ignored. 
It should be borne in mind that low inflation rates can be achieved 
through proper monetary policies, reducing also inflation differ-
entials. A more or less permanent move to low inflation rates 
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would in turn enhance exchange rate stability and make policies .~ 
.. "'-. 
more effective. Despite such reinforcement of effectiveness, 
however, the question would appear to remain concerning the cap-
ability of determining the rates which would produce exchange 
rate constancy. Generally, despite the rise in exchange rate 
stability, sufficient monetary control, necessary to ensure per-
manent exchange rate fixity, may not be achieved. 
Furthermore, the A1 variant would be a weak arrangement, since 
it emphasises only non-sterilizing intervention. Even under this 
rule, there is notHng to pmvent authorities from expanding their 
money stock as much as they desire. Large interventions could 
result in XB crises which may not avoid instability. 
The monetary policy which is being pursued is not independent 
from the outcome of fiscal policy, as the analysis of section 
4.A.b. poin~out. This is demonstrated by incorporating the 
government budget constraint into the IS-LM framework. Also, the 
portfolio approach, elaborated by McKinnon and Oates (1966) and 
Branson (1972), extends the analysis of the implications of the 
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budget constraint into the framework of an open economy. The 
\' '\ 
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: ~ .... ~ ~ 
,. 
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budgetary policy should not result in a monetary-fiscal mix that J 
is not in line with the private sector's desire to accumulate .~ 
money or with the foreign sector's desire to accumulate the _.' ~ 
country's money as reserves. The harmonisation of national bud-
getary policies is then important in securing intra-EEC exchange 
rate fixity. 
The problems do not seem to end here. Three more issues 
remain to be settled, namely, the choice of the exchange rate 
regime during the MI process, the exchange rate policy towards 
third countries and the possible need for a r.egional policy. 
Complete monetary effectiveness would come gradually and, as 
the analysis in section 4.B.d. indicates, parity realignments 
1 
I. I 
.. 
, . 
.. , . 
.... 
would be needed during the transition. They should be carried .:,. 
out in a way which would avoid delays, crises and disruptions, .~ 
also ensuring discipline towards coordination. Arguments are 
provided for a crawling peg with a diminishing rate of crawl. 
Another important question, analysed in sections 1.B.c., 
4.B.c. and 6.A.c., is that the MI arrangements should not be 
1. 1 • 
\. 
. 
. 
inward looking. The joint float could create exchange rate strains:' ' 
among the members, because it could affect their competitiveness 
differently, given their different dependence on the rest of the 
world, and also because their currencies would not be equally 
preferred during the initial coordination stages. The evolution 
of the currency bloc must be manipulated in a way that would 
satisfy each member. Such a task is difficult and complete 
symmetry may not be achieved. On the basis of the OPTICA find-
ings, which derive a strong conformity of exchange rate changes 
with the PPP under effective rates, it is proposed that it should 
be ensured that the weighted average of the effective rates of 
the members, possibly excluding their trade with one another, 
conforms to such a rule. At the same time, the nominal exchange 
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rate margins should be in operation. Some problems of competit-
iveness may arise, and strains in nominal exchange rate fixing, 
especially for members with inflation rates above the EEC average. 
Imbalances could also be created with respect to intra-union 
transactions. All these would provide an impetus to reduce infla-
tion and enhance coordination, also raising nominal exchange rate 
stability. 
Furthermore, despite the attempt to ensure similar national 
competitive conditions, international capital flows could create 
" t 
or intensify strains in nominal exchange rate fixing, given the • 
semi-integrated state of the EEC and the different preference 
among the EEC currencies. Such a danger is more evident· for 
capital flows between the USA and the EEC. Progress towards MI 
may be difficult without consistent national domestic policies, 
t-, 
.... 
. :.' 
implemented on a world basis. The analysis in section 6.8.a., .~ 
based on the seventies, points out that such a need has been 
recognised to promote world stability. 
Finally, certain members may be faced with costs during the 
implementation of all the above policies. In the absence of 
measures to ease these costs, they could become a cause for the 
'.' 
failure of progress towards MI. The analysis in sections 1.8.a., .;. 
3.A.a. and 3.C.a.J indicates that resource transfers may be required 1 
to level off national productivity differentials, when equalisation 
of nominal factor payments takes place along with MI. Temporary 
transfers may also be needed since, despite recent evidence on 
the Phillips curve, the transitory costs to the high inflation 
countries may not be insignificant. 
To summarise, under a strategy where coordination is required, 
". 
members must: {a} coordinate their monetary and budgetary policies, " 
(b) accept non-sterilizing intervention, (c) accept timely real-
ignments, {d} adopt common external exchange rate policies, and 
. , 
(e) implement a regional policy, whenever this is 
required. 
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Indeed, under the coordination strategy (A) these conditions 
should be sufficient to lead to an MU. Under this strategy, 
however, two important questions remain. Firstly, the whole 
responsibility lies with the national authorities who must 
establish the proper policies. The question is whether members 
behave in practice in this way. Secondly, doubts exist whether 
complete monetary effectiveness can be finally established. If 
one or both of these conditions are not fulfilled, the inadequacy 
" 
\ ' 
j' 
of the coordination strategy becomes evident. Other strategies, 
requiring additional or different measures, may have to be followed,': 
The experience from the implementation of the coordination strat-
egy in the EEC, to which we turn now, will help us answer these 
questions. 
Eu!.oE,e 
The analysis in chapter four indicates that the 1972 European 
arrangements, which were to establish an MU by 1980, were based 
on the A3 variant of the coordination strategy. This section 
refers to the implementation of these arrangements. It aims, 
firstly, to examine the extent to which members fulfilled the 
required policies, which were specified in the previous section, 
and the importance of these policies to the MI process. Secondly, 
to see the degree of currency stability and convertibility inside 
the EEC by analysing the degree to which the EEC currencies moved 
together, the progress on capital control dismantling and the 
degree of capital market integration. Thirdly, to add to the 
debate on the adequacy of the coordination strategy for the 
creation of an MU. 
The national domestic policies and obJ·ectl.·ves are analysed 
in sections 5.e.a. and 5.C.b. and the analysis is largely based 
on national rates of growth, the EEC average, standard deviations 
around the average and ranges. The estimates on money supply 
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rates indicate high and variable national growth rates, while 
the differences in these rates tended to increase among the mem-
bers with the increase in the average rate. The rise in the 
dispersion, however, should not lead one to the immediate conclu-
sion of absence of policy compatibility, given the national dif-
ferences in the structural characteristics of the demand for 
money. Indeed there should be a given degree of deviation among 
the national monetary growth rates for exchange rate stability. 
A more proper analysis would require to estimate the national 
rates which would be compatible with exchange rate stability and 
then examine the degree of divergence of the actual rates from 
such rates. One cannot ignore the indication, though, that the 
countries with the fastest money supply growth rates recorded the 
f . 
~ \ . 
I ' 
• 
I 
f 
, . 
• 
highest inflation rates during the period concerned, while the ",' 
opposite happened for the countries with the slowest rates. More- '~ 
over members felt free to diverge, some of them considerably, from 
their preannounced targets. The excessive money supply growth 
was also assisted by an inconsistent monetary-fiscal mix. Lack 
of policy coordination would then seem to be suggested. 
The inflation differentials increased dramatically among the EEC 
L I, 
members. Such differentials increased further along with the ~. 
increase in the EEC average, remaining high for most of the period. 
This kind of dispersion would not appear to make the EEC pattern 
robust. Exchange rate adjustments would be required, some of 
which might not be smooth, timely or easily accepted. Although 
substantial differentials were recorded, this dispersion would be 
a more accurate indicator of the need for nominal exchange rate 
adjustment if the inflation rates were adjusted for the real 
exchange rate changes, which each member experienced vis-a-vis 
the EEC average. 
National domestic policies were sUbject to frequent changes 
in an environment of high inflation, considerable national 
", 
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differentials in the inflation rates and the XBs and irregular 
growth. They resulted in frequent changes in expectations con-
cerning the exchange rates, as the analysis in section S.C.b. 
indicates. Rapidly shifting interest rate differentials took 
place, while both uncovered and covered differentials did not 
evolve in a similar way among the members. These findings would 
imply significant short-run exchange-rate variability among the 
member currencies. Furthermore, one should recognise the limit-
ations of the asset market equilibrium model in determining such 
variability. The effects of uncertainty and risk were also 
important, given that policies frequently became erratic, unstable 
and unpredictable. They made exchange rate forecasting a futile 
exercise and market operators had to change expectations con tin-
. , 
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t-, 
..... 
... 
uously. Destabilising speculation was not avoided in certain :." 
periods. 
1. 1 • 
Within the group of domestic policies the effects of foreign 
'. exchange market intervention were important, in the absence of 
sufficient coordination which resulted in frequent interventions 
to preserve the exchange rate margins. The analysis in section 
S.C.c. suggests that there were periods when national authorities 
practiced sterilizatio~ judging from their policy behaviour. The ;-
· 
, . 
analysis on the evolution of the MB components also appears to 
indicate such a behaviour, although this evidence would not be 
concltisive, since a negative relation between changes in net 
domestic assets (ANDA) and capital flows (C) is open to both off-
setting capital flows and sterilization. 
Our econometric analysis to check for sterilization, in sec-
tions S.C.d. and S.C.e., concentrates on the Kouri-Porter capital 
flow equation, a reduced form of a macroeconomic model (OlS) and 
• \ 
"'f 
th~ Argy-Kouri version which incorporates the authorities' reaction .' 
function along with the above equation (2SlS). The analysis in 
apperidix II points out that this model has certain advantages 
, 
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over the partial equilibrium model, but it also suffers from 
certain defects which make the results tentative in nature. 
Authorities may not directly control certain NDA components, 
while the complex relationship between domestic and foreign inter-
est rates may affect the offset coefficient. Further, simultan-
eity exists between C and ANDA, while national monetary policies 
may not be neutral with respect to XB. The 6NDA coefficient may 
then be biased. Argy and Kouri incorporated the authorities' 
reaction function to deal with the simultaneity bias. Their res-
ults have been questioned though due to mispecification of the 
reaction function, since they did not include the possibility of 
discount borrowing. Our analysis includes such borrowing. How-
ever, the need would seem to be for a complete set of equations 
and future research should be directed towards producing such 
models in less disaggregated forms, compared to the ones already 
existing. Serious difficulties exist in constructing such models, 
including the unavailability of reliable data, institutional 
detail and the lack of stability of the demand function for assets 
as they become perfect substitutes and individual structural 
equations cease to exist as well-defined functions. Information 
on the key question of sterilization is provided by the ANDA and 
CA (current account) coefficients in the Kouri-Porter approach 
and C and CA coefficients in the equation determining NDA in the 
Argy-Kouri approach. Absence of sterilization implies coeffic-
ients equal to -1 in the first case, while complete sterilization 
implies coefficients equal to -1 in the second case. More trust-
worthy results would be expected from the second approach, given 
that it attempts to cope with the simultaneity problem. Similar 
results in both approaches would indicate the importance of dis-
cretionary policies during the period. 
The results obtained indicate that no conclusions can be drawn 
for Belgium and France, given the insignificance or the wrong 
sign of the coefficients and/or the inconsistenc i th Y n eir values. 
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Under the single equation approach (OLS), indications only exist 
for sterilization for Denmark and Germany, given the insignificance 
of the CA variable. The same applies for the Netherlands, given 
the significant difference between the ~NDA and CA coefficients. 
The estimates of the ~NDA coefficient range from -0.40 to -0.50 
for Denmark, -0.22 to -0.44 for Germany and -0.56 to -0.68 for 
the Netherlands. Under the two-equation approach (2SLS), the 
results become more definite for Denmark and the Netherlands. 
For Denmark the C coefficient ranges from -0.69 to -0.76 and the 
CA coefficient ranges from -0.82 to -0.85, while for the 
Netherlands they range from -0.61 to -0.65 and -0.70 to -0.80 
respectively. The indication for sterilization in Germany remains 
as the C coefficient ranges from -0.78 to -0.81. The two approa-
, .. 
.... 
, 
ches do not seem to produce different results on the sterilization :." 
" 
question. The two-equation approach, however, reinforces and ~ 
makes the results more definite. 
The tentative conclusion of systematic sterilization comes as a 
surprise for the small members at a moment where the opposite has 
been frequently claimed,given their interest for exchange rate 
stability. Sterilization seems to have been pursued by more than 
1. 1 -
. 
. . 
one country, which makes the fixed exchange rate system unstable. 
Instability may also have been created when only the major country, ' 
Germany, sterilized, given the unwillingness of the others to a' 
continuous adjustment. 
The functioning of the Snake and the policies followed would 
suggest that members used their power of discretion to the detrim-
ent of the MU. This is more evidently demonstrated by analysing 
their behaviour in three vital aspects for the Snake survival , 
namely the questions of sufficient policy adjustment, timely 
realignments and a common exchange rate policy towards third 
countries. 
The analysis in section 6.A.a. would suggest that each member did 
,I. 
", 
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not adjust sufficiently. The coordination strategy did not secure 
the discipline required for each member. Germany did not offset 
the deflationary effects of OM appreciation and based its policy 
on upward floating to achieve the lowest possible inflation rate, 
it did not intervene in the Snake sufficiently, and sterilized 
frequently. Small members did not adjust their external deficits, 
due to adequate finance provided to them, while major members 
left the Snake because they were not willing to undertake the 
required adjustment. More discipline could have occurred if the 
regional policy had proved effective. The analysis in section 
5.E.a. would indicate otherwise. Resources were lacking and cer-
tain members objected to these rising. 
The analysis in section 6.A.b. reveals that members failed 
to agree on timely realignments, causing frequent undesirable 
implications, which could have been worse if all major currencies 
had participated throughout the period. The adjustable peg failed 
in this respect as members did not accept any curtailment in their 
autonomy in order to establish a crawling peg. Even this system, 
though, would appear to need large realignments in certain per-
iods, given the large national economic divergencies. As section 
6.A.b. explains, even the adjustable peg needed a set of criteria} 
concerning the need for realignmentsJto establish a smooth func-
tioning. 
finally, the coordination strategy in Europe lacked an 
exchange rate policy towards third countries. The analysis in 
section 6.A.c. suggests that arrangements fell short of assuring 
members' competitiveness. Our estimates, however, use wholesale 
prices and conclusions on competitiveness are highly sensitive 
on the index used. Members failed in their attempts to adopt a 
common policy towards third currencies. Each major country based 
,the evolution of its currency solely on national preferences 
, 
putting inevitable pressure on the others, especially under the 
unsettled IMS. 
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The above evidence of a general lack of policy coordination 
appears to be compatible uith the analysis on the direction and 
size of the EEC currency movements, in sections 5.8.a. and 5.C.b., 
and the analysis on convertibility in section 5.D.a. Substantial 
divergencies occurred among the EEC currencies. Overshooting 
also occurred uhich frequently uas abrupt and significant, widen-
ing the differences among these currencies. 
This period also uitnessed an intensification of unilateral capital 
controls, retarding convertibility and so affecting the MU adversely., 
, 
t • 
J 
. , 
. 
, 
Controls also postponed the domestic corrective action required. 
Coordination, uhich uould render such controls unnecessary to 
defend exchange rates, did not occur. Convertibility is the 
, . 
principal factor for capital market integration. The degree of 
such integration is measured by both analysing interest rate 
levels and testing for the interest parity theorem. This approach 
avoids the problems of interpretation of the findings of the 
capital flou and capital reflow approaches. It concentrates on 
prices and involves a notion of efficiency. Houever, it says 
little about the objects of policy and contrasts the covariabil~ty 
view uhich takes into account the effects of different levels of 
risk among the international financial assets. Our analysis on 
interest rate levels indicates that the tendency for national 
interest rate differentials to narrow was not strong, irreversible 
or even sustained over the period. Furthermore, the testing of 
the interest parity theorem indicates that equilibrium was hindered 
due to factors such as capital controls, costs of buying knowledge 
and risks of acting with incomplete knouledge. The need for 
stable policies and coordination to reduce these obstacles is 
once more emphasised. 
Generally, the coordination strategy was not implemented 
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properly in Europe. Systematic studies never took place to suggest ~' 
'" 
the appropriate monetary targets whose implementation uould have 
,,' ~ , 
,I' 
'J, 
~ 
-292-
provided the proper test on the ability of this strategy to bring 
forth an MU. The lack of consistent policies created currency 
instability, divergences and controls. Three major currencies 
opted out and many realignments, some of them large, occurred as 
the coordination effort had been abandonned. Parities were 
adjusted a number of times and their durability was questioned. 
Lack of overall discipline expected by the MI venture and lack of 
progress on MI did not assist in the achievement of the major EEC 
goals, set out in the beginning of this chapter. 
The task to create an MU by 1980, based on the coordination 
strategy, failed in the absence of fulfilment of the required 
policy conditions. Given the causes of failure, one should insist 
that members attempt to establish all such conditions in the fut-
)' ~ 
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ure. However, the implementation of this strategy proved its :, . 
• I 
major disadvantage, which inhibits the successful implementation ,~ 
of these policies, and makes this strategy rather inadequate for 
the creation of an MU. This has to do with the fact that it 
implies discretion. It is expected that national authorities 
behave properly to enhance stability. This,however, is not cer-
tain. No mechanism exists to prevent them from violating the 
coordination agreement and diverge or opt out. There is no 
assurance that such agreement will be renewed and there is no 
automatic process by which this discretion is reduced over time. 
i.Q. lh~ £e~t£a!i~ati~n_S!r~t~g~,_8~ 
Some critics of the coordination strategy propose the creation 
of an MU, under a process based solely on monetary reform, by 
introducing a stable CPC which will gradually replace the inflat-
ing national currencies through market forces. This section aims, 
firstl~ to elaborate on the way this strategy functions and 
secondl~ to assess its ability to lead gradually towards an MU. 
The analysis in section 7.8.a. indicates that a CPC would 
circulate alongside the national currencies. Its stable purchasing 
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power would be secured in terms of a representative commodity 
basket, by adjusting the rate between the CPC and the national 
currencies in a crawling peg formula. This adjustment would be 
based on a weighted average of inflation rates expressed in 
national currencies. When it replaces all national currencies, 
its supply should be subject to a monetary rule which would 
guarantee its stable purchasing power. 
The supporters of this strategy emphasise an element of attractive-
ness which, they argue, exists in relation to the minimisation of 
the transitional costs to reduce inflation since the inflating 
national currencies would be replaced, rather than stabilised, 
by this new stable currency. 
While this approach would bring automaticity, the analysis 
in sections 7.8.d. and 7.C.a would suggest a number of major 
problems which make the outcome of this proposal uncertain. 
These refer to the possibility that the CPC may not succeed in 
replacing the national currencies, that it might not ensure 
gradualism or the absence of a stabilisation crisis, and that 
its stability would be questioned at the final stage. 
It can be argued that this scheme appears not to take into 
, . 
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account the analytical distinctions which are important for the .. 
competitive process in the currency markets, such as those bet-
ween monetary stability and predictability, interest bearing and 
non-interest bearing money, and the various functions of money. 
The CPC might then fail to replace the national currencies. This 
in turn would imply an end to the MU plans. 
Assuming that the CPC manages to come about, the question 
remains as to how quickly this would happen. Uncertainty exists 
and the answers vary from a swift spread to a gradual .. 
replacement 
of the national currencies. The probabil't f 1 Y 0 losing gradualism 
could prevent any attempts of using this strategy. 
If the implementation of this strategy results in a loss of 
" 
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gradualism, the stabilisation crisis may not be avoided. The 
absence of such a crisis is due to the fact that, with this new ~ 
unit, inflationary expectations are eliminated because the CPC 
has an absolute value guarantee which takes the form of an 
exchange rate guarantee vis-a-vis the national currencies. This 
procedure, however, can work only as long as the CPC remains a 
parallel currency. Therefors,for the CPC to make sense, its 
introduction has to be gradual. 
The danger of such a crisis exists even if gradualism can be 
assured, due to the differential speed with which the CPC will 
spread over the community and the uncertainty as to where in the 
community it will initially spread. If it spreaw firstly through 
the more open and central regions the crisis may not be avoided 
in the high inflation periphery. If on the other hand it spreads 
firstly through the periphery, the structural problems of this 
area could further deteriorate. The coordination strategy seems 
to be better placed, since it recognises the need for stabilisation 
and suggests measures to ease the stabilisation costs. 
The supporters of the centralisation strategy emphasise the 
difficulties in building an effective monetary rule. This strat-
egy, however, needs such a rule in the end. One cannot possibly 
escape from the relevant ,studies which are required to suggest 
the correct rule. Further, it is highly questionable whether 
the stable purchasing power of the CPC can always be guaranteed 
at the final stage. A permanent guidance on expectations might 
not result. The supporters of this strategy seem also to con-
tradict themselves with respect to the ability of a monetary rule 
to bring about a specified inflation rate. 
, . 
t., 
.... 
.... 
: 1-
L' 
" 
. 
.. 
To summarise, uncertainty exists concerning the CPC success, 
its swift or gradual spread and its pattern of penetration through-
out the Community. Undesirable implications could follow ranging 
I, 
from failure to create an MU to the loss of gradualism and the 
, 
;. 
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occurrence of a stabilisation crisis. Stability may not always 
, . 
(.' 
be ensured at the final stage. All these problems would seem to ) 
open up a credibility gap in relation to this strategy. While 
it could bring about the benefits expected, uncertainty about 
the final outcome, indeterminances and contradictions would tend 
to undermine any sympathy with regard to this approach for the 
EEC. 
9.E. The Need for the Coordination-cum-Centralisation 
------------------------
St!,ate,9,y 
The analysis in the previous two sections pointed to the 
doubts about the efficacy of the centralisation strategy (83) and 
the coordination strategy (A) in establishing an MU in the EEC. 
While the former strategy indicated the uncertainties about the 
possible outcome stemming from currency competition alone, the 
implementation of the coordination strategy in the EEC indicated 
firstly, the importance of its various policy conditions, and 
secondly the effect of the power of national discretion. It is 
this power which prevented the coordination policies from being 
properly implemented. If therefore a mechanism could be found 
wherein this power can be reduced over time, one would hope that 
the proper implementation of these policies would follow and that 
exchange rate stability would be enhanced. 
This is where the need arises to supplement the coordination 
process with a centralisation process, that is a coordination-
cum-centralisation strategy. Coordination implies that the pol-
icies which were specified in section 9.8. will be followed, while 
centralisation will aim to (a) ensure the proper implementation of 
these policies, and (b) bring forth monetary reform which is 
necessary in order to enhance further the EEC monetary control 
and stability, and assist in establishing the final stage of MI _ 
that is a complete MU. 
This section aims to set out the type of centralisation process 
", .... 
" 
I' 
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of this mixed strategy, that is to analyse the role of a central 
institution and the ways it will achieve the above aims. 
The analysis in section 7.A.b., 7.A.c. and 7.C.a. points to 
the need to create an autonomous central institution. Reserve 
pooling would take place in this institution, which would gain 
I .. ' 
control over national central bank assets. By giving it its own ~ , 
reserves and conferring to it the power to promote integration, 
the irreversibility of the MI venture would be emphasised. This 
institution would enhance automaticity through (a) the introduc-
tion of a CPC, (b) the supervision of the exchange rate arrange-
ments, and (c) the implementation of credit conditionality. 
The institution would launch and gradually spread the CPC. 
National central banks would be credited with CPC at this instit-
. . 
-- . 
..... 
ution agdnst the deposit of reserves. The CPC would be the crucial." 
feature of the proposed strategy, used as an official currency 
during the initial stages, while it would aim to become an inter-
national private money in the future. Under this strategy, a num-
ber of measures would be vigorously pursued to stimulate the 
establishment of the CPC as a private asset. The nominal exchange 
rate evolution of the EEC currencies would be linked in terms of 
the CPC. Maintenance and gradual reduction of the intra-EEC band 
would require coordination among the members. Also certain tech-
. ' 
'. 
. 
. 
nical arrangements would be needed in the transitory stages which 
would assist the CPC role as a private asset and would also ensure ~ 
its coexistence with the national currencies. When it becomes the 
international private money to be used by the EEC borrowers and 
lenders, it would assist in enhancing the EEC monetary control 
and it would act as the instrument for a unified EEC capital and 
money market. It would protect the intra-EEC relationships from 
potential instability emanating from abroad, and it would permit 
the EEC to exercise fleXibility against trnworld without disrupt-
ing' the stabili ty of the intra-EEC exchange rates. 
The 
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institution would control.the growth of the CPC and would be 
able to influence the monetary affairs of the EEC countries. It 
would enhance convergence by promoting coordinated policies 
conducive to stability throughout the EEC. 
The central institution would also supervise the exchange 
rate arrangements, including interventions. It would control 
the intra-EEC arrangements and those between the EEC and third 
countries, ensuring stability inside the EEC. Firstly, it would 
develop a mechanism to carry out timely exchange rate adjustments. 
It would also coordinate the intra-EEC exchange market inter-
ventions, based on an objective avaluation of the cyclical XB 
position of the members. Secondly, it would decide on the CPC 
" 
I . 
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float. This policy would, in certain periods, include interven-
tions. Reserve pooling to the institution would make such a task ,. 
feasible. Later, as the CPC becomes an intervention currency, it 
would also be used on such interventions against dollars or SORs. 
The institution would exchange part of its dollars against SORs, 
in an IMF substitution account, so that the MI venture would be 
compatible with world reform rather than being a sign of region-
a1ism. 
The shaping of external policies would be facilitated by the 
existence of this separate institution. It would also become the 
focus of agreement with third countries in shaping consistent 
policies conducive to world stability. 
Finally this institution would have the means to grant credits 
to members for their interventions and other XB problems, instead 
of the granting of credits by members bilaterally. Conditionality 
on these credits must be given a real content since it would be a 
vital means of promoting integration. Also, the institution by 
taking measures to absorb a share of the lending capacity of 
. . 
~ 
private markets and by preventing the excessive use of the exchange' 
rate instrument, would be expected to 
enhance the effectiveness 
_298- : ... f 
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of conditionality. 
: . 
All these measures uould tend gradually to reduce the pouer 
of national discretion uhich exists in the coordination strategy 
(A) and uould close part of the credibility gap. A difficulty 
remains,houever, namely that of establishing the monetary expan-
sion rates uhich uould guarantee exchange rate fixity. The 
institution uould provide the impetus and undertake studies to I I 
. I 
suggest the proper targets. Its policies uould ensure that mem- ~ 
bers move to fulfil these targets and adjust them further touards 
more stability. The question on the ability to ensure permanent 
exchange rate fixitYJ houever, uould appear to remain. At this 
point the centralisation element becomes important. As coord ina-
tion progresses" the institution .would also take measures to, penetrate 
the CPC use in the private sector. So, substantial CPC denomirated 
,debt would be issued to give the private financial institutions 
encouragement to accept deposits and make loans denominated in 
CPC. Hence the use of CPC uould increase. As the bulk of the 
EEC money uould be held in CPC at some point in the future, the 
CPC would eventually replace all national currencies. The EEC 
monetary policy would accordingly be fully determined by the 
central institution. 
To conclude, uhen moving to create an MU, members should adhere 
to the coordination-cum-centralisation strategy. They should 
accept the policy conditions of the coordination strategy (A3), 
pool reserves and transfer power to a central institution. This 
institution would make the coordination process effective. It 
uould also launch the CPC in order to assist MI and establish 
eventually a complete MU. 
9.F. Su~m~r~ ~n~ Iu!u£e_P£o~p~C!s 
Various reasons lead to the need for MI in the EEC. Progress 
on MI requires a strategy to be folloued. There are three main 
strategies: the coordination strategy, the coordination_cum_ 
.. 
• • 
·. 
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centralisation strategy and the centralisation strategy. The 
first two have implications for national policies. Evidence 
indicates that the coordination strategy is rather inadequate for 
the creation of an MU, while doubts remain over the effectiveness 
of the centralisation strategy. The coordination-cum-centralisatior 
strategy is better placed for such a task and it is the strategy 
suggested here for the creation of an MU in the EEC. It would 
" 
ensure gradualism and automaticity, which in turn would promote ~ 
economic convergence, monetary reform and eventually the creation 
of an MU. 
The current EMS arrangements, which are based on the coordina-
tion strategy, are far removed from this strategy, as the analysis 
in chapter eight indicates. Exchange rate unification was again 
'" 
.... ' 
put in front of major unresolved issues, making the MU prospects 
in Europe uncertain. Its early functioning suggests that it 
. -, 
remains vulnerable to the same problems as the Snake. It is true 
that decisions to enhance automaticity, through the future creation' 
of the EMF, have been taken, but no further progress has taken 
place on the creation of such a Fund. National differences exist 
concerning its role, so that decision-making may not prove easy 
in the future. 
One should not ignore the research which is necessary in var-
ious areas, even if in the future such a transfer of power is 
decided upon. It should deal with arrangements for a strong 
institutional structure to secure an autonomous EMF and to analyti-
cal work on the development of effective monetary and exchange 
rate policies. Analysis is also needed to establish the condi-
tions for granting credit. Once reserve pooling has taken place 
on a permanent basis, the EMF has also to decide on where to 
lodge the exchange risk and how to generate enough income to pay 
an adequate interest on ECUs. A partl'cul 1 dif i ar Y f cult assign-
ment is for ECUs issued against gold. The difficulties of a 
ii 
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substitution account, stemming from the acceptance of reserves 
from official holders, should not be ignored. 
Other major difficulties should be borne in mind. Members 
have promised to restructure the EEC budget. National differences 
exist and a disagreement on this issue could jeopardise the whole 
European union process. Experience shows that decisions are blocke~ 
because members link agreement on one issue with the settlement of 
another issue regarded to be of greater national importance. 
finally, the new EEC enlargement would worsen the intra-EEC eco-
nomic disparities, and the EEC goal for an MU could become an even 
more distant prospect. On the other hand it could strengthen 
demands for a broader range of EEC policies to help backward 
regions. 
The analysis in this study suggests that so far there is noth-
ing tangible to convince us that the EEC is on the MU path. Opti-
mistic signs exist, however, with respect to the MU, given that 
certain ideas have advanced, such as those of having a common hard 
currency and moving towards MI with the aid of a CPC. In addition, 
the proposals related to the EEC having its own reserve asset in 
a world of diversified reserves and giving the EEC the instrument 
of exchange rate policy have progressed. finally, the idea of 
having a distinct monetary institution to manage these functions 
and host the evolution towards MU has also made g~ound. The 
decisions on this last issue are crucial and will determine the 
irreversibility of the MI process. 
Such an irreversibility could be accomplished by means of the 
coordination-cum-centralisation strategy suggested in th~ work. 
, ' 
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APPENDIX I EUROPEAN MONETARY CHRONOLOGY 
April 24, 1972 to December 31, 19BO 
1972 
April 24 
May 1 
May 23 
June 23 
June 27 
October 10 
1973 
february 13 
March 19 
April 3 
June 29 
September 17 
November 16 
1974 
January 19 
1975 
July 10 
1976 
March 15 
October 17 
"Basle Agreement" - April 10, 1972 - enters into 
force. The Snake in the tunnel starts function-
ing. Participants: Belgium, luxembourg, france, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
The UK and Denmark join. 
Norway becomes associated. 
The UK withdraws. 
Denmark withdraws but stays in Smithsonian 
dollar limits. 
Denmark returns. 
Italy withdraws. 
Transition to joint floating. Interventions to 
maintain fixed margins against the dollar -
"tunnel" - are discontinued. Sweden becomes 
associated. The OM is revalued by 3 percent. 
The establishment of the European Monetary 
Cooperation fund is approved. 
The DM is revalued by 5.5 percent. 
The Dutch Guilder is revalued by 5 percent. 
The Norwegian Krone is revalued by 5 percent. 
france withdraws. 
france returns. 
france withdraws. 
Frankfurt realignment. The Danish Krone is 
) 
, .. 
, 
, '~J 
" ~ 
I, 
I 
I 
1977 
April 1 
August 28 
1978 
february 13 
October 17 
December 12 
1979 
March 13 
-, - - ,'- - 1 
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devalued by 6 percent. The Dutch Guilder and ~ .. 
the Belgian franc by 2 percent and the Norwegian 
and Swedish Krone by 3 percent. 
The Swedish Krone is devalued by 6 percent, the 
Danish and Norwegian Krone by 3 percent. 
Sweden withdraws. The Danish and Norwegian 
Krone are devalued by 5 percent. 
The Norwegian Krone is devalued by 8 percent. 
The DM is revalued by 4 percent, the Dutch 
Guilder and Belgian franc by 2 percent. 
Norway withdraws. 
The "Brussels Agreement ll - December 5, 1978 -
enters into force. The EMS starts functioning. 
Participants: Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
/" 
" 
france, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Ireland. . 
.. 
September 24 Realignment of EMS currencies. The OM 1s 
November 30 
revalued by 2 percent, the Danish Krone is 
devalued by 3 percent against other member 
currencies. A 5 percent movement between the 
OM and the Danish Krone results. 
The Danish Krone is devalued by 5 percent against 
the OM. 
/. 
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APPENDIX II FORMS OF ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS ~.,'. 
Empirical work on international capital movements concen-
trates on three basic approaches. The first is the traditional 
partial equilibrium approach, based on a portfolio selection 
model and focuses on relative yields on financial assets on 
national markets and the associated capital flows on these 
markets. Interest rates are viewed as exogeneously determined. 
They influence capital flows but the latter do not influence 
interest rates. It is assumed implicitly that sterilization 
policies are taken to counteract liquidity effects of the XB, 
see Hodjera (1976, p 598). The other two approaches incorporate 
financial flows in a macroeconomic model of an open economy. 
They consider the case of a small economy facing exogeneously 
given interest rates abroad while the domestic interest rate 
is treated as an endogenous variable within the system of 
equations, determining equilibrium in the asset and money mar-
kets, and satisfying the equilibrium constraint imposed by the 
X8. One approach uses the reduced form of such a model as a 
basis for regression analysis. The alternative structural 
approach estimates the behavioural equations specified in the 
model(1). Most of the contributions though were highly dis-
aggregated structural models and did not consider the estima-
tion of capital movements as the major objective. 
The partial equilibrium approach is based on stock adjust-
ment analysis in which domestic and foreign interest rates play 
a major role. The structural form is expressed by a set of 
two equations defining a demand for foreign assets by investors 
and traders at home and abroad, see Branson (1968), Bryant and 
Hendershott (1970), Branson and Willet (1972), Miller and 
Whitman (1972). Most capital flow studies are conducted in 
net capital flow terms obtained by netting out assets from 
.I 
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liabilities. Incorporating lagged adjustment and expressing ~ ~ 
them in a first difference form, yields a basic regression 
equation that is generally used in explaining international 
capital flows. 
A( Lt-At ) = (t = ~ +a, 6 I dt +~' AI dt _1 +a3AI {+a4 LU f t-1 +a5 CAt + 
a 6CA t _1+a 7DSP+u 
where Id is the domestic interest rate whose coefficient is 
" 
expected to be positive. Domestic and foreign interest rates ~ 
are taken as independent - exogenous - variables of each other 
and of capital movements(2). The simultaneous relationship 
between them would not be a problem if complete sterilization 
of capital flow effects on domestic money supply could be 
assumed. The high degree of financial integration among 
industrial countries makes such an assumption rather unreal-
istic, so that coefficients would tend to be biased downwards, 
indicating a response of capital flows to domestic and foreign 
financial variables. Under perfect capital mobility, no 
relationship exists between interest rate movements and capital 
" I 
• 
.. 
flows. High simultaneity between capital movements and dom- ., 
estic and foreign interest rates would render insignificant 
and wrong-sign interest rate coefficients. Kouri and Porter 
(1974, p 446) mention that this model rests on solid micro-
economic foundations and it cannot be easily used to analyse 
many macroeconomic problems of importance. They also point 
out that the MABP is in contrast to the literature on capital 
flows. In the latter case only indirect effects are taken 
into account. 
Empirical evidence has so far given mixed results, see 
Hodjera (1976, p 620). It also demonstrates that by concen-
I, 
, ' 
trating on the asset market, important influences that are not " 
contained in the asset demand and supply function are ignored, 
., ' 
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particularly the interdependence between domestic and foreign 
interest rates generated by the role of asset and money flows. 
Kouri and Porter (1974) derive a model of capital flows of 
a SOE under fixed exchange rates concerned with the mechanism 
through which equilibrium is obtained in the financial markets, 
synthesizing the stock equilibrium approach to capital flows 
developed by Branson and the MABP developed by Mundell and 
~ .. 
j 
" 
I 
.j 
Johnson(3). Capital flows are viewed as a mechanism by which 1 
a domestic excess demand for money is removed and consequently 
the key explanatory variables are changes in domestic monetary 
instruments and changes in foreign interest rates, since they 
will all affect money demand and supply. Simultaneity bias, 
occurring when domestic interest rates are treated as being 
exogeneously determined, is avoided. The estimation of a com-
plete structural set of equations although proper, could contain 
several difficulties, a major problem being the unavailability 
of reliable data on stocks, assets and interest rates needed 
for simultaneous estimation. Further, considerable constitu-
tional details Qould be needed to adopt the model to the pec-
uliarities of any given country. Also) as assets become perfect 
substitutes, individual structural equations cease to exist as 
well defined functions. The above considerations suggest the 
alternative approach of estimating a reduced form equation, 
providing critical information on most of the questions with 
which we are particularly interested. By assuming perfect 
capital mobility they derive the equation used for regression 
analysis, see chapter five, pp 155-7. They experimented with 
four countries - Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Australia _ for 
the sixties and early seventies, see also Kouri (1975), indic-
ating support,for the offset capital flow hypothesis, although 
it differs among these countries. Their results for Germany 
. 
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are in accordance with those of Herring and Marston (1977, 
pp 188-91) over a sixteen quarter period starting in 1964 I. 
HoweverJcoefficients are significantly different from -1, 
indicating also room for sterilization. 
Hodjera (1976) raises a number of statistical difficulties 
of this analysis. Perfect capital mobility cannot be assumed) 
reducing the usefulness of the reduced model. A complete model 
is needed to integrate a careful portfolio analysis of the 
financial sector, within a macroeconomic model that can make 
endogeneous general equilibrium adjustments of financial and 
monetary variables and can quantify government policy measures. 
Further evidence shows that)under perfect capital mobilit~ the 
relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates is 
much more complex, so that it could be that)even under perfect 
capital mobility)the coefficient indicating sterilization is 
different from -1. 
By dropping the SOE assumption, the foreign interest rate 
coefficient will be subject to a downward bias. ANDA is the 
key exogenous variable intended to show the response of cap-
ital flows to positive or negative excess supply of money. 
Kouri and Porter recognise that government intervention in 
domestic money supply in response to foreign exchange flows 
could create a simultaneous relationship between ~NDA and 
capital flows as dependent variables. In order to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of capital flows they adopt as a key assump-
tion)a neutral monetary policy with respect to the XB. Howeve; 
they recognise that this assumption may not be satisfied and 
authorities try to adjust ~NDA at times so as to offset liquid-
ity effects of the external sector. Michaely (1971) provides 
evidence of partial sterilization among industrial countries 
for the 1950-66 period., It is also possible for authorities 
, 
,. ' 
' .... 
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1 
to assign monetary policy to the XB target. The central bank ,I-
J 
would increase rather than decrease ~NDA in response to capital 
floys. These policies give rise to a possible bias of OLS 
estimates. In the first case, under perfect world financial 
integration without sterilization, domestically caused MB 
changes will be offset, other things being equal, by an oppos-
ite change of equal size in the net foreign assets. However, 
with a low integration so as to permit authorities to insulate 
the MB from foreign influences, a change in NFA of the central 
bank caused by capital flows would immediately be offset by a 
change of the same size in NDA, leaving MB unchanged. In both 
cases of non-sterilization with perfect capital mobility and 
the case of complete sterilization} the ~NDA coefficient will 
" 
I 
. i 
. 
• 
be equal to -1, being unable to distinguish between these two ~ 
diametrically opposed situations. Sterilization policies 
reflect the authorities' reaction in response to changes in 
the foreign MB component, whereas offsetting capital flows are 
initiated by private investors in response to policy induced 
in domestic monetary policy. Both possibilities give rise to 
negative correlation between the domestic and foreign MB com-
ponent. Sterilization behaviour becomes difficult to distin-
guish empirically. The inherent simultaneity between the two 
phenomena has led to confusion in the empirical literature. 
In the case of partial sterilization and perfect capital 
mobility the ANDA coefficient has an upward bias - in absolute 
terms - that is directly related to the degree of capital flow 
sterilization. In the second case NFA changes will be followed 
by an accomodating change in the total money supply in the same 
direction aimed at restoring either XE or the original level of 
reserves. The relationship between C and ~NDA will be very 
weak as will be the explanatory power of other exogeneous 
" 
~ 
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variables that had triggered the original flou of capital. 
The ~NDA coefficient will be biased towards zero. All this 
controversy in the literature arose in response to an analysis on 
German money supply by Willms (1971) who reported a strong 
negative correlation between the flou of foreign exchange 
reserves and ~NDA)and interpreted it as a result of the 
Bundesbank sterilizing most of the impact of reserves on the 
MS. Porter (1972) howeve~noted that Willms' results were 
equally compatible uith the offsetting capital flow hypothesis, 
presenting evidence of strong capital flow response to reserve 
requirement changes)and concluded that the offset interpret-
ation of Willms' results uas more plausible. Kouri and Porter 
(1974) suggest that as long as the capital flow equation is 
uell specified and discretionary changes in monetary policy 
dominate central bank policy, the bias is likely to be small. 
It is important though to include dummy variables to capture 
large speculative capital flows such as the ones which occurred 
in Germany. Otherwise the sterilization that occurred in 
Germany and was reflected in 6NDA would seriously bias the off-
set coefficient towards -1. 
If the reaction function of the authorities is not properly 
specified, so that simultaneity remains, little confidence can 
be attached to some key coefficients in the regression equation 
based on the reduced equation. The offset coefficient may be 
biased and the direction of the bias is not clear. Argy and 
Kouri (1974) attempted to solve this controversy by incorpor-
ating a reaction function, see chapter five, p159. They obtain 
results confirming earlier findings, although the sterilization 
results for Italy do not allou for definite conclusions. They 
note though,that these results should be interpreted with 
caution since the sterilization equations are at best a rough 
. -
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approximation of central bank behaviour. Hodjera (1976) com-
pared the capital flow equation with the 2SLS form and did not 
come up with significant changes in the case of france. It 
suggests also that there does not seem to be a simultaneous 
relationship between ANDA and C agreeing with the view of the 
importance of discretionary policies. 
Herring and Marston (1977, pp 158-61) have questioned the 
Argy-Kouri results for Germany. They believe that there was 
a serious mis-specification in the reaction function since 
discount borrowing was omitted on the ANDA variable. Michaely's 
study indicated that even under a calm period, the MB was not 
allowed to contract by the cummulative amount of the XB 
deficit. Central banks consistently lend to commercial banks 
and the Treasury in an amount sufficient to partially sterilize 
the contraction on M8 that could otherwise have occurred. In 
contrast to USA, European central banks rely heavily on dis-
count facilities provided by their central banks. In these 
countries, except the UK, little relevance is placed on open 
market operations for MB changes in part because of the limited 
size and distribution of government marketable debt. Also 
authorities, notably for Germany, make much greater use of 
shifts in Federal and State government balance between the 
central bank and private banks, than do their US counterparts. 
The Bundesbank,in addition,have occasionally used swap opera-
tions in the forward exchange market. When European commercial 
banks experience reserve losses out of XB deficits they tend 
to increase their discounting with their central banks, even 
if the discount rate has been raised. Instead of open market 
operations by the central bank that compensate for the effects 
of reserve losses on the domestic MS, it is external deficit 
that brings them to the discount window. The increased cost 
, I 
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of obtaining reserves in this way, explains why only partial 
instead of full sterilization normally occurs. This practice 
implies a sUbstantial negative covariance between the change 
in borrowed reserves and the change in foreign exchange res-
erves. It is likely that when borrowing is excluded from the 
equation the change in foreign exchange reserves will tend to 
assume an additional role as proxy for borrowing thus biasing 
the sterilization coefficient towards zero. Herring and Marston 
(1977, pp 109-62) in their structural model for Germany's 
monetary system develop the reaction function by taking into 
account simultaneity between changes in monetary policy and 
changes in foreign exchange reserves by estimating their func-
tion by means of 2SLS, like Argy and Kouri, and by computing 
i 
, 1 
", 
quarterly changes in the average reserve requirements. Allow- ~ 
ing for discount borrowing they obtain results corresponding 
to those of Willm~(Note that Willms did take into account 
changes in borrowed reserves in his estimates of the steril-
ization coefficient). They indicate that the Bundesbank ster-
ilized more than 90 percent of reserve flows and that 
sterilization policy was the same for both inflows and out-
flows,both large and small. German authorities retained a 
substantial amount of monetary policy control despite a high 
degree of capital mobility. Their results are in striking 
contrast with most of the literature on this subject for the 
period 1960-71. 
De Grauwe (1975), (1976~, (1977) on the other hand, doubts 
the validity of empirical evidence for both offsetting capital 
and sterilization hypothesis. He shows that failure to consider 
the individual countri~' capital equation in the framework of 
a multicountry model, will underestimate the true offset 
coefficient and thus the offsetting capital flows. In a multi-
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country framework the net capital flow of a single country, 
apart from the domestic MB component,depends also upon changes 
in such components of the MB of all countries in the system, 
since any capital outflow (inflow) of a country must appear 
as an inflow (outflow) in some or all other countries. Since 
the change in the domestic MB component of a foreign central 
bank will have an opposite effect on a country's capital flow 
from a change in the same direction of the domestic MB compon-
ent of its own central bank, it can be shown that the offset 
coefficient is biased towards zero. Further, in the case of 
use of sterilization operations the necessary conditions of 
stability of a country's capital flows depend not only on the 
country's own use of sterilization policies but also on the 
extent of sterilization policy used by all the countries of 
the system. The use of sterilization by one country reduces 
the possibility of the other countries using sterilization 
without destabilising capital flows. Assuming that the Herring 
and Marston results conform to the facts, this is achieved at 
the expense of either use of sterilization policies of other 
countries or the stability of the system. German independence 
is achieved at the expense of independent monetary policy of 
other, particularly European, countries. In the latter case 
the system becomes unstable and could eventually be replaced 
by a more flexible one. 
Ue return now to the specification of the reaction func-
tion. Its complexity was emphasised above. Monetary measures 
must be looked at within the whole set of instruments oriented 
towards various targets of the overall economic policy of the 
government. The use of monetary policy instruments differs 
from one country to another. rurther,it is not specifically 
employed towards a specific target in any economy. There is 
,'. 
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often a degree of regularity in changing targets, assigning 
it to domestic objectives during periods of relative strength 
or alternatively to bring a high degree of world interest rate 
harmonisation when the country is faced with foreign exchange 
loss. A strong currency economy on the other hand may do the 
opposite in pairing of targets and monetary instruments. Mon-
etary policy may be used to discourage inflows during periods 
of XB strength and may sterilize in periods of relative XB 
weakness. Sterilization may also depend on policy instruments 
available. A degree of interest rate harmonisation can be 
maintained by altering the fiscal/monetary mix over the cycle. 
But again, this mix could be asymmetrical depending on whether 
the country in question has a weak or strong currency. 
Finally, one should not ignore the problem of the proper 
specification of exchange rate speculation. Models have been 
unable to incorporate exchange rate expectations that determine 
speculative behaviour, explaining both the determination of 
forward exchange rates and destabilising speculation based on 
parity change expectations. Such formation of expectations 
under fixed exchange rates with an intervention band is diffi-
cult to formulate in a model having empirical applicability. 
The inability to handle speculative forces properly could be 
a crucial flaw in specifying the regression equation and may 
exceed the difficulties created by biases in both approaches, 
see Hodjera (1976, pp 608-9). 
, 
I 
-, 
" , 
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APPENDIX III OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES 
Due to lack of quarterly data on income, regressions were 
run for Belgium, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, with 
the GDP as the dependent variable and two leading indicators, 
available on quarterly basis, namely the value of retail 
sales (L) and the value of industrial production (0), as indep-
endent variables. Regressions were run on annual figures. The 
estimated coefficients with the use of quarterly data on Land 
o were used to obtain quarterly GOP data. In the case of 
Germany national income data were used (IFS). 
Regression equations for the rest of the countries for the 
1972-78 period are: 
R2 F SE DW 
F GOP = -29B.60 + 7.36' L + 3.85 0 0.999 2277.0 292.4 2.171 
(-7.36) (5.67) (4.38) 
N GDP = -2.033 + 0.86 L + 0.47 Q 0.999 2336.4 4.6 2.353 
(-5.47) (8.60) (4.67) 
B GOP = -83.99 + 8.01 l + 5.69 Q 0.997 1073.7 1218.6 
(-1.33) (3.91 ) (2.41) 
o GOP = -24.38 + 0.15 L + 1.26 0 0.992 446.9 30.5 
(-2.84) (0.62) (5.37) 
Due to lack of data on the rate of capacity utilization 
for Denmark the rate of inflation was used as the domestic 
target of monetary policy. 
1 .819 
1.669 
The foreign interest rate is represented by the three-month 
Eurodollar rate (IFS). 
Data for the econometric analysis were selected from: IFS, 
Balance of Payments Yearbook, OECO main economic indicators, 
Monthly Reports of the Bundesbank, Wharton School of Finance 
and Commerce - Economic Research Unit - Eurostat Monthly 
Statistic Bulletin. 
~, 
NOTES 
Chapter One 
------
1. A common currency, to replace national currencies would 
give the same results. Its existence though is more preferable 
as it will be seen in the following parts. 
2. Due to the adjustment mechanism, external disequilibrium 
is difficult to maintain. The whole process is accelerated 
through rising capital mobility. Authorities cannot for a 
long time keep money supply at a different level from the one 
that brings XE. 
3. Parkin here accounts for different inflation rates, but 
Ji 
.. 
..... 
, 
. 
. ,'1 
~ I 
1 
not for the persistence of differences in inflation rates. He '1 
suggests in another paper, Parkin (1977), that one way of over-
coming this problem is by allowing explicitly for relative price 
changes between countries. So, the general level of prices 
relative to the price of tradeables - and their rates of change -
will depend on the difference between productivity, and their 
rates of change, in the two sectors. The faster the productivity 
growth in tradeables relative to non-tradeables, the faster the 
country's rate of inflation relative to the rate of inflation 
of tradeable prices. The reason for this result is that a 
faster productivity growth rate for tradeables implies higher 
wages everywhere and hence higher costs and therefore higher 
prices in the competitive non-tradeables sector. For an SOE 
therefore, its inflation rate is determined as that world 
determined rate of inflation of tradeables prices plus an 
adjustment which picks up the effect of that country's relative 
price movements. 
4. See Kouri (1975), Porter (1972), Kouri and Porter (1974), 
Argy and Kouri (1974), Brunner (1973), (1974). The table below 
presents the extent to which the current account is counter 
balanced by the capital account between 1972 and 1978 _ 
, I 
. , 
/', 
. ~
-.JI...J-
cumulative - in the EEC. 
G F It UK N BLEU 0 Ir 
14.5 90.0 38.0 67.4 83.6 86.7 57.0 26.6 
Source: constructed on basis of data found on the Balance of 
Payments Yearbook - Net Flows. 
Results vary. A significant degree of offsetting takes place 
in most countries. Not so for the case of Germany, whose huge 
current account surpluses were not offset by capital outflows. 
This evidence for Germany is opposite to that suggested by 
econometric analysis for the sixties. 
% 
5. Speculative capital flows should be mentioned. If the 
reserve currency country increases its inflation rate, incurring 
a current account deficit, and other countries attempt to main-
tain lower inflation rates, it will soon become obvious to 
speculators that such a conflict can only. be solved by exchange 
rate adjustment. Capital flows to surplus countries, reducing 
interest rates and rising money supply. It is the speedy 
response of speculators that could be the most effective 
equaliser of inflation rates as long as fixed exchange rates 
are adhered to. 
6. See Lutz (1972), Triffin (1972), Scitovski (1972), 
Corden (1972), Arndt (1973), Lundberg (1972). 
Chapter Two 
- - --
1. Due to lack ~ complete effectiveness of automatic adjustment. 
2. The Benelux case was raised by the participants at the EMS 
Conference, Reading University, July, 12, 1979. 
3. That together with only transitory costs of adjustment 
policies indicates that a free market monetarist might not in 
all cases advocate for freely floating exchange rates. See also 
Crockett (1977) and Johnson and Ball (1980, pp 9-12). 
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~. We test the statistic (API-b) using values of the t 
distribution. 
S. The explanation would have to do ~ith product diversific-
ation increasing intra-industry rather than inter industry 
specialisation in production. Balas sa (1975) agrees also. 
6 •.. The list of fundamental economic criteria may never be 
complete, if one is to look at the fact that all forces making 
for international shifts in demand and supply are relevant. 
7. SOEs prefer fixed exchange rates due to high trade 
dependence e.g. Luxembourg ~ith Belgium, the Benelux and 
Ireland with the UK. Ireland's decision to join EMS while 
the UK did not, breaking the MU bet~een the t~o countries, 
implied significant costs for Ireland at a moment when the 
UK is its most important trade partner, accounting for almost 
SO percent of its trade. Implications are analysed in chapter 
eight. 
8 • fratianni and Christie (1978) mention the obstacles to 
trade integration, despite the creation of the customs union 
in 196B, mainly in the form of non tariff barriers. There is 
a general resistance on harmonisation. The approach used is 
based on the destination principle ~hile they propose the 
alternative approach of the origin principle, to minimise 
potential disturbances ~hen moving to~ards harmonisation and 
more appropriate for a gradualistic approach to MU. 
9 • An examination of the Eurocurrency system, various theories 
to analyse its operation and the factors ~hich have influenced 
its grouth is provided by McKenzie (1976). See also articles 
on the importance of this market by Johnson and Ball (19BO) and 
frydl (1980). 
10. See Magnifico (1973, pp 137-198). 
11. See Crockett (1977, pp 26-7, 39) on what is termed US 
-~I (-
"benign neglect" policy. 
12. For further ~nalysis on this point see chapter six. 
13. An interesting comment doubting such destabilisation due 
to Euromarket importance is provided by frydl (1980, pp 11-20). 
14. See Johnson and Ball (1980, pp 9.12). 
15. Comparisons may not be meaningful due to the different 
number of countries in each system (72 versus 9). But it 
could suggest and reinforce the impression on the downward 
bias of Hickman's multipliers. 
16. Helliwell (1974) has carried such a complete study for 
the US and Canada demonstrating the channels through which 
policies are transmitted from one country to the other. He 
runs also simulation experiments on monetary interdependence, 
see Helliuell and Maxuell (1974). The strong effect of US 
policies is evident on all these simulations. In another 
study - Helliwell and McRae (1977) - debt, fiscal and monetary 
policies are especially analysed. 
17. Under flexible exchange rates with systematic intervention, 
the same broad results apply. foreign interest rate effects 
are reduced while more adjustment burden is on exchange rates 
and domestic interest rates. 
Chap.ter Three 
-------
1. Mundell (1962), (1968), H. G. Johnson (1967), Meade (1951), 
(1978), Carden (1960), (1977), Machlup (1958), Whitman (1970), 
Suoboda and Dornbusch (1969), Tinbergen (1952). 
2. Meade uas interested in ex ante relations and distinguished 
autonomous from accommodating transactions, a division based 
on motivations. This concept has remained although the concept 
of XE has changed over the years. According to the MABP, 
capital flows are included above the line and in contrast to 
earlier versions ~hich uere explicitly flow models, this is a 
-t-II·\,.J-
stock-flow model, dealing not only with a flow deficit but 
also a stock-flow deficit. XE in our analysis is given by 
the form u I a: B == T + K = 0, w her e B = 0 is the X B , Tis the 
current balance, K is the net capital inflow. 
T, K and hence B are treated as ex ante variables. 
3. Under a stable Phillips curve the solution is that of U 
A* * * and P. U is associated with an income level Y in IS-LM 
analysis. Various studies indicate that the Phillips curve 
has not been stable since 1967. Furthe~monetarists argue 
that in the long-run no such a trade-off exists. If the 
* * 
* 
vertical Phillips curve is correct, U and Yare associated 
with the short-run IB position, whereas Un and yn are associated 
n 
with the long-run one, where U denoted the natural rate of 
unemployment and yn the income level associated with it. 
4. It would be rather undesirable for this situation to con-
tinue for ever. It may not be continued though, because, 
no single region is likely to be in permanent imbalance, 
and in case policy coordination has taken place 
the regions would not be expected to be in different XB 
situations, unless there are reasons different in nature. 
5. On the XB, an MU may be in disequilibrium with A and still 
function s~ccessfully. Further, the common external policy 
implemented, could affect the XBMU • Also according to the 
MABP changes in the reserve position of both A and MU would be 
expected so that XE wou~ be established in the long-run. This 
is compatible with the concept of global symmetry. XBMU would 
be one of XE in the long-run. 
6. The description of an eoonomic union very much depends on 
prevalent political thinking and the type of economies to be 
included in it. For mixed economies there would be problems 
concerning the degree of government intervention and central-
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isation to be achieved. An economic union would be the end 
stage of the economic integration process where policy decision 
making about economic objectives are taken at the central 
level as opposed to regional. In the EEC context, apart from 
monetary and fiscal policy there could be the possibility of 
an incomes policy - as it will be seen below - as well as that 
of a regional policy, where it is necessary, see Magnifico and 
Williamson (1973, p 200), Tsoukalis (1976, p 32). 
7. One should distinguish between compatibility of policies 
and objectives which are required for a successful MU and 
deteDmining the actual level of these objectives. 
8. In fact under an economic union our three country model is 
reduced to a two country model, A and (S+C), where both groups 
are using expenditure switching and adjusting policies to 
achieve XB and lB. The degree of exchange rate flexibility 
and the need to avoid irresponsible policies for each group 
should be kept in mind. 
9. An indirect effect could take place though, assuming 
freedom in goods movement around the world, in the kind of 
increase or decrease of intra-union trade depending on the 
downward or upward movement of exchange rate variation of the 
union members. 
10. Another problem that would have to be solved when moving 
to form an MU is that of determining the appropriate parities 
among member countries. 
11. The MABP is based on two empirical propositions. A stable 
demand for money and that the price of traded goods, for an 
50E, is exogeneously determined. The analysis of this dynamic 
approach and its implications are thoroughly analysed in 
J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson (1970), (1978), Johnson (1956), 
(1913), (1911), J. A. Frenkel (1976), IMF (1977). Also 
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the articles Currie (1976) and Hahn (1977) among others. 
12. Devaluation is treated as a sUbstitute for domestic credit 
expansion according to the MABP. 
13. Taking also into account other factors. Parkin (1977) 
demonstrates that experience from the sixties indicates the 
importance of taking into account productivity of tradeables 
when setting DeE targets among countries if external imbalances 
are to be avoided. 
14. Thygesen's article refers to the DPTICA findings. Other 
articles on the OPTICA group and their proposals are by 
Thygesen (1977), Basevi (1977), Basevi and de Grauwe (1978), 
Yperselle (1978), Nienhans (1978). Further supporting evidence 
on ppp is provided by the CLARE group (1979). See also 
Machlup (1979), Lamfalussi (1979), Leipold (1979). 
15. There could be a problem with tariffs on third-country 
trade even in the presence of a common external tariff policy 
if trade dependence on third countries differs among MU members. 
16. See Lamfalussi (1979), Leipold (1979), Yperselle (1978), 
Green paper (1979), Katseli-Papaefstratiow (1980), IMF survey 
(1980) and Goldstein and Young (1979). 
17. See Tobin (1969), Branson (1972), (1976), Kouri (1976) 
and Dornbusch (1976). 
18. The behaviour of sterling in 1979 could serve as an 
example where despite forecasts suggesting currency depreciation 
given the unfavourable economic conditions, its buoyancy since 
Spring 1979 can largely be traced to North Sea oil at a 
t~me of political uncertainty in the middle East and uncertainty 
about the price and availability of oil. Such4rise was combined 
though with high nominal interest rates at home resulting from 
tight monetary policy, a high PSBR, a world of large capital 
flows and erratic US monetary policy. Elimination of 
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uncertainties concerning oil and the decision to reduce PSBR, 
reducing interest rates - although it could be difficult in a 
world of interest rate rises - could focus attention on 
traditional determinants of currencies like money supply, 
inflation and the XB. Sterling could depreciate, especially 
now in the absence of exchange controls. Of course even that 
might not happen if, like in 1974, sterling becomes attractive 
to OPEC surpluses or if interest rate decline is gradual, or 
even if they decline they could have perverse effects by 
attracting funds into gilt edged stock, in the hope of capital 
gains. Also oil revenues in the long-run re9uce money supply, 
by reducing PSBR, and hence inflation. 
19. Other arguments on the opposite side argue for potential 
instability out of such diversification. 
20. The 1972 arrangements in the EEC involved relationships 
with each other which implies keeping up with the best perform-
ances,assuming that the latter do not reflate to ease adjustment 
costs of less successful members. Certain governments of the 
major participants were not ready to submit to such costs. 
further, the ~lternative to achieve a common unemployment level 
and solve XB problems arising from inflation differentials 
through transfers could create political problems if such 
uillingness is lacking among the members. 
21. Hines's results are not accepted by many economists. Nor 
are his critics confined to the ranks of monetarists, see 
Trevithick (1977, p 94). 
22. Wiles's view (1973) of socio-political forces, trade union 
militancy and the spilling over of the criterion of compatibility 
to encompass inter-country uage rivalry. 
23. See Parkin and Zis (197~), Laidler and Nobay (1974), 
Trevithick and Mulvay (1975), Gray, Parkin and Summer (1975), 
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Cross and Laidler (1974), Perry (1975), Phelps (1967), 
Spinelly (1976), Parkin, Summer, Ward (1975). 
24. External factors involve both cost-push and monetary 
factors. In the concept of international cooperation the 
latter could be avoided although the former could still create 
inflationary pressures. 
25. Timing evidence and regression analysis is provided, see 
friedman (1961), friedman and Schwartz (1963), C~gan (1965), 
Andersen and Jordan (1968), Goodhart and Crockett (1970), 
Walters (1966), Artis and Nobay (1969), friedman and Meiselman 
(1963), Edge (1967), Ando and Modigliani (1965), Barett and 
Walters (1966). 
26. Although the fact that the given economy is open should 
be taken into account. 
27. Although with respect to the Snake members, the need to 
intervene in the fEM and the non-sterilization need of such 
intervention may necessitate monetary target overshooting. 
28. Additional evidence for the UK indicates that monetary 
expansion has now a much smaller effect on unemployment and 
feeds more quickly into inflation rates, see financial Times, 
October, 22, 1979, aanuary, 14, 1980, July, 31, 1980. 
29. While such consideration could even make the MU case 
unfavourable, it should be realised that the long-run need to 
reduce high inflation rates is inescapable whether a country 
joins an MU or not. 
30. See chapter seven. 
Chapter four 
------
1. Apart from political considerations i.e. EMU is a step towards 
political unity. 
2. More serious concern with such aggregates was taken in 1976, 
when the government adopted a range for sterling M3 - cash and 
bank current and seven day deposit accounts. 
3. 
see 
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Other major structural changes should be taken into account, 
foot et al (1979), throwing the adjustment burden into the 
financial markets. Authorities would then have the delicate 
task of weighting between a sufficient degree of rigidity of 
the MB system and the need to aleviate the public's uncertainty. 
On the MB debate in the UK see also, Midland Bank Review (1980a, 
pp 3-6), (1980b, pp 22-5), Rose (1979), (1980), Davies (1980~. 
4. In March 20, 1980 it was officially recognised that the 
SSDS and the reserve asset ratio had come to the end of their 
useful life for monetary control, see Green paper (1980). A 
six month consultation period was allowed lending emphasis on 
cash requirements and special deposit schemes, MB control was 
not favoured, firstly because of lack of a stable link between 
MB and M3 and secondly because the authorities did not want to 
abolish the lender of last resort of the Bank. They maintained 
that in the UK no single definition was sufficient and also 
explained why M3 should be used as a target to influence 
expectations, opting at the same time for an indicator system, 
where automatic MLR changes would take place when M3 is off 
the range. It would reduce the bias towards delay although 
political and technical reasons would still exist to create 
delays. The question still was on how interest rate decisions 
are made, although there would be greater automaticity compared 
to the previous system where the onus was placed on those who 
wanted to intervene. A stronger presumption of economic 
response might help confidence. In this system authorities 
would have to justify delaying a change rather than in the 
present discretionary system where the presumption is that the 
authorities must justify making a change. Short-term interest 
rates would then be the sole effective partner of fiscal policy 
to control M3. 
. \ 
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5. Given n instruments, arbitrary values can only be .assigned to 
n-1 of them. 
6. See Whitman (1975), Grubel (1976). Here the government 
constraint becomes: 
G + P + T = dB + dH + dR 
The deficit can also be financed by the disposal of foreign 
exchange reserves, besides the mechanism for a closed economy. 
7~ See also'Triffin (1971) and Lutz (1972). Others-
Sci tovskY1 (1972), Lundberg (1972) - support harmonisation to 
avoid fiscal policies being carried out ambitiously and so 
creating XB problems. 
8. The dispute on the strategy to be followed led to the 
creation of the Werner group. It was the division between 
"monetarists" and "economists". While both accepted the 
coordination need, the former asserted that effective coordin-
ation could be forced by an early exchange rate margin narrow-
ing. "Economists" argued that under this approach an MU could 
be reached de facto, without effective coordination having been 
achieved at the end where resource transfers take place to 
deficit members without the latter taking any corrective 
measures. Monetary arrangements should wait until coordination 
started proving itself successful. 
9. The 1970-2 dollar crisis apart from being a cause, served 
also as an immediate motive towards the new EEC exchange rate 
arrangement at that particular time. 
10. That could at times imply sharp interest rate changes to 
preserve orderly market conditions while at times of other 
domestic liquidity disturbances it may warrant holding interest 
rates stable. The effect on money supply control due to these 
sharp changes, depends on whether the situation is reversible. 
Interest rate changes could be compatible with such control, 
. : 
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although at times- could risk interest rate and money stock 
variability. Institutional and political factors may inhibit 
interest rate adjustment, creating a large source of exchange 
rate disturbance. Large institutional shifts of deposits and 
borrowing take place through the banking sector and the 
behaviour of rates in do~~stic markets relative to those in 
international markets could be an influence of considerable 
importance. Forward exchange rates seem to adjust mainly to 
deposit rates, so that any tendency of the latter to vary 
relative to those in international markets gives rise only to 
short-lived incentives to move funds. Bank lending rates on 
the other hand are often less flexible and differences may 
arise even on a covered basis, which may lead to persistent 
one way flows with significant implications on both exchange 
rates and monetary control. In trying to resolve conflicts 
between targets and interest rates there may be considerable 
scope in manipulating the structure of rates. As it will be 
seen in 1977 when Snake strains developed some members were 
ready to push up short-term rates to remarkably high levels 
in defence of their parities. France kept bank lending rates 
at fairly low levels for domestic reasons while money market 
rates adjusted upwards on external grounds. 
11. Agreement on monetary growth for one member and obliging 
others to maintain fixed exchange rates with it by adjusting 
their policies would be the easiest way. Implications of such 
a dominant role are analysed below. 
12. It should be mentioned that even if countries want to 
sterilize, it is sometimes self-defeating for various reasons, 
see Argy and Kouri (1974, p 221). 
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13. The Balance Sheet of a National Central Bank 
Liabilities Assets 
(d) Coin and currency held (a) Government securities 
by the Public from OMO 
(e) Reserves of Commercial (b) Net foreign exchange 
banks reserves 
MB=(d)+(e)=O(=(a)+(c»+R(=(b» (c) Discounts (Loans) to 
commercial banks 
14. However given the reasons for which the SOR failed to become 
a major reserve currency - see Crockett (1977, pp 121-31) - and the 
dollar prevailed, it was felt that the USA would remain the most 
important reserve currency qountry. Accepting that an asymmetry 
existed. between the US and the European financial systems _ see 
Cooper (1972, p 327) - a h,ighlY-80phiaticated capit~l m~ket in 
Europe would be needed for a real change to be brought about. 
15. The provision to intervene in EEC currencies had perhaps 
also the role of limiting the possibility of a member currency 
becoming a major intervention medium. However the possibility 
of a dominant currency under fixed exchange rates exists. 
16. The possibility existed in fact for the Snake agreement 
to undermine the dollar e.g. a problem on the DM/Fr Fr cross 
rate could lead people to sell dollars for OMs. 
17. All implications should be considered at the background of 
exchange rate developments in the year of agreement. All members 
had made full use of the permitted exchange rate flexibility 
where EEC currencies did not show any tendency to move as a 
group towards the dollar. Also the significance of the 
implications for each member and the EEC as a whole should 
be distinguished. 
18. "Economists" considered it as a disadvantage at such an 
," 
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early coordination stage. "Monetarists" suggested though that 
it would be another driving force for more effective coordina-
tion. 
19. The effects of such interest rate coordination could be 
important e.g. tight monetary policy in Germany could oblige 
others to adopt the same policy which may be undesirable at 
least for some of them. 
20. For "monetarists" this was the start of a lessened depend-
ence on the dollar both as a reserve and vehicle currency. 
21. Many of the difficulties of the BWS apply to the Snake, in 
the absence of sufficient coordination, like those of inter-
vention and currency borrowing by weak countries from strong 
ones. The EEC arrangements turned to be far from solid. The 
Snake ~oo included a policy of potential borrower subsidisation. 
However, the jpint float, since March 1973, could be an important 
safety valve. 
22. The problem could be mitigated only to the extent that a 
member country could prove more successful to its partners' 
representations than the US proved to be. 
23. See also Bergsten, Halm, Machlup and Roosa, (Eds), (1970) on 
the need for exchange rate flexibility. 
24. The amount of credit facilities is important. A low amount 
could push further coordination as members do not have adequate 
finance to defend their parities. 
25. Members may also be willing to accept new commitments for 
policy coordination in other areas. It should be easier to 
reach agreement on policy objectives and instruments. 
26. Regional problems were also present in other countries, 
see Swan (1975, pp 167-8). New structural problems were being 
created due to world competition endangering traditional 
industries. The Rome Treaty took regional considerations into 
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account - Articles 80, 92, 39. The European Investment Bank 
was set up under the Articles 129, 130, specifically charged 
with regional development. Article 226 allowed members to take 
transitional measures incompatible with other parts of the 
Treaty, to solve difficulties which seriously impair the 
economic situation of a region. 
Chapter Five 
------
1. See footnote No. 16 of chapter three. Also see Schadler 
(1977), 8ilson (1978~, (1979), lMF Annual Aeport (1977), (1979) 
and de Grauwe and Peeters (1978). 
2. A covered lRD between two countries would require to deduct 
from the uncovered lRD the forward premium or add the forward 
discount, say on the OM if that referred to UK and Germany. 
Uncovered lADs will approximate to the forward premium or dis-
count obtaining between the two exchange rates, (cost of forward 
cover), so that profitable arbitrage operations will be avoided, 
in the absence of exchange controls. 
3. Financial Times, March 27, 1980. 
4. See Porter (1972), Kouri and Porter (1974), Kouri (1975), 
Argy and Kouri (1974), Hodjera (1976), Herring and Marston (1971). 
5. The effect of using dollar intervention can be neutralised 
only if France intervenes by selling its dollar reserves to buy 
FrFr, putting back into the system the dollars taken out by 
Germany and so the rise in the OM supply is matched by a fall 
in the FrFr supply. The circle of FEM intervention is com-
pleted. The net supply of dollars is unaffected as is the 
weighted exchange rate of the Snake currencies against the 
dollar. It is clearly difficult in practice to ensure that 
dollar interventions cancel each other out in the Snake. It 
is also not known to what extent the net effect of Snake inter-
ventions is internal on the values of the Snake currencies 
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relative to each other or external, i.e. their values against 
the dollar. 
6. Unfortunately the insignificance of the interest rate 
variable does not allow us to see the XB fluctuation, if the 
Bundesbank wanted to maintain the domestic interest rate fixed, 
in case of a one percentage change in the Eurodollar rate. 
7. The ~NDA coefficient is between -0.61 and -0.82 indicating 
that to increase the MB by DG100 m the central bank must 
increase its ~omestic assets by DG256m to DG555m to 
allow for the decline of foreign reserves by DG156m to.DG455m. 
B. The use of this variable is put into question for all 
countries concerned. Zolotas (1979, p 29) suggests that its 
measurements have been rendered unreliable to a great extent, 
mainly due to dramatic increases in the cost of energy since 
1973 which affected investment plans adversely, conservation 
and environmental considerations implying increased marginal 
capital output ratios, adding to costs of new investment. 
9. Within the Danish monetary policy - based on controlling 
credit expansion with the vital instrument of ceilings on loan 
commitments by the banks - high interest rates are used to 
ensure that short-term trade credits and a substantial propor-
tion of medium term business investments are financed in 
foreign currency, helping to finance the current account 
deficit. 
10. The money call rates are said to be at interest parity if 
the return onEur~dollar deposits (1 + i ) is equal to the 
e 
covered return on money call X deposits (1 + Ix) fx/Sx, where 
S is the spot exchange rate and f is the forward exchange rate 
expressed in dollars per unit of currency. This condition for 
interest parity reduces to ix = ie - FP
x
' if second order terms 
are neglected. 
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11. Further,the above use of the interest parity departs 
somewhat from traditional usage. In the literature of the 
forward exchange market, it is the forward premium (FP) that 
is said to be at interest parity with respect to the two 
interest rates. Here the money call interest rate of the 
European country is said to be at interest parity with respect 
to the Eurodollar rate and the FP. The same interest parity 
condition is of course involved in both instances. 
12. The evolution of domestic short-term rates was paralleled 
by a more or less similar evolution in the discount rates. 
The mini-Snake countries and Italy were closer up to 1976 I. 
Also with respect to the time that discount changes took place. 
Smaller Snake countries undertook more changes than Germany 
keeping almost throughout the period higher rates than those 
of the latter, largely due to their attempt to remain within 
the Snake, at a moment of less satisfactory performance com-
pared to that of Germany. Furthermore. on 
certain cases abrupt changes took place. Denmark, since the 
Frankfurt realignment in 1976 undertook a continuous discount 
rate reduction, despite its rising economic divergence. The 
fact that from that time on it counted on more frequent 
devaluations has to do with this behaviour. Generally the 
choice between interest rate and exchange rate changes depends 
on whether pressure is produced by a once and for all portfolio 
adjustment or is the result of permanent inflation differentials. 
~he latter seemed the case between 1973 and 1976. EEC members 
did not have the freedom or did not want to alter their 
exchange rates, trying to protect their citizens' living 
standards. They only postponed their inevitable cut, achieved 
largely through an exchange rate fall in the 1976 crisis. SSC 
though devalued less for reasons explained above. 
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Generally interest rate evolution uas not solely due to 
the necessity of remaining inside the Snake. ThePSBR con-
tributed a lot to their rise in Belgium and Denmark. 
Finally the possible deflationary effects of such interest 
rate rises are analysed in chapter six. 
13. In Holland, May 1977, to stop regional aid on S. Holland. 
In Denmark, early 177, to stop aid to Jutland. In France, 
Dec '76, not to extend aid to N. France. In Italy to stop 
uhat the Commission considered subsidies for social security 
payments in Mezzogiorno. Italians modified the scheme in 1976. 
In the UK there uas a similar case uith respect to the regional 
unemployment premiums. A payrol subsidy paid in development 
areas uas abolished in 1977 under EEC and IMF pressure. 
Chapter Six 
---~--
1. Competitiveness - or the real exchange rate - is the product 
of the relative uholesale price and the nominal effective 
exchange rate indices. Changes in competitiveness are computed 
on an annual basis. One should be careful in drauing conclu-
sions out of these calculations. At least five different 
indices of costs and prices are used. These are unit labour 
costs, "normal" unit labour costs - i.e. ",ages adjusted for 
the productivity trend - value added (GOP) deflator, uholesale 
prices and export unit values. The conclusions reached are 
highly sensitive to the cost or price index. 
2. Sueden, an associate member, provides another example, where 
real exchange rate appreciation together with the pursuing of 
independent objectives, led to a rapid deterioration of its 
competitive position to the point of not being able to finance 
its current account deficit. Finally it left the Snake. 
3. Evidence on sterilization for the Netherlands and Denmark, 
indicated in earlier analysis, would also suggest that these 
, 
I~J 
1 
'·1 
1 
l 
·1 
,~ 
" 
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economies did not allow their XS deficits to create deflation-
ary pressures in their economies and is compatible with commentS 
here, on the expansive policies they undertook. 
4. Professor Thygesen, after a private communication agreed 
that real adjustment is unavoidable in the long-run for exchange 
rate stability in the SSC. 
5. Conclusion after a discussion with other participants in 
the EMS conference at the University of Reading, July 11-3, 1979. 
If there is, for example, a question of realignment between 
the OM and the SFr, then if the two central banks agree, there 
will not be any problem with the other members. 
6. One reason that has perhaps facilitated more timely real-
ignments was the existence of MCAs in CAP so that any realign-
ment did not have any direct and quick impact on the formers' 
incomes. The abolition of MCAs agreed for the future could 
increase political resistance on realignments. 
7. See Ypersele de Striho~ (1979), Spaventa (1979), Thygesen 
. ; 
.1 
" 
, '! 
(1979), First Report from the Expenditure Committee (1979, p 49). .~ 
8. Excessive real appreciations, while real dollar depreciation 
was taking place, had the danger of giving rise to cumulative 
appreciations, reducing exports and profits and investment, 
bringing stagnation, aggravating Europe's structural difficult-
ies, raising unemployment, protectionism and producing more 
inward looking currency blocs. 
9. The ECOFIN suggested though to its members to undertake 
studies on exchange rate matters and also establish an indic-
ator to trigger automatically policy coordination discussions. 
In the Ouisenberg plan this role was assigned to the exit of 
a country's effective rate from its target zone. 
10. See also the EMS part in chapter eight. 
11. The German government's commitment to intervene more within 
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the EMS and the determination of the new British government 
to make inflation control its paramount priority, were encour-
aging signs at the end of the seventies. 
12. An interesting exposition of such problems is provided 
by Jacquemin and de Jong (19 77 ). 
Chapter Seven 
-------
1. Although for the Fund to operate efficiently multilateral 
compensation, the use of the EUA as a reference currency and 
reserve pooling should be pursued from the outset. 
2. Keeping aside structural factors. 
3. See Magnifico-Williamson (1973), Magnifico (1978a), (1978b). 
4. It should be said that Magnifico-Williamson emphasised 
cost-push factors of inflation. However later Magnifico 
(1978b, p 72) recognises the importance of monetary and credit 
policy coordination as well as fiscal policy harmonisation for 
exchange rate stability. Their proposal is compatible with 
the coordination process established in the earlier chapters. 
5. Other technical complications are involved here too, see 
De Grauwe and Peeters (1978), (1979, p 42). Also in the EMS 
case an additional problem would be that of a currency which 
is not part of the system but is counted in the CPC. 
6. The alternative method of adjusting the CPC parities fol-
lowing a change in CPC parity of currency 1 by selecting one 
currency - nth - and have it undertake all necessary adjust-
ments allowing all .other currencies in the basket to keep their 
CPC parities unchanged - i.e. keeping CPC parities and bilat-
eral currency rates other than currency 1 and n unchanged _ 
has the political disadvantage of introducing financial asym-
metry into the financial status of currencies. 
7. See Economist, London, November 1, 1975, pp 32-8. 
B. An international CPC rDle giVes the ability to EEC 
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authorities to run higher balance of payments deficits; a 
policy that may not be inconsequential in the future. 
9. The MU involves a loss of national money supply control 
and power transferred to a central decision making body. 
Questions on power responsibility and mandate of this body 
would have to be cleared. The degree of its independence, 
the number of its objectives, the role of national central 
banks would have to be clearly specified in the form of a 
monetary constitution for the European MU before significant 
steps are taken towards MU, providing guidance on more trans-
itional measures. Prior commitment to a monetary constitution 
would assume that EEC did not find itself developing a momen-
tum towards MU without the necessary consensus to take the 
final step. Such reform may not be without problems and 
economists are still divided on that. See Triffin (1978), 
Parkin (1978), Kloten (1978), Murphy (1978), Allen (1978). 
£h~pte£ fight 
1. For a detailed presentation of the arrangements see the 
EMS Resolution and the Twelfth Annual Report of the European 
Communities (1979, pp 75-8). 
2. The effects of floating exchange rates uas one of them. 
An interesting study by Sumner and Zis (1980) on the relative 
inflation bias of flexible rates concludes that they are more 
conducive to inflation than fixed ones - uith the possible 
exception of the key currency country - uhile countries become 
more inflation prone than under a fixed exchange rate system. 
Moves to exchange rate stability indicate some recognition 
that an externally imposed constraint offers some protection 
against both domestic pressures and international uncertainties 
which dominated the last decade. 
3. It was explained in chapter seven that in order to avoid 
! 
, I 
'. 
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speculative runs with respect to the choice of the intervention 
currency, bilateral margins may have to be established, com-
patible with the ECU margins. The intervention system becomes 
identical to the one in the Snake. Intervention in EMS cur-
rencies could bring symmetry in adjustment. 
4. The maximum divergence spread is reached only when a cur-
rency is standing at its bilateral limit of :2.25 percent 
against all other currencies. On the technical EMS features 
see also de Grauwe and Peeters (1978), Shone (1979b), (1979c), 
(1980c), Leipold (1979). 
5. Renewable swaps which are to be unwound after two years 
except where a decision to the contrary is taken unanimously. 
(In fact the renewal took place in the Luxembourg summit, 
December 1980.) ECUs will be utilised only by central banks 
within the EMS with the possibility of not accepting more than 
SO percent of the settlement amount. 
6. Assuming that while the threshold has been reached, bilat-
eral margins have not been reached. 
7. On the other hand strict conditionality could discourage 
recourse to EMF credits - especially in a world where they own 
abundant reserves and could also obtain credits elsewhere _ 
avoiding adjustment. 
8. The danger of a two-tier EUrope should be kept in mind. 
9. An interesting analysis on the question of EMF and ECU on 
the one hand and the IMF and SDR on the other took place in 
the seminar on the EMF, see Banca Nazionale del Lavoro , 
September, 1980. 
10. Another important question is raised, referring on the 
appropriate balance to be struck between the requirements of 
XB finance and adjustment and the extent to which the EMF will 
fulfill such a task avoiding undesirable implications in the 
future. 
J 
I 
1 
I 
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11. Europeans emphasised the need to stop potential exchange 
rate instability. 
12. The MB target was 6-9 percent between 197B III and 1979 III 
, 
" 
, 
I 
and 5-8 percent between 1979 III and 1980 III, while it will 'J 
be 4-7 percent for the 1980 III - 1981 III period. Germany 
has now resorted to ranges since the SUbstantial overshooting 
in 1978. 
13. See C. Johnson (1980), Emerson (1980), de Vries (1980), 
and the proceedings of the seminar on the EMF, Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro, September 1980. 
14. Computed on the basis: nominal rate of depreciation (-) 
or appreciation (+) of the exchange rate plus rate of domestic 
inflation - wholesale prices - minus German rate of wholesale 
price inflation. 
15. The larger real appreciation though occurred outside the 
EMS. 
16. See Financial Times, March 13, 1980. 
17. See Footnote No. 13 above. 
, 
,I 
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NOTES 
~PEe~d!x_Il 
1. See Rhomberg (1960), (1964), Helliwell (1969), Helliwell 
and Officer and Shapiro and Stewart (1969). 
2. The extent to which this is true at least for certain 
countries is questioned. This level of correspondence could 
be likely to reflect the influence of general monetary and 
business cycle conditions affecting financial markets rather 
than interdependence of interest rate movements. To discover 
a country's dominance over another, analysis of short-run cyc-
lical movements may be additionally needed. Boh! (1972) has 
carried out such a study for ten developed countries using 
spectral analysis. He suggests that international interest 
rates are not highly interrelated. HOwever one should not 
assume that the countriet money markets are successfully 
insulated from foreign influences, since he uses Treasury bill 
rates where there is less international interdependence among 
them since these rates are more determined by domestic factors. 
Domestic monetary conditions are more important to them than 
external ones, while the opposite may be true in the case of 
inter-bank rates. 
3. For the derivation of the model see Kouri and Porter (1974, 
pp 444-52). 
l 
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